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CIA Project CHAOS/MHCHAOS
by Gregory Foster 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Document Exploitation (Feb 26) - "Confirmed: The CIA Destroyed Its Noam Chomsky File and Thousands More on Other U.S. Citizens": http://www.docexblog.com/2014/02/confirmed-cia-destroyed-its-noam.html > The file [scheduled for destruction] contains 7840 of a total of > 8,328 folders on individual U.S. persons (citizens, resident > aliens) and 2,196 volumes consisting of official and "soft" subject > files and so-called sensitive files (i.e., > organizations/activities), individual documents, and the index > related to these collections which were established under project > CHAOS during the period 1967-1974. The files were opened to > maintain information bearing on possible foreign Communist > exploitation of dissention in the United States, primarily > concerning the Vietnam War. Subjects of the folders were U.S. > citizens and organizations involved in dissident activities in the > United States. Now about that alleged CIA/FBI line between foreign and domestic surveillance... Also interesting as a historical precedent for why the NSA should be required to retain records in its databases which otherwise would be (allegedly) automatically purged on schedule: they are evidence of crimes helpful for active lawsuits. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCgQqQ… HT the invaluable @saftergood, gf - -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.19 (Darwin) Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJTDrP6AAoJEMaAACmjGtgj2IsP/1P4Xc/ZBmm7TImxGrsVxjJQ Nu0HU+YltOAS68NbDfCKo/yQhYnDkvbjjuEO6WiTmEtf9C6sr1f0Xitr2n7PZEft BC397hkp02i8xZGeny5dn3JENe/8DNromdGfO+v5/oQ3ZNURNX+S8aIWxAVHL2ws ebxuR5CrlWFFhbg9H9YAMDe0DtXc54vWoEXC36rEpvKLpTWC5LZl8QuikbtuIC9m xW8LhwQMKUDT/mZFQ+W0W6KAFWlWHMEWRC2mEL2aKucbf2rfND7FX/pgYyeRjUeF iLrI8orHqJKDtddeFNO0agTz21v2+4D88hFk/4FjRdrUAFNHcAy7XrF9zwDP/Kzm jqcWFIFjEbPTDxRR4tXlA5aMnkqose+N77LRXk4YKACgfmK+cPaYkVaPCgJ4D7uO pOZSRnduRkdI6VPdvVww8AvHYGhkbwDUBGc7CQN1WMiBtyLSHsnji7stxDsIMVze ervt8ZkjGWJWT/BgFsJYUE/MH8TCMd0m3y2jmQG9nVwyYURCz8fn+AiOMgv2rynB +aSA6SqCQiXKpAT6GGbRvijUmmVY9Bx3jUzqh72jGp3ANRq53E+ySS4z6TPXe3e5 P6QvCvNegnTEhdgy4zc5Q9buwdShQEZRVC/7YetmodloT3czjBX3me/nTGvpFxwy jAoQVJ2hSDA1L5jCBLyI =L5rJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Test #1
by Cypher 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

This is a test to validate if I am properly receiving list email. I've not seen anything in a few days. Cypher

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Red Pike cipher
by Anonymous Remailer (austria) 10 Mar '14

10 Mar '14

/* Red Pike cipher source code */ #include <stdint.h> typedef uint32_t word; #define CONST 0x9E3779B9 #define ROUNDS 16 #define ROTL(X, R) (((X) << ((R) & 31)) | ((X) >> (32 - ((R) & 31)))) #define ROTR(X, R) (((X) >> ((R) & 31)) | ((X) << (32 - ((R) & 31)))) void encrypt(word * x, const word * k) { unsigned int i; word rk0 = k[0]; word rk1 = k[1]; for (i = 0; i < ROUNDS; i++) { rk0 += CONST; rk1 -= CONST; x[0] ^= rk0; x[0] += x[1]; x[0] = ROTL(x[0], x[1]); x[1] = ROTR(x[1], x[0]); x[1] -= x[0]; x[1] ^= rk1; } rk0 = x[0]; x[0] = x[1]; x[1] = rk0; } void decrypt(word * x, const word * k) { word dk[2] = { k[1] - CONST * (ROUNDS + 1), k[0] + CONST * (ROUNDS + 1) }; encrypt(x, dk); }

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Re: [Cryptography] See??? Satoshi Nakamoto Smeared
by Lodewijk andré de la porte 08 Mar '14

08 Mar '14

On Mar 8, 2014 3:42 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Actually RAH did invent BitCoin and was feeling the heat a little and so used some of the $0.5 Billion he stashed away in BTC to hire an actor to pretend to be Satoshi. To act as a distraction... > > > The disclosure of Satoshi might be the start of the end for BTC. Before BitCoin was a tabula risa on which everyone could write their own goals for a perfect currency. Stop talking out of your ass wil you?... ->Newsweek<- > It also means that his family are at risk of being kidnapped by the seedy types that BTC has attracted. > > > -- > Website: http://hallambaker.com/ > > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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Re: [Cryptography] See??? Satoshi Nakamoto Smeared
by Robert Hettinga 08 Mar '14

08 Mar '14

On Mar 7, 2014, at 9:24 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Actually RAH did invent BitCoin and was feeling the heat a little and so used some of the $0.5 Billion he stashed away in BTC to hire an actor to pretend to be Satoshi. To act as a distraction... > Dang. It almost worked, too… Poor bastard. Cheers, RAH

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Bounties
by Bob Hettinga 08 Mar '14

08 Mar '14

They're talking about offering bounties on anyone who touches Satoshi Nakamoto. Somewhere, Jim Bell is laughing… Cheers, RAH

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Re: [Cryptography] Are Tor hidden services really hidden?
by John Young 08 Mar '14

08 Mar '14

"Also keep in mind that there are no confirmed on the record cases to date of a Tor 'break/weakness' having been used to find a user. It appears to be only user error." One of the perdurable claims of comsec promoters is that comsec breaks and weaknesses inevitably turn out to be user errors. Exactly who the fictitious user is remains obscure but assuredly means somebody other than the comsec promoter user who inevitably offers a greatly improved product, trust them. Tor is especially adept at blaming users, itself faultless except for lack of volunteers to patch its innumerable holes (caused by clueless users), so much so one might think that is a feature derived from the religion of national security (actually that is its source and shows its heritage of exculpability) which inevitably fails due to lack of funding, political will, public support, unwillingness of youngsters to die for officer careers, that is customers must suffer for company profits. Has there been a better account of inevitable exculpability for inevitable comsec failure than that by NSA in 1998? <http://www.nsa.gov/research/_files/publications/inevitability.pdf>http://www.nsa.gov/research/_files/publications/inevitability.pdf Still hope continues -- thanks to Edward Snowden and his legions of inevitable comsec failure promoters: Cyber Security Market Forecast 2014-2024: Prospects For Leading Companies in Military, Government, Critical Infrastructure & Private Sector Protection Defence report Cyber attacks continue to dominate the headlines, and with good reason. While the threat of cyber security is often exaggerated, there is no doubt that the enhanced networking of society has created substantial vulnerabilities lurking within its interconnected pathways. With attackers able to strike from anywhere and inflict damage on a significant (but often unnoticed) scale, the threat has never been greater to the reams of knowledge held by governments and enterprise. There is also the threat to military information sharing networks representing a significant challenge: in an era of increased integration between systems and platforms, the very webs which act as force multipliers could collapse. Efforts to counter these extensive vulnerabilities are presently ongoing to an impressive degree, and the speed of these developments is not expected to lessen unduly. As a consequence, visiongain has assessed that the value of the global Cyber Security market in 2014 will reach $76.68bn. Why you should buy Cyber Security Market Forecast 2014-2024: Prospects For Leading Companies in Military, Government, Critical Infrastructure & Private Sector Protection

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Obscurity via Cross-Coin Exchanges
by Cathal Garvey 07 Mar '14

07 Mar '14

Hey all, As it came up in the Mt Gox asides in one of the variously titled threads on Nakomoto etc.: Bitcoin's pretty pseudonymous, rather than anonymous. Coin transactions are public, and some can be pinned to real identities, vendors or products, while others can be well inferred, leaving a smaller, hard to quantify set of "really anonymous" addresses, coins and transactions. Added to that, you have coin "taint" and badly patched wallets that mix coins from other addresses when sending payments, correlating various receiving addresses in one single transaction. There are laundries, but my understanding is that they're not highly regarded; their methods may be questionable, potentially they can be untangled. Without a large enough set of users, you have little guarantee of laundering; if only Alice and Bob pay in, and Alice and Bob receive out, then the recipient set is clearly too bad to protect them! OK, big problem. Zerocoin was designed to help fix that problem, by minting a zero-knowledge-proof based 'coin, but it hasn't yet been implemented. What about simply exchanging different blockchain based coins, though? Would that not help to "launder" with reasonable efficacy, provided both participants use crypto to hide the transaction? From the outside, transactions occur on both blockchains, but there's no "data trail" correlating the transactions with one another as there is within each blockchain. So, Alice buys .4 btc from a friend, but knows the friend's opsec might be poor, or that the transaction may have occurred over a bad channel, or that the coins were purchased from an exchange that demands valid phone numbers, etc.: she wants to launder. She contacts Bob, a Dogecoin seller, to set up a private exchange. She asks him to sell her 0.4btc worth of Dogecoin in two transactions of unequal value (to prevent analysis by exchange rate to ID their transaction). They conduct the exchange over an encrypted channel. From the outside, someone knows she's laundering, and just bought Dogecoin, but because they don't know her Dogecoin receiving addresses, they've lost the scent; she now has 0.4btc worth of Dogecoin, and can convert that back to btc again in the same way. In a round trip, she's broken the chain; she keeps her value, minus fees, of 0.4btc, but now it's in different btc, with no blockchain-recorded transaction logs to link the original, tainted btc to the new, clean btc. As a way for an individual to "launder", does this look plausible? Is it any better or worse than laundries as they currently exist? -- Please help support my crowdfunding campaign, IndieBB: Currently at 44.8% of funding goal, with 6 days left: http://igg.me/at/yourfirstgmo/x/4252296 T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +3538763663185 W: http://indiebiotech.com

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See???
by Robert Hettinga 07 Mar '14

07 Mar '14

I *told* you I wasn’t Satoshi. ;-) Poor bastard... Cheers, RAH

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a speech
by dan＠geer.org 06 Mar '14

06 Mar '14

Perhaps of some relevance here. We Are All Intelligence Officers Now invited address to the RSA Conference, San Francisco, 28 February 2014 http://geer.tinho.net/geer.rsa.28ii14.txt --dan

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