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Re: Proof of Stake...
by Sean Lynch 09 Feb '14

09 Feb '14

Sorry, meant to include the list before. Switching to inline reply since I want to reply to separate points separately. On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 12:40 PM, Lodewijk andré de la porte <l(a)odewijk.nl>wrote: > 2014-02-07 Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org>: > > Substitute "CPU power" for "wealth," and your claim about trust equally >> applies to the current proof-of-work function. I don't accept your premise >> that giving more power to wealthy people is somehow worse than giving more >> power to people with lots of CPU power (i.e. wealthy people). > > > Ah, yes. But now you're confusing some things. > > I can calculate that a certain transaction is no longer worth falsifying. > Let's say that there's 10,000 USD (10kusd) required to fake a single block. > > Now my transaction is buried 5 blocks. Setting apart a block just for the > sake of luck-prevention I can say that if my transaction is <40kUSD it is > now entirely safe. It is not worth it to revert it. > > Unless someone wants to mess with me (specifically me) it will not be > done. If I suspect someone wants to mess with me I only have to estimate > how much he can spend messing with me. > > Block reward kind of throws a wrench into the story. It drastically > reduces the actual cost of mining a block. Still I can say with math that > it isn't worth it after a while. > > With proof of stake I cannot do such math. I'm subjected not to the will > of the rich to mess with me. Not the will of the rich to waste money on me. > And the cost of faking a chain does not grow with it's length, unless it's > a proof-of-work-and-stake. In which case I'm really wondering why you're > taking two risks. > Either way, this is not equivalent to introducing trust into the system where it did not exist before. My claim about proof-of-stake not being trust any more than proof-of-work is stands. I was proposing using coin days destroyed as part of the "difficulty" computation, which would mean they actually DO have value, since you cannot use the same coin days more than once, and they would reduce the number of CPU cycles you need to burn in order to produce a block. The idea is to reduce the cost of mining in terms of pure CPU cycles by giving value to something that currently has no value: coin days. So you actually CAN do such math still. This is not a pure proof-of-stake system, though. I am as skeptical of pure proof of stake as you are. > I'm more strongly in favor of using citizen's ID's as provided by > governments for the purpose of voting on blocks than in proof of stake. > Not knowing you, this doesn't tell me much, since the same could be said of the most statist friend I actually tolerate, the one who thinks Bitcoin should die in a fire. I'm guessing that this means "not in favor of it at all." There are a couple of problems people are trying to solve with proof-of-stake. The first is that the value of mining will eventually go down, meaning people will be willing to devote less computing power to it, reducing the cost of an attack. The second is that, even if it didn't go down, we don't necessarily want a huge fraction of the world's computing power devoted to mining. The goal is to take some limited resource that doesn't depend on a trusted third party and that is difficult to corner and use that to distribute voting authority. In addition, we'd like the people doing the voting to have an economic incentive to vote correctly. Bitcoin does that by paying them to vote and revoking the payment if their block doesn't end up in the main chain. Proof-of-stake does it by hoping that the voters care about the integrity of the system, similar to only allowing landowners to vote, only (hopefully) without the ability to prevent others from becoming stakeholders, which I think is your main worry about it. Incidentally, the coin days are from ALL of the transactions in the block, not just your own. I'm not sure if I was clear about that before. You could maybe override a transaction that had fewer coin days, but you'd have to burn a similar amount (though less) of CPU time in addition. Speaking of which, is there any reason peers couldn't watch for forks and incorporate any still-valid transactions into new blocks and permanently blacklist any outputs that get double-spent? You could create a special "blacklist" transaction that just incorporates the two separate spends into the main chain, so that everyone could validate that the account holder attempted to double spend.

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Snowden Drop to Poitras and Greenwald Described
by John Young 09 Feb '14

09 Feb '14

http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-drop.pdf (7.6MB)

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Proof of Stake...
by Juan Garofalo 08 Feb '14

08 Feb '14

...does it work?

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Penetration of Target's HVAC Controls
by John Young 07 Feb '14

07 Feb '14

Good to see the report on Target's penetration through its remote heating and cooling controls. These and a slew of other building automation systems are often run on central computers along with data processing. Data processing may be protected but the other systems often are not, for IT sec tends to focus on the data of businesses housed in a structure but not the systems running or monitoring the structure with its operating systems most often overseen by maintenance and operation staff seldom skilled in cybersec. We have seen quite a few buildings with decent data protection and building physical and electronic security systems, but lacking oversight of the security of building automation systems often remote from the facilities with 24x7 access, and from there who knows where else -- central automation firms may link up to hundreds of other buildings in a batch of countries. Critical infrastructure protection seldom covers the great variety of buildings. Some use the same Internet connection, separated only by software and folders, with folders of the automation system in obscure locations seldom seen by principal IT data admins. Different duties, contracts, staff, budgets. Much interest in data security, hardly any for automation security. This is not the case for experienced designers, constructors and operators of buildings. Although compartmentalization among them continues to erect easy to penetrate "firewalls" and gaps of responsibility. Spies very much like the porosity and attention to data protection.

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The Spies in Your 3D Printer
by Gutem 06 Feb '14

06 Feb '14

This article remembered me a documentary about how Xerox's technicians intercepted Communications from Russia's embassy at Cold War... http://3dprintingindustry.com/2014/02/04/spies-3d-printer/ Att, - Gutem ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Registered Linux User: 562142

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Fwd: [Cryptography] (MIT) TALK: Thursday 02-06-2014 Thursday 02-06-14 NSA Surveillance and What To Do About It
by Robert Hettinga 05 Feb '14

05 Feb '14

Pass it along, if you know someone local who should be there. Cheers, RAH Begin forwarded message: > From: Peter Trei <petertrei(a)gmail.com> > Subject: [Cryptography] (MIT) TALK: Thursday 02-06-2014 Thursday 02-06-14 NSA Surveillance and What To Do About It > Date: February 4, 2014 at 7:54:47 PM AST > To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > > I know this is late notice, but some here may be interested. > > > > Subject: TALK: Thursday 02-06-2014 Thursday 02-06-14 NSA Surveillance and What To Do About It > > NSA Surveillance and What To Do About It > Speaker: Bruce Schneier > > Host: MIT Big Data Initiative at CSAIL > Host Affiliation: MIT CSAIL > > Date: Thursday, February 06, 2014 > Time: 5:00 PM to 6:00 PM > Refreshments Time: 4:45 PM > Location: 32-123 > > ABSTRACT: > Edward Snowden has given us an unprecedented window into the NSA's surveillance activities. Drawing from both the Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, this talk describes the sorts of surveillance the NSA conducts and how it conducts it. The emphasis will be on the technical capabilities of the NSA, and not the politics or legality of their actions. I will then discuss what sorts of countermeasures are likely to frustrate any nation-state adversary with these sorts of capabilities. These will be techniques to raise the cost of wholesale surveillance in favor of targeted surveillance: ubiquitous encryption, target dispersal, anonymity tools, and so on. > > [I cut out Bruce's bio - no one here needs it - pt] > > Relevant URL: http://bigdata.csail.mit.edu/ For more information please contact: Susana Kevorkova, 617-324-8424, <a href="mailto:skevorkova@csail.mit.edu">skevorkova(a)csail.mit.edu</a> > _______________________________________________ > The cryptography mailing list > cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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Re: My contacts have been deleted [Incident: 140202-009907]
by jim bell 03 Feb '14

03 Feb '14

Incidents: 140126-043015 140127-126735 140127-132061 140128-041612 140128-126181 140202-010643 140202-009907 I have discovered this article, showing that Yahoo staff like to play games with customers, trying to dissuade them from re-activating old accounts. But my issue, today, is far stronger: I did not allow an account to become 'old' and 'unused': My account (jamesdbell8(a)yahoo.com) was quite literally taken from me, one week ago while I was trying to use it daily, even hourly. (I am now using a new account, 'jamesdbell9(a)yahoo.com', to communicate with you. Do not try to convince me that you have 'lost' my data. That's not possible. No doubt Yahoo has backups of backups of backups. The data IS, indeed, 'there', somewhere. And if it's not 'there', it's in the NSA where you illegally sent it as it was being generated. Maybe you don't want to take the time and trouble to access it and restore it to my use, but that merely shows how callous, rude, and malicious your staff really is! Fix the problem immediately so I am only temporarily damaged, not permanently damaged. Jim Bell ________________________________ From: jim bell <jamesdbell9(a)yahoo.com> To: Yahoo Customer Care <customercare-en(a)cc.yahoo-inc.com> Sent: Sunday, February 2, 2014 1:05 PM Subject: Re: My contacts have been deleted [Incident: 140202-009907] Incidents: 140126-043015 140127-126735 140127-132061 140128-041612 140128-126181 140202-010643 I am talking about restoring both my contacts and my emails in account 'jamesdbell8(a)yahoo.com', NOT 'jamesdbell9(a)yahoo.com . I have gotten some (effectively) rude and certainly unhelpful emails from Yahoo staff claiming that my account is supposed to be deleted soon. I have repeatedly challenged your staff's original assertion that the account was stopped due to 'abuse'. Due to recent public news reports, it appears that millions of Yahoo email accounts were 'hacked', or at least were attempted to be 'hacked'. You staff has, negligently and rudely, never acknowledge the existence of this 'hacking' in regard to my own email account. Effectively, you blamed me for something that (maybe) somebody else did. I believe that your software reacted very badly to whatever malicious attempts were made against my email: I think your system has effectively deleted my account ONLY due to your own mistakes, not specifically the actions of some 'hackers'. You need to EXPLAIN what has actually happened, why it had the effect on my email account that it did, apologize, and then immediately restore the account (including all emails and address book entries) to me. And, you must do so IMMEDIATELY. Jim Bell ________________________________ From: Yahoo Customer Care <customercare-en(a)cc.yahoo-inc.com> To: jamesdbell9(a)yahoo.com Sent: Sunday, February 2, 2014 12:31 PM Subject: My contacts have been deleted [Incident: 140202-009907] My contacts have been deleted Recently you requested personal assistance from our on-line support center. Below is a summary of your request and our response. Subject My contacts have been deleted Discussion Thread Response Via Email (Curtis) 02/02/2014 12:31 PM Hello Jim, Thank you for contacting Yahoo Mail. I went to restore your contacts, and the only files I could restore from only contained the same contacts you have in your Address Book already. No action was taken. I tried every option to restore your missing Yahoo Contacts, but unfortunately, I wasn’t able to get them back for you. The good news is that you can keep this from happening again by making the occasional backup copy of your contacts. Here’s how to export them as a CSV file. Exporting your Yahoo Contacts as a Comma Separated Value (CSV) file 1. Sign in to your Yahoo Contacts page. 2. Select Actions | Export All. 3. Select the Export Now button that corresponds to the application you would like to export to. * If you're not sure, click Yahoo CSV. This file type can be easily imported into Yahoo Contacts. All of your Yahoo Contacts are now saved in a CSV file on your computer, which is readable by Yahoo Contacts and programs like Microsoft Excel. * To make it easier to find this CSV file in the future, we recommend moving it to a folder on your computer that you'll remember, or writing down its location. * You can make changes to the data in the file if you wish, as long as you don't change the field names in the first row of the file (changing these field names will make the file unreadable by Yahoo Contacts). Need help with something else? * Learn how to request restoration of email or instant messages. * If you have any other concerns that you need to contact Yahoo for, please submit another inquiry through our Yahoo Contacts help form. Thank you again for contacting Yahoo Mail. Regards, Curtis Yahoo Customer Care Auto-Response 02/02/2014 03:18 AM This is an automated message acknowledging your recent submission for help to Yahoo Customer Care. Please do not reply to this automated message as replies will not been seen or answered by a Yahoo Customer Care representative. • If you reported abuse, we will investigate and take action where appropriate, and may be contacted if additional information is required to complete our investigation. We appreciate your efforts to make our community better. • If you are submitting a request for assistance, or asking a question, a representative will respond as soon as possible. Your Incident ID is: 140202-009907 Sincerely, The Yahoo Customer Care Team We will assume your issue has been resolved if we do not hear from you within 72 hours. Thank you for allowing us to be of service to you. [---001:002237:33423---]

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Re: [p2p-hackers] The next gen P2P secure email solution
by grarpamp 02 Feb '14

02 Feb '14

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 12:58 AM, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> wrote: > On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 12:34 AM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: >> >> So sad. I have a clue and don't trust Skype. But I can't for the life of >> me migrate my friends off of it. It's as addictive as crack. It's just >> better than the alternatives. > > > Anything that is as good as skype is going to allow contact tracing, that > this person talks to that person. No... we are specifically talking about developing decentralized solutions here, so that that centralized lookup authority context and risk goes away. Yes... a low latency non-fixed-length non-chaffed network will still have some characteristic risks... timing, etc. Yet likely nowhere near the order of the above centralized issues. > But it does not have to allow mass interception (the original skype did not > allow mass interception), and it does not have to allow undetectable > interception, which the original skype did allow. That is just designing good applied crypto in the former, which nullifies the latter.

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Yet another interesting take on assassination markets.
by jim bell 02 Feb '14

02 Feb '14

See the article by Tomasz.Wegrzanowski(a)gmail.com (Spell that 5 times really fast!) http://t-a-w.blogspot.com/2013/11/if-assassination-markets-were-real.html I'd praise this guy's take on assassination markets, but since 90% of it is virtually identical to my own from January 1995 (before I'd published Part 1 of AP), that would pretty much be me patting myself on the back. Even so, there are some things on which we disagree: For example, TAW (Tomasz Wegrzanowski) says he believes that today's 'assassination markets' are probably scams. (I know only of Sanjuro's "Assassination Market", and David's DPL, or Digital Prediction Lottery; Technically, DPL doesn't label itself as an 'assassination market', but for purposes of my analysis I will label it one.) It is hypothetically possible that either or both of these are some government honey-pot, although I don't think so. I have previously pointed out that I see little reason for any government to, now, promote a system similar to my AP idea, particularly when I wasn't promoting AP itself since my release from the Federal governments' 'gated communities' in March 2012. Indeed, to do so would have been about as much a mistake as 2003's FutureMAP system. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Awareness_Office#Futures_Markets_A… (And I'm not implying FutureMAP was a bad idea; rather I think that to float the idea as they did led to so much negative reaction that they had to withdraw it, amazingly within one day too!) But I also don't believe that either system is likely to be a money- (Bitcoin-) seeking scam, either. The reason is based on Game theory. Imagine somebody starts up an AP-type operation. Imagine further that it is acting is what I'd call a 'healthy' fashion, actively collecting at least dozens of hundreds of individual donations per day. (This would be strongly impeded if the system collected minimum donations of 1.0 BTC, like Sanjuro's system started out doing , or it was somehow not sufficiently easy to use, or it did not provide the various proofs of operational security sufficient to induce confidence in potential donors.) I think if it was 'working', such a system would quickly develop hundreds of target-names, albeit some with tiny reward amounts, and would certainly collect enough donations within, say, three months to raise the bounties to a level sufficient to result in at least one, uh, 'hit'. Prior to that, many potential donors would still hold back, either because they weren't confident that somebody would be rewarded, or they would wait to see if something 'happened'. But suppose that one 'hit' occurred. Suppose the system demonstrated that some unknown-named person had correctly predicted the date of death of the person listed. (This should be unavoidable: It should not be possible for the system to conceal the existence of a correct donation; in any case, the public and all potential future donors would insist on the exposure of all relevant donations naming that particular target.) Would the operator 'defect' or 'cooperate' (both are terms used in Game Theory.) Would the operator of that system actually pay the stated amount, or would he refuse? (I am assuming that the system was at least set up to have the technical ability to prove, to the public, that the reward had been paid to the correct predictor.) To me, it is obvious that if the operator indeed pays the reward, and this fact can be proven to the public without revealing the true name of the correct predictor, for every Bitcoin paid out as a reward, this confidence-building measure will result in at least tens, and probably many hundreds of Bitcoins of further donations from other themselves naming other targets. In other words, at that point it would become totally illogical for the system operator to 'defect', to refuse to pay a (relatively) small donation, because by doing that he would be foregoing further donations that would be collectively hundreds of times larger. (Nobody would donate to a system which provably refused to pay on a correction 'prediction', or failed to sufficiently disprove the non-payment of the reward.) This same analysis would apply after the second 'hit', and the third, and the fourth, etc. At no point, I think, would the 'assassination market' system operator find it financially more advantageous to refuse to pay the reward, than to pay it and remain in operation and collect far more donations. He will always be better off by paying the reward. There is, however, one exception that I can think of to this analysis. A person (or persons, or a government) might conceivably run an 'AM'-type organization, for a while, specifically for the purpose of discrediting the entire concept of AP. That person might run the system, for a while, even paying off one, or a dozen or two, predictions, and collect a substantial reward in the process, eventually intending to run away, thereby leading to 'fear, uncertainty, and doubt' over the question of whether a credible 'AP'-type system could exist. The big problem, for that person, is that by doing so he would be inadvertently demonstrating the proper (for awhile) functioning, and effect of, that system. Once demonstrated to work, for that period of time, it would become obvious that such a system could, indeed, function 'properly' if the person or people involved are motivated to do so. And, there would be nothing they could do about stopping credible, reliable people from initiating and running an honest AP-type organization. Eventually, reputable systems would win out, because they would build up the longevity leading confidence as to their offers. Jim Bell

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Jim Bell's Email crash: Why not sue Yahoo AND the NSA?
by jim bell 02 Feb '14

02 Feb '14

I just received a seeming 'boilerplate' (pre-canned) email from Yahoo email, saying that my previous account (jamesdbell8(a)yahoo.com) will be deleted. It does not repeat the previous claim of "abuse" on the account, but the timing of the events strongly suggests that the source of the problem was an attack on probably millions of Yahoo email addresses that has occurred over the last week or so. Naturally, I am completely outraged that they allowed such an event to result in actual loss of 'all' data in the account. Could it be that Yahoo's system was truly damaged so seriously as to cause the complete loss of my email and address-list database? However, I am reminded of the old saying, "If you get lemons, make lemonade". Because of Edward Snowden's revelations, we have known that the NSA has been storing all domestic, and probably as many foreign, emails as they could get their grubby little hands on. Why not a class-action lawsuit demanding that Yahoo obtain prior emails from the NSA? While it is difficult to sue the US (primarily due to something called "Sovereign Immunity"), I am aware that the Federal government has already waived Sovereign immunity for everything except money damages. (In other words, you can sue them for 'declaratory' and 'injunctive' relief: A court could order the NSA to deliver the data back to Yahoo.) Does anyone out in the Wide World of Cypherpunks know of an attorney wanting to take on this kind of issue? It could put the NSA in a world of hurt for taking the data, and make them realize that one consequence of taking hold of such a massive amount of data is that they will ultimately be sued if it is necessary to recover. It would also put email providers such as Yahoo on notice that they have additional obligations (other than those they think they have) to recover lost emails. Jim Bell

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