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Re: [cryptography] How big a speedup through storage?
by grarpamp 21 Jun '14

21 Jun '14

On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 6:35 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey(a)goldmark.org> wrote: > (I hope it is clear that I do not think of this as anything like a practical > threat to AES. Of course, 8 rounds at 2^unreachable is not practical. > I had just remembered this paper, with its enormous data > requirements when I saw original question.) >>> Any (reliable) estimates on how big? > >> $10M in drives at consumer pricing will get you a raw 177PB, or 236PB at >> double the space and power. Or $1B for 17EB. Budget is an issue. > > As always, let’s go with the high estimate in the hands of the attacker. We > are still far far short of the storage requirements for this particular attack > (and all for less than a 2-bit gain). > > So I think that it is safe to say that all that data storage is not an attempt > to use the particular attack I cited. I meant as answer 'estimates on how big' question. Take what we know about storage, figure in some good efficiencies for the 'storage only' case. And figure what can be bought and operated year on year per foot. You could hide/support $1B + $1B/year but $10B/yr would be hard given entire intel budget is $80B, or $50+B if you drop mil. So... 1) How big can you get within budget? 2) What can you do with it re: a) crypto, or b) otherwise? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_intelligence_budget https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Community http://www.martingrandjean.ch/data-visualization-top-secret-us-intelligence…

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Fwd: [cryptography] [Cryptography] encrypting hard drives (was Re: Shredding a file on a flash-based file system?)
by coderman 21 Jun '14

21 Jun '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 2:27 PM Subject: Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] encrypting hard drives (was Re: Shredding a file on a flash-based file system?) On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 4:18 PM, Dan McDonald <danmcd(a)kebe.com> wrote: > ZFS crypto, closed-source thanks to Oracle, was supposed to address this > problem. Its design was to apply crypto in the "ZIO" path, like it does for > checksums. I've not used Oracle Solaris, but apparently ZFS crypto is in > there and it supposedly works. And as in the design papers/blogs, Oracle ZFS seems to have some data that is not encrypted that arguably should be. https://blogs.oracle.com/darren/entry/zfs_encryption_what_is_on > And let me state for people wondering, "Why isn't it in OpenZFS already?" In the OpenZFS world, you deploy each OS's FDE underneath ZFS. OpenZFS will likely add native encryption feature flag someday to satiate those who want per dataset keying, etc... but, thanks to Oracle, anything post zfs28/zpool5 might not end up interoperating. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZFS http://www.open-zfs.org/

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Re: Assange
by John Young 20 Jun '14

20 Jun '14

Virtually nobody is not exploiting Assange for their own purposes. Kristinn Hrafnsson is among the media monsters, pro and con, creating and feeding a market for their derivative shallowness of Assange's fame. Our latest derivative exploitation over eight years: http://cryptome.org/2014/06/saluations-assange.htm To be sure, Assange has derivatively exploited Cypherpunks since about 1995, naming a book, articles, talks, brags, after this collective as if his own. That ownership, to be certain, is a given of this list as it should be everywhere to combat the thieves and spies of content, branded, marked up and marketed by way of centralizing media monstrosities. Combat between cryptoarchists of centralized control and cryptoanarchists of distributed uncontrol wll go on forever. Assange's fame and infame are being fought over by centralizers and decentralzers. Which way he will tip is his secret of controlling the tusslers as well as what he whispers to those he is fucking.

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Re: [cryptography] How big a speedup through storage?
by grarpamp 20 Jun '14

20 Jun '14

On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey(a)goldmark.org> wrote: > On 2014-06-19, at 10:42 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l(a)odewijk.nl> wrote: > >> With common algorithms, how much would a LOT of storage help? > > Well, with an unimaginable amount of storage it is possible to shave a few bits off of AES. > > As {Bogdanov, Andrey and Khovratovich, Dmitry and Rechberger, Christian} say in Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (ASIACRYPT 2011) [PDF at http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/cryptanalysis/aesbc.pdf ] > > "This approach for 8-round AES-128 yields a key recovery with computational complexity about 2^125.34, data complexity 2^88, memory complexity 2^8, and success probability 1.” > > It’s that 2^88 that requires a LOT of storage. I’m not sure if that 2^88) is in bits or AES blocks, but let’s assume bits. Facebook is said to store about 2^62 bits, so we are looking at something 2^26 times larger than Facebook’s data storage. 8 rounds, lot more to go. >> I know this one organization that seems to be building an omnious observation storage facility, > > Any (reliable) estimates on how big? I believe the square footage is public, if not guesstimate by parking spaces etc in JYA's sat photos. Then fill it to the brim with nothing but 6TB drives, less some space for racks, aisles, power, network at say 50% better density than industry best [1]. That's your physical upper bound. $10M in drives at consumer pricing will get you a raw 177PB, or 236PB at double the space and power. Or $1B for 17EB. Budget is an issue. Give it a shot on paper, best estimate wins... [1] If all you care about is storage, you plug drives into tiny custom storage fabric asics and present giant block devices at the end of each row or room, not into bulky servers. Commodity CPU's have 64bit address space, ZFS covers that. Or go custom access/compute on your data as well. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZFS#Capacity

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Assange
by Александр 20 Jun '14

20 Jun '14

http://rt.com/op-edge/167324-assange-wikileaks-human-rights/ http://rt.com/op-edge/163608-assange-god-lonely-man/

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Ars Thecnica TrueCrypt Disinformation Article ???
by Jose Damico 20 Jun '14

20 Jun '14

This article from Ars (http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/06/following-truecrypts-bombshell-advi…) ****** Following TrueCrypt’s bombshell advisory, developer says fork is “impossible” TrueCrypt developer withholds permission, suggests "starting from scratch." ****** Seems to be a text inserted by some Intelligence Agency, as part of a disinformation agenda, with the aim of sowing fear in those who has interest in fork TrueCrypt. For me, there are no real facts demonstrated in the article. Also at end of the day, some organization or institution must claim the ownership of truecrypt in order to protect its interests over the source code. Am I right? What do you think? yap

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Introduction to crypto
by Ankit Kulshrestha 20 Jun '14

20 Jun '14

Hey guys, This is my first post at cypherpunks... I'm new to the field of crypto and have done only some basic crypto work.I was wondering if you could provide me some papers on crypto and network security ... I'm working on developing secure embedded devices this summer

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Tell a lie, remove the gear: How the NSA covers up when cable taps are found
by jim bell 19 Jun '14

19 Jun '14

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/tell-a-lie-remove-the-gear-how-t… Tell a lie, remove the gear: How the NSA covers up when cable taps are found Get caught, remove the evidence, and come up with a plausible cover story. by Nate Anderson - June 19 2014, 10:56am PDT23Der Spiegel via Edward Snowden via NSA Sometimes, the spooks do get caught. German magazine Der Spiegel yesterday revealed a new slide (PDF) from the Edward Snowden document cache that offers a tantalizing glimpse of what it looks like when someone stumbles on an intelligence agency cable tap. The NSA's Special Source Operations (SSO) branch isn't in the business of computer hacking but of cable tapping; its logo shows an eagle flying above the globe and clutching a string of wires in its talons. These taps, each obscured with a codename, are often made deep within the network of telecom providers and often with the cooperation of key executives. But sometimes non-cleared people start raising questions about just what might be going on, as was the case with AT&T whistleblower Mark Klein, who revealed an NSA "secret room" in San Francisco. On March 14, 2013, an SSO weekly briefing included a note regarding such a discovery. The unit had been informed two days earlier that "the access point for WHARPDRIVE was discovered by commercial consortium personnel. Witting partner personnel have removed the evidence and a plausible cover story was provided. All collection has ceased." According to Der Spiegel, Wharpdrive was a fiber-optic cable tap (underseas fiber is often laid by consortia of companies, so it's possible this took place at an onshore landing point for such a cable). Employees from one of the companies involved—though not the company that had a relationship with NSA and the German intelligence agency BND—apparently noticed some unusual gear and commented on it. In response, the company involved with the NSA ("witting partner personnel") removed the tap and made up a story to explain what the gear in question had been doing. Though the NSA lost access to Wharpdrive, it wasn't for long. Der Spiegel cites additional documents in its possession and says that "a team was quietly put together to reinstall the program."

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Re: Tor DNSBL
by Seth 18 Jun '14

18 Jun '14

On Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:21:12 -0700, Scott Blaydes <scott(a)sbce.org> wrote: > Started running a Tor relay node yesterday and found myself on the DAN > TOR DNS Blacklist. Just wondered if anyone else running a node had any > issues with email while running a relay node on the same server? Yes, I've had a handful outbound emails bounce because of that stupid blacklist. (I run a Tor relay and mail server from home on the same public IP) Guy running the blacklist won't even allow you view his dumb-ass blacklist web page (https://www.dan.me.uk/dnsbl) from any Tor exit or *or non-exit relay node* for that matter. Which is just pure idiocy because it takes about 10 seconds to circumvent the block for anybody with two braincells to rub together. (ever heard of GOOGLE CACHE ya JACK-ASS?!!) Just goes to show you the mindset of the person running the thing IMO. As for inbound email to an IP running a Tor relay, I have had zero problems that I am aware of. Just hit up mailgun or sendgrid for a free personal relay account or grab a cheap VPS to relay all your outbound mail through and you're golden. -- Seth Thank you for trimming your replies

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Fwd: [Cryptography] bitcoins over the air
by grarpamp 17 Jun '14

17 Jun '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Sampo Syreeni <decoy(a)iki.fi> Date: Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 8:59 PM Subject: [Cryptography] bitcoins over the air To: cryptography-list <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> In case people are interested in a project of a friend of mine, Joel Lehtonen (aka Zouppen) is on a fast track to implementing Bitcoin transaction and blockchain broadcast over the airwaves. Everything is half done, so he might need some help; at the same time that half-done then also includes half the funding, half the code, and half the negotiation with the Finnish monopoly DVB-T provider, Digita, to actually broadcast the stuff to a couple of million strong. Even if it's just a test, it's already well on its way to happening in a month or so; so it will. If people are willing to chip in, especially with funding, deeper code knowhow, radio-fu, and the rest of the useful ones, do contact him, or me (aka decoy), on FB/G+/IRCNet/freenode, or better yet join #bitcoinradio on the latter. In particular we don't have any idea of how to push transactions back towards the network over any sort of cheap-to-free, preferably universal radio path. If you do, even in a quilted fashion, we'd really like to know. And since the only ones who're really allowed to experiment on them waves today are hams, those of you who possess that qualification, your input is in the direst of needs. Finally, I hope this isn't too much off topic; it *is* about spreading a cryptocurrency and finding its optimal OTA protocols, after all. Not perhaps the most usual stuff on-list nowadays...but certainly the kind of across-the-board architectural stuff the list started out with, in the crypto days of yonder. I hope it fits. -- Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - decoy(a)iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front +358-40-3255353, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2 _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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