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Re: Meeting Snowden in Princeton
by Juan 05 May '15

05 May '15

On Sat, 02 May 2015 21:14:35 -0600 Mirimir <mirimir(a)riseup.net> wrote: > I won't quote much, but I can't resist sharing this: "And it’s a > matter of record that Ed [Snowden] trusted his life to Tor, because > he saw from the other side that it worked." > Huh? 'trusted his life', how? It's a matter of record that you are quoting a guy making a baseless assertion in some random blog. > I wonder what the haters say to that. Actually, I know: "He's a double > agent, and it's all a con." Amirite? Snowden keeps sounding like an american nationalist. That's a big red flag.

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Surveillance forces journalists to think and act like spies
by Lorenz Szabo 03 May '15

03 May '15

Interesting read. Found via HackerNews on ycombinator.com. Original here https://cpj.org/x/5fdd <https://cpj.org/x/5fdd>; cleaned up ASCII version below. ~ BizDevCon ___ Austria, Vienna PGP: 3542726F Surveillance forces journalists to think and act like spies April 27, 2015 By Tom Lowenthal Once upon a time, a journalist never gave up a confidential source. When someone comes forward, anonymously, to inform the public, it's better to risk time incarcerated than give them up. This ethical responsibility was also a practical and professional necessity. If you promise anonymity, you're obliged to deliver. If you can't keep your word, who will trust you in the future? Sources go elsewhere and stories pass you by. Grizzled correspondents might recall this time with nostalgia. For many young journalists, it's more like historical fiction--a time when reporters could choose not to give up a source, gruff editors chain-smoked cigars, and you could spot a press hack by the telltale notebook and card in the brim of a hat. The experience of a new generation of news writers tells a different story. Whether you choose to yield a source's name is secondary. Can you even protect your source to begin with? Call records, email archives, phone tapping, cell-site location information, smart transit passes, roving bugs, and surveillance cameras--our world defaults to being watched. You can perhaps achieve privacy for a few fleeting moments, but, even then, only with a great deal of effort. Yet this is journalism's brave new world. In the United States, the National Security Agency, otherwise known as the NSA, seeks to listen to every electronic communication sent or received. In the U.K., the Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, has succeeded in intercepting and storing every peep that passes over the wires. Commercial spy software FinFisher (also called FinSpy) monitors citizens in at least 20 other countries, according to a report by The Citizen Lab, a research group based at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto in Ontario, Canada. Global Information Society Watch's global report details the state of communications surveillance in plenty more. Even Canada's spy agency may be watching Canadians illegally, though the GISWatch report could not say so conclusively. If a journalist can protect the identity of his or her sources at all, it's only with the application of incredible expertise and practice, along with expensive tools. Journalists now compete with spooks and spies, and the spooks have the home-field advantage. Shadowy worlds of subterfuge and surveillance should not be a journalist's habitat. The time a journalist spends learning to play Spy-vs.-Spy could be better spent honing his or her craft. Every hour spent wrangling complex security tools could be an hour spent researching and writing. All the staff on a newsroom's security team could be writers and editors instead. Each geeky gizmo and air-gapped computer (a computer that is never connected to a network) could be another camera or microphone, or the cost could be spent on payroll. All the extra labor and logistics dedicated to evading espionage is a loss. This poses sometimes-steep financial costs on newsrooms. If journalists and media organizations are to protect themselves, they must buy more tools and adopt practices that limit their efficiency. Robust security practices are complex and time-consuming, imposing logistical costs. The psychological toll of constant surveillance leads to exhaustion and burnout. Few journalists do their best work when they know that government thugs could break down the door at any moment--as they did at the home of independent New Zealand reporter Nicky Hager in October 2014, according to The Intercept. Many have worked to slow the swing of the pendulum from privacy to panopticon, increasing development of anti-surveillance tools and advice for journalists. The response to widespread knowledge of the long arm of the surveillance state has been gradual but impressive. Developers have increased work on surveillance-resistance projects and anonymous tip lines. Experts have put together numerous digital security guides and training programs, all intended to help reporters from falling under the focused gaze of government surveillance. Perhaps the flagship of this proliferation is SecureDrop, a secure and anonymous submission system for journalists. First pioneered by the former hacker and current digital security journalist Kevin Poulsen and the late programmer and political activist Aaron Swartz under the moniker DeadDrop, SecureDrop is intended to allow a potential source or whistleblower to get in touch with journalists without leaving any dangerous records of his or her identity. SecureDrop combines several pieces of security and privacy software into an integrated system, ensuring that only the journalists can read anonymous tips. Messages are protected with PGP, the tried-and-true gold standard for this task. Sources' anonymity is provided by Tor, the anonymity network that underpins private communications for everyone from the U.S. Navy and CIA to large businesses and survivors of domestic abuse. The result is safely encrypted messages and no metadata trail. With SecureDrop, journalists don't just choose not to reveal a source's identity. Unless a source chooses to reveal his or her identity, the reporters could not unmask the source even if they tried. Initially just an idea and some prototype code, SecureDrop was mostly theoretical until early 2013. The first major deployment was at The New Yorker. The project was soon adopted by the nonprofit Freedom of the Press Foundation, which was founded with the specific mission of facilitating journalism that governments oppose. FPF, as the foundation is known, soon took over SecureDrop's development and maintenance, as well as outreach and funding. More than a dozen other news organizations and prominent journalists have now deployed SecureDrop. With an ongoing crowdfunding campaign, FPF plans to bring it to many more. SecureDrop works hard to evade even targeted attacks and surveillance. Making use of cutting-edge technology and contemporary security best practices, SecureDrop separates different tasks onto different computers. Each machine only performs part of the puzzle, so it's very difficult to compromise the whole system at once. This makes SecureDrop quite expensive to deploy. FPF estimates that a single SecureDrop installation would set a newsroom back around $3,000, which is a lot to ask for a tool designed to protect the most important of tips from the most advanced of snoops. Other organizations have developed and distributed best practices and training materials. Universities have deepened their research into the threats journalists face. The Citizen Lab, already discussed in this piece, is dedicated to deep research about how technology and security affect human rights and is the source of some of the most detailed and comprehensive technical reports of recent years. If you want to know about the threats facing journalists and human rights groups, Citizen Lab is the place to go. Yet, as deep as Citizen Lab's work goes, it is as likely to induce security nihilism as it is to produce savvy security practices. An August 2014 report tells of terrifying new tools for state attacks on the media. Called "network injection appliances," these devices insert malicious software into otherwise innocuous traffic. Used right, one can modify an online video, adding malware that takes over a journalist's computer. If a journalist is using a service such as YouTube or Vimeo, session cookies allow the journalist to be targeted precisely. This makes these attacks very difficult to detect and prevent. With this new technology, journalists don't have to make a mistake to be compromised. Gone are the phishing days of opening a malicious attachment or clicking a suspicious link. There's no trap to notice and avoid. Just browsing the Web puts one at risk, and avoiding online video is an impractical ask of a journalist conducting research. Network injection appliances have likely already been deployed in Oman and Turkmenistan, according to Citizen Lab, and because they're commercially developed by private companies, the price of these devices will only continue to drop as their capabilities expand. Another Citizen Lab paper paints a disturbing picture of government cyberattacks. Journalists, among the principal victims of this sort of technological espionage, face state-level threats while lacking the funds and expertise to protect themselves. Attacks on computer systems can reach across borders into seemingly safe locations, allowing attackers to disrupt communications and impairing journalists' ability to do their core work. Sometimes attacks are simply a nuisance or a resource drain; at other times they present major risks to individuals' safety. It's all but impossible for journalists to learn the strategies of the state and appropriate countermeasures on a shoestring budget. Websites and service providers are often better positioned to protect journalists from these attacks. Securing the everyday tools of the trade works much better than does demanding that journalists jump through arcane hoops to stay safe. Simple measures can go a long way. Just enabling secure HTTPS rather than insecure HTTP can make a huge difference. The New York Times has called on all news sites to adopt this very measure by the end of 2015. As noted security expert The Grugq puts it: "We can secure the things people actually do, or we can tell them to do things differently. Only one of these has any chance of working." Since we first saw Edward Snowden's face, in 2013, computer-security guides for journalists have multiplied, but using computers safely is hard when a government is trying to get the drop on you. Many guides only scratch the surface, detailing basic--but important--steps. Turning on automatic software updates or using password managers and two-factor authentication for online accounts make a big difference. These first steps make journalists slightly harder to attack. In fact, simple practices probably have a greater impact than do more complex ones. Esoteric security strategies are a lot of work and sometimes only inconvenience a savvy attacker. Simple measures completely stymie simple attacks and force advanced attackers to change their tactics. A sophisticated attacker will never use an advanced technique when a simple one will do. More sophisticated attempts require more work, cost more, and are more prone to detection. Changing the game by forcing attackers to use scarce resources helps everyone stay safe. Other guides delve deeply into advanced principles of operational security. Abbreviated "OPSEC," the term is military jargon for measures taken to keep critical information out of hostile hands. If the phrase sounds more at home in a spy thriller than in a journalism manual, that's a hint at the problems posed by press surveillance. Mainstream journalists and press organizations openly acknowledge their need to learn spies' tactics and techniques to stay a step ahead. The adoption of military tactics and an espionage mindset has a substantial downside. The Grugq explains: "OPSEC comes at a cost, and a significant part of that cost is efficiency. Maintaining a strong security posture ... for long periods of time is very stressful, even for professionally trained espionage officers." Yet even in apparently free democratic societies, compromising a free press is the day-to-day work of the security services. Intelligence services sometimes target journalists for surveillance, even when the missions of the agencies involved are ostensibly centered around foreign intelligence. Iranian spies orchestrate elaborate campaigns to bamboozle journalists; they even pose as journalists when targeting think tanks and lawmakers, Wired has reported. The FBI has also admitted using the latter tactic and actually defended it publicly when criticized. In the U.K., security services have abandoned restraint when it comes to surveillance of journalists and civil society, Ryan Gallagher wrote in The Intercept, summarizing: "An investigative journalist working on a case or story involving state secrets could be targeted on the basis that they are perceived to be working against the vaguely defined national security interests of the government." Some journalists have risen to this challenge. After meeting with Snowden, Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald realized that traditional newspapers and media groups were not well suited to this world of watchers. They needed a new sort of organization--one ready to play spy games with professional spies from the very start. They founded the First Look Media group with help from fellow investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill and funding from eBay mogul Pierre Omidyar. First Look's flagship online magazine, The Intercept, is dedicated to exposing the abuses of the surveillance state. Choosing such powerful foes meant that The Intercept had to stay one step ahead from the start. Micah Lee is The Intercept's resident security expert. Formerly a staff technologist at technology civil rights group the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lee was on The Intercept team from the beginning. He designed and implemented the security measures that Greenwald, Poitras, and Scahill--and now a team of 20--use to stay safe. When asked about the infrastructure needed to protect the publication, he frankly admitted: "When we think it'll make us safer, we normally just buy another computer or device. We're willing to spend money on these things when there's a clear security benefit." Lee was referring to security practices typically only needed when one is facing adversaries with the sophistication of governments. Protecting important information on separate air-gapped computers is a common practice at The Intercept. Lee and other technologists are fond of a security principle called "defense in depth," an approach that assumes that some security measures will fail and calls for systems that remain secure even when that happens. In the planning for defense in depth, a process should become insecure not when one security measure fails but instead when dozens do. Systems built this way demand more hardware than do those where security is more brittle. Several computers ensure that the compromise of one will leave the others safe. Smartcards protect cryptographic keys even when other things go wrong. All of this tech costs money and requires experienced technologists like Lee to design and operate. In keeping with this level of prudent paranoia, Lee and his colleagues often eschew regular smartphones in favor of the CryptoPhone. These $3,500 devices, made by German manufacturer GSMK, don't just provide encrypted calls; they're heavily customized and locked-down Android devices loaded with a whole host of custom software. They even try to detect anomalies in cellular networks that might be indicative of an attack or targeted surveillance. These practices and this technology are the best that media organizations can buy. It's a far cry from the James Bond-esque gadgetry that one might see at MI6 or the CIA, but, used correctly, it can keep the spooks at bay long enough for you to meet with sources and write the stories that need to be written. Staff at The Intercept use PGP for email encryption by default. Lee estimates that more than 80 percent of the emails he sent in the last six months were encrypted in this way. For most people who aren't security experts, PGP is a niche tool with a notoriously steep learning curve. Getting started requires hours of training and practice to wrap one's head around complex and unintuitive principles of public-key cryptography. The process takes even longer if one doesn't have an experienced guide. Between building sustainable long-term security strategies and jetting around protecting the magazine's VIP writers, Lee quickly ran out of the time needed to show each new hire how to use PGP. But he noticed that he wasn't always needed: "Folks learn PGP the same way they do any other tricky technical thing--they Google it, or they ask their nerd friends, and sometimes they get bad advice," he said. At The Intercept, new hires were learning PGP from folks already there--journalists and editors as well as technologists. The Intercept had developed what Lee calls a "security culture," an operational security term that has its roots in activism. In a "security culture," a community adopts customs and norms that protect its members. It's a wholesale adoption of operational security practices into the everyday work and activities of the group. The Intercept team considers security a core value, so people there are willing to work together to protect one another, even when that's outside their usual work. "Of course, having Erinn in New York helps, too," Lee joked, referring to Erinn Clark, the most recent member of First Look's security team. Clark came to First Look from the Tor Project, the nonprofit group responsible for developing Tor. Another security virtuoso, Clark is more than familiar not only with the nitty-gritty of security tools but also with the adoption of secure practices across an organization. In technology circles, the Tor Project is famous both for the exotic ways in which states have tried to infiltrate and attack it and for the extreme security measures its members have adopted to protect themselves. Leading the incredible heavy hitters of First Look's security team is Morgan "Mayhem" Marquis-Boire. A security superstar, Marquis-Boire worked on Google's security incident-response team, and he is a senior researcher at The Citizen Lab. This incredible brain trust isn't just there to keep just First Look safe. Once First Look's basic security needs are met, the group plans to branch out. "We want the security team to start developing tools and hardware and doing bigger research." Lee said. The team members plan to use their skills and expertise to help other organizations that can't afford their own elite security teams. The challenge is always resources. First Look has a billionaire on call to pay for the latest technology and fancy technologists. This is a rarity. Other journalists may face a stark choice between hard-hitting stories and staying safe. What does information security look like at publications that don't have First Look's billionaire funding? FPF regularly sends technical experts to help newsrooms install, set up, and upgrade SecureDrop. Every time they set foot in a newsroom, FPF techs find themselves flooded with security questions from reporters and editors. Questions aren't just about SecureDrop or FPF; news teams want to know about everything from the ins and out of other tools, such as OTR and Tails, to the sort of advanced operational security measures that can help them keep their heads above water when spies come snooping. Runa A. Sandvik, a member of FPF's technical team, said, "Even if you wanted to use these tools and had all the patience to learn them, there's still so much conflicting information--it's very confusing, very intimidating." And though few media organizations have the ability to hire technologists to work with their reporting staffs, Sandvik notes that the situation for journalists not affiliated with a major organization is even bleaker: "If you have a technologist, someone to help you, that's one thing. If you're freelance and not overly technical, I don't know how you're going to work this stuff out." She added, "Many feel overwhelmed; they don't know who to ask for help." Just having a technologist to help with analysis and security may not be enough. The newsroom has to commit to understanding the issues and taking good advice. Barton Gellman, who currently writes for The Washington Post, was one of the recipients of the document cache Snowden assembled, and he knew that he didn't have the technical skills to work on the documents alone. He brought prominent security researcher Ashkan Soltani (now chief technologist for the Federal Trade Commission) on board to help. Soltani bolstered Gellman's security practices and helped Gellman analyze and understand the more technical material in the collection. To make matters worse, intelligence agencies encourage confusion and misunderstanding when it comes to secure tools and practices. They try to associate a need for privacy with wrongdoing. This association makes it even harder for journalists to protect themselves and their sources. Persuading a source to protect him- or herself is harder when the tools of safety are associated with suspicion. In some cases, making secure tools seem suspicious actively endangers sources who live in less tolerant environs, such as dissidents in mainland China who use Tor. This doublethink is a strange flip side to the surveillance state: First, watch everyone, always, then vilify any attempt to recover some privacy. This is especially disruptive to journalists and their ability to serve as watchdogs. Even without state propaganda and unforced errors, covert action takes a substantial toll on the press's ability to hold leaders accountable. Espionage targeting journalists and their sources impairs the healthy function of the states where it occurs. And these practices are not just a feature of regimes known to be restrictive or autocratic. In 2013, David Miranda was detained for most of a day while making a connection between flights at Heathrow Airport in London. Miranda was changing planes on a journey from Germany to Brazil on which he was transporting documents and video footage between Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras. British police held him under measures designed to combat terrorism. Their reasoning? Miranda was promoting a "political or ideological cause." In July 2013, surveillance agency GCHQ destroyed computers at the Guardian newspaper in London. The security agency had already threatened the newspaper's editors, demanding that the Guardian stop reporting on government surveillance. A security service literally knocked on the doors of a prominent and critical newspaper in Western Europe. They ground a computer into pieces with the use of power tools. All of this was done in a vain attempt to prevent the publication of more articles on a topic that discomfited the government. These are the tools the state has at its disposal to discourage dissent. It is understandable that, for some, the risk of challenging this authority is simply too great. When these are the consequences of hard-hitting reporting, sticking to "safe" topics and innocuous pieces is a reasonable response. But even for those who choose to continue the hard work of comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable, evading the panopticon comes at a tremendous cost. There are the costs incurred in avoiding simple tools in favor of secure ones. The costs of using extra hardware to protect sensitive materials. The costs of hiring elite security teams instead of extra editors. The costs of worrying that you've made a mistake in your security measures. The costs of wondering whether your hotel room will be undisturbed when you get back. The costs of hoping that today isn't the day that a government agent knocks at the door and asks to destroy your work, or worse. When journalists must compete with spies and surveillance, even when they win, society loses. Disclosure: The author previously worked at the Tor Project, the non-profit organization responsible for developing and maintaining the Tor software and network Tom Lowenthal is CPJ's resident expert in operational security and surveillance self-defense. He is also a freelance journalist on security and tech policy matters. Web site content (c) CPJ. All rights reserved. Articles may be reproduced only with permission.

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Fwd: design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises
by coderman 03 May '15

03 May '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 20:37:17 -0700 Subject: design for a Tor router without anonymity compromises To: tor-dev <tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org> a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4] we're soliciting feedback as part of a go / no-go decision on continuing this effort. in particular, the design is intended to meet the scrutiny of Nick M., Roger, and Mike P. as the focus on support for Tor Browser and Tor on each client indicates. --- the design and prototype code is marked "copyright Tor Project Inc. by assignment", which means that we're using a notary public to formally assign copyright ownership to the corporate entity "Tor Project, Inc.". your comments will be taken into consideration, however, please defer patches / code contributions under other owners (you) until assignment complete. --- last but not least, we're trying to eat our own dog food. all of our planning, development, and operations use hidden services, called Onion services in the document, and this bootstrap is more difficult than expected. [5] please provide feedback in reply on this thread or to me directly.[6] assuming the project continues, we will have Onion services to support collaborative development up soon. best regards, and my thanks in advance for your scrutiny! 0. "Tor Enforcing Privacy Router" http://serqet345qt265xp.onion/ 1. "Op-ed: Why the entire premise of Tor-enabled routers is ridiculous" http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/04/18/op-ed-why-the-entire-premise-of-… 2. "[tor-relays] Anonbox Project - Mike Perry" https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-October/005541.html 3. "[tor-relays] Anonbox Project - Roger Dingledine" https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-October/005544.html 4. "[tor-talk] Cloak Tor Router (thread)" https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-November/035436.html 5. "Onion services" came in behind "Tor sites" because sites felt too web browser focused. we're trying to avoid the legacy "hidden services" nomenclature. 6. i have a long history of extreme dislike for encrypted email, key servers, web of trust, and other moral hazards. however, if you encrypt to my key you can send private mail, if desired. note that some encrypted email clients will fail insecure if the intended recipient doesn't match a keyring identifier! https://peertech.org/keys/0x65A847E7C2B9380C-pub.txt

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Re: Backward compatibility bites again (like RC4 in WPA2), "Cryptanalysis has been seen of RC4"
by coderman 03 May '15

03 May '15

On 3/3/15, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... >> 2015, RC4 still in WPA2, WPA2 still in everything, ... regarding Snowden in Princeton, https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2015/05/02/meeting-snowden-in-princeton/ "There’s no evidence of a “wow” cryptanalysis; it was key theft, or an implant, or a predicted RNG or supply-chain interference. _Cryptanalysis has been seen of RC4_, but not of elliptic curve crypto, and there’s no sign of exploits against other commonly used algorithms." RC4 still in WPA2 (targeted attack) allowing decryption of collected signals. this is why VPN is necessary over WiFi networks regardless of WPA2 security settings in the Tor router requirements. best regards,

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Meeting Snowden in Princeton
by coderman 03 May '15

03 May '15

https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2015/05/02/meeting-snowden-in-princeton/ Meeting Snowden in Princeton 2015-05-02Cryptology, Internet censorship, Legal issues, Open-source security, Politics, Privacy technology, Protocols, Security economics, Security engineering, Security psychology, UsabilityRoss Anderson I’m at Princeton where Ed Snowden is due to speak by live video link in a few minutes, and have a discussion with Bart Gellmann. Yesterday he spent four hours with a group of cryptographers from industry and academia, of which I was privileged to be one. The topic was the possible and likely countermeasures, both legal and technical, against state surveillance. Ed attended as the “Snobot”, a telepresence robot that let him speak to us, listen and move round the room, from a studio in Moscow. As well as over a dozen cryptographers there was at least one lawyer and at least one journalist familiar with the leaked documents. Yesterday’s meeting was under the Chatham House rule, so I may not say who said what; any new disclosures may have been made by Snowden, or by one of the journalists, or by one of the cryptographers who has assisted journalists with the material. Although most of what was discussed has probably appeared already in one place or another, as a matter of prudence I’m publishing these notes on the blog while I’m enjoying US first-amendment rights, and will sanitise them from my laptop before coming back through UK customs. The problem of state surveillance is a global one rather than an NSA issue, and has been growing for years, along with public awareness of it. But we learned a lot from the leaks; for example, wiretaps on the communications between data centres were something nobody thought of; and it might do no harm to think a bit more about the backhaul in CDNs. (A website that runs TLS to a CDN and then bareback to the main server is actually worse than nothing, as we lose the ability to shame them.) Of course the agencies will go for the low-hanging fruit. Second, we also got some reassurance; for example, TLS works, unless the agencies have managed to steal or coerce the private keys, or hack the end systems. (This is a complex discussion given CDNs, problems with the CA ecology and bugs like Heartbleed.) And it’s a matter of record that Ed trusted his life to Tor, because he saw from the other side that it worked. Third, the leaks give us a clear view of an intelligence analyst’s workflow. She will mainly look in Xkeyscore which is the Google of 5eyes comint; it’s a federated system hoovering up masses of stuff not just from 5eyes own assets but from other countries where the NSA cooperates or pays for access. Data are “ingested” into a vast rolling buffer; an analyst can run a federated search, using a selector (such as an IP address) or fingerprint (something that can be matched against the traffic). There are other such systems: “Dancing oasis” is the middle eastern version. Some xkeyscore assets are actually compromised third-party systems; there are multiple cases of rooted SMS servers that are queried in place and the results exfiltrated. Others involve vast infrastructure, like Tempora. If data in Xkeyscore are marked as of interest, they’s moved to Pinwale to be memorialised for 5+ years. This is one function of the MDRs (massive data repositories, now more tactfully renamed mission data repositories) like Utah. At present storage is behind ingestion. Xkeyscore buffer times just depend on volumes and what storage they managed to install, plus what they manage to filter out. As for crypto capabilities, a lot of stuff is decrypted automatically on ingest (e.g. using a “stolen cert”, presumably a private key obtained through hacking). Else the analyst sends the ciphertext to CES and they either decrypt it or say they can’t. There’s no evidence of a “wow” cryptanalysis; it was key theft, or an implant, or a predicted RNG or supply-chain interference. Cryptanalysis has been seen of RC4, but not of elliptic curve crypto, and there’s no sign of exploits against other commonly used algorithms. Of course, the vendors of some products have been coopted, notably skype. Homegrown crypto is routinely problematic, but properly implemented crypto keeps the agency out; gpg ciphertexts with RSA 1024 were returned as fails. With IKE the NSA were interested in getting the original handshakes, harvesting them all systematically worldwide. These are databased and indexed. The quantum type attacks were common against non-crypto traffic; it’s easy to spam a poisoned link. However there is no evidence at all of active attacks on cryptographic protocols, or of any break-and-poison attack on crypto links. It is however possible that the hacking crew can use your cryptography to go after your end system rather than the content, if for example your crypto software has a buffer overflow. What else might we learn from the disclosures when designing and implementing crypto? Well, read the disclosures and use your brain. Why did GCHQ bother stealing all the SIM card keys for Iceland from Gemalto, unless they have access to the local GSM radio links? Just look at the roof panels on US or UK embassies, that look like concrete but are actually transparent to RF. So when designing a protocol ask yourself whether a local listener is a serious consideration. In addition to the Gemalto case, Belgacom is another case of hacking X to get at Y. The kind of attack here is now completely routine: you look for the HR spreadsheet in corporate email traffic, use this to identify the sysadmins, then chain your way in. Companies need to have some clue if they’re to stop attacks like this succeeding almost trivially. By routinely hacking companies of interest, the agencies are comprehensively undermining the security of critical infrastructure, and claim it’s a “nobody but us” capability. however that’s not going to last; other countries will catch up. Would opportunistic encryption help, such as using unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman everwhere? Quite probably; but governments might then simply compel the big service forms to make the seeds predictable. At present, key theft is probably more common than key compulsion in US operations (though other countries may be different). If the US government ever does use compelled certs, it’s more likely to be the FBI than the NSA, because of the latter’s focus on foreign targets. The FBI will occasionally buy hacked servers to run in place as honeypots, but Stuxnet and Flame used stolen certs. Bear in mind that anyone outside the USA has zero rights under US law. Is it sensible to use medium-security systems such as Skype to hide traffic, even though they will give law enforcement access? For example, an NGO contacting people in one of the Stans might not want to incriminate them by using cryptography. The problem with this is that systems like Skype will give access not just to the FBI but to all sorts of really unsavoury police forces. FBI operations can be opaque because of the care they take with parallel construction; the Lavabit case was maybe an example. It could have been easy to steal the key, but then how would the intercepted content have been used in court? In practice, there are tons of convictions made on the basis of cargo manifests, travel plans, calendars and other such plaintext data about which a suitable story can be told. The FBI considers it to be good practice to just grab all traffic data and memorialise it forever. The NSA is even more cautious than the FBI, and won’t use top exploits against clueful targets unless it really matters. Intelligence services are at least aware of the risk of losing a capability, unlike vanilla law enforcement, who once they have a tool will use it against absolutely everybody. Using network intrusion detection against bad actors is very much like the attack / defence evolution seen in the anti-virus business. A system called Tutelage uses Xkeyscore infrastructure and matches network traffic against signatures, just like AV, but it has the same weaknesses. Script kiddies are easily identifiable from their script signatures via Xkeyscore, but the real bad actors know how to change network signatures, just as modern malware uses packers to become highly polymorphic. Cooperation with companies on network intrusion detection is tied up with liability games. DDoS attacks from Iran spooked US banks, which invited the government in to snoop on their networks, but above all wanted liability protection. Usability is critical. Lots of good crypto never got widely adopted as it was too hard to use; think of PGP. On the other hand, Tails is horrifically vulnerable to traditional endpoint attacks, but you can give it as a package to journalists to use so they won’t make so many mistakes. The source has to think “How can I protect myself?” which makes it really hard, especially for a source without a crypto and security background. You just can’t trust random journalists to be clueful about everything from scripting to airgaps. Come to think of it, a naive source shouldn’t trust their life to securedrop; he should use gpg before he sends stuff to it but he won’t figure out that it’s a good idea to suppress key IDs. Engineers who design stuff for whistleblowers and journalists must be really thoughtful and careful if they want to ensure their users won’t die when they screw up. The goal should be that no single error should be fatal, and so long as their failures aren’t compounded the users will stay alive. Bear in mind that non-roman-language countries use numeric passwords, and often just 8 digits. And being a target can really change the way you operate. For example, password managers are great, but not for someone like Ed, as they put too many of the eggs in one basket. If you’re a target, create a memory castle, or a token that can be destroyed on short notice. If you’re a target like Ed, you have to compartmentalise. On the policy front, one of the eye-openers was the scale of intelligence sharing – it’s not just 5 eyes, but 15 or 35 or even 65 once you count all the countries sharing stuff with the NSA. So how does governance work? Quite simply, the NSA doesn’t care about policy. Their OGC has 100 lawyers whose job is to “enable the mission”; to figure out loopholes or new interpretations of the law that let stuff get done. How do you restrain this? Could you use courts in other countries, that have stronger human-rights law? The precedents are not encouraging. New Zealand’s GCSB was sharing intel with Bangladesh agencies while the NZ government was investigating them for human-rights abuses. Ramstein in Germany is involved in all the drone killings, as fibre is needed to keep latency down low enough for remote vehicle pilots. The problem is that the intelligence agencies figure out ways to shield the authorities from culpability, and this should not happen. Jurisdiction is a big soft spot. When will CDNs get tapped on the shoulder by local law enforcement in dodgy countries? Can you lock stuff out of particular jurisdictions, so your stuff doesn’t end up in Egypt just for load-balancing reasons? Can the NSA force data to be rehomed in a friendly jurisdiction, e.g. by a light DoS? Then they “request” stuff from a partner rather than “collecting” it. The spooks’ lawyers play games saying for example that they dumped content, but if you know IP address and file size you often have it; and IP address is a good enough pseudonym for most intel / LE use. They deny that they outsource to do legal arbitrage (e.g. NSA spies on Brits and GCHQ returns the favour by spying on Americans). Are they telling the truth? In theory there will be an MOU between NSA and the partner agency stipulating respect for each others’ laws, but there can be caveats, such as a classified version which says “this is not a binding legal document”. The sad fact is that law and legislators are losing the capability to hold people in the intelligence world to account, and also losing the appetite for it. The deepest problem is that the system architecture that has evolved in recent years holds masses of information on many people with no intelligence value, but with vast potential for political abuse. Traditional law enforcement worked on individualised suspicion; end-system compromise is better than mass search. Ed is on the record as leaving to the journalists all decisions about what targeted attacks to talk about, as many of them are against real bad people, and as a matter of principle we don’t want to stop targeted attacks. Interference with crypto in academia and industry is longstanding. People who intern with a clearance get a “lifetime obligation” when they go through indoctrination (yes, that’s what it’s called), and this includes pre-publication review of anything relevant they write. The prepublication review board (PRB) at the CIA is notoriously unresponsive and you have to litigate to write a book. There are also specific programmes to recruit cryptographers, with a view to having friendly insiders in companies that might use or deploy crypto. The export control mechanisms are also used as an early warning mechanism, to tip off the agency that kit X will be shipped to country Y on date Z. Then the technicians can insert an implant without anyone at the exporting company knowing a thing. This is usually much better than getting stuff Trojanned by the vendor. Western governments are foolish to think they can develop NOBUS (no-one but us) technology and press the stop button when things go wrong, as this might not be true for ever. Stuxnet was highly targeted and carefully delivered but it ended up in Indonesia too. Developing countries talk of our first-mover advantage in carbon industrialisation, and push back when we ask them to burn less coal. They will make the same security arguments as our governments and use the same techniques, but without the same standards of care. Bear in mind, on the equities issue, that attack is way way easier than defence. So is cyber-war plausible? Politically no, but at the expert level it might eventually be so. Eventually something scary will happen, and then infrastructure companies will care more, but it’s doubtful that anyone will do a sufficiently coordinated attack on enough diverse plant through different firewalls and so on to pose a major threat to life. How can we push back on the poisoning of the crypto/security community? We have to accept that some people are pro-NSA while others are pro-humanity. Some researchers do responsible disclosure while others devise zero-days and sell them to the NSA or Vupen. We can push back a bit by blocking papers from conferences or otherwise denying academic credit where researchers prefer cash or patriotism to responsible disclosure, but that only goes so far. People who can pay for a new kitchen with their first exploit sale can get very patriotic; NSA contractors have a higher standard of living than academics. It’s best to develop a culture where people with and without clearances agree that crypto must be open and robust. The FREAK attack was based on export crypto of the 1990s. We must also strengthen post-national norms in academia, while in the software world we need transparency, not just in the sense of open source but of business relationships too. Open source makes it harder for security companies to sell different versions of the product to people we like and people we hate. And the NSA may have thought dual-EC was OK because they were so close to RSA; a sceptical purchaser should have observed how many government speakers help them out at the RSA conference! Secret laws are pure poison; government lawyers claim authority and act on it, and we don’t know about it. Transparency about what governments can and can’t do is vital. On the technical front, we can’t replace the existing infrastructure, so it won’t be possible in the short term to give people mobile phones that can’t be tracked. However it is possible to layer new communications systems on top of what already exists, as with the new generation of messaging apps that support end-to-end crypto with no key escrow. As for whether such systems take off on a large enough scale to make a difference, ultimately it will all be about incentives.

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Opinions of qwertycards.com?
by Shawn K. Quinn 01 May '15

01 May '15

https://www.qwertycards.com Has anyone on the list tried one of these? Thoughts? -- Shawn K. Quinn <skquinn(a)rushpost.com>

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any going to Nepal?
by Zenaan Harkness 01 May '15

01 May '15

To help establish new mobile base stations, internet network, etc? Ham radios are being used right now, but longer term there's lots of tourist dollars that need mobile phone homes and connections, along with the rest. If you work ok with others, are able to travel and passionate for our collective future, perhaps now is a moment. I dunno where else to send this email. I tried searching for libre mobile base station (thought there was some project in that regards) but found only gnuradio. Carpe diem.

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Re: any going to Nepal?
by Zenaan Harkness 01 May '15

01 May '15

On 5/1/15, Seth <list(a)sysfu.com> wrote: > On Thu, 30 Apr 2015 14:39:06 -0700, Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> > wrote: >> I dunno where else to send this email. I tried searching for libre >> mobile base station (thought there was some project in that regards) >> but found only gnuradio. > > A few other mailing lists you might hit up: > > diy-isp(a)lists.ffdn.org > tech(a)openwireless.org > autonomous-discuss(a)gnu.org Done. Thanks.

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Matt Blaze Testimony on Encrytion
by John Young 30 Apr '15

30 Apr '15

Matt Blaze testified yesterday at the House hearing on encryption http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/4-29-2015-IT-Subcommi… Others too: http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/encryption-technology-potential-u-s-poli…

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Perhaps good news [The Slovak Constitutional Court cancelled mass surveillance of citizens]
by Ben Mezger 30 Apr '15

30 Apr '15

http://www.eisionline.org/index.php/sk/projekty-m-2/ochrana-sukromia/109-th… ASCII: An act, which ordered large-scale mass surveillance of citizens (so called data retention) is now history. Today the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic proclaimed the mass surveillance of citizens as unconstitutional. The decision was rendered within proceedings initiated by 30 members of the Parliament on behalf of the European Information Society Institute (EISi), a Slovakia based think-tank. In a non-public session, the Grand Chamber of the Constitutional Court (PL. ÚS 10/2014) proclaimed provisions § 58(5) to (7) and § 63(6) of the Electronic Communications Act (Act No. 351/2011 Coll.), which until now required mobile network providers to track the communication of their users, as well as provisions of § 116 of the Penal Code (Act No. 301/2005 Coll.) and § 76(3) of the Police Force Act (Act No. 171/1993 Coll.), which allowed access to this data, to be in contradiction to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens to privacy and personal data. As a consequence, these provisions lost their binding effect. According to now invalid provisions of the Electronic Communications Act, the providers of electronic communications were obliged to store traffic data, localization data and data about the communicating parties for a period of 6 months (in the case Internet, email or VoIP communication) or for a period of 12 months (in case of other communication). Hence, data about who, for how long, when, how and from where the communication was made, has been stored. Data about unsuccessful calls was also stored to the same extent. Moreover, the legal framework regulating the access to data retention data was completely arbitrary and much more benevolent than comparable provisions on wire-tapping. The obligation to store data, presented, for a long time, perceivable interference with the private life of all Slovak citizens, who were subject to extensive surveillance irrespective of their honesty or innocence. Although the detailed reasoning of the Court is not available yet, it is clear, that this kind of interference with a citizen's right to privacy will not be possible in the future. Today's decision of the Slovak Constitutional Court confirmed that the initiative started by EISi more than five years ago was substantiated. “The mass surveillance of electronic communications of Slovak citizens led to years of continual unconstitutional violations of their privacy”, stated Ľubomír Lukič, EISi's lawyerand one of the original initiators of the action. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic was issued almost a year after the Court of Justice of the European Union proclaimed the Data Retention Directive invalid in the Spring of 2014. At that time, the Constitutional Court of Slovakia promptly reacted by suspending the collection of data through a preliminary measure. Today, data collection was completely cancelled. -- Kind regards, *Ben Mezger* www.benmezger.com GPG Public Key <http://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x7C19F16D575B7C1C>

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