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Re: [cryptography] New NSA Slides and Details Released last night via Fantastico (BR)
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from David D <david(a)7tele.com> ----- Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 12:56:17 +0200 From: David D <david(a)7tele.com> To: 'Crypto discussion list' <cryptography(a)randombit.net> Subject: Re: [cryptography] New NSA Slides and Details Released last night via Fantastico (BR) X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0 http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/09/nsa-documents-show-united-sta tes-spied-brazilian-oil-giant.html No millisecond counter: 1:49 US-983 Stormbrew - Fiber connections 1:49 US-983 Stormbrew - "KEY CORPORATE PARTNER WITH ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL CABLES, ROUTERS, AND SWITCHES". (# traceroute google.com) 2:07 - "QUERY BY CERTIFICATE META DATA" 2:07 - "Private keys of Diginotar stolen by hacker" FLYING PIG ... Launch a MITM attack. 2:08 - mail.ru and server IP: 94.100.104.14 This site has broken out some of the screenshots from the video: http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/economic-espionage-nsa-spies-on-b razil-oil-giant-petrobras/ "How the attack was done:" image is most interesting. http://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/nsa-brazil-5.png Based on this slide, it appears that the bandwidth providers are dumping the traffic at core routers directly to the NSA. -----Original Message----- From: cryptography [mailto:cryptography-bounces@randombit.net] On Behalf Of David D Sent: Monday, September 09, 2013 12:07 PM To: 'Crypto discussion list' Subject: Re: [cryptography] New NSA Slides and Details Released last night via Fantastico (BR) Lots of gems in this video: http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/09/nsa-documents-show-united-sta tes-spied-brazilian-oil-giant.html _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] Meet the 'cowboy' in charge of the NSA
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 12:50:49PM +0200, phryk wrote: http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cowboy.htm 9 September 2013 The Cowboy of the NSA Keith Alexander -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keit… Foreign Policy Magazine The Cowboy of the NSA Inside Gen. Keith Alexander's all-out, barely-legal drive to build the ultimate spy machine. BY SHANE HARRIS | SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 Shane Harris is a senior writer for Foreign Policy and author of The Watchers: The Rise of America's Surveillance State. On Aug. 1, 2005, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander reported for duty as the 16th director of the National Security Agency, the United States' largest intelligence organization. He seemed perfect for the job. Alexander was a decorated Army intelligence officer and a West Point graduate with master's degrees in systems technology and physics. He had run intelligence operations in combat and had held successive senior-level positions, most recently as the director of an Army intelligence organization and then as the service's overall chief of intelligence. He was both a soldier and a spy, and he had the heart of a tech geek. Many of his peers thought Alexander would make a perfect NSA director. But one prominent person thought otherwise: the prior occupant of that office. Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden had been running the NSA since 1999, through the 9/11 terrorist attacks and into a new era that found the global eavesdropping agency increasingly focused on Americans' communications inside the United States. At times, Hayden had found himself swimming in the murkiest depths of the law, overseeing programs that other senior officials in government thought violated the Constitution. Now Hayden of all people was worried that Alexander didn't understand the legal sensitivities of that new mission. "Alexander tended to be a bit of a cowboy: 'Let's not worry about the law. Let's just figure out how to get the job done,'" says a former intelligence official who has worked with both men. "That caused General Hayden some heartburn." The heartburn first flared up not long after the 2001 terrorist attacks. Alexander was the general in charge of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He began insisting that the NSA give him raw, unanalyzed data about suspected terrorists from the agency's massive digital cache, according to three former intelligence officials. Alexander had been building advanced data-mining software and analytic tools, and now he wanted to run them against the NSA's intelligence caches to try to find terrorists who were in the United States or planning attacks on the homeland. By law, the NSA had to scrub intercepted communications of most references to U.S. citizens before those communications can be shared with other agencies. But Alexander wanted the NSA "to bend the pipe towards him," says one of the former officials, so that he could siphon off metadata, the digital records of phone calls and email traffic that can be used to map out a terrorist organization based on its members' communications patterns. "Keith wanted his hands on the raw data. And he bridled at the fact that NSA didn't want to release the information until it was properly reviewed and in a report," says a former national security official. "He felt that from a tactical point of view, that was often too late to be useful." Hayden thought Alexander was out of bounds. INSCOM was supposed to provide battlefield intelligence for troops and special operations forces overseas, not use raw intelligence to find terrorists within U.S. borders. But Alexander had a more expansive view of what military intelligence agencies could do under the law. "He said at one point that a lot of things aren't clearly legal, but that doesn't make them illegal," says a former military intelligence officer who served under Alexander at INSCOM. In November 2001, the general in charge of all Army intelligence had informed his personnel, including Alexander, that the military had broad authority to collect and share information about Americans, so long as they were "reasonably believed to be engaged" in terrorist activities, the general wrote in a widely distributed memo. The general didn't say how exactly to make this determination, but it was all the justification Alexander needed. "Hayden's attitude was 'Yes, we have the technological capability, but should we use it?' Keith's was 'We have the capability, so let's use it,'" says the former intelligence official who worked with both men. Hayden denied Alexander's request for NSA data. And there was some irony in that decision. At the same time, Hayden was overseeing a highly classified program to monitor Americans' phone records and Internet communications without permission from a court. At least one component of that secret domestic spying program would later prompt senior Justice Department officials to threaten resignation because they thought it was illegal. But that was a presidentially authorized program run by a top-tier national intelligence agency. Alexander was a midlevel general who seemed to want his own domestic spying operation. Hayden was so troubled that he reported Alexander to his commanding general, a former colleague says. "He didn't use that atomic word -- 'insubordination' -- but he danced around it." The showdown over bending the NSA's pipes was emblematic of Alexander's approach to intelligence, one he has honed over the course of a 39-year military career and deploys today as the director of the country's most powerful spy agency. Alexander wants as much data as he can get. And he wants to hang on to it for as long as he can. To prevent the next terrorist attack, he thinks he needs to be able to see entire networks of communications and also go "back in time," as he has said publicly, to study how terrorists and their networks evolve. To find the needle in the haystack, he needs the entire haystack. "Alexander's strategy is the same as Google's: I need to get all of the data," says a former administration official who worked with the general. "If he becomes the repository for all that data, he thinks the resources and authorities will follow." That strategy has worked well for Alexander. He has served longer than any director in the NSA's history, and today he stands atop a U.S. surveillance empire in which signals intelligence, the agency's specialty, is the coin of the realm. In 2010, he became the first commander of the newly created U.S. Cyber Command, making him responsible for defending military computer networks against spies, hackers, and foreign armed forces -- and for fielding a new generation of cyberwarriors trained to penetrate adversaries' networks. Fueled by a series of relentless and increasingly revealing leaks from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the full scope of Alexander's master plan is coming to light. Today, the agency is routinely scooping up and storing Americans' phone records. It is screening their emails and text messages, even though the spy agency can't always tell the difference between an innocent American and a foreign terrorist. The NSA uses corporate proxies to monitor up to 75 percent of Internet traffic inside the United States. And it has spent billions of dollars on a secret campaign to foil encryption technologies that individuals, corporations, and governments around the world had long thought protected the privacy of their communications from U.S. intelligence agencies. The NSA was already a data behemoth when Alexander took over. But under his watch, the breadth, scale, and ambition of its mission have expanded beyond anything ever contemplated by his predecessors. In 2007, the NSA began collecting information from Internet and technology companies under the so-called PRISM program. In essence, it was a pipes-bending operation. The NSA gets access to the companies' raw data--including e-mails, video chats, and messages sent through social media--and analysts then mine it for clues about terrorists and other foreign intelligence subjects. Similar to how Alexander wanted the NSA to feed him with intelligence at INSCOM, now some of the world's biggest technology companies -- including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Apple -- are feeding the NSA. But unlike Hayden, the companies cannot refuse Alexander's advances. The PRISM program operates under a legal regime, put in place a few years after Alexander arrived at the NSA, that allows the agency to demand broad categories of information from technology companies. Never in history has one agency of the U.S. government had the capacity, as well as the legal authority, to collect and store so much electronic information. Leaked NSA documents show the agency sucking up data from approximately 150 collection sites on six continents. The agency estimates that 1.6 percent of all data on the Internet flows through its systems on a given day -- an amount of information about 50 percent larger than what Google processes in the same period. When Alexander arrived, the NSA was secretly investing in experimental databases to store these oceans of electronic signals and give analysts access to it all in as close to real time as possible. Under his direction, it has helped pioneer new methods of massive storage and retrieval. That has led to a data glut. The agency has collected so much information that it ran out of storage capacity at its 350-acre headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland, outside Washington, D.C. At a cost of more than $2 billion, it has built a new processing facility in the Utah desert, and it recently broke ground on a complex in Maryland. There is a line item in the NSA's budget just for research on "coping with information overload." Yet it's still not enough for Alexander, who has proposed installing the NSA's surveillance equipment on the networks of defense contractors, banks, and other organizations deemed essential to the U.S. economy or national security. Never has this intelligence agency -- whose primary mission is espionage, stealing secrets from other governments -- proposed to become the electronic watchman of American businesses. This kind of radical expansion shouldn't come as a surprise. In fact, it's a hallmark of Alexander's career. During the Iraq war, for example, he pioneered a suite of real-time intelligence analysis tools that aimed to scoop up every phone call, email, and text message in the country in a search for terrorists and insurgents. Military and intelligence officials say it provided valuable insights that helped turn the tide of the war. It was also unprecedented in its scope and scale. He has transferred that architecture to a global scale now, and with his responsibilities at Cyber Command, he is expanding his writ into the world of computer network defense and cyber warfare. As a result, the NSA has never been more powerful, more pervasive, and more politically imperiled. The same philosophy that turned Alexander into a giant -- acquire as much data from as many sources as possible -- is now threatening to undo him. Alexander today finds himself in the unusual position of having to publicly defend once-secret programs and reassure Americans that the growth of his agency, which employs more than 35,000 people, is not a cause for alarm. In July, the House of Representatives almost approved a law to constrain the NSA's authorities -- the closest Congress has come to reining in the agency since the 9/11 attacks. That narrow defeat for surveillance opponents has set the stage for a Supreme Court ruling on whether metadata -- the information Alexander has most often sought about Americans -- should be afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures," which would make metadata harder for the government to acquire. Alexander declined Foreign Policy's request for an interview, but in response to questions about his leadership, his respect for civil liberties, and the Snowden leaks, he provided a written statement. "The missions of NSA and USCYBERCOM are conducted in a manner that is lawful, appropriate, and effective, and under the oversight of all three branches of the U.S. government," Alexander stated. "Our mission is to protect our people and defend the nation within the authorities granted by Congress, the courts and the president. There is an ongoing investigation into the damage sustained by our nation and our allies because of the recent unauthorized disclosure of classified material. Based on what we know to date, we believe these disclosures have caused significant and irreversible harm to the security of the nation." In lieu of an interview about his career, Alexander's spokesperson recommended a laudatory profile about him that appeared in West Point magazine. It begins: "At key moments throughout its history, the United States has been fortunate to have the right leader -- someone with an ideal combination of rare talent and strong character -- rise to a position of great responsibility in public service. With General Keith B. Alexander ... Americans are again experiencing this auspicious state of affairs." Lawmakers and the public are increasingly taking a different view. They are skeptical about what Alexander has been doing with all the data he's collecting -- and why he's been willing to push the bounds of the law to get it. If he's going to preserve his empire, he'll have to mount the biggest charm offensive of his career. Fortunately for him, Alexander has spent as much time building a political base of power as a technological one. * * * Those who know Alexander say he is introspective, self-effacing, and even folksy. He's fond of corny jokes and puns and likes to play pool, golf, and Bejeweled Blitz, the addictive puzzle game, on which he says he routinely scores more than 1 million points. Alexander is also as skilled a Washington knife fighter as they come. To get the NSA job, he allied himself with the Pentagon brass, most notably Donald Rumsfeld, who distrusted Hayden and thought he had been trying to buck the Pentagon's control of the NSA. Alexander also called on all the right committee members on Capitol Hill, the overseers and appropriators who hold the NSA's future in their hands. When he was running the Army's Intelligence and Security Command, Alexander brought many of his future allies down to Fort Belvoir for a tour of his base of operations, a facility known as the Information Dominance Center. It had been designed by a Hollywood set designer to mimic the bridge of the starship Enterprise from Star Trek, complete with chrome panels, computer stations, a huge TV monitor on the forward wall, and doors that made a "whoosh" sound when they slid open and closed. Lawmakers and other important officials took turns sitting in a leather "captain's chair" in the center of the room and watched as Alexander, a lover of science-fiction movies, showed off his data tools on the big screen. "Everybody wanted to sit in the chair at least once to pretend he was Jean-Luc Picard," says a retired officer in charge of VIP visits. Alexander wowed members of Congress with his eye-popping command center. And he took time to sit with them in their offices and explain the intricacies of modern technology in simple, plain-spoken language. He demonstrated a command of the subject without intimidating those who had none. "Alexander is 10 times the political general as David Petraeus," says the former administration official, comparing the NSA director to a man who was once considered a White House contender. "He could charm the paint off a wall." Alexander has had to muster every ounce of that political savvy since the Snowden leaks started coming in June. In closed-door briefings, members of Congress have accused him of deceiving them about how much information he has been collecting on Americans. Even when lawmakers have screamed at him from across the table, Alexander has remained "unflappable," says a congressional staffer who has sat in on numerous private briefings since the Snowden leaks. Instead of screaming back, he reminds lawmakers about all the terrorism plots that the NSA has claimed to help foil. "He is well aware that he will be criticized if there's another attack," the staffer says. "He has said many times, 'My job is to protect the American people. And I have to be perfect.'" There's an implied threat in that statement. If Alexander doesn't get all the information he wants, he cannot do his job. "He never says it explicitly, but the message is, 'You don't want to be the one to make me miss,'" says the former administration official. "You don't want to be the one that denied me these capabilities before the next attack." Alexander has a distinct advantage over most, if not all, intelligence chiefs in the government today: He actually understands the multibillion-dollar technical systems that he's running. "When he would talk to our engineers, he would get down in the weeds as far as they were. And he'd understand what they were talking about," says a former NSA official. In that respect, he had a leg up on Hayden, who colleagues say is a good big-picture thinker but lacks the geek gene that Alexander was apparently born with. "He looked at the technical aspects of the agency more so than any director I've known," says Richard "Dickie" George, who spent 41 years at the NSA and retired as the technical director of the Information Assurance Directorate. "I get the impression he would have been happy being one of those guys working down in the noise," George said, referring to the front-line technicians and analysts working to pluck signals out of the network. Alexander, 61, has been a techno-spy since the beginning of his military career. After graduating from West Point in 1974, he went to West Germany, where he was initiated in the dark arts of signals intelligence. Alexander spent his time eavesdropping on military communications emanating from East Germany and Czechoslovakia. He was interested in the mechanics that supported this brand of espionage. He rose quickly through the ranks. "It's rare to get a commander who understands technology," says a former Army officer who served with Alexander in 1995, when Alexander was in charge of the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. "Even then he was into big data. You think of the wizards as the guys who are in their 20s." Alexander was 42 at the time. At the turn of the century, Alexander took the big-data approach to counterterrorism. How well that method worked continues to be a matter of intense debate. Surely discrete interceptions of terrorists' phone calls and emails have helped disrupt plots and prevent attacks. But huge volumes of data don't always help catch potential plotters. Sometimes, the drive for more data just means capturing more ordinary people in the surveillance driftnet. When he ran INSCOM and was horning in on the NSA's turf, Alexander was fond of building charts that showed how a suspected terrorist was connected to a much broader network of people via his communications or the contacts in his phone or email account. "He had all these diagrams showing how this guy was connected to that guy and to that guy," says a former NSA official who heard Alexander give briefings on the floor of the Information Dominance Center. "Some of my colleagues and I were skeptical. Later, we had a chance to review the information. It turns out that all [that] those guys were connected to were pizza shops." A retired military officer who worked with Alexander also describes a "massive network chart" that was purportedly about al Qaeda and its connections in Afghanistan. Upon closer examination, the retired officer says, "We found there was no data behind the links. No verifiable sources. We later found out that a quarter of the guys named on the chart had already been killed in Afghanistan." Those network charts have become more massive now that Alexander is running the NSA. When analysts try to determine if a particular person is engaged in terrorist activity, they may look at the communications of people who are as many as three steps, or "hops," removed from the original target. This means that even when the NSA is focused on just one individual, the number of people who are being caught up in the agency's electronic nets could easily be in the tens of millions. According to an internal audit, the agency's surveillance operations have been beset by human error and fooled by moving targets. After the NSA's legal authorities were expanded and the PRISM program was implemented, the agency inadvertently collected Americans' communications thousands of times each year, between 2008 and 2012, in violation of privacy rules and the law. Yet the NSA still pursued a counterterrorism strategy that relies on ever-bigger data sets. Under Alexander's leadership, one of the agency's signature analysis tools was a digital graph that showed how hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people, places, and events were connected to each other. They were displayed as a tangle of dots and lines. Critics called it the BAG -- for "big ass graph" -- and said it produced very few useful leads. CIA officials in charge of tracking overseas terrorist cells were particularly unimpressed by it. "I don't need this," a senior CIA officer working on the agency's drone program once told an NSA analyst who showed up with a big, nebulous graph. "I just need you to tell me whose ass to put a Hellfire missile on." Given his pedigree, it's unsurprising that Alexander is a devotee of big data. "It was taken as a given for him, as a career intelligence officer, that more information is better," says another retired military officer. "That was ingrained." But Alexander was never alone in his obsession. An obscure civilian engineer named James Heath has been a constant companion for a significant portion of Alexander's career. More than any one person, Heath influenced how the general went about building an information empire. Several former intelligence officials who worked with Heath described him as Alexander's "mad scientist." Another called him the NSA director's "evil genius." For years, Heath, a brilliant but abrasive technologist, has been in charge of making Alexander's most ambitious ideas a reality; many of the controversial data-mining tools that Alexander wanted to use against the NSA's raw intelligence were developed by Heath, for example. "He's smart, crazy, and dangerous. He'll push the technology to the limits to get it to do what he wants," says a former intelligence official. Heath has followed Alexander from post to post, but he almost always stays in the shadows. Heath recently retired from government service as the senior science advisor to the NSA director -- Alexander's personal tech guru. "The general really looked to him for advice," says George, the former technical director. "Jim didn't mind breaking some eggs to make an omelet. He couldn't do that on his own, but General Alexander could. They brought a sense of needing to get things done. They were a dynamic duo." Precisely where Alexander met Heath is unclear. They have worked together since at least 1995, when Alexander commanded the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade and Heath was his scientific sidekick. "That's where Heath took his first runs at what he called 'data visualization,' which is now called 'big data,'" says a retired military intelligence officer. Heath was building tools that helped commanders on the field integrate information from different sensors -- reconnaissance planes, satellites, signals intercepts -- and "see" it on their screens. Later, Heath would work with tools that showed how words in a document or pages on the Internet were linked together, displaying those connections in the form of three-dimensional maps and graphs. At the Information Dominance Center, Heath built a program called the "automatic ingestion manager." It was a search engine for massive sets of data, and in 1999, he started taking it for test runs on the Internet. In one experiment, the retired officer says, the ingestion manager searched for all web pages linked to the website of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Those included every page on the DIA's site, and the tool scoured and copied them so aggressively that it was mistaken for a hostile cyberattack. The site's automated defenses kicked in and shut it down. On another occasion, the searching tool landed on an anti-war website while searching for information about the conflict in Kosovo. "We immediately got a letter from the owner of the site wanting to know why was the military spying on him," the retired officer says. As far as he knows, the owner took no legal action against the Army, and the test run was stopped. Those experiments with "bleeding-edge" technology, as the denizens of the Information Dominance Center liked to call it, shaped Heath and Alexander's approach to technology in spy craft. And when they ascended to the NSA in 2005, their influence was broad and profound. "These guys have propelled the intelligence community into big data," says the retired officer. Heath was at Alexander's side for the expansion of Internet surveillance under the PRISM program. Colleagues say it fell largely to him to design technologies that tried to make sense of all the new information the NSA was gobbling up. But Heath had developed a reputation for building expensive systems that never really work as promised and then leaving them half-baked in order to follow Alexander on to some new mission. "He moved fairly fast and loose with money and spent a lot of it," the retired officer says. "He doubled the size of the Information Dominance Center and then built another facility right next door to it. They didn't need it. It's just what Heath and Alexander wanted to do." The Information Operations Center, as it was called, was underused and spent too much money, says the retired officer. "It's a center in search of a customer." Heath's reputation followed him to the NSA. In early 2010, weeks after a young al Qaeda terrorist with a bomb sewn into his underwear tried to bring down a U.S. airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day, the director of national intelligence, Dennis Blair, called for a new tool that would help the disparate intelligence agencies better connect the dots about terrorism plots. The NSA, the State Department, and the CIA each had possessed fragments of information about the so-called underwear bomber's intentions, but there had been no dependable mechanism for integrating them all and providing what one former national security official described as "a quick-reaction capability" so that U.S. security agencies would be warned about the bomber before he got on the plane. Blair put the NSA in charge of building this new capability, and the task eventually fell to Heath. "It was a complete disaster," says the former national security official, who was briefed on the project. "Heath's approach was all based on signals intelligence [the kind the NSA routinely collects] rather than taking into account all the other data coming in from the CIA and other sources. That's typical of Heath. He's got a very narrow viewpoint to solve a problem." Like other projects of Heath's, the former official says, this one was never fully implemented. As a result, the intelligence community still didn't have a way to stitch together clues from different databases in time to stop the next would-be bomber. Heath -- and Alexander -- moved on to the next big project. "There's two ways of looking at these guys," the retired military officer says. "Two visionaries who took risks and pushed the intelligence community forward. Or as two guys who blew a monumental amount of money." As immense as the NSA's mission has become -- patrolling the world's data fields in search of terrorists, spies, and computer hackers -- it is merely one phase of Alexander's plan. The NSA's primary mission is to protect government systems and information. But under his leadership, the agency is also extending its reach into the private sector in unprecedented ways. Toward the end of George W. Bush's administration, Alexander helped persuade Defense Department officials to set up a computer network defense project to prevent foreign intelligence agencies --mainly China's -- from stealing weapons plans and other national secrets from government contractors' computers. Under the Defense Industrial Base initiative, also known as the DIB, the NSA provides the companies with intelligence about the cyberthreats it's tracking. In return, the companies report back about what they see on their networks and share intelligence with each other. Pentagon officials say the program has helped stop some cyber-espionage. But many corporate participants say Alexander's primary motive has not been to share what the NSA knows about hackers. It's to get intelligence from the companies -- to make them the NSA's digital scouts. What is billed as an information-sharing arrangement has sometimes seemed more like a one-way street, leading straight to the NSA's headquarters at Fort Meade. "We wanted companies to be able to share information with each other," says the former administration official, "to create a picture about the threats against them. The NSA wanted the picture." After the DIB was up and running, Alexander proposed going further. "He wanted to create a wall around other sensitive institutions in America, to include financial institutions, and to install equipment to monitor their networks," says the former administration official. "He wanted this to be running in every Wall Street bank." That aspect of the plan has never been fully implemented, largely due to legal concerns. If a company allowed the government to install monitoring equipment on its systems, a court could decide that the company was acting as an agent of the government. And if surveillance were conducted without a warrant or legitimate connection to an investigation, the company could be accused of violating the Fourth Amendment. Warrantless surveillance can be unconstitutional regardless of whether the NSA or Google or Goldman Sachs is doing it. "That's a subtle point, and that subtlety was often lost on NSA," says the former administration official. "Alexander has ignored that Fourth Amendment concern." The DIB experiment was a first step toward Alexander's taking more control over the country's cyberdefenses, and it was illustrative of his assertive approach to the problem. "He was always challenging us on the defensive side to be more aware and to try and find and counter the threat," says Tony Sager, who was the chief operating officer for the NSA's Information Assurance Directorate, which protects classified government information and computers. "He wanted to know, 'Who are the bad guys? How do we go after them?'" While it's a given that the NSA cannot monitor the entire Internet on its own and that it needs intelligence from companies, Alexander has questioned whether companies have the capacity to protect themselves. "What we see is an increasing level of activity on the networks," he said recently at a security conference in Canada. "I am concerned that this is going to break a threshold where the private sector can no longer handle it and the government is going to have to step in." * * * Now, for the first time in Alexander's career, Congress and the general public are expressing deep misgivings about sharing information with the NSA or letting it install surveillance equipment. A Rasmussen poll of likely voters taken in June found that 68 percent believe it's likely the government is listening to their communications, despite repeated assurances from Alexander and President Barack Obama that the NSA is only collecting anonymous metadata about Americans' phone calls. In another Rasmussen poll, 57 percent of respondents said they think it's likely that the government will use NSA intelligence "to harass political opponents." Some who know Alexander say he doesn't appreciate the depth of public mistrust and cynicism about the NSA's mission. "People in the intelligence community in general, and certainly Alexander, don't understand the strategic value of having a largely unified country and a long-term trust in the intelligence business," says a former intelligence official, who has worked with Alexander. Another adds, "There's a feeling within the NSA that they're all patriotic citizens interested in protecting privacy, but they lose sight of the fact that people don't trust the government." Even Alexander's strongest critics don't doubt his good intentions. "He's not a nefarious guy," says the former administration official. "I really do feel like he believes he's doing this for the right reasons." Two of the retired military officers who have worked with him say Alexander was seared by the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and later the 9/11 attacks, a pair of major intelligence failures that occurred while he was serving in senior-level positions in military intelligence. They said he vowed to do all he could to prevent another attack that could take the lives of Americans and military service members. But those who've worked closely with Alexander say he has become blinded by the power of technology. "He believes they have enough technical safeguards in place at the NSA to protect civil liberties and perform their mission," the former administration official says. "They do have a very robust capability -- probably better than any other agency. But he doesn't get that this power can still be abused. Americans want introspection. Transparency is a good thing. He doesn't understand that. In his mind it's 'You should trust me, and in exchange, I give you protection.'" On July 30 in Las Vegas, Alexander sat down for dinner with a group of civil liberties activists and Internet security researchers. He was in town to give a keynote address the next day at the Black Hat security conference. The mood at the table was chilly, according to people who were in attendance. In 2012, Alexander had won plaudits for his speech at Black Hat's sister conference, Def Con, in which he'd implored the assembled community of experts to join him in their mutual cause: protecting the Internet as a safe space for speech, communications, and commerce. Now, however, nearly two months after the first leaks from Snowden, the people around the table wondered whether they could still trust the NSA director. His dinner companions questioned Alexander about the NSA's legal authority to conduct massive electronic surveillance. Two guests had recently written a New York Times op-ed calling the NSA's activities "criminal." Alexander was quick to debate the finer points of the law and defend his agency's programs -- at least the ones that have been revealed -- as closely monitored and focused solely on terrorists' information. But he also tried to convince his audience that they should help keep the NSA's surveillance system running. In so many words, Alexander told them: The terrorists only have to succeed once to kill thousands of people. And if they do, all of the rules we have in place to protect people's privacy will go out the window. Alexander cast himself as the ultimate defender of civil liberties, as a man who needs to spy on some people in order to protect everyone. He knows that in the wake of another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, the NSA will be unleashed to find the perpetrators and stop the next assault. Random searches of metadata, broad surveillance of purely domestic communications, warrantless seizure of stored communications -- presumably these and other extraordinary measures would be on the table. Alexander may not have spelled out just what the NSA would do after another homeland strike, but the message was clear: We don't want to find out. Alexander was asking his dinner companions to trust him. But his credibility has been badly damaged. Alexander was heckled at his speech the next day at Black Hat. He had been slated to talk at Def Con too, but the organizers rescinded their invitation after the Snowden leaks. And even among Alexander's cohort, trust is flagging. "You'll never find evidence that Keith sits in his office at lunch listening to tapes of U.S. conversations," says a former NSA official. "But I think he has a little bit of naivetÃ© about this controversy. He thinks, 'What's the problem? I wouldn't abuse this power. Aren't we all honorable people?' People get into these insular worlds out there at NSA. I think Keith fits right in." One of the retired military officers, who worked with Alexander on several big-data projects, said he was shaken by revelations that the agency is collecting all Americans' phone records and examining enormous amounts of Internet traffic. "I've not changed my opinion on the right balance between security versus privacy, but what the NSA is doing bothers me," he says. "It's the massive amount of information they're collecting. I know they're not listening to everyone's phone calls. No one has time for that. But speaking as an analyst who has used metadata, I do not sleep well at night knowing these guys can see everything. That trust has been lost."

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[liberationtech] Meet the 'cowboy' in charge of the NSA
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

Looks paywalled. Can someone liberate the document, and repost it here? ----- Forwarded message from Noah Shachtman <noah.shachtman(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 21:36:04 -0400 From: Noah Shachtman <noah.shachtman(a)gmail.com> To: liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Subject: [liberationtech] Meet the 'cowboy' in charge of the NSA X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1085) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> All: Sorry if this is considered spamming the list - if it is, it won't happen again. At Foreign Policy, we just published what I believe is the first major profile of NSA chief Keith Alexander. It is not a particularly flattering one. One scooplet among many in Shane Harris' nearly 6,000-word story: Even his fellow spies consider Keith Alexander to be a "cowboy" who's barely concerned with law. Anyway, take a look. Let me know what you think. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keit… All the best, nms -- Noah Shachtman Executive Editor for News | Foreign Policy 917-690-0716 noah.shachtman(a)gmail.com http://www.foreignpolicy.com/author/NoahShachtman encrypted phone: 415-463-4956 -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 22:35:02 -0700 From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> To: David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> Cc: Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography(a)randombit.net> Subject: Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:57 PM, David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> wrote: > ... > I've argued in private (and now here) that a large entropy pool is a natural > response to entropy famine and uneven supply, just like a large grain depot > guards against food shortages and uneven supply. this is a good analogy :) > ... The natural size for the state > shrinks to the block size of the crypto function being used for entropy > extraction for best effective performance, it seems memory bus(es) constrains the optimal transmission unit size. 4k extended instructions providing more throughput than repeated instructions at 512bit chunks. the worst case scenarios, you're passing entropy directly into AES native instructions, and/or onward to PCIe lanes... > This is one of the things that drove the design decisions in the RdRand > DRNG. With 2.5Gbps of 95% entropic data, there is no value in stirring the > data into a huge pool (E.G. like Linux) you keep coming back to this assumption that RDRAND is entirely trusted and always available. consider adding additional entropy sources like USB keys, scavengers like Dakarand or Haveged, and so forth. conversely to your argument, there is no harm in aggressively mixing a large pool with a high rate hardware entropy source. if you are one of the worst case scenarios, like seeding an entire new volume for full disk encryption with entropy, then you can manage accordingly and cut out the OS level, kernel pool middle man, system call boundary, and other overhead accordingly. > A consequence of Linux having a big pool is that the stirring algorithm is > expensive because it has to operate over a many bits. but not effectively expensive! again, i find very few the situations in which my modern processor is unable to keep a properly refilled aggressively reseeded /dev/random up to any demanded rate of consumption for high speed network services, common client side uses, most key generation, and so forth. if you are one of the worst case scenarios, like seeding an entire new volume for full disk encryption with entropy, then you can manage accordingly and cut out the OS level, kernel pool middle man, system call boundary, and other overhead > When I count my raw data in bits per second, rather than gigabits per > second, I am of course going to use them efficiently and mix up a large pot > of state, so I can get maximum utility. With the RdRand DRNG, the bus is the > limiting factor, not the supply or the pool size. fair enough, but consider the inverse, particularly for a skeptical audience knowing what we do now: why not mix aggressively with multiple sources if you have the CPU budget? why not provide access to the raw, un-mixed, un-encrypted, un-whitened, un-obfuscated state of the raw entropy bits for those so inclined to use it in such a manner? efforts to drive RDRAND into direct use instead of the kernel entropy pool in the linux kernel, efforts to steadfast refuse access to the raw entropy stream, are thus viewed with elements of suspicion and provide an air of lack of credibility. even with all of these concerns, i have publicly said and will continue to assert, using RDRAND is better than nothing. the current state of entropy on most operating systems and especially virtual machine environments on these operating systems, is very poor. it is just a shame this resource cannot be used to greater utility and confidence, as would be provided, were raw access be available. best regards, _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[liberationtech] Pew: Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Collin Anderson <collin(a)averysmallbird.com> ----- Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 01:24:15 -0400 From: Collin Anderson <collin(a)averysmallbird.com> To: "liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu" <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: [liberationtech] Pew: Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> This was linked to in the FP piece on Alexander, and should hopefully be of interest to many here in privacy and CFAA work (14% have used VPNs, Tor, etc). - Collin --- http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Anonymity-online/Summary-of-Findings.as… Most internet users would like to be anonymous online at least occasionally, but many think it is not possible to be completely anonymous online. New findings in a national survey show: - 86% of internet users have taken steps online to remove or mask their digital footprints—ranging from clearing cookies to encrypting their email, from avoiding using their name to using virtual networks that mask their internet protocol (IP) address. - 55% of internet users have taken steps to avoid observation by specific people, organizations, or the government - Still, 59% of internet users do not believe it is possible to be completely anonymous online, while 37% of them believe it is possible. A section of the survey looking at various security-related issues finds that notable numbers of internet users say they have experienced problems because others stole their personal information or otherwise took advantage of their visibility online—including hijacked email and social media accounts, stolen information such as Social Security numbers or credit card information, stalking or harassment, loss of reputation, or victimization by scammers. - 21% of internet users have had an email or social networking account compromised or taken over by someone else without permission. - 13% of internet users have experienced trouble in a relationship between them and a family member or a friend because of something the user posted online. - 12% of internet users have been stalked or harassed online. - 11% of internet users have had important personal information stolen such as their Social Security Number, credit card, or bank account information. - 6% of internet users have been the victim of an online scam and lost money. - 6% of internet users have had their reputation damaged because of something that happened online. - 4% of internet users have been led into physical danger because of something that happened online. - 1% of internet users have lost a job opportunity or educational opportunity because of something they posted online or someone posted about them. Some 68% of internet users believe current laws are not good enough in protecting people’s privacy online and 24% believe current laws provide reasonable protections. Most internet users know that key pieces of personal information about them are available online—such as photos and videos of them, their email addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, home addresses, and the groups to which they belong. And growing numbers of internet users (50%) say they are worried about the amount of personal information about them that is online—a figure that has jumped from 33% who expressed such worry in 2009. People would like control over their information, saying in many cases it is very important to them that only they or the people they authorize should be given access to such things as the content of their emails, the people to whom they are sending emails, the place where they are when they are online, and the content of the files they download. -- *Collin David Anderson* averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C. -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 22:05:33 -0700 From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> To: David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> Cc: Discussion of cryptography and related <cryptography(a)randombit.net> Subject: Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 9:26 PM, David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> wrote: > ... > #1) Maintaining a strong security boundary. > ... > #2) FIPS compliance. > ... > #3) Robust engineering. [trust us entirely] > ... > #4) Software solutions have been a demonstrable failure. [trust us instead] none of these are compelling reasons to not release raw access to the entropy stream from hardware noise sources.* clearly you have done your homework, and the design, _if trusted_, is a good one. however, denying access to the raw sources prevents any evaluation that the entropy sources are indeed operating as designed, and prevents any mode of operation where independent entropy estimates, mixing, and host/application pool seeding is possible. and surely you, when considering the point of view of an attacker, can recognize the immense value of modes (RDRAND, RDSEED) which provide only the obfuscated output to callers of these instructions. last but not least, you take these criticisms as personal attack. i have not seen anyone attack you personally. in fact, you simply do not have the clearance nor indoctrination to be trusted with such a backdoor. as per the leaked documents, early access to these designs is used to develop backdoors, exploits, and other surreptitious access available when the product is. keeping you in the dark, and enjoying your passionate rebuttals to claims of compromise, is more effective, isn't it? _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> ----- Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2013 21:57:43 -0700 From: David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> To: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] urandom vs random User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 8/17/2013 9:39 AM, Sandy Harris wrote: > Papers like Yarrow with respected authors argue convincingly that > systems with far smaller state can be secure. I've argued in private (and now here) that a large entropy pool is a natural response to entropy famine and uneven supply, just like a large grain depot guards against food shortages and uneven supply. If you've got lots of good quality random data available, you don't need a large state. You can just stir lots on raw data into a small state and the small state will become fully entropic. The natural size for the state shrinks to the block size of the crypto function being used for entropy extraction. Once the value is formed and fully entropic, you spit it out and start again. This is one of the things that drove the design decisions in the RdRand DRNG. With 2.5Gbps of 95% entropic data, there is no value in stirring the data into a huge pool (E.G. like Linux) so that you can live off that pool for a long time, even though the user isn't wiggling the mouse or whatever. There will be more random data along in under 300ps, so prepare another 256 bits from a few thousand raw bits and reseed. A consequence of Linux having a big pool is that the stirring algorithm is expensive because it has to operate over a many bits. So an LFSR is used because it's cheaper than a hash or MAC. An LFSR may be a good entropy extractor, but I don't know of any math that shows that to be the case. We do have that math for hashes, CBC-MACs and various GF arithmetic methods. When I count my raw data in bits per second, rather than gigabits per second, I am of course going to use them efficiently and mix up a large pot of state, so I can get maximum utility. With the RdRand DRNG, the bus is the limiting factor, not the supply or the pool size. DJ _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> ----- Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2013 21:26:24 -0700 From: David Johnston <dj(a)deadhat.com> To: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 9/7/2013 6:11 PM, James A. Donald wrote: > On 2013-09-07 9:14 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> That's the claimed design, yes. I see no particular reason to believe >> that the hardware in my server implements the design. I can't even test >> that the AES whitening does what it is documented to do, because Intel >> refused to provide access to the prewhitened input. > > On chip whitening is extremely suspicious behavior. Since the need > for random numbers is low bandwidth, on chip whitening is a waste > of silicon. > > Despite repeated requests, the decision to do whitening on chip has > never been explained. > I answered this once before many months ago, the last time you asked. There is no 'whitener'. It is a CBC-MAC based entropy extractor, as per the spec in the current SP800-90B draft. You can call it a whitener, but that would risk confusing it with things like the Von Neumann or Yuval Peres whiteners, which are a different class of algorithm with different constraints. The reasons for it are: #1) Maintaining a strong security boundary. We don't want an attacker to be able to infer the seed values by exposing them to all sorts of classes of attack by letting the values get into the system state accessible by the microprocessor SW. #2) FIPS compliance. Which is more or less #1 restated. It wants stuff to happen within a well defined boundary. #3) Robust engineering. Our goal is to make the lack-of-entropy problem go away on intel based products. Reseeding the DRBG 2 million times a second is a good way of making it hard to infer the state of the DRBG. This is one of several stages of mitigation design, intended to make the DRBG robust even if a problem should arise with any one of the stages. You can't do that in software. In general, once attackers have got a foot in the door of a software system, it is game over. #4) Software solutions have been a demonstrable failure. At least this hardware solution remains robust. #5) A non-goal is making James A Donald satisfied. Sorry, but no solution compatible with security and manufacturing realities is going to satisfy the demands you have made. DJ _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis(a)mit.edu> ----- Date: Sun, 8 Sep 2013 21:23:33 -0400 From: "Jeffrey I. Schiller" <jis(a)mit.edu> To: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> Cc: Cryptography <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 05:22:26PM -0700, John Gilmore wrote: > Speaking as someone who followed the IPSEC IETF standards committee > pretty closely, while leading a group that tried to implement it and > make so usable that it would be used by default throughout the > Internet, I noticed some things: > ... Speaking as one of the Security Area Directors at the time... I have to disagree with your implication that the NSA intentionally fouled the IPSEC working group. There were a lot of people working to foul it up! I also don’t believe that the folks who participated, including the folks from the NSA, were working to weaken the standard. I suspect that the effort to interfere in standards started later then the IPSEC work. If the NSA was attempting to thwart IETF security standards, I would have expected to also see bad things in the TLS working group and the PGP working group. There is no sign of their interference there. The real (or at least the first) problem with the IPSEC working group was that we had a good and simple solution, Photuris. However the document editor on the standard decided to claim it (Photuris) as his intellectual property and that others couldn’t recommend changes without his approval. This effectively made Photuris toxic in the working group and we had to move on to other solutions. This is one of the events that lead to the IETF’s “Note Well” document and clear policy on the IP associated with contributions. Then there was the ISAKMP (yes, an NSA proposal) vs. SKIP. As Security AD, I eventually had to choose between those two standards because the working group could not generate consensus. I believed strongly enough that we needed an IPSEC solution so I decided to choose (as I promised the working group I would do if they failed to!). I chose ISAKMP. I posted a message with my rationale to the IPSEC mailing list, I’m sure it is still in the archives. I believe that was in 1996 (I still have a copy somewhere in my personal archives). At no point was I contacted by the NSA or any agent of any government in an attempt to influence my decision. Folks can choose to believe this statement, or not. IPSEC in general did not have significant traction on the Internet in general. It eventually gained traction in an important niche, namely VPNs, but that evolved later. IPSEC isn’t useful unless all of the end-points that need to communicate implement it. Implementations need to be in the OS (for all practical purposes). OS vendors at the time were not particularly interested in encryption of network traffic. The folks who were interested were the browser folks. They were very interested in enabling e-commerce, and that required encryption. However they wanted the encryption layer someplace where they could be sure it existed. An encryption solution was not useful to them if it couldn’t be relied upon to be there. If the OS the user had didn’t have an IPSEC layer, they were sunk. So they needed their own layer. Thus the Netscape guys did SSL, and Microsoft did PCT and in the IETF we were able to get them to work together to create TLS. This was a *big deal*. We shortly had one deployed interoperable encryption standard usable on the web. If I was the NSA and I wanted to foul up encryption on the Internet, the TLS group is where the action was. Yet from where I sit, I didn’t see any such interference. If we believe the Edward Snowden documents, the NSA at some point started to interfere with international standards relating to encryption. But I don’t believe they were in this business in the 1990’s at the IETF. -Jeff -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFSLSMV8CBzV/QUlSsRAigkAKCU6erw1U7FOt7A1QdItlGbFRfo+gCfeMg1 0Woyz0FyKqKYqS+gZFQWEf0= =yWOw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '13

09 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Kent Borg <kentborg(a)borg.org> ----- Date: Sun, 08 Sep 2013 20:34:55 -0400 From: Kent Borg <kentborg(a)borg.org> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130804 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 09/08/2013 06:16 PM, John Kelsey wrote: > I don't think you can do anything useful in crypto without some > good source of random bits. I don't see the big worry about how hard it is to generate random numbers unless: a) You need them super fast (because you are Google, trying to secure your very high-speed long lines), or b) You are some embedded device that is impoverished for both sources of entropy and non-volatile storage, and you need good random bits the moment you boot. On everything in between, there are sources of entropy. Collect them, hash then together and use them to feed some good cryptography. If you seem short of entropy, look for more in your hardware manual. Hash in any local unique information. Hash in everything you can find! (If the NSA knows every single bit you are hashing in, no harm, hash them in anyway, but...if the NSA has misunderestimated any one of your bits...then you scored a bit! Repeat as necessary.) I am thinking pure HW RNGs are more sinful than pure SW RNGs, because real world entropy is colored and hardware is the wrong place to fix that. So don't buy HW RNGs, buy HW entropy sources (or find them in your current HW) and feed them into a good hybrid RNG. On a modern multi-GHz CPU the exact LSB of your highspeed system counters, when the interrupt hits your service routine, has uncertainty that is quite real once the you push the NSA a few centimeters from your CPU or SoC. Just sit around until you have a few network packets and you can have some real entropy. Wait longer for more entropy. In case you did notice, I am a fan of hybrid HW/SW RNGs. -kb P.S. Entropy pools that are only saved on orderly shutdowns are risking crash-and-playback attacks. Save regularly, or something like that. P.P.S. Don't try to estimate entropy, it is a fool's errand, get as much as you can (within reason) and feed it into some good cryptography. P.P.P.S. Have an independent RNG? If it *is* independent, no harm in XORing it in. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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