- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Surveillance
by Juan Garofalo 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

Am I right in assuming that the US is the only country who has its own subjects PLUS a good deal of the world under close surveillance? Perhaps the government of china does a similar thing, but obviously only inside china? Other governments like, say, the japanese government or the european governments don't have these clearly nazi surveillance programs?

8 11

[RISKS] Risks Digest 27.50
by RISKS List Owner 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tuesday 1 October 2013 Volume 27 : Issue 50 ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/27.50.html> The current issue can be found at <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt> Contents: Cybersecurity should be seen as an occupation, not a profession (Steve Ragan) Cost and Responsibility for Snowden's Breaches (Jonathan S. Shapiro) What Facebook, Twitter, Tinder, Instagram, and Internet Porn Are Doing to America's Teenage Girls (Nancy Jo Sales via Monty Solomon) LAUSD halts home use of iPads for students after devices hacked (Re: Blume, RISKS-27.49) Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 2:50 AM From: InfoSec News <alerts(a)infosecnews.org> Subject: Cybersecurity should be seen as an occupation, not a profession, (Steve Ragan) [From Dave Farber's IP list] Steve Ragan, CSO Online, 26 Sep 2013 http://www.csoonline.com/article/740456/cybersecurity-should-be-seen-as-an-… A panel from the National Academy of Sciences, commissioned by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, says that cybersecurity should be seen as an occupation and not a profession. After being commissioned by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, a panel from the National Academy of Sciences reported that the cybersecurity field is too young, and the technologies, threats, and actions taken to counter them change too rapidly, for professionalization to be considered. Thus, cybersecurity is an occupation and not a profession. For some organizations, making cybersecurity a profession may provide a useful degree of quality control, the report says, but at the same time, professionalization also imposes barriers, which would prevent talented workers from entering the field at a time when "demand for cybersecurity workers exceeds supply." Sticking to the quality control aspect of the report, professionalization, it says, has the potential to attract workers and establish long-term paths to improving the work force overall, but measures such as standardized education or requirements for certification, have their disadvantages too. ... [According to *Webster's*, an occupation is the principal business of one's life. Is the world's youngest would-be "profession" somehow in the same league as the "world's oldest profession", which might also deserve to be called an occupation -- and that it has occupied such a prominent place in our civilization? One more thought: we have often noted here that software engineering is not really an engineering discipline, although millions of people are occupied with it. Does that mean that software engineering also needs to be termed an occupation rather than a profession? Furthermore, if cybersecurity is really an occupation, then we need to recognize the occupational hazards -- one of which seems to be that every computer user's life is unfortunately being occupied and preoccupied with the collateral damage of the lack of professionalism among computer system developers? (Let's not blame the sys admins, who have a really thankless job under the circumstances in trying to protect systems and networks that are inherently unprotectable.) PGN] ------------------------------ Date: October 1, 2013 9:28:07 AM PDT From: "Jonathan S. Shapiro" <shap(a)eros-os.org> Subject: Cost and Responsibility for Snowden's Breaches [Via Dave Farber's IP] The press has lately been recirculating stories about the dollar damages of the Snowden disclosures. The repudiation of key cryptography standards - the ones that underly our electronic currency exchanges and clearinghouses, and are present in an overwhelming number of products - may in the end cost billions of dollars of damage. Some of the press would have us believe that all of this is Snowden's fault. Better, some feel, to focus attention on the messenger and protect the perpetrator. Or even if not better, easier. It sells more papers to focus on a "David vs. Goliath" story than to examine whether Goliath was actually a Philistine. In compromising these cryptography standards, NSA's alleged goal was to read the electronic communications of terrorists, arms dealers, and other savory characters. In a world of open cryptography standards, the only way to do that was to compromise *everybody*. That includes ordinary citizens, businesses, governments (ours and others), armed forces command and control, domestic and global financial systems, and so on. This goes beyond privacy. Cryptography sits under all of our most essential electronic communications. Focusing on Snowden has people asking "How safe are my secrets from the NSA?" when a more pertinent question might be "Is my bank still safe from the eastern block mafia and the terrorist of the month?" Banks for the most part don't operate by storing dollar bills; they operate electronically. Then there is the power delivery infrastructure, or... the list goes on. *That* is what NSA compromised. And when you understand that, it becomes clear that the damage to *us* was far worse than any cost to the terrorists. In fact, the damage is proportional to your dependence on electronic infrastructure. That's bad. Because it means that people inside our government, at the direction of government officials, sworn to protect and defend the constitution and the country, actively conspired to undermine every segment of the United States along with our key allies. While the run-of-the-mill staff may not have understood this, the more senior people at NSA knew what they were doing. They were certainly told by people on the outside often enough. Frankly, I think some of them should hang. And I mean that literally. These decisions by NSA weren't made by extremist muslims. They were made by people from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton (and elsewhere) right here in America. But there is something worse. In a certain sense, the NSA's primary mission is the discovery of secrets. Being in the secret breaking business, one of the things they know very well is that the best way to break a secret is to get someone to tell you what it is. And there is *always* someone who will tell you, either out of conviction or out of fear of compromise. There was never a question whether the fact that NSA compromised every first world and second world country would leak. The only questions were *who* would leak it and *how soon*. It happened to be Snowden, but if not for Snowden it would have been somebody else. So setting aside the technical damage, there is the fact that the U.S. Government is now known - and more importantly, believed - to have compromised ourselves and our allies. We need to ask what the consequences are of that. Here are some questions that suggest themselves: 1. Cryptography is clearly too important to entrust to the government. Who can we trust? 2. Fragmentation seems likely. Does that help or hinder us? 3. Do the issues differ for communications cryptography vs. long-term storage cryptography? Given that communications is recorded and stored forever, I suspect not. 4. Can our allies ever again trust an American-originated crypto system? Software system? Can we trust one from them? 5. Can our allies ever again afford to trust an American manufacturer of communications equipment, given that every one of the major players seems to have gotten in bed with NSA when pressured to do so by the U.S. Government? 6. What *other* compromised technologies have been promulgated through government-influenced standards and/or back room strong arm tactics? One thing seems clear: we must now choose between the credibility of American technology businesses and the continuation of export controls on cryptography and computer security technology. The controls are ineffective for their alleged purpose; there are too many ways to circumvent them. The main use of these laws has been to allow government pressure to be brought to bear on vendors who won't "play ball" with U.S. Government objectives. As long as the big players in the U.S. computing and networking industries can be be backdoored by their government (take that either way), only a fool would buy from them. If the goal is to destroy the American technology industry, this strategy is even better than software patents. As long as those laws remain on the books, the American tech sector has a credibility problem. A second thing seems clear: we need to move to openly *developed* standards for critical systems, not just open *standards*. And not just openly developed standards, but standards whose "theory of operation" is explained and critically examined by the public. No more unexplained magic tables of numbers. We need fully open public review, and public reference implementations as part of the standardization process. A third thing seems clear: fixing the cryptography doesn't solve the problem. Even with back doors, the best place to break crypto is at the insecure end points. We need to develop information management methods (e.g. "zero knowledge" methods, but also others) and software architectures that let us limit the scope of damage when it occurs. The operating systems - and consequently the applications - that we are using today simply weren't designed for this. Fortunately, the hardware environment has converged enough that we can do a lot better than we have in the past. There will never be perfect security, but we can largely eliminate the exponential advantage that is currently enjoyed by the attacker. Jonathan S. Shapiro ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 10:36:47 -0400 From: Monty Solomon <monty(a)roscom.com> Subject: What Facebook, Twitter, Tinder, Instagram, and Internet Porn Are Doing to America's Teenage Girls (Nancy Jo Sales) Nancy Jo Sales, *Vanity Fair*, 26 Sep 2013 Friends Without Benefits This year, 81 percent of Internet-using teenagers in America reported that they are active on social-networking sites, more than ever before. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and new dating apps like Tinder, Grindr, and Blendr have increasingly become key players in social interactions, both online and IRL (in real life). Combined with unprecedented easy access to the unreal world of Internet porn, the result is a situation that has drastically affected gender roles for young people. Speaking to a variety of teenaged boys and girls across the country, Nancy Jo Sales uncovers a world where boys are taught they have the right to expect everything from social submission to outright sex from their female peers. What is this doing to America's young women? ... http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/09/social-media-internet-porn-teenag… ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2013 13:27:54 -0400 From: Monty Solomon <monty(a)roscom.com> Subject: LAUSD halts home use of iPads for students after devices hacked (Re: Howard Blume, RISKS-27.49) Howard Blume, *LA Times*, 25 Sep 2013 Following news that students at a Los Angeles high school had hacked district-issued iPads and were using them for personal use, district officials have halted home use of the Apple tablets until further notice. It took exactly one week for nearly 300 students at Theodore Roosevelt High School to hack through security so they could surf the Web on their new school-issued iPads, raising new concerns about a plan to distribute the devices to all students in the district. ... http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lausd-ipad-hack-20130925,0,6974… ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2012 20:20:16 -0900 From: RISKS-request(a)csl.sri.com Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks) The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011. => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent) if possible and convenient for you. The mailman Web interface can be used directly to subscribe and unsubscribe: http://lists.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks Alternatively, to subscribe or unsubscribe via e-mail to mailman your FROM: address, send a message to risks-request(a)csl.sri.com containing only the one-word text subscribe or unsubscribe. You may also specify a different receiving address: subscribe address= ... . You may short-circuit that process by sending directly to either risks-subscribe(a)csl.sri.com or risks-unsubscribe(a)csl.sri.com depending on which action is to be taken. Subscription and unsubscription requests require that you reply to a confirmation message sent to the subscribing mail address. Instructions are included in the confirmation message. Each issue of RISKS that you receive contains information on how to post, unsubscribe, etc. => The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites, copyright policy, etc.) is online. <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html> *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. => .UK users may contact <Lindsay.Marshall(a)newcastle.ac.uk>. => SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative address from which you NEVER send mail! => SUBMISSIONS: to risks(a)CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line. *** NOTE: Including the string "notsp" at the beginning or end of the subject *** line will be very helpful in separating real contributions from spam. *** This attention-string may change, so watch this space now and then. => ARCHIVES: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for current volume or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks for previous VoLume http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's searchable archive at newcastle: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html gets you VoLume, ISsue. Lindsay has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r <http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/> . ==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners: <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html> for browsing, <http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf> or .ps for printing is no longer maintained up-to-date except for recent election problems. *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads. ==> Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum: <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1> ------------------------------ End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 27.50 ************************

2 1

Bitmessage?
by d.nix 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I've seen little or no discussion of Bitmessage, and was wondering what thoughts - pro or con - people have of it: https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page I've got it up and running and have exchanged messages with a friend and well as a few other folks testing the waters. One thing I like about it, is that it seems at first glance to not suffer from the same sort of traffic analysis issues that plague regular email; to me, the traffic analysis problems are a bigger issue than message encryption. One could also paste PGP/GPG or other encrypted content into Bitmessage for your super duper secret stuff where you are concerned the recipients machine is compromised. There's apparently a standard email gateway for it also: https://bitmessage.ch/ Tho, that may bring you back to the problems of traffic analysis. I'd also love to see more mix network stuff getting developed so we could help secure against traffic analysis of existing systems. Tom Ritter's talk on analyzing mix network traffic was quite cool: http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm.html http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing_amm_followup1.html But anyhow, Bitmessage; yay or nay? Dave BM-2D9fgf9MeGhq9Fxcwg1k2W1C179KJuUEFg - -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSSRByAAoJEDMbeBxcUNAeevIH/3RFdqhbuKtlB4ZraFH531zE hdXHfQFOPhAvpV2SjIscm3YMLWnDMR2ap5zRrIZ6OSPThVNa7339q87ITU4sRBAs yCXHJaEFiT/kY/IfGr8PeYLrUegSgY41iGjgYekkZUfIrQdXwlA7afMr4XZz4DKP XsrpE3Mjq8tw9JOgB3q8VzMOaDuCOyIceFxyGiDhlwTlM1Imy4NPGkaToAvkhg4C 51MmXjRW/L+hBhjyeCJ0iG4o1YOhaOIVocsHXYy7n3V7mHmwvrS86cF1i0wpxAxM 3Q/7N7FNM57LEHBgU8xLsGkrmY/FLk0hZLPOz3ZClefhjaQIE9jpz8GHKCXziSw= =8xN+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?
by John Young 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

The several crypto lists run by mailman email passwords monthly. Open crypto lists are not meant to be more trustworthy than open crypto. At 10:28 AM 10/1/2013, you wrote: >This falls somewhere in the land of beyond-the-absurd. > >Just got this message from your robot: > >On Oct 1, 2013, at 5:00 AM, mailman-owner(a)metzdowd.com wrote: > > > If you have questions, problems, comments, etc, send them to > > mailman-owner(a)metzdowd.com. Thanks! > > > > Passwords for greg(a)kinostudios.com: > > > > List Password // URL > > ---- -------- > > cryptography(a)metzdowd.com iPoopInYourHat > > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/options/cryptography/greg%40kinostudios.com > >So, my password, iPoopInYourHat, is being sent to me in the clear by >your servers. > >Of all the places on the internet, this would be on the last places >I would expect this to happen. > >- Greg > >-- >Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also >sharing with the NSA. > > > >_______________________________________________ >The cryptography mailing list >cryptography(a)metzdowd.com >http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

1 0

Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> ----- Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 14:14:54 -0400 From: The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> To: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet Organization: Virtual Adept Networks, Unlimited User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130514 Thunderbird/17.0.6 Reply-To: drwho(a)virtadpt.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 09/27/2013 09:35 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > I don't see how a ham running a repeater backbone can prevent end > to end encryption other than sniffing for traffic and actively > disrupting it. I'm not sure tampering If enough hams (or one sufficiently angry lone ham operator) decide that this is a problem they'll organize a turkey hunt to triangulate the operator(s) and politely ask them to stop before the feds get called in. The thinking behind this seems to be that the amateur community has been graciously granted a small portion of the RF spectrum to experiment with. People (licensed hams or otherwise) who do specifically prohibited things within the amateur bands (like transmitting encrypted traffic or undocumented digital protocols (which may be indistinguishable from encrypted traffic)) can get some or all of the amateur band taken away. A lot of time and effort are spent every year by ham operators who don't want this, that, or the other sliver of the amateur band reassigned away from amateur use, and someone doing something dodgy within those spectra could have disasterous consequences. When Project Byzantium was adding amateur radio support for ISC milestone #3, these regulations were noted and discussed at length during initial reasearch. We also spoke with the ARRL during development, which expressed similar sentiments about crypto in the amateur bands (and passing traffic from unlicensed network users over the amateur band, incidentally). > with transport is within ham ethics, though they definitely That would probably fall under jamming, which is definitely against ham ethics. > don't understand the actual uses for encryption, at The hams I've spoken to seem to, but they also seem to fall into the camp of "It's on the amateur bands, so if it's something I'd want to encrypt I'm not going to talk about it while chewing the rag anyway." > least the old hands (are there even new hands?). Hello. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "Be the strange that you want to see in the world." --Gareth Branwyn -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJJv54ACgkQO9j/K4B7F8GO0wCeMVOKo1YmC+/8VqUcm4+CGBek fk4AnjiH3UGQ/kqSzmSatwKFpSceISBq =n2mL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

[Bitcoin-development] homomorphic coin value (validatable but encrypted) (Re: smart contracts -- possible use case? yes or no?)
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from Adam Back <adam(a)cypherspace.org> ----- Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 16:26:03 +0200 From: Adam Back <adam(a)cypherspace.org> To: Mark Friedenbach <mark(a)monetize.io> Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net> Subject: [Bitcoin-development] homomorphic coin value (validatable but encrypted) (Re: smart contracts -- possible use case? yes or no?) User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 10:49:00AM -0700, Mark Friedenbach wrote: >This kind of thing - providing external audits of customer accounts >without revealing private data - would be generally useful beyond >taxation. If you have any solutions, I'd be interested to hear them >(although bitcoin-dev is probably not the right place yet). Thanks for providing the impetus to write down the current state, the efficient version of which I only figured out a few days ago :) I have been researching this for a few months on and off, because it seems like an interesting construct in its own right, a different aspect of payment privacy (eg for auditable but commercial sensistive information) but also that other than its direct use it may enable some features that we have not thought of yet. I moved it to bitcointalk: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=305791.new#new Its efficient finally (after many dead ends): approximately 2x cost of current in terms of coin size and coin verification cost, however it also gives some perf advantages back in a different way - necessary changes to schnorr (EC version of Schnorr based proofs) allow n of n multiparty sigs, or k of n multiparty sigs for the verification cost and signature size of one pair of ECS signatures, for n > 2 its a space and efficiency improvement over current bitcoin. Adam ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ October Webinars: Code for Performance Free Intel webinars can help you accelerate application performance. Explore tips for MPI, OpenMP, advanced profiling, and more. Get the most from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60134791&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

Re: [cryptography] The Unbreakable Cipher
by Collin RM Stocks 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

On 09/25/2013 03:51 PM, Jonathan Katz wrote: > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Greg Rose <ggr(a)seer-grog.net > <mailto:ggr@seer-grog.net>> wrote: > > > On Sep 25, 2013, at 9:40 , Jonathan Katz <jkatz(a)cs.umd.edu > <mailto:jkatz@cs.umd.edu>> wrote: > > "Every cipher is breakable, given enough traffic": in principle, > yes, as long as the traffic (formally, the entropy of the traffic) > is larger than the key length. > > You misstated this. It's breakable if the *redundancy* of the > traffic is larger than the key length. > > > Not so; this is most easily seen by taking the uniform distribution over > n-bit messages, in which case the entropy is n and the redundancy is 0. > > regards, > Greg. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography(a)randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > If the message is chosen from a uniform distribution over n bits (and assuming that the message is not used for something else after it is deciphered), the adversary will not be able to distinguish a correctly deciphered message from an incorrectly deciphered message, no matter how short the key is in comparison to the data. Now, you could easily argue that there is absolutely no reason to send a message with those properties, but that isn't really the point. -- KmNJcjeUDRXMu6riH0KAK9Og8WAaAT8oXcbnFIij5djCP4v+6GTFxnHoHzvW NTL+4ZPiGUqerypkfsDfEOcO+i6ZlY59G79tEMwR0fsKO9w9MLbv6Odz5RxY JZgUsZJ8lZWx/zBsL4oqU60k+EFbV14fSUVoaRpazy1ozgQFdi2SdfHTB41y 7SsMX/JlevnnBj/GhUyFlXPr2kwechOSy5W74iVbUaOpeYMqNIx3jCmZfjez Gi+sS8ghQB8y5b9NgYTlR7HBh+leObqQX/R5bAkyPyh2oDOlFbD2HQiCsiB9 Uj/qLtG3CaZQVtkCSC1s3NschLBgWHfQ9xkb3Peqzg==

1 0

three crypto lists - why and which
by Adam Back 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

I am not sure if everyone is aware that there is also an unmoderated crypto list, because I see old familiar names posting on the moderated crypto list that I do not see posting on the unmoderated list. The unmoderated list has been running continuously (new posts in every day with no gaps) since mar 2010, with an interesting relatively low noise, and not firehose volume. http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography The actual reason for the creation of that list was Perry's list went through a hiatus when Perry stopped approving/forward posts eg http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/ originally Nov 2009 - Mar 2010 (I presume the mar 2010 restart was motivated by the creation of randombit list starting in the same month) but more recently sep 2010 to may 2013 gap (minus traffic in aug 2011). http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/ I have no desire to pry into Perry's personal circumstances as to why this huge gap happened, and he should be thanked for the significant moderation effort he has put into create this low noise environment, but despite that it is bad for cryptography if people's means of technical interaction spuriously stops. Perry mentioned recently that he has now backup moderators, OK so good. There is now also the cypherpunks list which has picked up, and covers a wider mix of topics, censorship resistant technology ideas, forays into ideology etc. Moderation is even lower than randombit but no spam, noise slightly higher but quite reasonable so far. And there is now a domain name that is not al-quaeda.net (seriously? is that even funny?): cpunks.org. https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/ At least I enjoy it and see some familiar names posting last seen decade+ ago. Anyway my reason for posting was threefold: a) make people aware of randombit crypto list, b) rebooted cypherpunks list (*), but c) about how to use randombit (unmoderated) and metzdowd. For my tastes sometimes Perry will cut off a discussion that I thought was just warming up because I wanted to get into the detail, so I tend more prefer the unmoderated list. But its kind of a weird situaton because there are people I want views and comments from who are on the metzdowd list who as far as I know are not on the crypto list, and there's no convenient way to migrate a conversation other than everyone subscribing to both. Cc to both perhaps works somewhat, I do that sometimes though as a general principle it can be annoying when people Cc to too many lists. Anyway thanks for your attention, back to the unmoderated (or moderated) discussion! Adam

2 1

Re: Surveillance
by Juan Garofalo 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

--On Monday, September 30, 2013 7:46 PM -0700 coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 7:38 PM, Juan Garofalo <juan.g71(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> So, the question should be : apart from the anglo-americans, and >> perhaps the chinese, is there any other cyber police state out there? > > > russia, of course. and ... > > perhaps the question you need to ask is who isn't a cyber police state? > > even the third world is buying tools from the first for this purpose... > I guess you're right in a way, but, is there a european equivalent to the utah datacenter for instance? Does japan have its own (smaller but still substantial) version of it? China? Even russia? I understand that european governments expect the ISPs to spy on their customers ('data retention laws') which seems to suggest that they[governments] are not doing it themselves? wikipedia, lousy source, but still "On 2 March 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled the law unconstitutional as a violation of the guarantee of the secrecy of correspondence.[18] As such, the directive is not currently implemented in Germany."

2 1

Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography(a)dukhovni.org> ----- Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 04:15:50 +0000 From: Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography(a)dukhovni.org> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Reply-To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 10:07:14AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > Therefore, everyone should use Curve25519, which we have every > reason to believe is unbreakable. Superceded by the improved Curve1174. http://cr.yp.to/elligator/elligator-20130527.pdf -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0