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Re: Defcon slides
by John Young 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

Someone else got a 402. Good Housekeeping Mr Clean machines do not get a 402. Most likely the Kaspersky-Krebs-Schneier-TCMay-Muppets- JPMorgan-In-Q-Tel-in-YourBox v.12 exploit is MiTM by DoD-BBG-Tor. Pay the ransom. No BTC, Rai only. At 05:14 AM 8/21/2015, you wrote: >On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 5:03 PM, <wirelesswarrior(a)safe-mail.net> wrote: > > My slides are now online. There is a link from the front page of > cryptome.org under the "Offsite" section. > >http://defcon-wireless-village.com/docs/Defcon23-Covert-Wireless.pdf >http://www.wirelessvillage.ninja/ > >402 Payment Required >Just kidding. Unless you really want to pay us. Chances are, if you >got this page, that means the server doesn't like something about you. >You may be using an invalid HTTP option, or an evil browser string, or >maybe just from a country we are leery of. If you want to access the >page, and you are not attempting to index/hack/inject/pwn it, DM Us to >get it looked at. > >tor so leery.

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Re: Defcon slides
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

As a backup for those experiencing difficulties via the cryptome.org link I uploaded the slides to a "dropbox" http://s000.tinyupload.com/?file_id=73132852308922752258 WW

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FOIPA adventures
by coderman 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

"you want me to consent to make my FBI file public? Are you fucking mad?" - https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/563036665837789184 --- i am currently making requests through MuckRock.com which i recommend for their helpful and dedicated staff, as well as their time devoted to review and reporting on released information. i am using the professional service, which lets you set requests private until reviewed and ready to release publicly. this implies a bit of trust in MuckRock, and i hope it is not misplaced. few years back i asked for participants in a similar effort. some things resulted: 1) this also opens up the requester to risk; that is, whoever is filing must also potentially show some trust, if a falsified DOJ-361 is sent and used as pretext to "deter" you. i have not heard of this actually happening, but i was also not willing to push it. '''beware who you accept, coder, or they're setting you up for USC 18 fuckery. sure, it may in the end be ok. but you're in misery until cleared.'''' 2) the information is going to be public; if you've got a file because you're a privacy enthusiast, then filing to make your file public is the opposite of enjoying your privacy. there is merit in taking one for team earth human, however... --- as a first report, deliveries of USPS forms DOJ-361 to multiple, and a batch of three sent concurrently. two arrived promptly, but one got scrutiny before leaving town (forms to FBI, perhaps related to ? :) a) INTERPOL Washington FOIA Service Center (202)-616-0201 U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 4, 2015 , 11:41 pm - Arrived at USPS Facility - WASHINGTON, DC 20066 Tracking Number: 9405510200829494303833 b) U.S. Department of Justice United States Marshals Service Office of General Counsel Washington, DC 20530-1000 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 4, 2015 , 11:40 pm - Arrived at USPS Facility - WASHINGTON, DC 20066 "Your item arrived at our USPS facility in WASHINGTON, DC 20066 on February 4, 2015 at 11:40 pm. The item is currently in transit to the destination." Tracking Number: 9405510200830593742348 c) Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) FBI-Records Management Division 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602-4843 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 3, 2015 , 6:15 pm - Arrived at USPS Origin Facility - PORTLAND, OR 97218 "Your item arrived at our USPS origin facility in PORTLAND, OR 97218 on February 3, 2015 at 6:15 pm. The item is currently in transit to the destination." Tracking Number: 9405510200828494428195 [ i offered to send via FAX if mail was problematic and excessively latent. ]

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Defcon slides
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

Cpunks, My slides are now online. There is a link from the front page of cryptome.org under the "Offsite" section. WW

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Re: [tor-relays] clarification on what Utah State University exit relays store ("360 gigs of log files")
by grarpamp 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 12:30 AM, Mike Perry <mikeperry(a)torproject.org> wrote: > I submitted a proposal to tor-dev describing a simple defense against > this default configuration: > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-August/009326.html nProbe should be added to the router list, it's a very popular opensource IPFIX / netflow tap. http://www.ntop.org/products/netflow/nprobe/ For those into researching other flow capabilities... There are also some probes in OS kernels and some other opensource taps, they're not as well known or utilized as nProbe. Other large hardware vendors include Brocade, Avaya, Huawei, and Alcatel-Lucent. Lots of SDN and monitoring projects can plug in with gear like this, because, FTW... http://telesoft-technologies.com/technologies/mpac-ip-7200-dual-100g-ethern… http://www.hitechglobal.com/IPCores/100GigEthernet-MAC-PCS.htm http://www.napatech.com/sites/default/files/dn-0820_nt100e3-1-ptp_data_shee… https://www.cesnet.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/hanic-100g.pdf http://www.ndsl.kaist.edu/~kyoungsoo/papers/2010-lanman-100Gbps.pdf http://info.iet.unipi.it/~luigi/netmap/

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Re: Open Fabs
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 20 Aug '15

20 Aug '15

I still maintain that bootstapping is best done using EBL to create LSI and less complex VLSI (USB chips, CPLD and FPGA). Sure EBL is slow but it can eliminate the cost and complexity of masking. EBL immensely simplifies the foundry and offers the possibility for OS distributed design and manufacture, affordable for "maker" groups, without involving a commercial entity. The number of trusted parties shrinks significantly.

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Crypto policy is a presidential campaign issue
by Alfonso De Gregorio 19 Aug '15

19 Aug '15

"Crypto policy is a presidential campaign issue." -- Matt Blaze, https://twitter.com/mattblaze/status/634120680557150208 “If you create encryption, it makes it harder for the American government to do its job—while protecting civil liberties—to make sure that evildoers aren’t in our midst,” -- Jeb Bush, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/08/19/jeb-bush-comes-encryption/ Those damn communists commented: "Übeltäter und kryptographen aller Länder, vereinigt euch!" -- Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on Crypto Wars II

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Re: FOIA/PA
by coderman 19 Aug '15

19 Aug '15

On 8/5/15, jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > Keep in mind that pages are free from PACER (www.pacer.com) until you get > 150 pages per calendar quarter. Spreading the task with others, so that > nobody downloads more than 149, would save money. life happened, and this delayed. should get to it tonight! will also check RECAP first, before forking over PACER payola... http://archive.recapthelaw.org/search/advanced/?q=USA+v.+Bell best regards,

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CNSS Issues Memo on Shift to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
by John Young 19 Aug '15

19 Aug '15

CNSS Advisory Memo on Use of Public Standards for Secure Sharing of Information Among NatSec Systems 08/11/15 <https://t.co/O2h82B5ZGE>https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/openDoc.cfm?DLuhIVBMUGJh7R8iXAWwIQ== This Advisory expands on the guidance contained in CNSS Policy No. 15, National Information Assurance Policy on the Use of Public Standards for the Secure Sharing of Information Among National Security Systems (Reference a). Based on analysis of the effect of quantum computing on Information Assurance (IA) and IA-enabled Information Technology (IT) products, the policy's set of authorized algorithms is expanded to provide vendors and IT users more near-term flexibility in meeting their IA interoperability requirements. The purpose behind this additional flexibility is to avoid vendors and customers making two major transitions in a relatively short timeframe, as we anticipate a need to shift to quantum-resistant cryptography in the near future.

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Resisting Surveillance: it's is not just about the metadata
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 19 Aug '15

19 Aug '15

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8yfDX0Myvw "This talk is given by three activists who were all targeted by UK police spy Mark Kennedy and who have direct personal experience of that and other physical surveillance. It will look at experiences of infiltration of social justice movements by the state and private contractors and some of our responses. " Basically shows that the COINTELPRO tactics are still sucessfully used today by undercover cops.

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