- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

What do you think about it: <<www.unseen.is>> - a service that provides privacy and security for messaging, email and calling
by Александр 27 Jun '14

27 Jun '14

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Research into Law Enforcement surveillance technology
by Morgan Mayhem 26 Jun '14

26 Jun '14

Recently released research on software used by police / intelligence agencies for mobile phone surveillance: https://citizenlab.org/2014/06/backdoor-hacking-teams-tradecraft-android-im… . The piece in Wired piece covering this was particularly well done: http://www.wired.com/2014/06/remote-control-system-phone-surveillance/ Also worth a glance: Associated Press: http://bigstory.ap.org/article/eyes-you-experts-reveal-police-hacking-metho… VICE: http://motherboard.vice.com/read/police-grade-mobile-spyware-is-spreading-t… International Business Times: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hacking-team-tools-allow-governments-take-full-con… -- Seek not the favor of the multitude; it is seldom got by honest and lawful means. But seek the testimony of few; and number not voices, but weigh them

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why do you sign your mails?
by stef 26 Jun '14

26 Jun '14

i noticed lots of users pgp-sign their mails to mailing-lists. what exactly is the reason/usecase/attackvector you defend against for that? what exactly is the reason for doing so on public mailing lists? and why does it make sense to sign irrelevant messages like "+1" or "just kidding" - assuming no stego usecase is in play. -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt

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List of digital currencies?
by grarpamp 25 Jun '14

25 Jun '14

Any links to a list of digital currencies organized by technology? ie: Bitcoin has countless forks characterized by nothing more than adjusting (or not) the operating parameters of the bitcoin.org code and starting their own genesis. Others may swap out the hash or crypto functions within that. While useful to list them all under the aforesaid parent technology 'Bitcoin', they are all ultimately uninteresting and a waste of time to research. A real list would group all the digital currencies by genuine differences in architecture... those archs thus resulting in their suitability to different applications, capabilities to anonymity, features for centralization/regulation, etc. So now you might have Bitcoin Paypal, Linden Some other various coin designs Currencies that pass serialized 'banknotes' around

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[OT] Libreoffice's VBA and cross platform virii
by Georgi Guninski 25 Jun '14

25 Jun '14

http://lwn.net/headlines/newrss Ubuntu has updated libreoffice (14.04 LTS: unexpected VBA macro execution) They might make client virii cross platform, the way java is screwing people.

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Keybase.io
by MrBiTs 25 Jun '14

25 Jun '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hello, guys Keybase.io seems to be a great tool to create a true WoT. Are anybody in there? They are working with invitations. CheerS - -- echo 920680245503158263821824753325972325831728150312428342077412537729420364909318736253880971145983128276953696631956862757408858710644955909208239222408534030331747172248238293509539472164571738870818862971439246497991147436431430964603600458631758354381402352368220521740203494788796697543569807851284795072334480481413675418412856581412376640379241258356436205061541557366641602992820546646995466P | dc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTpFtOAAoJEG7IGPwrPKWrrmgIAJe2oyJodQtlMmi4cNZ/tCXq vGLnzkOos4PZYiIxM8Vx/gb5LaYZnK30tJ9eXkiUBw9d0OVdMLnBSCDvlPLiGOL0 gww+vzv8Ys005rdK8wfEs5BwZxRJUbA6yQ4BGPsmoWfO8ceUodzwmKi861dwe8sY CRqtHPsLEULO0ChSmNOL+nSDhZITTpFmK27Nu3/3BMxImDb0iCktJ/JGeRnId4pm lmiVgPkJMUlT2c18EZRZuqf3oMNBoN9ce1e5Mbfun+STd33d5/5yxpiPfAnxmtSn rWEY4C+6c8fh/Nf5MvX4nGZlbejBxeCdZUqIIv3ZPIxAaVhCnbnLfrWXp3qRN8g= =s7LH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NSA aims for absolute surveillance
by grarpamp 25 Jun '14

25 Jun '14

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FScSpFZjFf0

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waͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣͣll-of-sheeͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤͤp iͥͥn theater (zürch, jun26-jul7)
by Nathan Andrew Fain 24 Jun '14

24 Jun '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 http://gessnerallee.ch ("begin statistical purification" on 1st and every 5th load) We(*) are putting together a theater show/installation for Festspiele Zürich at the Gessnerallee theater called Anonymous-P. It's a show between us and the cell phones of the audience. Something between Defcons "Wall-of-Sheep" on steroids as well as a game we developed for profiling between audience members. Over top of it all are 3 actors dealing with the topics of privacy and digital fingerprinting in their own way. http://vimeo.com/99041398 It's either going to be epic or a complete disaster. Test runs have proven interesting. It is strange when an actor pulls you aside to help you change your phone so you stop leaking passwords (which 1 in 10 people do). Or when your interaction with the game has made the conclusion that you are most likely to lie. Or when you have to pay the higher price for a beer that's listed between 2 to 7chf just because the barman thinks you are rich (you have an iPhone or data game determined you make over 5000chf). Come see it if you get a chance or know someone interested. * We: myself, another anonymous coder, Chris Kondek, Christiane Kühl, Phil Hayes, Sonja Füsti, Hannes Strobl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iEYEARECAAYFAlOpz7AACgkQveagdEkPM4BYrwCeLU7+hWVAUixZFGtYzYx8PBxv rvQAn2ic2nzWn/YkV+j21aAc9WW33EJn =PJZQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[drone-list] WH OLC memo re: targeted killings released
by Gregory Foster 23 Jun '14

23 Jun '14

Ars Technica (Jun 23) - '"Civilian casualties" authorized under secret US drone-strike memo': http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/civilian-casualties-authorized-u… > A secret Obama administration memo disclosed Monday outlines the legal justification for the government's drone-targeted killing program, a lethal strategy that authorizes the killing of innocents as collateral damage. US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Jun 23) - "NYT v. United States": http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/usca2-olc-memo-6232014.pdf OLC memo begins on page 67. gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ -- Want to unsubscribe? Want to receive a weekly digest instead of daily emails? Change your preferences: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list or email companys(a)stanford.edu

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Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
by Eugen Leitl 23 Jun '14

23 Jun '14

http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 , Francesco Regazzoni2 , Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1 1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA 2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland 3Horst ortz Institut for IT-Security, Ruhr-Universiat Bochum, Germany Abstract. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like, and how dicult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against "golden chips". We demonstrate the ectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs | a digital post-processing derived from Intel's cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation and by exploring their detectability and their ects on security. Keywords: Hardware Trojans, malicious hardware, layout modifications, Trojan side-channel

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