- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment Protocol: BIP 70, 71, 72
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> ----- Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 12:12:45 -0400 From: The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> To: bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Payment Protocol: BIP 70, 71, 72 Organization: Virtual Adept Networks, Unlimited User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130514 Thunderbird/17.0.6 Reply-To: drwho(a)virtadpt.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 09/25/2013 07:35 AM, Melvin Carvalho wrote: > It depends on the attacker. I think a large entity such as a govt > or big to medium size corporation *may* be able to MITM https, of > course the incentive to do so is probably not there ... DLP (data loss prevention) products usually have MITM capability, to make sure that proprietary information isn't being exfiltrated. Also, some companies have full packet capture policies. The technology is out there and people buy and use it. Whether or not they're going to care about Bitcoin URIs in the short term, I don't know. Some of the companies documented here have such products: http://bluecabinet.info/wiki/Blue_cabinet#List_of_companies You are correct in that the incentive to carry out MITM attacks in this use case may not be there. However, detecting transactions may be more useful to an attacker than meddling with them. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "Shiloh? Is your name Shiloh? Can I talk to you?" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJDC30ACgkQO9j/K4B7F8FungCgyQtkyiQIekhlv1/Nqdd/JAIV 3EgAoKW8wTOI11lEq0ieOsRiQmnkM9w6 =W50W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ October Webinars: Code for Performance Free Intel webinars can help you accelerate application performance. Explore tips for MPI, OpenMP, advanced profiling, and more. Get the most from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60133471&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[tahoe-dev] the GNU 30th Birthday party!
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Zooko O'Whielacronx <zookog(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 05:00:04 +0000 From: Zooko O'Whielacronx <zookog(a)gmail.com> To: tahoe-dev <tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org> Subject: [tahoe-dev] the GNU 30th Birthday party! Folks: Tahoe-LAFS is one of the featured projects at the GNU 30th Birthday Party Hackathon! https://www.gnu.org/gnu30/celebration I'm going to be there in person in Cambridge. What I want to do during the Hackathon is make Tahoe-LAFS work better with Tor and/or I2P. I know that at least a couple of Tor developers and at least one I2P developer will be there in person, so this is a good opportunity to collaborate face-to-face or side-by-side. One thing I could spend Hackathon time on is just to contribute some patch review service to the Tor project, if it seems like they want that. Issue tickets relevant to this: Go to https://Tahoe-LAFS.org, click on "View Tickets" → https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/ViewTickets , click on "anonymity" → https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/query?status=!closed&keywords=~anony… Eyeballing those, I recognize the following as especially ripe, because the I2P folks have been working on them and flagging them as blockers for I2P: #68, #1010. https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/68# implement distributed introduction, remove Introducer as a single point of failure https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1010# use only 127.0.0.1 as local address See also a couple of patches that the I2P people are trying to contribute to foolscap, and which are also needed for full Tahoe-LAFS+I2P integration: http://foolscap.lothar.com/trac/query?status=!closed&keywords=~i2p You can join in! Just connect to us on IRC -- irc.freenode.net channel #tahoe-lafs -- or physically show up in Cambridge. Or, I suppose, at one of the other GNU 30th Birthday celebrations around the world: https://www.gnu.org/gnu30/ (scroll down to "Satellite Events"). ☺ Regards, Zooko _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: The Unbreakable Cipher (2)
by brian carroll 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

coderman wrote: > you're wrong. perfect. thank you (though assumption was more like MMORPG as distributed parallel network keying same space from many unique vantages, where environment* is of different structures and conceptualizations and parts do not necessarily align into a clear 'whole' view, including if many-many exchanges function beyond limits of model or framework) i think i grasp a fundamental concept of crypto that relates size of message (message length) with design of algorithmic structure needed to successfully embed or hide the message else hidden order may be easily visible/discovered i still contend this is different for set theory and models of noise - yet assume equations in that space could function differently and could have other design requirements or crypto principles perhaps more shallow if hiding in massive noise or equations to nest data in higher-dimensional matrices or at various levels, presumably unlike what appears a more static, confined construct of linear equationspace and its requirements in that 'keys' could function differently in bit set approach though perhaps rekeying is universal as a security principle yet potentially flawed if it could reveal a particular structure leading to its compromise whereas reusing an 'infinity key' (regenerating keys or using same key in new instantiations, accessing different arbitrary structure as keychain multitool) may function in a different context than existing approaches, in some way- which relates to the dataspace; such that perhaps the key itself is noisy or indeterminate as to what exactly the key is though this speculation could all be false. *(though of cipher environment presumed 'outside' the capacity of computers to process, rationalize accurately, thus not contained in electronic boxes; thus beyond modeled computer space, infinitely so)

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[drone-list] You're a threat to drones
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Yosem Companys <companys(a)stanford.edu> ----- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 10:45:10 -0700 From: Yosem Companys <companys(a)stanford.edu> To: Drones <drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: [drone-list] You're a threat to drones Reply-To: drone-list <drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu> From: Joan Livingston <joanlives(a)earthlink.net> Glenn Greenwald on how governments view Yemeni, Pakistani, US, and UK anti-drone activists as propaganda-wielding threats. The NSA's pro-drone propaganda is of course okay, as is detaining activists, denying visas, and denying facts about civilian casualties: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/25/nsa-uk-drone-opponents… -- Want to unsubscribe? Want to receive a weekly digest instead of daily emails? Change your preferences: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list or email companys(a)stanford.edu ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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South Park NSA
by brian carroll 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

Original Air Date: 09.25.2013 (two sets of commercials for web access) Cartman infiltrates the NSA and doesn’t like what he finds in his personal file. http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-episodes/s17e01-let-go-let-gov

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re: sneakernet calculation
by brian carroll 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 3:21 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: For very high latency you could just use a global sneakernet. > http://what-if.xkcd.com/31/ has some numbers. > quoted from that site: "Cisco estimates that total internet traffic currently averages 167 terabits per second. FedEx has a fleet of 654 aircraft with a lift capacity of 26.5 million pounds daily. A solid-state laptop drive weighs about 78 grams and can hold up to a terabyte. "That means FedEx is capable of transferring 150 exabytes of data per day, or 14 petabits per second—almost a hundred times the current throughput of the internet." i imagine most with mathematical instinct would think something 'real-world' is missing in this approximation, in that you could not realistically use-up all FedEx resources for such a data sharing project without likely taking down the system or being denied access- and thus existing traffic and congestion are not included in this ideal naive model. what would actually occur if you tried to use all FedEx shipping resources on a single day, and then after considering that, doing so repeatedly day after day. not only is I/O data transfer omitted (time needed to access/store/exchange data between platforms), though also hardware failures which, perhaps i am wrong- packet technology succeeds in transferring via multiple attempts and thus the 'internet traffic' of 167 terabits could potentially includes delivery failures and successful resends, and routing around congestion- whereas it is completely unrealistic to assume you could decide to ship such material and use up all "network" resources of FedEx without considering its tolerances for additional bandwidth to cover this parallelism, and also limits of local delivery or to various locations in an overnight scenario-- so delays would likely be involved, and if any data on laptop drives were to fail it would seemingly require reshipment to compare to the internet data transmission approach. or not. it is not to lose grasp of the notion, only to consider it in its depth, and knowing what may feasibly and more actually occur in such a scenario could provide a more accurate understanding of the limits of analogies without corresponding matched dimensions. such that maybe it would not be as efficient or as easy or even possible, as believed. though the simple mathematical comparison makes it appear so. and most comparisons of this nature often have similar 'modeling errors' where approximations function in an ideological realm as a result, though likewise makes for interesting considerations in considering where the gap is between what is said and what exists as a situation.

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One Time Pad Cryptanalysis
by John Young 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

"Cryptanalystis make their living out of sloppy thinking and enthusiastic over-ingenuity of designers of cipher systems." Brig. Gen. J.H. Tiltman, "Some Principles of Cryptographic Security," NSA Technical Journal, Summer 1974. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/Some_Principles.pdf Tiltman vaunts the One Time Pad but cautions there have been effective decrypts exploiting enthusiastic sloppy thinking that OTP is unbreakable. Most appears to involve non-decipher means and methods. The paper redacts others presumably still effective. For amateur ingenuity Tiltman footnotes: "I remember an early example of the solution of the problem of producing strictly one-time perforated tape. A Canadian engineer working for a British intelligence organization in New York who knew nothing at all about cryptography produced in 1942 an on-line machine called TELEKRYPTON. He generated his tapes by pouring a mixture of metal and glass balls through a hopper, the metal halls alone passing current and perforating 5-level tape. He analyzed the result and saw that it was biased, owing to the heavier weight of the metal balls, and then changed the respective sizes of the balls to compensate for the extra weight of the metal."

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The Compromised Internet
by John Young 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

Now that it appears the Internet is compromised what other means can rapidly deliver tiny fragments of an encrypted message, each unique for transmission, then reassembled upon receipt, kind of like packets but much smaller and less predictable, dare say random? The legacy transceiver technologies prior to the Internet or developed parallel to it, burst via radio, microwave, EM emanations, laser, ELF, moon or planetary bounce, spread spectrum, ELF, hydro, olfactory, quanta, and the like. Presumably if these are possible they will remain classified, kept in research labs for advanced study, or shelved for future use. Quite a few are hinted at, redacted and partially described in NSA technical publications from 25-50 or so years ago. Many developed for military use and the best never shared with the public. A skeptic might suppose the internet was invented and promoted as a diversion along with public-use digital cryptography. This ruse has led to immense growth in transmission-breakable ciphers as well as vulnerable transceivers. Packet techology could hardly be surpased for tappability as Snowden and cohorts disclose the tip of the iceberg. Ironically, the cohorts believe encryption protects their communications, conceals his location and cloaks the depositories.

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Re: The Unbreakable Cipher (2)
by brian carroll 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 9:11 AM, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > > Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict > traffic > volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that. > Presuming that NSA and cohorts have investigated this effect. > no- not for a multilinear/nonlinear bit set approach. voluminous data exchange and not censoring throughput (given ability to correlate elsewhere, delayed or real-time; thus store+forward) and allowing inaccurate modeling of data via ideological rationalizations turns that limited analysis back against itself as truth is secure, folding the framework via collapsing pseudo-truth and falsity, recontextualizing the shared situation, establishing new zones of interaction and unmapped boundaries that do not coherently correlate within existing models of analysis, instead breaking them. versus propping them up via following their rules and dictates that seek to limit and censor interactions as a basis for secrets or sustaining false-perspectives, seemingly often for self-preservation of legacy systems versus allowing collapse, deterioration or loss of control over what occurs- freedom in relation to governance versus its constriction, choking what can happen, to keep it finite, bound, gagged hypothetical, the massive influx of data (in truth) that is wrongly assessed (as pT) via limited observer established zone of secure interaction by default of its own false framework and incapacity to account for what does not exist in its categorization- any move toward accommodation is ideological weakness and falsifies belief system. it is to overwhelm with data that cannot be grounded in the false framework and its ungrounded evaluation undermines the existing inaccurate view because it yields less and less in the limited perspective. flooding the corrupt oversight with what amounts to pseudo-truth, allowing any and all correlations to fever circuits- it breaks the rationalization model by forcing decision-making that tends towards falsity, as it is ungrounded and the more it decides, the more it persists and expands itself in error. transparency in truth, a shared domain, remains a secret and a secure realm insofar as it cannot be accessed, perceived, or altered in the dimensions it exists- seemingly only censored, stopped, or attacked which forces polarization, ramps up potential dynamics, and creates conditions for extreme actions that can force or break hidden systems via operating beyond their known boundary or losing stealth advantage in some ways it may be like reverse radar, what they see is the entire radar field as the signal, potentially, unable to distinguish its value or meaning or interpret what is happening in vast many different frames simultaneously, keying in and out, leading to massa confusa... (perhaps equivalent to big bang inflation of a paralleled universe) ♃ ♃

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Re: [liberationtech] The missing component: Mobile to Web interoperability (in Internet Freedom Technologies)
by Eugen Leitl 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> ----- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 01:52:14 -0400 From: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)mailman.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] The missing component: Mobile to Web interoperability (in Internet Freedom Technologies) User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 09:32:46PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:34 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > ... > > Roger Dingledine has said that his biggest fear is that the > > NSA has found a way to break Tor, > > citation? ;) You left out the rest of his sentence (and maybe some different punctuation would have helped too). Once upon a time, we argued that sure, maybe NSA could break Tor if they put enough resources into it, but at least we could rely on the fact that if the FBI called them up on the phone and asked for some help with a case, they sure wouldn't admit to it. And also, if they *did* have an attack, surely they wouldn't "spend" their super-secret knowledge on just any old situation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ultra It's similar reasoning that might make you comfortable jaywalking in front of a secret service agent -- surely they have more important things to be doing with their time, or with our tax dollars, than coordinating with the local police to bust you for something irrelevant, right? And now here we are learning about a growing number of cases where NSA actually does provide intelligence for cases that are totally outside their scope or mandate, with sentences that start with "you didn't hear it from me, but". So the snippet of quote above is out-of-context -- I do think that an organization that puts a lot of energy into surveilling large parts of the Internet can probabilistically correlate some Tor traffic flows, but I wouldn't call that threat my biggest fear. That said, I do really worry about the slippery slope where everybody collects their own huge database of Internet traffic and then eagerly shares their analysis with everybody else. It shifts the balance of power even more in favor of the surveillance state(s). --Roger -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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