November 2013 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '16

07 Sep '16

----- Forwarded message from Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> ----- Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 09:33:28 +0100 From: Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 07/09/2013 01:48, Chris Palmer wrote: >> Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?" > > Why would they perform the attack only for encryption software? They > could compromise people's laptops by spiking any popular app. Because NSA and GCHQ are much more interested in attacking communictions in transit rather than attacking endpoints. Endpoint attacks cost more to undertake, only give access to a limited amount of data and involve much greater risks that their attack will either be discovered or their means of attack will leave evidence of what they have done and how they have done it. The internal bueaucratic costs of gaining approval for (adverarial) endpoint attacks also makes it a more costly process than the use of network based interception. There is significant use of open source encryption software in end to end encryption solutions, in file archivers, in wifi and network routers, and in protecing the communications used to manage and control such components when at remote locations. The open source software is provided in source code form and is compiled from source in a huge number of applications and this means that the ability to covertly substitute broken source code could provide access to a huge amount of traffic without the risks involved in endpoint attacks. I stress that I am NOT suggesting that this has happened (or is happening), simply that it has attractions from an NSA/GCHQ viewpoint. Fortunately, I think it is a difficult attack to mount covertly (that is, without the acqiecience of the author(s) of the software in question). On the more general debate here, in my view, 'security for the masses' through the deployment of encryption is a 'pipe dream' that isn't going to happen. Functionality (and the complexity that comes with it) is the enemy of security and it is very clear that the public places a much higher value on functionality than it does on security (or privacy). Every time a new device comes onto the market, it starts with limited functionality and some hope of decent security but rapidly evolves to be a high functionality product in which the prospect of decent security declines rapidly to zero. Raspberry Pis look interesting _now_ but I would be willing to bet that they won't buck the trend of increasing funtionality and declining security simply because this is what the majority in even this limited user community will want. To buck this trend we need an effort like the Raspberry Pi effort but one driven by our community with a strong commitment to simplicty and deliberately limited functionality in both hardware and software. Brian Gladman _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers
by Eugen Leitl 17 Aug '16

17 Aug '16

----- Forwarded message from micah <micah(a)riseup.net> ----- Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 10:05:42 -0400 From: micah <micah(a)riseup.net> To: Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net>, 'liberationtech' <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers User-Agent: Notmuch/0.15.2 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.3.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Hi Micah! Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net> writes: > I'm working on a talk for OHM2013 about PGP. Can anyone send me examples > of interesting keys in key servers that you know of? Since you are preparing a talk about the subject, I'm going to be pedantic and correct your usage of "PGP", because it is important to get your terminology straight when giving a talk. I presume you aren't giving a talk about the commercial software, but instead you are actually giving a talk about OpenPGP which is the standard specified by RFC4880 that different programs like GnuPG, Seahorse, MacGPG, and PGP etc. all implement. If that is true, then you should refer to it as OpenPGP, and not PGP. I dont know what your talk will consist of, besides the funny enigmail XSS and goatse.cx stuff (thanks for that! always good to have some goatse early in the morning), but I would like to point out a few things that might be useful to mention. One is a wiki page that I created with some people: https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices - it contains some useful hints about using OpenPGP, maintaining a good key and some general good practices that people often dont know about (such as the importance of keeping your keys updated to get critical revocation and expiration extension certifications!) One thing mentioned on that page that I wanted to highlight, because you used pgp.mit.edu links in your original email, is that the keyserver pgp.mit.edu is not a good one to use/promote. Everyone uses it as their 'goto' keyserver, but it is a really bad idea! As a keyserver, it has been broken for years. For a long time it was just dropping revocations, subkey updates and expirations on the floor. That is *really* bad. Eventually, they upgraded their keyserver software, but it is *still* running an older version of SKS, a version that fails to handle 16-digit subkeyid lookups (among other failings). So, please don't rely on pgp.mit.edu for your security, and please don't include them in your slides! If you are looking for one to use, I highly recommend using the SKS pool address (hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net or http://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/ - or if you want a more close geographical pool, have a look at http://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php) Finally, there seems to be some amazing misconceptions about keyservers, keys and the web of trust. In particular this http://cryptome.org/2013/07/mining-pgp-keyservers.htm circulated recently and it pained me to see because it suggested various wreckless conclusions that were dangerously off the mark[0] (and used pgp.mit.edu, hah). While it is true that we've jokingly called the OpenPGP web of trust "the original social network" because of the exposed social relational graphing that can be done by querying keyservers, and it is for this reason that many activists I know do not want to have signatures uploaded to keyservers (and instead use the bulky local-only signature work-around)... ... but for some reason people seem to think that if it is on a keyserver, is true, or it means something that it doesn't. People don't realize critical things, such as the fact that I can create a key with the UID Nadim Kobeissi and upload it to the keyservers[1]. That doesn't mean that is the real Nadim's key (this is what exchanging key fingerprints and doing certifications is for, so you can know, with a certain degree of certainty, that this person is the person who controls that secret key material). Or people think that because I signed your key and that signature is on the keyserver that indicates: I trust you; we met in person at that date; we know each other; we are involved in a criminal conspiracy with each other; or many other wrong assumptions about what that certification means. I can sign Edward Snowden's key and send that to the keyservers[1]. Hell, I can sign Snowden's key with my fake Nadim Kobeissi key[1] and then send it to the keyservers. Does that mean that Nadim and Snowden have met in person?! No, it does not at all. Anyways, I can keep going... but I dont know what the focus of your OHM talk is about, so going on like this isn't particularly useful to you and your talk... however, I'd be happy to provide more feedback about your talk if you would like![2] After all, we Micahs need to stick together, micah 0. "the cryptome article just sounds like impenetrable bullshit from someone with no interest in actually understandning what's happening" - I'm not saying who said this... 1. no, I didn't do that, nor did I upload the edward snowden or bradly manning keys. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
by Eugen Leitl 23 Jun '14

23 Jun '14

http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 , Francesco Regazzoni2 , Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1 1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA 2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland 3Horst ortz Institut for IT-Security, Ruhr-Universiat Bochum, Germany Abstract. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like, and how dicult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against "golden chips". We demonstrate the ectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs | a digital post-processing derived from Intel's cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation and by exploring their detectability and their ects on security. Keywords: Hardware Trojans, malicious hardware, layout modifications, Trojan side-channel

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QUANTUMINSERT "wide stack" covert network communication
by coderman 13 Mar '14

13 Mar '14

in the discussion regarding well positioned injection points on the backbone (QUANTUMINSERT) i have not yet seen discussion of using these well positioned injection points for covert network connections. consider that you are eavesdropping on return path for a given un-used, high address space of a third party (a lot of that 15.0.0.0/8 is idle :) consider that you can inject arbitrary packets into the egress for same net block (even if upstream, still sufficient to match route). you can now establish a covert TCP connection appearing to come from the high space of 15.0.0.0/8, of which HP only sees the returning (encrypted) martians. (and this assumes they're even watching!) this "wide stack" approach provides cover via multitudes of idle address spaces of third parties, while the actual communicators are hidden. anxiously awaiting the details on how this is used... *sacrifices chickens to the "Snowden Release Gatekeepers" (TM)*

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Omidyar influence in new Greenwald venture [was: SRF: cryptic]
by coderman 07 Jan '14

07 Jan '14

On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 6:11 PM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... this should be tempered with appropriate caution: > "Six Degrees of Omidyar" > http://tomslee.net/2013/09/six-degrees-of-omidyar.html > who will surely show up in any Open Data effort making progress... also involved in: """ Glenn Greenwald, who has published many of the most important scoops from the Edward Snowden leaks, is leaving The Guardian and setting up a new media venture with long-time journalist Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill from The Nation. The venture is being funded by eBay founder Pierre Omidyar, who has suggested that he's prepared to invest more than $250 million in the new venture. """

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Open phones for privacy/anonymity applications, Guardian
by grarpamp 10 Dec '13

10 Dec '13

A few links... http://neo900.org/ http://projects.goldelico.com/p/gta04-main/ https://jolla.com/ http://www.fairphone.com/ http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/13/11/02/1637236/openphoenux-neo900-bill… More interesting platforms for even Guardian or other OS than any Nexus 5 or alike hardware, no? https://guardianproject.info/hardware/ http://unrevoked.com/rootwiki/doku.php/public/root_friendly http://wiki.cyanogenmod.org/w/Devices

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good clocks (not using GPS) and multi-channel hw [was: sidebands of great justice]
by coderman 09 Dec '13

09 Dec '13

On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 11:32 PM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... > SDR MIMO kit leaves much to be desired, however. let me clarify: the hardware available for SDR MIMO development leaves much to be desired. ... the blocks and implementations for OFDM coding in software are OK :) USRP N2X0 can do it, other setups require external reference clock with high fidelity. any recommendations for non-GPS clocks performing at 50-100ppb or better?

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Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
by coderman 06 Dec '13

06 Dec '13

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 4:40 AM, <dan(a)geer.org> wrote: >... > http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt an interesting discussion :) "This is perhaps our last fundamental tradeoff before the Singularity occurs: Do we, as a society, want the comfort and convenience of increasingly technologic, invisible digital integration enough to pay for those benefits with the liberties that must be given up to be protected from the downsides of that integration?" -- dan i would argue that there is an alternative in design and architecture, mainly those which decentralize and protect end-to-end. however, there is a cost attached to these efforts as well, which so far most opt-out of paying... best regards,

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ntru-crypto - Open Source NTRU Public Key Cryptography Algorithm and Reference Code
by coderman 03 Dec '13

03 Dec '13

https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto """ Security Innovation, Inc., the owner of the NTRU public key cryptography system, made the intellectual property and a sample implementation available under the Gnu Public License (GPL) in 2013 with the goal of enabling more widespread adoption of this superior cryptographic technology. The system is also available for commercial use under the terms of the Security Innovation Commercial License. NTRU represents a significant improvement in the Public Key cryptography world—it’s faster, stronger and smaller than virtually any other system in use and it’s quantum computer resistant, making it the best choice for current projects with lifetimes that extend into the post quantum computer age.... NTRU is a lattice-based public key cryptosystem from Security Innovation and the leading alternative to RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) due to its higher performance and resistance to attacks from quantum computers. NTRU was developed in 1996 as a visionary solution to cyber security challenges for the twenty-first century. NTRU is based on a mathematical problem called the “Approximate close lattice vector problem” and comprises three algorithms: NTRUEncrypt, NTRUSign, and PASSSign. It has been reviewed and published in scholarly journals and presented at Crypto, Eurocrypt, and RSA, and has been adopted in IEEE and X9 standards Because it is based on different math from RSA and ECC, the NTRU algorithm has different cryptographic properties. At comparable cryptographic strength, NTRU performs costly private key operations much faster than RSA or ECC. In addition, NTRU's comparative performance increases with the level of security required. As key sizes increase by a factor of n, RSA's operations/second decrease by about n3 whereas NTRU's decrease at n2. """

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Re: bitcoin as a global medium of exchange (was Re: Interesting take on Sanjuro's Assassination Market)
by Bill Stewart 03 Dec '13

03 Dec '13

At 05:43 PM 11/25/2013, David Vorick wrote: >Bitcoin has a lot of problems. >Andy, the problem isn't the denomination, the problem is that >Satioshi has 5% of all the currency, and the Winklevoss twins have >another 0.5%. If bitcoin becomes worth 100 trillion dollars, they've >got a solid 500 billion for being nobody and doing nothing. That's a >problem to me. Satoshi gave us the technology and got people to start using it. If he gets fabulously wealthy by owning 5% of it, I'm not jealous (well, ok, a bit jealous, but I'm not going to contend that he shouldn't have it just because of jealously.) The Winklevossen are just speculators; I don't particularly like using a currency whose value is mostly from speculation, but experimentation is a critical part of rolling out something like a new type of currency, so whatever. At least they pumped some cash into the system early on. And that guy in Norway who was an early experimenter, then kind of forgot about his bitcoins until he suddenly noticed they were worth $800K? Cool, good for him! It wouldn't be surprising if the first people to do GPU-based mining also got a large pile of bitcoins compared to the CPU-based miners. >I'm working on one right now. It's not built but the idea is to use >proof-of-contribution instead of proof-of-work, where contribution >is disk storage contributed to a distributed network. I think "proof of useful contribution" is a much better thing than "proof of wasted electricity"; good luck getting it off the ground. I'd recommend reading all of Zooko's Tahoe-LAFS work for getting some ideas about privacy and reliability issues, both of which are harder than they look. The other catch is that storage costs do keep decreasing, and storage in a cloud is always a lot slower than local storage, so you'll have to think hard about business models. One of the cool things Bitcoin did was created a way to have the proof-of-work turn into currency without needing a banker in the middle; that means that users and miners don't have to worry (much) about the creator absconding with the value or being shut down, and there's built-in protection against hyperinflation, unlike some of the dotcom silly currencies like Beenz and Flooz that appeared and vanished along with the dogfood-on-line dotcoms. It's been interesting to watch Bitcoin's value surviving after the loss of the Silk Road site (which got around the "Nothing To Buy With It" hurdle that helped kill the original Chaumian Digicash.)

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Interesting take on Sanjuro's Assassination Market
by Jim Bell 30 Nov '13

30 Nov '13

http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/11/owl-assassination-market-website-are-the… Disclaimer: I am not associated with 'Sanjuro's "Assassination Market" in any way.

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Youtube item on "Assassination market"
by Jim Bell 30 Nov '13

30 Nov '13

I found this on Youtube.com. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbGypiDik2E (Disclaimer: I am not associated with 'Sanjuro's "Assassination Market" in any way. I do not know who he is.) Jim Bell

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Re: DEF CON 19 - hackers get hacked!
by coderman 30 Nov '13

30 Nov '13

On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:14 AM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... > seriously EOM this time. well, what do you know, sunlight prevails! ;) http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-syste… ... this is but a feeling; one aspect of the whole.[0] 0. "Blind men and an elephant" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant

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Re: Interesting take on Sanjuro's Assassination Market
by brian carroll 30 Nov '13

30 Nov '13

On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 7:55 PM, Bill St. Clair wrote: > I'd like 50% of MY taxes to be paid to me. And 50% of the remaining half, etc. yeah. the problem with calculation as reasoning is if the equations are not accurate or correct the 'answers' obtained via processing can be too easy or simple for the actual situation involved. this is the problem of language itself, seemingly, absence of connection with logic, accountability for actual versus perceived truth, shared and unshared observations, competing relativism in the literal, whereby local calculation-like determinist viewpoints compete without all variables taken into account to get "answers". societal-wide, civilizational pandemic. for instance, assuming *taxes* are a yearly issue taken out of payroll only, and not a national debt burden (is this $500,000 per citizen, when will everyone be a millionaire in reverse, via debt owed?) the economy is not sane in terms of "economics" and yet taxes are viewed locally as if a pure action that indebted to the absolute fucked-up-ness of things, then used against individuals who pay less or whatever, to justify a certain viewpoint when its not this simple, yet entire groups view it this way as an ideology which is self-beneficial to share values or functioning. instead, it is normal for the tax pious to take vengeance against others immoral for not carrying their own weight, when the entire system is leveraging a certain class against others, forcing lives into ruin, to sustain the given economy, then moralizing on top of this as a conceit, of superior virtue, for those fictionally supporting others in conditions and circumstances of privilege if not duplicity and criminality, social darwinism survival-of-the-fittest the masturbatory fantasia of those fat-brained and ill-conceived, nannied by television sets, sporting events, and retirement pension plans, for their better-than-thou thinking, not noticing their boots on the necks of many below, living off their structural misery, last of a generation of assholes able to do this unless extending this fiction into the present, those able to have sustainable living temporarily within a completely corrupt and bankrupt system and society, and acting as if this is normal, on the level, and not based entirely on bullshit and lies. it is to assume the monetary system and taxes are something pure, as if the gold standard today is not based in SHIT itself, junk economy and throwaway culture and planned obsolescence, ripping people off normalized, and then complaining because people need money for shelter and food to just keep breathing, versus someone having five television sets and three cars and two homes or just alot of stuff while others cannot even get past a state of continual debt and are forced out of the economy for the good of these bastard others who then look down on those they are standing on, spitting at, and viewing as a lower form of life- because money. really, people actually think the monetary system and tax system is going to be altered via a change in policy and a new system enacted, and that is how a new way of taxes will be transitioned. that this current fiction is going to peacibly be transformed into something else, everyone holding hands singing kumbaya around a campfire, -or- will it include the beginning of armageddon, separation of peoples into those who are friends and enemies, and then within the friendly-set, making these changes while 9/10th of the population is liquidated via war, for starters. what if the more realistic tax-improvement scenario. what the more accurate scenario, modifying the existing system or starting over, when taking everything that needs to be taken into account into account to actually be able to deal with the involved issues. it seems this very language prevents that modeling from occurring, it is to be trapped within a realm of words divisible, perspective unto perspective, never able to integrate all views into a single correct viewpoint, removed of error, and thus every warp and skew exchanged as normal and legitimate when it is not a default condition, absolute correspondence between belief and conveyance and yet this communication medium makes it appear so as an illusion, as if saying (signs) is truth itself versus its being referenced from this condition. and the truth of taxation is far more than a dollar number or how it is allocated individual to individual, yet this is commonplace and typical of its politics, as if people can vet out "justice" via monetary-based ideology as a value and moral system, 'truth itself', objective (A=A) because it is number-based, and yet it is monopoly money, game money, a fiction at the level of its purpose and the concept of economy itself. at the very least is incredibly dirty money, filthy, and thus to rationalize a moral superiority based upon it as a perspective, which many do as if highest truth, is a realm of the base for those who believe this, and only this, as their value system. it really captures the situation perfectly also in terms of the state subsidizing itself, basically it is at the point where the state is taxing itself, which is totally insane. people on welfare are being blamed for being so poor as to not have enough to pay taxes, and looked at as cheaters alone. taxing welfare that is not even enough for subsistence in the existing quasi ~political-economy. such issues are detached from a larger, more grounded reality that involves structural issues relied upon for bullshit viewpoints and too-simple frameworks, using inaccurate ideas as if a cudgel to attack others in these situations. in this way, ignorance is a way for 'might makes right' when a large group believes this ideology and then acts against others, as if a moral police, yet at its core it serves first and foremost a state of shit. rationalization and extension of bad ideas and inaccurate thinking, like the economy itself, allowed to inflate and granted power. it is a bubble alright. including the fat in peoples heads bubbling over as if insight when making and repeating idiotic calculations born of ideology, mantra, dogma of oppressors. they cannot be reasoned with either. which is perhaps why weapons were invented. hell, the state itself is being run by these same people today. all they care about is money, minus the truth it was to represent as shared value, now devoid within currency, the basis for the extortative ripoff via currency, the expropriation of work (via labor transmuted into currency) then siphoned and hoarded via onesided exchange, where most value flows uphill and is stored or used for corporate citizens in their corporate democracy (yes, democracy exists, just for corporate citizens not humans who are basically slaves). the very use of money is an unequal exchange, it is A=B exchange, it is not a shared truth that is being transferred, it is an institutionalized ripoff that has become standardized, normalized, yet made beyond contestation due to enforced illiteracy, the TAXATION moralizers the holier-than-thou choir, though fundamentally, foundationally basing these views in utter and absolute bullshit of the state.

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Internetworked crimes against humanity [was: Interesting take on Sanjuro's Assassination Market]
by coderman 30 Nov '13

30 Nov '13

On Thu, Nov 28, 2013 at 3:30 AM, alex wright <wrightalexw(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Not to mention all the horrific typos. The pain grammar school teachers > suffer as a result of anonymous, uninhibited and over caffeinated anarchists > is one of the silent tragedies of our times. the Social Media Internet Generation has bequeathed unto the future untold generations this intentionally careless and crass accosting of common courtesy; unceasing, forever. not just archived, but cultivated and analyzed, repeatedly, as some part of a magnificent and meandering machine learning corpus across the cloud... (~_~;) . o O ( weeping silently for humanity )

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bitcoin as a global medium of exchange (was Re: Interesting take on Sanjuro's Assassination Market)
by Jim Bell 29 Nov '13

29 Nov '13

We can certainly agree on that! The new currency should be as anonymous as Zerocoin. (I can think of an application that will require robust anonymity.) Jim Bell ________________________________ From: David Vorick <david.vorick(a)gmail.com> I have faith that additional cryptocurrencies will be launched/released that are substantially better and different from bitcoin. Bitcoin is just the beginnning, and ultimately I don't think it will make more than a few years farther before there is an unquestioned replacement. On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 1:53 AM, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> wrote: On 2013-11-26 11:43, David Vorick wrote: > >Andy, the problem isn't the denomination, the problem is that Satioshi >>has 5% of all the currency, and the Winklevoss twins have another 0.5%. >>If bitcoin becomes worth 100 trillion dollars, they've got a solid 500 >>billion for being nobody and doing nothing. That's a problem to me. >> >Five hundred billion for freeing the world financial system from US domination without bloodshed. Sounds mighty cheap to me. > >I am, however worried that bitcoin can be dominated by a small group. As the total transaction volume increases, the number of people that are full and equal participants in recording and facilitating transactions must diminish. > >This was my original objection, scaling failure, way back in the beginning, and it is now coming true. > >But even if my worst fears are realized, that is still a whole lot better than what we have now. > > >

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Re: DEF CON 19 - hackers get hacked! , DEF CON 20 was not DRT
by coderman 28 Nov '13

28 Nov '13

no, DC20 was not DRT. then i would feel bad for getting my ass handed to me... (when i discover the codename for my retribution, it shall become my headstone..)

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MONKEY PUZZLE timeline / history
by coderman 27 Nov '13

27 Nov '13

per document cloud (mirror at http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf) MONKEY PUZZLE version 6 active as of Nov 2009. when was first iteration of this effort fielded? other versions? *sacrifices more chickens to the "Snowden Release Gatekeepers" (TM)*...

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NSA TAO Botnet
by CJ Knight 27 Nov '13

27 Nov '13

I noticed this published here in the UK; the Guardian's drip-feeding apparently didn't deem this one important enough for them to run. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/11/25/nsa_botnet/ "Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad reports that the elite NSA TAO (Tailored Access Operations) hacking squad had used malware to establish a zombie army with tentacles all across the world. The malware serves as a sleeper agent on compromised PCs, waiting months or longer before it activates and begins harvesting data. This stolen information is covertly fed into the NSA's voracious data processing apparatus. The malware (or "implants" in the lexicon of the NSA) is slung onto compromised machines using Computer Network Exploitation, or hacking, tactics." </snip> Regards, CJ

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Re: [Cryptography] Email is unsecurable
by grarpamp 25 Nov '13

25 Nov '13

On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 1:01 AM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: > On 23/11/13 15:30 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote: >> On Sat, 23 Nov 2013, David Mercer wrote: >> >>> But of course you're right about actual current usage, encrypted email >>> is an >>> epic fail on that measure regardless of format/protocol. >> >> Yes, but it's about time we do something about that. Do we *exactly know >> why* it is such a failure? > > It's an interesting question, and one worth studying for pedagogical > motives. From my experiences from both sides, it is clear that both sides > failed. But for different reasons. > Hence, I've concluded that email is unsecurable. Obviously. It will never be able to escape the non-body header content and third party routing, storage and analysis with any form of patching over today's mail. And it's completely ridiculous that people continue to invest [aka: waste] effort in 'securing' it. The best you'll ever get clients down to is exposing a single 'To:' header within an antique transport model that forces you to authenticate to it in order to despam, bill, censor and control you. That system is cooked, done and properly fucked. Abandon it. What the world needs now is a real peer to peer messaging system that scales. Take Tor for a partial example... so long as all the sender/recipient nodes [onions] are up, any message you send will get through, encrypted, in real time. If a recipient is not up, you queue it locally till they are... no third party ever needed, and you get lossless delivery and confirmation for free. Unmemorable node address?, quit crying and make use of your local address book. Doesn't have plugins for current clients?, so what, write some and use it if you're dumb enough to mix the old and new mail. The only real problem that still needs solved is scalability... what p2p node lookup systems are out there that will handle a messaging world's population worth of nodes [billions] and their keys and tertiary data? If you can do that, you should be able to get some anon transport over the p2p for free. Anyway, p2p messaging and anonymous transports have all been dreamed up by others before. But now is the time to actually abandon traditional email and just do it. If you build it, they will come.

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[IP] NSA report
by Eugen Leitl 23 Nov '13

23 Nov '13

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> ----- Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2013 14:56:20 -0500 From: Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> To: ip <ip(a)listbox.com> Subject: [IP] NSA report Message-ID: <CAKx4trhUOu7dOpsXqKO=JFWg6L9sCwKv1fqL-Dx1wwqmNMHBVQ(a)mail.gmail.com> Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net [image: The New York Times] <http://www.nytimes.com/> ------------------------------ November 22, 2013 N.S.A. Report Outlined Goals for More PowerBy JAMES RISEN<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/james_risen/in…> and LAURA POITRAS WASHINGTON — Officials at the National Security Agency<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/nationa…>, intent on maintaining its dominance in intelligence collection, pledged last year to push to expand its surveillance powers, according to a top-secret strategy document. In a February 2012 paper<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/11/23/us/politics/23nsa-sigint-stra…> laying out the four-year strategy for the N.S.A.’s signals intelligence operations, which include the agency’s eavesdropping and communications data collection around the world, agency officials set an objective to “aggressively pursue legal authorities and a policy framework mapped more fully to the information age.” Written as an agency mission statement with broad goals, the five-page document said that existing American laws were not adequate to meet the needs of the N.S.A. to conduct broad surveillance in what it cited as “the golden age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence. “The interpretation and guidelines for applying our authorities, and in some cases the authorities themselves, have not kept pace with the complexity of the technology and target environments, or the operational expectations levied on N.S.A.’s mission,” the document concluded. Using sweeping language, the paper also outlined some of the agency’s other ambitions. They included defeating the cybersecurity practices of adversaries in order to acquire the data the agency needs from “anyone, anytime, anywhere.” The agency also said it would try to decrypt or bypass codes that keep communications secret by influencing “the global commercial encryption market through commercial relationships,” human spies and intelligence partners in other countries. It also talked of the need to “revolutionize” analysis of its vast collections of data to “radically increase operational impact.” The strategy document, provided by the former N.S.A. contractor Edward J. Snowden, was written at a time when the agency was at the peak of its powers and the scope of its surveillance operations was still secret. Since then, Mr. Snowden’s revelations have changed the political landscape. Prompted by a public outcry over the N.S.A.’s domestic operations, the agency’s critics in Congress have been pushing to limit, rather than expand, its ability to routinely collect the phone and email records of millions of Americans, while foreign leaders have protested reports of virtually unlimited N.S.A. surveillance overseas, even in allied nations. Several inquiries are underway in Washington; Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the N.S.A.’s longest-serving director, has announced plans to retire<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-usa-nsa-transition-idUSBRE99F1…>; and the White House has offered proposals to disclose more information about the agency’s domestic surveillance activities. The N.S.A. document, titled “Sigint Strategy 2012-2016,” does not make clear what legal or policy changes the agency might seek. The N.S.A.’s powers are determined variously by Congress, executive orders and the nation’s secret intelligence court, and its operations are governed by layers of regulations. While asserting that the agency’s “culture of compliance” would not be compromised, N.S.A. officials argued that they needed more flexibility, according to the paper. Senior intelligence officials, responding to questions about the document, said that the N.S.A. believed that legal impediments limited its ability to conduct surveillance of terrorism suspects inside the United States. Despite an overhaul of national security law in 2008, the officials said, if a terrorism suspect who is under surveillance overseas enters the United States, the agency has to stop monitoring him until it obtains a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. “N.S.A.’s Sigint strategy is designed to guide investments in future capabilities and close gaps in current capabilities,” the agency said in a statement. “In an ever-changing technology and telecommunications environment, N.S.A. tries to get in front of issues to better fulfill the foreign-intelligence requirements of the U.S. government.” Critics, including some congressional leaders, say that the role of N.S.A. surveillance in thwarting terrorist attacks — often cited by the agency to justify expanded powers — has been exaggerated. In response to the controversy about its activities after Mr. Snowden’s disclosures, agency officials claimed that the N.S.A.’s sweeping domestic surveillance programs had helped in 54 “terrorist-related activities.” But under growing scrutiny, congressional staff members and other critics say that the use of such figures by defenders of the agency has drastically overstated the value of the domestic surveillance programs in counterterrorism. Agency leaders believe that the N.S.A. has never enjoyed such a target-rich environment as it does now because of the global explosion of digital information — and they want to make certain that they can dominate “the Sigint battle space” in the future, the document said. To be “optimally effective,” the paper said, “legal, policy and process authorities must be as adaptive and dynamic as the technological and operational advances we seek to exploit.” Intent on unlocking the secrets of adversaries, the paper underscores the agency’s long-term goal of being able to collect virtually everything available in the digital world. To achieve that objective, the paper suggests that the N.S.A. plans to gain greater access, in a variety of ways, to the infrastructure of the world’s telecommunications networks. Reports based on other documents previously leaked by Mr. Snowden showed that the N.S.A. has infiltrated the cable links<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/nsa-is-mining-google-and-yahoo…> to Google and Yahoo data centers around the world, leading to protests from company executives and a growing backlash against the N.S.A. in Silicon Valley. Yet the paper also shows how the agency believes it can influence and shape trends in high-tech industries in other ways to suit its needs. One of the agency’s goals is to “continue to invest in the industrial base and drive the state of the art for high performance computing to maintain pre-eminent cryptanalytic capability for the nation.” The paper added that the N.S.A. must seek to “identify new access, collection and exploitation methods by leveraging global business trends in data and communications services.” And it wants to find ways to combine all of its technical tools to enhance its surveillance powers. The N.S.A. will seek to integrate its “capabilities to reach previously inaccessible targets in support of exploitation, cyberdefense and cyberoperations,” the paper stated. The agency also intends to improve its access to encrypted communications used by individuals, businesses and foreign governments, the strategy document said. The N.S.A. has already had some success in defeating encryption, The New York Times has reported<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html>, but the document makes it clear that countering “ubiquitous, strong, commercial network encryption” is a top priority. The agency plans to fight back against the rise of encryption through relationships with companies that develop encryption tools and through espionage operations. In other countries, the document said, the N.S.A. must also “counter indigenous cryptographic programs by targeting their industrial bases with all available Sigint and Humint” — human intelligence, meaning spies. The document also mentioned a goal of integrating the agency’s eavesdropping and data collection systems into a national network of sensors that interactively “sense, respond and alert one another at machine speed.” Senior intelligence officials said that the system of sensors is designed to protect the computer networks of the Defense Department, and that the N.S.A. does not use data collected from Americans for the system. One of the agency’s other four-year goals was to “share bulk data” more broadly to allow for better analysis. While the paper does not explain in detail how widely it would disseminate bulk data within the intelligence community, the proposal raises questions about what safeguards the N.S.A. plans to place on its domestic phone and email data collection programs to protect Americans’ privacy. N.S.A. officials have insisted that they have placed tight controls on those programs. In an interview, the senior intelligence officials said that the strategy paper was referring to the agency’s desire to share foreign data more broadly, not phone logs of Americans collected under the Patriot Act<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/usa_patriot_…> . Above all, the strategy paper suggests the N.S.A.’s vast view of its mission: nothing less than to “dramatically increase mastery of the global network.” Other N.S.A. documents offer hints of how the agency is trying to do just that. One program, code-named Treasure Map, provides what a secret N.S.A. PowerPoint presentation describes as “a near real-time, interactive map of the global Internet.” According to the undated PowerPoint presentation, disclosed by Mr. Snowden, Treasure Map gives the N.S.A. “a 300,000 foot view of the Internet.” Relying on Internet routing data, commercial and Sigint information, Treasure Map is a sophisticated tool, one that the PowerPoint presentation describes as a “massive Internet mapping, analysis and exploration engine.” It collects Wi-Fi network and geolocation data, and between 30 million and 50 million unique Internet provider addresses — code that can reveal the location and owner of a computer, mobile device or router — are represented each day on Treasure Map, according to the document. It boasts that the program can map “any device, anywhere, all the time.” The documents include addresses labeled as based in the “U.S.,” and because so much Internet traffic flows through the United States, it would be difficult to map much of the world without capturing such addresses. But the intelligence officials said that Treasure Map maps only foreign and Defense Department networks, and is limited by the amount of data available to the agency. There are several billion I.P. addresses on the Internet, the officials said, and Treasure Map cannot map them all. The program is not used for surveillance, they said, but to understand computer networks. The program takes advantage of the capabilities of other secret N.S.A. programs. To support Treasure Map, for example, the document states that another program, called Packaged Goods, tracks the “traceroutes” through which data flows around the Internet. Through Packaged Goods, the N.S.A. has gained access to “13 covered servers in unwitting data centers around the globe,” according to the PowerPoint. The document identifies a list of countries where the data centers are located, including Germany, Poland, Denmark, South Africa and Taiwan as well as Russia, China and Singapore. Despite the document’s reference to “unwitting data centers,” government officials said that the agency does not hack into those centers. Instead, the officials said, the intelligence community secretly uses front companies to lease space on the servers. Despite the N.S.A.’s broad surveillance powers, the strategy paper shows that N.S.A. officials still worry about the agency’s ability to fend off bureaucratic inertia while keeping pace with change. “To sustain current mission relevance,” the document said, Signals Intelligence Directorate, the N.S.A.’s signals intelligence arm, “must undertake a profound and revolutionary shift from the mission approach which has served us so well in the decades preceding the onset of the information age.” James Risen reported from Washington, and Laura Poitras from Berlin. ------------------------------------------- Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/25094221-ddf8422b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message -----

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whoah
by Eugen Leitl 23 Nov '13

23 Nov '13

https://blockchain.info/tx/1c12443203a48f42cdf7b1acee5b4b1c1fedc144cb909a3b… http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1r87p5/omfg_what_is_going_on/

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NSA Global SIGINT Power to Generate Profits and Pay
by John Young 23 Nov '13

23 Nov '13

The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty well covers all the comsec and crypto initiatives to covertly exploit people, cryptographers, anonymizers, informants, planted spies, security firms, networks, governments, nations, friends, lovers and citizens. Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests will deter this bounty of profits for the comsec industry, unless the public is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp the nettle, and all those making money from this deception operation decide to give up their profits, perks and prestige. I mean those on the comsec and crypto lists, those participating in standards committees, those enjoying contracts and grants in think tanks and universities, those in law firms and public interest orgs, those in the media and academia, those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending to be in opposition as they scramble to rejigger their products and sales pitches, to exploit what is being fabricated to diminish Snowden's revelations with new forms of secrecy, technology, law, regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants, contracts, list lurking, online and offline spying, break-ins, the usual kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are fulfilled. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf [Excerpt] SIGINT Goals for 2012-2016 1. (U//FOUO) Revolutionize analysis fundamentally shift our analytic approach from a production to a discovery bias, enriched by innovative customer/partner engagement, radically increasing operational impact across all mission domains. 1.1. (U//FOUO) Through advanced tradecraft and automation, dramatically increase mastery of the global network 1.2. (U//FOUO) Conduct original analysis in a collaborative information space that mirrors how people interact in the information age 1.3. (U//FOUO) Disseminate data at its first point of relevance, share bulk data, and enable customers to address niche requirements 1.4. (U//FOUO) Drive an agile technology base mapped to the cognitive processes that underpin large scale analysis, discovery, compliance and collaboration 2. (U//FOUO) Fully leverage internal and external NSA partnerships to collaboratively discover targets, find their vulnerabilities, and overcome their network/communication defenses. 2.1. (U//FOUO) Bolster our arsenal of capabilities against the most critical cryptanalytic challenges 2.1.1. (S//SI//REL) Employ multidisciplinary approaches to cryptanalytic problems, leveraging and integrating mid-point and end-point capabilities to enable cryptanalysis 2.1.2. (S//REL) Counter the challenge of ubiquitous, strong, commercial network encryption 2.1.3. (TS//SI//REL) Counter indigenous cryptographic programs by targeting their industrial bases with all available SIGINT and HUMINT capabilities 2.1.4. (TS//SI//REL) Influence the global commercial encryption market through commercial relationships, HUMINT, and second and third party partners 2.1.5. (S//SI//REL) Continue to invest in the industrial base and drive the state of the art for High Performance Computing to maintain pre-eminent cryptanalytic capability for the nation 2.2. (TS//SI//REL) Defeat adversary cybersecurity practices in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need from anyone, anytime, anywhere 2.3. (S//SI) Enable discovery capabilities and advanced tradecraft in the collection architecture to enable the discovery of mission-critical persona, networks, accesses, signals and technologies 2.4. (S//SI) Integrate capabilities into the mission architecture, deepen workforce skill base in advanced network and signals analysis, and optimize processes and policies for the benefit of discovery 3. (S//SI//REL) Dynamically integrate endpoint, midpoint, industrial-enabled, and cryptanalytic capabilities to reach previously inaccessible targets in support of exploitation, cyber defense, and cyber operations 3.1. (C//REL) Drive the SIGINT mission architecture to underpin synchronized, integrated, multi-capability operations, extending it to mission partners 3.2. (TS//SI//REL) Integrate the SIGINT system into a national network of sensors which interactively sense, respond, and alert one another at machine speed 3.3. (U//FOUO) Continuously rebalance our portfolio of accesses and access capabilities based on current and projected contributions to key SIGINT missions 3.4. (S//SI//REL) Identify new access, collection, and exploitation methods by leveraging global business trends in data and communications services [End excerpt]

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Tor for the masses
by dan＠geer.org 23 Nov '13

23 Nov '13

http://venturebeat.com/2013/11/21/pogoplug-packages-tor-for-the-mass-market… leading to https://pogoplug.com/safeplug --dan

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hidden parameters (urls)
by brian carroll 22 Nov '13

22 Nov '13

--- perceptual thresholds --- IR vision lets researchers see through—and into—multiple layers of graphene http://phys.org/news/2013-11-infrared-vision-throughand-intomultiple-layers… --- on natural fluorescence --- // intro to blacklight with rocks starts around 5:47 min... [video] Bill's Fluorescent Rock and Mineral Collection http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gVtWOcrat4o [video] Science Friday: 3:36 min tour http://www.sciencefriday.com/video/05/05/2011/rock-stars.html "In 1968, the New Jersey Senate decreed the town of Franklin a geological wonder: "The Fluorescent Mineral Capital of the World." Over 350 different minerals have been found in the area, ninety of which glow brilliantly under ultraviolet light. There are two mineral museums devoted to fluorescing rocks, the region's unusual geology and its zinc mining history." [search] images of fluorescent minerals in rocks... https://www.google.com/search?q=fluorescent+rocks&client=firefox-a&hs=ZEF&s… What Materials Glow Under a Black or Ultraviolet Light? http://chemistry.about.com/cs/howthingswork/f/blblacklight.htm [images] Hall of Fame Specimens - fluorescent minerals in rocks http://www.tigerowner.com/crf_photos.htm // fingerprinting phosphorescence patterns, real vs. fake diamonds UV Rays Shed New Light on the Hope Diamond’s Mysterious Red Glow http://mineralsciences.si.edu/research/gems/hope_diamond/blue_diamond_resea… [quote] The 45.52-carat blue diamond puzzles scientists because of the fiery red glow it gives off for several minutes after being exposed to ultra-violet light. Scientists refer to this phenomenon as phosphorescence. “It looks like a glowing orange coal in your barbeque grill,” explains Post. “It has been described as one of the unique properties of this unique diamond, something special to the Hope Diamond.” [quote] // note: electronic lollipop, the new healthy cigarette? Electrode recreates all four tastes on your tongue http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22029444.500-electrode-recreates-all-… NEW: CF = collider function (juxtapose A & B) interstructure. e.g: a. High tech toilets receive big prizes from Bill Gates http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/15/bill_gates_toilet_fair/ b. Kanye West blasts Zappos for 'shit product,' Zappos responds with toilet picture http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/20/5127502/kanye-west-blasts-zappos-for-shi… // International Documentary Film Festival Amsterdam 2009 [video] People vs. Power (1/2) Walking and Talking with Peter Wintonick... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0L1BCN9Ze4 // about bicycle cultures today, componentry bureaucratized, // efficiencies/innovation lost to varying incongruent approaches. // missing information, parts do not match, line-up, made esoteric. // guess that is everything to do with beliefs and mindset translated // into general manufacturing approach, as with computer devices. // shared model vs 'reinventing' & duplication ideologically forced. [video] People vs. Power (2/2) Walking and Talking with Peter Wintonick... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJZ-wiuaJeo [video] The Kids in This Billboard Point at Actual Planes Flying Overhead http://gizmodo.com/the-kids-in-this-billboard-point-at-actual-planes-flyin-… // interactive advert reminded me of this... [video] First Official Clip from The Zero Theorem http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyY5InLYJPQ [video] The Zero Theorem official trailer - film by Terry Gilliam http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLYkXhgFIAk --- crypto gift ideas --- :L [note: wondered if computer crypto approach has become detached from questioning basics of cryptography outside of a computer context. also, for those like myself with interest yet little knowledge, how to approach the subject, beyond just reading. various authors and thinkers have mentioned reading childrens books rather than academic texts for a basic and introductory overview of a subject. thus, what about those interested in crypto, is a childrens crypto kit beyond the domain of issues involved in crypto, or perhaps may some fundamental skills, questions, issues remain overlooked or already decided upon in a given framework. therefore, for child or adult with crypto interest...] Codes, Ciphers and Secret Writing (Dover Children's Activity Books) http://www.amazon.com/Ciphers-Secret-Writing-Childrens-Activity/dp/04862476… Kidz Labs - Spy Science Secret Message Kit - Ages 5+ http://www.amazon.com/Kidz-Labs-Science-Secret-Message/dp/B000JM0JCS POOF-Slinky 2023 Slinky Science Secret Messages Mini Lab http://www.amazon.com/POOF-Slinky-2023-Slinky-Science-Messages/dp/B000BL1C96 Circuit Stickers // electronic principles, circuits https://www.crowdsupply.com/chibitronics/circuit-stickers note: microcontroller programmable, paper, etc. --- on rings --- recently mentioned data exchange between electromagnetic ring and symbolic device... once visited the Intel Museum which had a gift shop that sold jewelry made from unusable pentium chips; cufflinks, necklaces, earrings, and presumably rings (though do not remember seeing them). Intel CPU Chip Jewelry & Pins http://www.chipsetc.com/intel-jewelry--pins.html so any such key-exchange or other interaction between ring and device, in a data mood ring or other informational approach, is going to have circuitry built into it, issues of energy and power, and involve transistors, capacitors, resisters, protocols, etc. so in some sense there is a depth to the circuitry, it is not just an image of a ring but a complexity hidden beyond the boudary of what is immediately visable- whereas the Intel jewelry was itself this circuitry on display, as if a future data ring would involve these aesthetic dimensions, inherently. note also the issue of toxins in manufacturing if a diy approach with repurposed circuitboards and components, highly toxic to skin, eyes, etc. including chemical offgasing, related to toxic waste sites of discarded electronics, this leaking into groundwater, poisoning populations. the concept of a data ring that is an IC or computer that then interacts with the environment, say in a crypto context, that it carries passwords, synced as a paired identity device validating ID or providing authentication or whatever. and so this functionality is just not an issue of taking an IC or processor, memory, and storage and having 'data' on the ring. it would need to be secured, have its own perimeter security, ways of allowing and preventing access, etc. the following rings visualize this greater involvement in the aesthetics beyond just what the device would look like, and into its multilayered in-depth construction, in dimensions that may also be internal and unseen. thus a parallel between the chip as structure and building as structure, and similarity of issues of detailing and design, issues of foundation, & so on... [image search] architecture rings https://www.google.com/search?q=bague&client=firefox-a&hs=7GZ&rls=org.mozil… the larger context for this is the parallel between the circuitboard and the city (plug-in city, Archigram) and again issues of relations of building types and electronic components that have interrelated structures, functioning, and programming of circuitry at the larger scale. in this way, modularity into a larger entity, say 'crypto' and 'comms' (NFC) and 'processor' and 'memory' and 'storage'; likewise- stadium, highways, bank, tv station, school, dwellings. [image] cityscape ring http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_ip12zh9vdvI/StTg6_V0qkI/AAAAAAAAAWM/5NaTtzcq__4/s… Philippe Tourraine - Les bagues Architecture http://www.philippetournaire.com/collections/70-architecture what would the foundation be, what would the walls be, roof, how many buildings, how are they arranged, what is the interior and exterior relation and dynamic, what is the perimeter, what is the functionality and purpose, what can it do and why. rings and sensors, modules, ecosystem relations, programmability, display or opaque, indicating feedback, etc. what is potential for, sans LCD, micro- or nano-leds as ultra-low power matrix. beyond conventions. how many different typological relations in larger ecological context: ring-computer, ring-phone, ring-signage, ring-symbolic.device (orb), ring-POS.device, ring-ATM machine, etc. // and a potential approach for managing crypto keys... ex. Intel Chip Keychain http://www.chipsetc.com/uploads/1/2/4/4/1244189/4120271_orig.jpg?196 Intel Chip Keychains http://www.chipsetc.com/intel-keychains-page-5.html {educational fair-use of copyright, 2013} א ט ם ך

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