- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

[Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting
by Eugen Leitl 13 Aug '14

13 Aug '14

----- Forwarded message from Eric Mill <eric(a)konklone.com> ----- Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 09:48:32 -0400 From: Eric Mill <eric(a)konklone.com> To: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com List" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: [Cryptography] miniLock seems pretty interesting Message-ID: <CANBOYLVg=Dndusthy82zbksDwyVupdHU9BaSL1mE6199FbvmYQ(a)mail.gmail.com> I saw this announced at HOPE X this weekend: http://minilock.io/ It uses curve25519 <http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html>, which requires much smaller keys (32 or 64 bits) to ensure security -- and so it basically just demands a strong passphrase from the user from which can be derived a strong private key. The developer has a video <http://vimeo.com/101237413> and slides <http://minilock.io/files/HOPEX.pdf> to go along with it, and in general focused his energy on persuading the audience that JavaScript crypto is a necessary and achievable part of the future. -- Eric -- konklone.com | @konklone <https://twitter.com/konklone> _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message -----

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A post-spy world
by John Young 13 Aug '14

13 Aug '14

"We are moving toward a post-spy world, according to the guy that runs the CIA's venture capital arm." <http://t.co/5eYfbRYU8k>http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/08/10-ways-make-internet-safe-cyb…

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DropItLike
by coderman 13 Aug '14

13 Aug '14

https://github.com/mozilla/DropItLike

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SSL cert expired for cpunks.org
by Alfie John 12 Aug '14

12 Aug '14

Hi guys, In case it was missed, the cert for cpunks.org expired last month. If money is the only reason it wasn't renewed, contact me off list and I'll happily pay for it. Alfie -- Alfie John alfiej(a)fastmail.fm

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Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 14, Issue 12
by Ryan Carboni 12 Aug '14

12 Aug '14

> > So if that bill will be passed, National Security and Defense Council > can ban any foreign media, website, foundation, movement, printed > material, etc. without court. > Syria was under martial law... for several decades prior to their civil war. But than again... for a few years, Lincoln was a dictator, going so far to even free the slaves amid disapproval from his cabinet. On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 9:00 AM, <cypherpunks-request(a)cpunks.org> wrote: > Send cypherpunks mailing list submissions to > cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://cpunks.org/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > cypherpunks-request(a)cpunks.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > cypherpunks-owner(a)cpunks.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of cypherpunks digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 14, Issue 11 (Andrew White) > 2. Re: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" > traffic confirmation attack (Juan) > 3. A post-spy world (John Young) > 4. Re: Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" > traffic confirmation attack (rysiek) > 5. SnakeoilMailbox? (rysiek) > 6. Ukraine passed the bill about sanctions in first reading, it > give power to close media, websites, and more (Anton Nesterov) > 7. Re: [cryptography] A post-spy world (Ryan Carboni) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 09:37:53 -0700 > From: Andrew White <invalidheader(a)gmail.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > Subject: Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 14, Issue 11 > Message-ID: > <CA+gYD=_VsQqV4_tGwjQ0NdV4np_afTETU4= > bpsKQ6iFqcELCwQ(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > > > > > > Message: 2 > > Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 08:42:20 +1000 > > From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> > > To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > > Subject: Ripple's consensus algorithm. > > Message-ID: <53E7F54C.80805(a)echeque.com> > > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed > > > > Bitcoin's consensus algorithm is weight of computing power, which is OK > > as long as weight of computing power aligns with interest in bitcoin > > being a useful currency. > > > > Weight of stake would be better, but so far I am unaware of any > > satisfactory proposals for weight of stake. > > > > > This is called "proof of stake" not weight of stake and is different from > Ripple's consensus process. > > > > > Ripples consensus algorithm is weight of club members, and the process > > for getting into the club is opaque, as are the interests and incentives > > of the existing club members. > > > > This doesn't really describe how Ripple works. Ripple relies on the > agreement of 80% or more of validator nodes per gateway to verify if a > transaction took place or not. I write more about this in > http://rippleinvestmentguide.com/ > > > > > > I would suppose one gets into the club if no existing member blackballs > > you, which would be fine if there is already sufficient diversity of > > interests within the club. > > > > Only if 80% of the networks validator nodes do that which is in practice > not likely to happen on a large enough scale. > > > > > > It is not obvious to me how well the ripple consensus algorithm would > > work in the event of substantial conflicts between club members, or bad > > behavior by club members, or bad things happening to the network. > > > > Has it been analyzed for performance in the event of bad behavior by > > some club members? > > > > I'll ping David Schwartz one of the co-inventors about this question. >

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SnakeoilMailbox?
by rysiek 12 Aug '14

12 Aug '14

Hi there, so, this got sent my way: http://securemailbox.com/ It rings several of stef-defined bells for snakeoil, but maybe I don't see something? Anybody any info on this? -- Pozdr rysiek

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Update your Tors - Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack
by coderman 11 Aug '14

11 Aug '14

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-… [see also release notes per below] ''' On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks. The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected. . . . Relays should upgrade to a recent Tor release (0.2.4.23 or 0.2.5.6-alpha), to close the particular protocol vulnerability the attackers used — but remember that preventing traffic confirmation in general remains an open research problem. Clients that upgrade (once new Tor Browser releases are ready) will take another step towards limiting the number of entry guards that are in a position to see their traffic, thus reducing the damage from future attacks like this one. Hidden service operators should consider changing the location of their hidden service.

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Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 14, Issue 11
by Andrew White 11 Aug '14

11 Aug '14

> > > Message: 2 > Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 08:42:20 +1000 > From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > Subject: Ripple's consensus algorithm. > Message-ID: <53E7F54C.80805(a)echeque.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed > > Bitcoin's consensus algorithm is weight of computing power, which is OK > as long as weight of computing power aligns with interest in bitcoin > being a useful currency. > > Weight of stake would be better, but so far I am unaware of any > satisfactory proposals for weight of stake. > > This is called "proof of stake" not weight of stake and is different from Ripple's consensus process. > Ripples consensus algorithm is weight of club members, and the process > for getting into the club is opaque, as are the interests and incentives > of the existing club members. > This doesn't really describe how Ripple works. Ripple relies on the agreement of 80% or more of validator nodes per gateway to verify if a transaction took place or not. I write more about this in http://rippleinvestmentguide.com/ > > I would suppose one gets into the club if no existing member blackballs > you, which would be fine if there is already sufficient diversity of > interests within the club. > Only if 80% of the networks validator nodes do that which is in practice not likely to happen on a large enough scale. > > It is not obvious to me how well the ripple consensus algorithm would > work in the event of substantial conflicts between club members, or bad > behavior by club members, or bad things happening to the network. > Has it been analyzed for performance in the event of bad behavior by > some club members? > I'll ping David Schwartz one of the co-inventors about this question.

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Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Hidden service policies
by grarpamp 10 Aug '14

10 Aug '14

On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White <thomaswhite(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Mike Hearn, > Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it > is ... then I will > block any connection of your relays to mine > ... > Freedom isn't free unless it is > totally free and a selective reading policy through Tor is not just a > bad idea as stated below, I find it outright insulting to me and > everyone else who cares about the free and open internet. The fact > somebody has the audacity to come to a project like Tor and propose > blacklisting mechanisms is jaw-dropping. > ... > As I recall, you are also the person who raised the idea of coin > tinting or a similar concept in the bitcoin community to identify > "suspect" coins and that backfired spectacularly on you. Yes, that is the person. Though the term is known as 'taint'. One of many discussions from that suggestion is here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=333824.0 > so while you are reading this, let me know if you run any relays so I > can avoid them. router riker 207.12.89.16 9001 0 0 fingerprint 8657 6CF6 AA84 496F 62C0 5AFE 9F26 8962 A5F0 B2BD contact Mike Hearn <mike(a)plan99.net> accept *:8333 reject *:* Normally I would thank exits for passing BTC traffic, but now I'm unsure of this one (and a few others), especially given that's the only exit policy of the above node. To identify anon (Tor) coins for marking and tracking?

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Bitcoin Armory not as secure as promised?
by Crypto 10 Aug '14

10 Aug '14

Hello Everyone! It appears that Bitcoin Armory, supposedly one of the most secure Bitcoin wallets isn't so secure after all. Check out this forum post for more details. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=731315.0 -- Crypto https://www.digitalocean.com/?refcode=b90b690ca5bb

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