- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Alleged "microkernel mathematically proven to be bug free"
by Georgi Guninski 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

news: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/28/aussie_droneprotecting_hackerdetect… site: http://sel4.systems/ AFAICT they used Isabelle for the proofs. Coq sucks much (not counting its developers).

7 22

Re: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"
by grarpamp 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

> I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. Proliferation is a political means. Keep on proliferating, proliferate widely, proliferate fast, get all your friends and business on it, get the public on it, remove the capability for legacy plaintext, and embed and entrench crypto deeper than the Marianas. Also, call/visit/write your MP/congresscritter and give them your concerns about backdoors and your freedom/rights, your life being meta'd, recorded, analyzed and stored forever for no good reason (for which an interest in crypto and speech isn't one). Proliferate and speak! On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 5:24 PM, John Denker <jsd(a)av8n.com> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Today's Gomorrah Post has a long article in the "National Security" > section: > > Ellen Nakashima > "Proliferation of new online communications services > poses hurdles for law enforcement" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/proliferation-of-new-… > > I see no particular reason to believe a single word of what > it says. Virtually all of the evidence supporting the main > conclusion is "according FBI officials and others" ... which > puts it in the same category as the "stories" Judy Miller > wrote for the New Ys Times in the runup to the Irag war. > http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/international/middleeast/08IRAQ.html?ex=1… > > Positive reasons for disbelieving the main thrust of that > story is that if the authorities want to search somebody's > bedroom, they can still do it; they just (sometimes!) can't > do it quite so cheaply. That can't do it without getting > up from their comfy armchairs. > > The article contradicts Bill Frantz's assumption that all > present-day crypto is ineffective. I tend to disbelieve > both extremes. I reckon any lock can be picked or drilled > out /if somebody wants to badly enough/ ... but this does > not mean that all locks are completely useless. > > > There is a companion article that lets the cat out of the > bag: > > Ellen Nakashima > "The government wants to wiretap online communications > — or in some cases hack them" > http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/07/25/the-government… > > Both articles appear to be part of a PR campaign to lay > the groundwork for a new CALEA-on-steroids law that would > reportedly require every ISP and every app developer to > provide hooks to enable armchair/pushbutton wiretapping. > > Before you say that such a law is impossible, especially > in the context of open-source software, let me point out > that most people on earth /already/ live under regimes > where use (or even possession) of an unregistered encryption > device is a serious crime. > > I don't see any technical/cryptological way to defeat the > proposed US law; it looks like a political problem that > needs to be dealt with by political means. > > Tangentially related: On 07/24/2014 09:13 PM, Peter Gutmann > wrote: >> [....] should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the >> keys so you'll have to let me go"). This [imprisonment] perfectly >> sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the >> Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. > > I am certainly not an international lawyer, but we can all read > the plain language of the law. Under the otherwise-Draconian > UK RIP law, the Rumpelstiltskin defense is explicitly allowed: > http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/53 > > Also note that if such a defense is not possible, you are already > a criminal, because of the encrypted "message" below, which you > have already received. > a) You don't know the decryption key, although nobody can prove > that you don't. > b) You cannot obtain the key from me or anyone else, because > I destroyed the public key /before/ encrypting the message, > although nobody can prove that I did. > c) Furthermore I can tell you that the plaintext consisted of > 512 bytes of high-grade randomness that wasn't seen or recorded, > although nobody can prove that either. > > I encourage you to forward my "message" to all your legislators, > along with lots of similar messages. > > To say the same thing in more constructive terms: This serves > as an example of /cover traffic/. It allows you to say with > complete sincerity that at least "some" of the data you hold > is undecryptable. > > Adversaries will have to consider the hypothesis that I'm > engaging in some bizarre yet effective steganography, hiding > a tree in the front row of the forest. Nobody can prove /or/ > disprove this hypothesis. > > > - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > > hQIMA9jh5gIisxa+AQ//T8x3vgxCVqq6cCNln4TW5r8H6JeHqD1txxEy+jOiybvb > mvdcut6uQQqu/eFkV06rK+1K5LoUWemqTpAgz/E7MKtNsvYv4gardebFLRDxgn3v > WW01mc6XKqH+xpDoqabDN+Mc2jeQGhDD+fBBCMCePx/ca8iJ1gjVL93A3L+2AVan > PJFsRsoCx8X/DoUpIQOqCm0XOJrS+anVTrSOdVSo4t/V4QF7yx+51yi4ro26eAz0 > 5vCm+afMQSMIvZcpK54LI+oWUITQGP8ZhD2+B5HsIUh9nmcZjRr5fK+edGe6tS3W > aam0pQHWrkmyyjfKxNVfxK/aujrboHVybF9sP0tN8wUhFh7Tdj8F1e5EtPppXB/p > DoC7O3SQ30HHCCeNSLMErMzsniw+fHmL6zoE/UnkAsQZ1HJvg/9OD/dxJP/BaMwr > RUwG73wKPBp9m5ROs0tRopBNFcRXtM6hg/1i9ZE8IcbZcsgfcGwUdeo4qbYvhtyR > XU1FfQRyIhW7KRXQeWFSmMS1AWYMl0fX6n02qTbTSmUY7bujdEpOH3Dz8ndSKsjK > q0IWmXXcCpc9OGbiwSRhNgbxQBVu2tZ4ntk8vC+deM9itR7CMo94p95gvZQ9H7dU > fTKHb28jel8Y7CL7MYfcXpeO/vZIsj9H5GnJc+pSOuY8ueR/rTauJZux2DlIrwbS > 6QGqzHz6PaJ4NqoeyL7IiMJDNM4panzYqa4/Shfk3fiTol4FDLCdXMtT3V6eiPOn > GKGjjpbZ/3FP9cJrepM5wuHaesWnyoDO96FYTmqNqgw31r3Cg5sn1JrL6hcguN1x > CHc7mu5yTrft98pjk5olWaCyvqco0OqK3aID+IAKVJgfJV/2FWZE8KMpw+NvJosn > g6UwwN4PMUpq+CGgPRyRx12RzyP8iFxp8J8D0nS8H+BMSOA/+E2Mny54zjFrDUsH > amzFM9QlwCIrBQJ50V+OwTDzCnQVXlsbIV9kH6YaZDKo7vFIuyi7myr6mYttbh5o > m6xgSNQMSLDabyvKQ9l1GX9pQGzR0KPQRR/yn/frQDLydz5qhVEWTwprwxwGSBa/ > lVjLWTsYqqwl1SErI/FfTqJuWGSZUWqy2kUOzTmi5DA+tOvbspaghO5Aqxim/emG > Sz0DoRcR74zgUNLAAzUN4aZIBxfsO9HSqIXq9I6fK4cT6VBMYKjaJh23Hf2qOiuA > Z2g5nl+oT5CDzTlzzIMHZmCTkEjtNDAK+lb6SBCp8ScHcjafcm/cO9gNMV4+EBks > PgEm1eutCEpOpGIOHjcsFV1ryZonB8U0VmbpsxqsDE1Y0l1u6bEUKTMeJoHfEeTe > Q4wdo5LxbKt4LGQACopwX4NNdfupdPNT2SyiGCu7Vh+0P78+IEewbpRetW1KpNg3 > MXWd7sWh2tnA9cRzPwYhvUtUsj0L/GXLOKO9bMH8qfivOnsp5lbRnr6KAKoqzn2L > 3g== > =OuR2 > - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1 > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iQIVAwUBU9LLD/O9SFghczXtAQJedA//UoclobLIQI4cKNu2V/bNIxUxEGb71pXr > QCQJJJQgMbK0kAE9pf6uFldur3m3kDOtPeQEx8AUZ4pS7YEPkE8mDrPxeohYi4i0 > S1yp82EX3JEchZrMDgEveP4C8zqgLg38ie0idL72nPQo2o1D5BpfRFElVA72Z8A1 > 0A9ehua+B9f1g+QKo4wMzPqbfRsHIdOIRELkrniJfRfuIxLY6F4MuiIR5F1YLhJR > TlVjsVUqEFduulO8yBF4A/4QZ1x6QzL47bUYigJwft3YNwbKNshrL8YPhMSgbdjB > BQSoPf93h2RasxKczWalawmTbZaev4kIvBy3EV2S11oy85SqRkAHb/G4f0dq1xI3 > Nc5WTWk+L0Im4Zh0+lqXrBucVvstDsrwEvDRztbrkNaey7p4HKWq+0JQ8zGKxZeq > D4eQD/N89uZLnXV+Q0Gut1w0BHSn7jmYm7TiDiXwk9DBy49i88MYaHocjGtWmLUP > tTSdunXAtOVfRPTJyL47mgbxgsDAyAHFN3CfhmN+PcjaUvrPTvlJ7g6ObdCiAGcr > CEiqKU0QoZTQS9bCkXOeV5LhIvbeh/2P5Ft+4acAAG38oE4/VKJZ+ly49Du4HF6v > LEQFDFJ03WbYRysPIX3J1Krgkza0/wm8Oy0Og27RVfSpVrOV+hPzmgCMURRYz0yS > 21uL+NP/O+o= > =spOA > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

3 7

going double cryptome at DEF CON 22
by coderman 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

per hddupe some many days hence, [0] requesting public mirrors post-con of copied volumes for Cryptome and other archives, also to be mirrored on Cryptome and other non-affiliated onions. the five deep cryptome'ing petabytes future metropolis mesh near at hand!.... clogging signals directorate capacities like darth cheney's arterial plaque butter, . . . 0. "DEF CON media hard drive duping station - six 1:11 duplication towers / 3 x 4TB mirror tracks (BLUE, GREEN, ORANGE)" - https://defcon.org/html/defcon-22/dc-22-news.html#dc22hddupe

1 0

Help me test Alpha?
by Crypto 30 Jul '14

30 Jul '14

Hello Everyone! If you would like to help test alpha.jpunix.net I'd be willing to set up a FREE email account for you. Please note that the account is NOT anonymous unless you take the necessary precautions! Just contact me directly if you are interested. Features: * SSL 4096 RSA/SHA512 certificate with PFS enabled. Please note this is a self-signed certificate that is for encryption only. * POP3/IMAP supported - same caveats as above. * SpamAssassin learning SPAM filter * Optional YubiKey Authentication * Optional Google Authenticator 2FA authentication * Roundcube web interface If you have any questions or comments please let me know. As I said this is *NOT* anonymous! It's up to you to take the necessary precautions! -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb

2 3

Re: [Cryptography] propaganda on "hurdles for law enforcement"
by grarpamp 29 Jul '14

29 Jul '14

On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 12:07 PM, John Kelsey <crypto.jmk(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On the other hand, mass surveillance is one of those issues that > gets a very strong consensus among the people at the top, regardless > of their political party--even if the public as a whole doesn't > like the idea This is because they are in fear of the people. So they feel the need to mass surveil them in order to stay on top of potential issues with their position that could lead to, ultimately, revolt. Why are they in fear? Because they are doing wrong, if not for their own individual selves, for the collective power at the top. Any true servant of the people will have no such fear or need because no one can point any finger at them... they serve, they do not rule. > if both big parties' leadership supports it, who are you going > to vote for, to register your disagreement? You will never, ever, under any circumstance, vote for (in the US) either of the two parties so long as they continually play into an effective one party system. You will only vote for other third and further parties, and rarely choose incumbents among such, unless they are shown to serve the people. You will not fail to vote such thirds unless there is no third candidate. A vote for Dem/Rep (in US) is an obviously wasted vote supporting maintenance of power, the effective 'one party' system... not servants. >> Here in the USA people are convinced that dangerous >> criminals are lurking behind every corner > I don't think this is quite right. Media focus on fear and outrage > because they sell papers and draw eyeballs, and they're easy to do. It is exactly right. Only reason media focus wins is because sheep eyeballs believe and flock to it. It is self reinforcing. Media is especially guilty of choosing to profiteer from these sheep rather than pursue real journalism. You must break that bullshit feedback loop. Hope and Change... lol.

1 0

NSA Systems Abroad Query
by John Young 28 Jul '14

28 Jul '14

What is NSA "WB Quad System" for GCHQ, Amberwind (PL), TIGERFIRE (IN), IBIS (AU, JP), GCSB SSO Site (NZ): <http://t.co/AoBG9jyuAY>http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fy13-semiannual-report.pdf This is an NSA travel expenses report. Via Jason Leopold.

2 1

Russia open procurement for report on deanonymization of Tor users
by Anton Nesterov 28 Jul '14

28 Jul '14

It's tender by "Special equipment and communication of Ministry of Internal Affairs". Title fully says "Study the possibility of obtaining technical information about users (user equipment) on anonymous network Tor, codename TOR (navy)" ~$111500 (3 900 000 roubles) http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/order/notice/zkk44/view/common-info.html?regNumbe…

4 3

Re: [tor-talk] EFF / applied law mailing list?
by Zenaan Harkness 28 Jul '14

28 Jul '14

Eben's emails get rejected from at least one of these lists. If there is a whitelist facility, his email addy ought definitely be on it. On 7/28/14, Eben Moglen <moglen(a)columbia.edu> wrote: > Yes, but please be careful that people don't rely on the conversation > as legal advice. That should be printed in the footer of every > message that goes through the system: This isn't legal advice, you > can't rely on it. If you have questions, get local legal help AND > etc.

1 0

Fwd: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs
by grarpamp 27 Jul '14

27 Jul '14

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Caspar Bowden (lists) <lists(a)casparbowden.net> Date: Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 2:21 PM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] hard to trust all those root CAs To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz>, crypto.jmk(a)gmail.com, justgold79(a)gmail.com Cc: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com On 07/25/14 06:13, Peter Gutmann wrote: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk(a)gmail.com> writes: Yeah, and the judge and prosecutor who get your case will be helpless before your clever skills at evading them, because they've never had to deal with literal-minded people trying transparent dodges to get around the law before. You will doubtless enjoy the same success as tax protesters do when they end up in court. And shortly thereafter, you'll enjoy an all-expenses- paid vacation with free room and board, courtesy of the US government. This should be preserved somewhere as the standard response to the Rumpelstiltskin Defence ("you can't prove I'm using crypto/know the keys so you'll have to let me go"). This perfectly sums up what will happen to anyone who wants to try the Rumpelstiltskin Defence in court. In UK law, there is a Rumpelstiltskin Defence (and although I am not happy with the result, I caused it to be put there and it is better than nothing) http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2000-06-28a.1006.27#g1007.6 (that's all there is BTW - not aware of anything worthwhile written since, grateful for any refs or cases) see also www.fipr.org/sfs8/bowden.pdf Caspar Bowden _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

1 0

Re: [Cryptography] Browser JS (client side) crypto FUD
by grarpamp 27 Jul '14

27 Jul '14

On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 26, 2014 at 05:03:46PM +0200, Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote: >> >> "WHAT'S THE "CHICKEN-EGG PROBLEM" WITH DELIVERING JAVASCRIPT CRYPTOGRAPHY? > Somebody, please, give me something to say against people that claim JS > client side crypto can just never work! // ianG // It's like opportunistic security.. // It specifically defeats mass surveillance... This is a valuable thing. Yes, it's nice and helps. It just needs to come with better disclaimers. Otherwise companies/providers that remain silent on their threat models do nothing but tarnish themselves amongst those that know better. Such silence could backfire. Whether they get used as an bad example in security presentations, or something happens to one or more of their users they effectively sold (or gave) snakeoil to. > Like it or not, the vast majority of people are using some kind of web > based e-mail, whether it's GMail or Yahoo Mail or Hotmail, or > something else. Please provide link to your source that breaks down Email use by HTTP, IMAP/SMTP and legacy POP. And their crypted versions. > I think it's a bit more complicated than you're making it out to be. > Ultimately, the nearly all of the software that people run come from > the network, at one time or another. Even if you are using gpg > running on your linux laptop, where did you get your copy of gpg and > the Linux OS? Odds are, you got it over the network. The problem is the context of where in the network you got the software from, and who you're using it with, and who you're trying to keep in the dark. If your first install or subsequent updates are from your mail, storage, or comms central service provider, etc... that's a major and direct conflict of your security interests. It's why Matasano objects. You don't download your OS from your adversary. On the other hand, if you obtain and use the code independantly of your provider, or the code creates a disinterested decentral P2P infrastructure (Freenet, etc)... then you're in a much better position. You've inserted a layer of independance/abstraction. Similar to installing gnupg to use independantly... https://openpgpjs.org/ http://code.google.com/p/crypto-js/ You should be able to download openpgp.js from the code distribution point, read any audits, check the sig, locally load and permanently lock it into your browser from your plugins directory. And then mail providers should develop a consistant RFC based API from which you interact with them so you don't have to download whatever blob they claim you need. Directly trusting codeloading works fine for internal corporate environments. But it's a really bad idea elsewhere. Examples of careful differences in security model... Holds the keys https://www.hushmail.com/ Provides the code https://encrypt.to/ https://www.bitaddress.org/ https://brainwallet.github.io/ Browser addon (likely dependant on provider webmail scraping 'API': remember attempts to scrape providers that did not offer IMAP/POP.) https://www.mailvelope.com/ Standalone webclient https://whiteout.io/technology.html https://www.mailpile.is/ https://github.com/pagekite/Mailpile Standalone UI https://www.enigmail.net/

1 0