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Re: [cryptome] Re: snowman news
by John Young 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

The Polk Award plaques have concealed cavity transmitters, so our Google glasses indicate. Back-up. we palmed a sliver RFID in GG's wide mouthed molar, another in Miranda's steely butt, Poitras's panoptic camera, Gellman's top-sekret OTR widget, MacAskill's brogue-decrytor (we saw him plant a 0-day craw deep inside James Ball's kisser). Our totally undoctored vids and transcripts are at Amazon, Utah, Four Eyes, RU, CN, BR, all of them on the same transceiving thieving pipe, each with a twinned JPmorgan, Goldman Sachs fiber, so reports ourr splitter at Ross Anderson's lab in Oxbridge-Cheltenham, centroid of the universe's gobbling inadvertencies. The fake one underskinned in Markus Kuhn's vestigal tail. Real one infected at Vatican, eternal cloud of the pipe of pipes. ----- On Mon, Apr 7, 2014 at 4:48 PM, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > Great that Snowden is getting another chance to speak for himself, speaking of speaking directly, i hear one fine JYA got to mingle with the leakers? how hard did you press for a mass doc drop, John? i would have donated toward such a bribe... looks like an interesting crowd! (who has .vid transcripts?) best regards, #JustALittleJealous c.f.: http://cryptome.org/greenwald-miranda-young.jpg

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"How I obtained the private key for www.cloudflarechallenge.com"
by rysiek 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

Hi there, https://gist.github.com/epixoip/10570627 -- Pozdr rysiek

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NTRU Prime implementation
by coderman 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

reification requested! http://blog.cr.yp.to/20140213-ideal.html """ Here's a concrete suggestion, which I'll call NTRU Prime, for eliminating the structures that I find worrisome in existing ideal-lattice-based encryption systems. This suggestion uses a number field of prime degree, so that the only subfield is Q; and uses an irreducible polynomial xp-x-1 with a very large Galois group, so that the number field is very far from having automorphisms. The best CVP dimension seems to be about half the degree; this is optimal for number fields without many real embeddings. (It's hard to create many real embeddings while keeping coefficients small, and if coefficients are large then there are other problems.) This suggestion also chooses its modulus q so that (Z/q)[x]/(xp-x-1) is a field; this simultaneously avoids (1) NTRU's traditional 2-adic structure and (2) the linear splittings used in most recent papers. """

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NSA alleged to have known & used Heartbleed for 2 years
by Gregory Foster 13 Apr '14

13 Apr '14

Bloomberg (Apr 11) - "NSA Said to Have Used Heartbleed Bug, Exposing Consumers": http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-b… > The U.S. National Security Agency knew for at least two years about a flaw in the way that many websites send sensitive information, now dubbed the Heartbleed bug, and regularly used it to gather critical intelligence, two people familiar with the matter said. gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/

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If not StartSSL, the next best CA for individuals?
by Eric Mill 12 Apr '14

12 Apr '14

(Setting aside how awful the CA system is generally...) For those who still have a need to participate in it, and for those angry at StartCom's refusal to waive[1][2] revocation fees for their free class 1 certs, what's the best CA for the job? Even if not free, I'm looking to recommend[3] something priced attractively for individuals and non-commercial uses. The friendlier the interface, and the more reliable and principled the customer service, the better. -- Eric [1] https://cv.exbit.io/emails/startssl_heartbeat.txt [2] https://twitter.com/startssl/status/453631038883758080 [3] https://konklone.com/post/switch-to-https-now-for-free -- konklone.com | @konklone

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healthcare.gov vulnerability?
by jim bell 11 Apr '14

11 Apr '14

It occurred to me that I haven't heard much on the news about deliberate attacks on the healthcare.gov website, even though it is reputed to be extremely weak. Might somebody (potentially a supporter of Obama and/or Obamacare) have deliberately 'spammed' it with fake signups, simply to get the number of such signups increased? How vulnerable would it be to 'invented' names/addresses? How 'valid' would these names/addresses have to be to keep the system from finding out until some arbitrary stage in the process? If such an attack had been done, would the public ever find out, and when? Jim Bell

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Police inventing fake crimes
by jim bell 11 Apr '14

11 Apr '14

The major flaw that I see with this case (and others like it) is that it presumes that the defendants actually BELIEVED the statements by the police, and RELIED ON them. From the article: "Still, undercover officers with the U.S. Secret Service and Miami Beach police told both clearly that they wanted to buy bitcoins with cash supposedly generated by the hacking of Target Corp. customer information. The undercover officers said during the secretly videotaped meetings that they planned to use the bitcoins to acquire still more stolen credit cards." I could 'clearly tell' somebody that the Sun orbited the Earth, but that doesn't mean that the statement was factual. Similarly, the fact that the police told these guys what the article claims they did, doesn't require that the defendants actually BELIEVED the allegations. My expectation is that these charges will be quietly dropped: The only ones actually committing the crime(s) are the police themselves: The police solicited money laundering, when there were no facts (actual underlying crimes) supporting the money laundering predicate. Jim Bell ======================================= http://news.yahoo.com/fla-bitcoin-case-tests-money-laundering-limits-152957… MIAMI BEACH, Fla. (AP) — Two police officers burst through a hotel room door with guns drawn, yelling "Police! Get Down!" just after an alleged money laundering transaction went down. But instead of briefcases stuffed with a drug dealer's cash, this exchange involved an undercover officer with supposedly stolen credit cards and the virtual currency bitcoin. The February arrests of Pascal Reid and Michell Espinoza marked the first time any state has brought money laundering charges involving bitcoins, according to Miami-Dade State Attorney Katherine Fernandez Rundle. And it's likely to be a closely-watched test of whether criminal law can adapt to new digital forms of payment. "These cybercriminals are way ahead of the rest of us in terms of trying to figure out ways they can launder dirty money," Rundle said. Investigators trolled through an online directory of bitcoin traders to find the 29-year-old Reid and 30-year-old Espinoza, setting up separate meetings with each of the men at restaurants and coffee shops. They were arrested at the same Miami Beach hotel on the same day, at different times. Defense attorneys said the men have no previous criminal records and were simply enthusiasts of the payment format that allows people to convert cash into digital money for online transactions. Still, undercover officers with the U.S. Secret Service and Miami Beach police told both clearly that they wanted to buy bitcoins with cash supposedly generated by the hacking of Target Corp. customer information. The undercover officers said during the secretly videotaped meetings that they planned to use the bitcoins to acquire still more stolen credit cards. "My client has never dealt in the area of stolen credit cards," said Espinoza's attorney, Rene Palomino Jr. "My client was simply selling a piece of personal property, which is what a bitcoin is. It has not been recognized as currency yet in the United States."Attorneys for Reid and Espinoza, both of whom have pleaded not guilty, say they will challenge the very legal foundations of the cases, which are being prosecuted separately. The arrest affidavits for both Reid and Espinoza refer to bitcoins as "electronic currency with no central authority." The Internal Revenue Service issued guidance last month concluding that bitcoins can only be taxed as property and are not legal tender. Federal law enforcement agencies are watching whether bitcoins are used increasingly in criminal activity, such as the now-defunct Silk Road illegal drug marketplace. "The idea that illicit actors might exploit the vulnerabilities of virtual currency to launder money is not merely theoretical," said Jennifer Shasky Calvery, director of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, in a recent Florida speech to bankers. Still, bitcoins have been gaining popularity among mainstream businesses. Overstock.com recently became the first major retailer to accept digital money and the NBA's Sacramento Kings in January announced the team would accept bitcoins, another first. They are increasingly used in restaurants, coffee shops and elsewhere. The Latin House Grill in Coral Gables is one of the first South Florida restaurants to accept bitcoins and has been hosting meetings to educate people.Bitcoin users exchange cash for digital money using online exchanges, then store it in a computer program that serves as a wallet. The program can transfer payments directly to merchants or individuals around the world, eliminating transaction fees and the need for bank or credit card information. "This technology can't go away. It's completely disrupted a lot of existing technology that's archaic, that hasn't evolved," said patron Andrew Barnard, who has been using bitcoins for a year. In the Florida criminal case, Reid and Espinoza each face up to 25 years in prison if convicted of money laundering and engaging in an unlicensed money services business. Reid is free on $100,000 bail but Espinoza has been unable so far to make bail. The transactions started small — one payment of $500 translated into about half a bitcoin — and eventually built to a proposed swap involving $30,000 in Reid's case. "Ice cold money. Ice cold cash. Right out of the freezer," the undercover agent, holding a plastic bag of cash tells Reid on the surveillance tape. Just after Reid accepts the bag, the undercover agent says, "We're cooking with gas," an apparent signal to the officers outside to come in. "You're a cop?" Reid is heard saying on the tape. "You're a cop?" Reid attorney Ron Lowy said the prosecution was manufactured. "The government is frightened of bitcoin. Apparently, they see it as an emerging, new type of economic medium of exchange, and they're worried that they're not regulating it close enough," Lowy said. "These facts do not constitute a crime." ___

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Two possible vulnerabilities in OpenSSL?
by Peter Malone 11 Apr '14

11 Apr '14

Hey there, I was auditing OpenSSL last night. I looked at several files and found the following: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/ssl/t1_lib.c#L2893 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI * absence on initial connect only. */ Well that's awful coding. Unless I'm mistaken, the following memcmp is vulnerable to a remote timing attack. https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1974 static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return(1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return(1); return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } I posted both of these findings to the full disclosure list last night. I figured someone on this list might find it interesting as well. Cheers, Peter.

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Assange: Debian is Owned by the NSA
by rysiek 10 Apr '14

10 Apr '14

Hi there, so this has come to my attention. Whaddya guys and gals think? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - http://igurublog.wordpress.com/2014/04/08/julian-assange-debian-is-owned-by… In his Q&A to his keynote address at the World Hosting Days Global 2014 conference in April, the world’s largest hosting and cloud event, Julian Assange discussed encryption technology in the context of hosting systems. He discussed the cypherpunk credo of how encryption can level the playing field between powerful governments and people, and about 20 minutes into his address, he discussed how UNIX-like systems like Debian (which he mentioned by name) are engineered by nation-states with backdoors which are easily introduced as ‘bugs’, and how the Linux system depends on thousands of packages and libraries that may be compromised. I recommend watching his 36 minute Q&A in its entirety, keeping in mind my recent warnings about how GNU/Linux is almost entirely engineered by the government/military-affiliated Red Hat corporation. The Voice of Russia website has an article on Assange’s address with a few quotes: “To a degree this is a matter of national sovereignty. The news is all flush with talk about how Russia has annexed the Crimea, but the reality is, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, principally the United States, have annexed the whole world as a result of annexing the computer systems and communications technology that is used to run the modern world,” stated Julian Assange in his keynote address… Don’t just read the short article, listen to the address yourself, because Assange goes into many areas, and the work being done in these fields. Assange mentions how Debian famously botched the SSL random number generator for years (which was clearly sabotaged – a known fact). Speaking of botched security affecting Red Hat, Debian, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SuSE, *BSD, and more, the nightmarish OpenSSL recently botched SSL again (very serious – updated comments on how a defense contractor in Finland outed the NSA here?) It’s very hard to believe this wasn’t deliberate, as botching the memory space of private keys is about as completely incompetent as you can get, as this area is ultra-critical to the whole system. As a result, many private keys, including of providers, were potentially compromised, and much private info of service users. Be sure to update your systems as this bug is now public knowledge. (For more on how OpenSSL is a nightmare, and why this bug is one among many that will never be found, listen to FreeBSD developer Poul-Heening Kamp’s excellent talk at the FOSDEM BSD conference.) From the start, my revelations on this blog about Red Hat’s deep control of Linux, along with their large corporate/government connections, hasn’t been just about spying, but about losing the distributed engineering quality of Linux, with Red Hat centralizing control. Yet as an ex-cypherpunk and crypto software developer, as soon as I started using Linux years ago, I noted that all the major distributions used watered-down encryption (to use stronger encryption in many areas, such as AES-loop, you needed to compile your own kernel and go to great lengths to manually bypass barriers they put in place to the use of genuinely strong encryption). This told me then that those who controlled distributions were deeply in the pockets of intelligence networks. So it comes as no surprise to me that they jumped on board systemd when told to, despite the mock choice publicized to users – there was never any option. A computer, and especially hosting services (which often run Linux), are powerful communication and broadcasting systems into today’s world. If you control and have unfettered access to such systems, you basically control the world. As Assange notes in the talk, encryption is only as strong as its endpoints. eg if you’re running a very secure protocol on a system with a compromised OS, you’re owned. As Assange observed: “The sharing of information, the communication of free peoples, across history and across geography, is something that creates, maintains, and disciplines laws [governments].” - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Pozdr rysiek

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OpenWTF
by rysiek 10 Apr '14

10 Apr '14

OHAI, So I suppose many of you have already seen this. Nonetheless... W: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.openbsd.misc/211963 T: http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/heartbleed-vs-mallocconf F: http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/analysis-of-openssl-freelist-reuse To get you interested: > No. OpenSSL has exploit mitigation countermeasures to make sure it's > exploitable. -- Pozdr rysiek

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