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Economics: USA Racking Up $490 Billion Debt Every Quarter
by grarpamp 08 Dec '18

08 Dec '18

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-30/treasury-s-488-billion-i… https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/8g7izp/the_us_treasury_department… https://www.reddit.com/r/politics/comments/8g26mb/the_us_just_borrowed_488_… https://www.reddit.com/r/Libertarian/comments/8g2oa0/the_us_just_borrowed_4… https://www.reddit.com/r/collapse/comments/8g4g76/the_us_just_borrowed_488_…

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Cypherpunk University by JW Weatherman
by grarpamp 08 Dec '18

08 Dec '18

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbIPKm3inWU https://jwweatherman.com/class http://www.cypherpunku.com/index.php?threads/so-what-is-cypherpunk-universi… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9OML5D8RMo https://archive.org/details/youtube-wrAtsQrs7dY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa87kudAVFs

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ROTF! Cloudflare CEO: “I woke up this morning in a bad mood and decided to kick them (DailyStr0mer) off the Internet.”
by Razer 08 Dec '18

08 Dec '18

Quote source: http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/08/cloudflare-and-the-debate-over-content-n… What cut it? Making shit up. Nazis do that... A LOT. AAMOF most of what they spew is complete utter ahistorical nonsense (holocaust denial for instance) targeting desperate people who have no analysis and are looking to blame "someone". In this case, because Nazis have no friends they needed to create invisible secret ones. > > "Earlier today, Cloudflare terminated the account of the Daily > Stormer. We've stopped proxying their traffic and stopped answering > DNS requests for their sites. We've taken measures to ensure that they > cannot sign up for Cloudflare's services ever again. > > Our terms of service reserve the right for us to terminate users of > our network at our sole discretion. The tipping point for us making > this decision was that the team behind Daily Stormer made the claim > that we were secretly supporters of their ideology. > > Our team has been thorough and have had thoughtful discussions for > years about what the right policy was on censoring. Like a lot of > people, we’ve felt angry at these hateful people for a long time but > we have followed the law and remained content neutral as a network. We > could not remain neutral after these claims of secret support by > Cloudflare. > > Now, having made that decision, let me explain why it's so dangerous..." > Cloudflare CEO's blog posting on the topic of scumbag removal: https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-we-terminated-daily-stormer/ Note many people are making reference in the post's comments to Cloudflare's hosting of ISIS chatrooms, which came to public knowledge in this Congressional hearing: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20150127/102855/HHRG-114-FA18-Transc… CCloudflare is undoubtely running honeypots allowing the feds to monitor ISIS chats, and potentially find Useful Idiots for the FBI to set up in the latest and greatest islamo-terror plot they create lock, stock, and explosives. Rr

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Cryptocurrency: Who created it, #PeakStatism
by grarpamp 08 Dec '18

08 Dec '18

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yjrmIIpgo0 #CreatedByGovt https://www.zdnet.com/article/dhs-looking-into-tracking-monero-and-zcash-tr… https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=f0e31ab37561cac3cc4a4ab88d9059b0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c9EdzrBxUAo #TheLastChance https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BF1hVkK_9Aw #PeakStatism https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdwpKKOAR6o #PeakStatism https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4ybfIdefT8 #PeakStatism

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Re: [Cryptography] What if Responsible Encryption Back-Doors Were Possible?
by grarpamp 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

On 12/6/18, Bill Cox <waywardgeek(a)gmail.com> wrote: > As for responsible encryption policies, I believe: > > 1) It is possible, but _hard_ and _expensive_ to build it securely. > 2) No one wants to be in a position where a mass murderer has encrypted > data that cannot be revealed to law enforcement. > 3) Governments will always over-reach and go for mass-surveylence that > violates everyone's privacy. > > I wont go into tech details, but if Bitcoin can protect billions in online > value, there are systems that can unlock back-doors without too many > failures to make the system a bad idea. Check out what Oasis Labs is up > to, for some good ideas (that remain to be proven). The problem is that > while the public wants tech companies to help law enforcement in extreme > cases, no one wants to simply let governments around the world spy on > absolutely everything we do. > > IMO, the only acceptable solutions to this problem will require distributed > trust (like Bitcoin), such that users' devices can participate in decisions > on how their data is used, distributed widely enough that no single entity > can unilaterally decrypt a user's data Data policies will need to be > automated, like smart-contracts on something better than the total-crap > Ethereum VM. When a backdoor is used (or used too often), it should make > the news, because a bunch of different interested folks would notice the > transaction(s) on the blockchain. Secret mass surveylence should be > impossible, as a key requirement for the system design. Publicly visible > mass surveylence should be prohibited by the smart contracts, and the > public should hold governments accountable for overreach. > > If the public can monitor the access policy and frequencey of use of these > backdoors, then the tech companies will have a way out of the ethical > delema law enforcement always tries to put them in: secretly snooping on > users for the government (like we saw with Yahoo). > > Anyway, I feel very strongly that folks out there should start thinking > along these lines. We'll have to cooperate to make it happen. Please tell us when you develop or find such a distributed backdoored cryptosystem that you feel is strong enough to protect *your own secrets* from access by others... all the salacious messages pics and videos of that BDSM affair you had, all the edits you've made to your resume, the source and fact of your last weed order because the PTSD from your stint as a secret CIA torturer has you about to lose it, all the crap you nicked, your bank accounts, your speech and politik, that weird thing you do with the stuffed groundhog, your kids, your health, etc. Or the fact that you're a complete nothing with nothing to say if that's the case. You'd have a better chance of eliminating Government Surveillance through Anarchism than you would finding such a cryptosystem. > the only acceptable solutions to this problem Stalemate status quo is an acceptable solution, no change to implement backdoors needed... People have been using codes since thousands of years, as relatively strong and without backdoors in their day back then, as they are now today, and society has done just fine all along. If you want distributed for yourself, use secret sharing system. Trying to develop and force that upon others will just come back upon you and you know it. Strong crypto is a tool, not the problem. Melting down the tool isn't going to help. It just reverts you to former centuries. Backdoors are stupid. Get over it. > the public should hold governments accountable for overreach. Never in the history of all Governments past has that ever worked, therefore any apparent working today is extremely likely to fail. Kings will Govern and Force their backdoors in your backdoor until you depose them. Next time that happens, do the one thing that hasn't been tried in history... don't prop them up in the first place. The change in thinking needed to do that will likely eliminate most of the extant problems you seek to "fix" with backdoors. > moderators Lol, bcc'd.

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Re: [tor-talk] Most Security Assertions Dangerous [Re: YouTube via Onion Services]
by grarpamp 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

> Tutanota open sourced their client. You could use the source and run your > own version of the Tutanota client if that's your threat model. It's true > the email provider could serve different users different versions of the app > and there is no possible way to audit it in real time A standalone app can give at least some distance and pinnable code. And a bit more if served up from a "neutral" third party like github, f-droid, or allowing tor or vpn to get it in some masked user fashion. > 2) You are running unknown code every day. Do you trust the vendors? Probably not wise until the world changes some more towards those hashtags. Shall we add #SharedAudit . > It's unfair [...] They're trying to > solve a complicated problem, inside a web browser, with no easy solution :-/ Yes of course, they're at least trying something new, that's important, so kudos. > It's unfair [...] to call [out] encrypted email providers But is it... just look at most of their own front page advertising statements that often go like... "Secure Encrypted Email in your Browser" Without weasel words, those statements can end up being fake. Does what net benefit the service may have for [most] users offset potential damage arising from such statements? There's a bunch of front page statements here too that also have more holes than a block of Swiss Cheese... https://www.torproject.org/ Who is parsing and calling them out, and or proffering page updates that use suitably accurate weasel words? > inside a web browser, with no easy solution :-/ If the world is still stupidly insisting on the derelict spy exploited relic of SMTP transport, instead of say fully encrypted P2P overlay transports with legacy SMTP / POP / IMAP frontends for the old timey feels, they should at least be directly extending browser functionality to load and exec user selected third party provided and fourth party audited message crypting code modules from local disk. Or should be using actual properly stood at a distance tools like GPG, Enigmail, Mailpile, NeoMutt, whatever, while replacement distributed P2P messaging and storage systems gain marketshare. If user can locally compile and use Tutanota from Github with no blobs, that's interesting, perhaps consider dropping them some coin if so.

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Re: [tor-talk] comparison of Tor and Kovri in regards to deanonymization attacks
by grarpamp 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

> - I2P can be attacked with far less resources than Tor; Moot when $10k is probably enough to Sybil at least some small fraction of either of them. > - Tor is deeply researched and various attack types and problems have > already been solved; So if Tor is done, why don't you start writing grants to reseach, advance, and solve some of the undone, equally applicable, and necessary problem space of mixnets and other potential designs, instead of continuing to throw [government] money at Tor's curve of diminishing returns. > - Tor is larger as a network with more capacity, and more diversity; Start advertising, using, analysing other types of networks then. > They also have different purposes so they cannot be directly compared on > absolutely every feature Why do so many reviews keep implying this copout, "B network doesn't have X feature therefore B sucks"... of course networks are different, unique features are not detractions they're just incomparable items, go compare and analyse the similar features then. Both Tor and I2P generally claim their non-exit modes to be anonymous advanced designs resistant to attack. Go compare and analyze that. If you don't like the results, go start new designs. Reviews can even conform features... users can actually torrent internally over both, and exit over both... analyze that. Many orthagonal features are modular ideas embeddable in any decent network anyway, so they're not necessarily unique, only a matter of doing it, if sensible of course. > - I2P is more oriented for traffic inside the I2P network (e.g. you > cannot browse cnn.com anonymously via I2P). Yes you can, you just have to find or be an exit outproxy service and configure it manually. >> I would summaries the success of Tor over I2P with these points: Government: Initialed the Tor design, put in Decades of $Millions of controlling interest funding, and programmed Marketing. Throw those kind of resources at I2P or any other network and they would be relatively equal contenders too. Throw Voluntary versions of those kinds of resources at any network, and it might be a bit more novel and free to go up against the backer of the "successful" one above. >> - Tor has a modified browser which is a fork of firefox-esr called Tor >> Browser Bundle which is easy to click and run with Tor. I2P until now >> there is no official browser supporting it and user needs to do the >> configurations manually. So stuff I2P inside TBB's work and call it IBB.

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Re: [tor-talk] comparison of Tor and Kovri in regards to deanonymization attacks
by grarpamp 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

>> I was curious for Monero dev's rationale to pick I2P over Tor >> Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing. Same could be asked of Zcash strong cryptographic ZKP style currencies users often using Tor. As well as a handful of other cryptocurrencies explicitly advertised and designed to use with Tor. >> Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing. >> Is there published research in regards to deanonymization attacks against >> both Tor and I2P Some are here, some are in sites of other messaging systems... https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib All overlay networks currently in production are massively vulnerable to at least two classes of attack by sufficiently interested and capable adversaries... 1) Sybil a) This requires people to actually use PKI to make and use assertions and identities and to punt the results they get from their deep social anal probing of each other in real life as operator peers worldwide... into the consensus, DHT, or whatever mechanism each network uses for node approval and selection. b) Also requires complete ongoing analysis of all known physical and logical metadata and behaviour of the nodes themselves. 2) Global Passive Monitoring The US NSA, Global and Regional Telecom Corporations, and other Entities Worldwide, acting both separately and together, have a complete passive and active view of the internet from at minimum the Global Tier-1 ISP Level, including significant analysis and recording capabilities therein. Yet everyone still stupidly fails to execute at least a few of the seemingly available and reasonable countermeasures... a) Encrypt Everything. Automatic, on by default, strong crypto suites, forward secrecy, tofu, psk, rekeying, whatever works best, etc... both... 1) By and between end to end users, same for server to server... 2) On all physical network links worldwide, every port automagic and independant... fiber, copper, radio, etc... embedded in the network hardware itself via RFC, IEEE, etc b) Deploy fulltime network fill traffic aka chaff, to fill the committed capacity that each node provisioned itself into the [overlay] network with, dynamically yielding room for and upon native traffic. This applies both to, logical nets 2a1, and physical nets 2a2, above. c) Politics, Anarchism, Cryptocurrency Crowdfunding, and whatever else works to uproot and route around persistant known bad actors. 3) Etc Nobody seems to want to do much on the above, to actually shape those into effective global project efforts, to deploy any sufficient mitigation finally therein, therefore the vulnerabilities shall remain. #OpenFabs , #OpenHW , #OpenSW , #OpenDev , #OpenBiz , #CryptoCurrency , #Anarchism , #SybilBusters , #EncryptEverything , #FillEverything ... the list gets longer. Anyone can launch rockets these days. So there is no reason any of the above and more can't be done. Go build and launch some rockets.

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Lé Guardian "Jealous AF on CNN", clinches Fake News Cup -
by Zenaan Harkness 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

[PEACE] Reply-To: In-Reply-To: <20181130125754.p7kro4odxzr2b2jg(a)eye.freedbms.net> On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 11:57:54PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 12:07:04PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 05:48:02AM +0000, jim bell wrote: > > > https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/11/28/assange-wikileaks-prosec… > > > Philip Agee. > > > > Entirely apropos and an interesting story to boot. > > > > Just as the Jews have their spyware and flashmob "counter > > anti-semitic" apps: > > > > The software, called the Anti-Semitism Cyber Monitoring System, or > > ACMS, is "the most advanced development in the world for monitoring > > anti-Semitism in real time," the ministry said... > > https://www.timesofisrael.com/diaspora-ministry-unveils-system-for-tracking… > > > > https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/asa-winstanley/israel-running-campaign… > > > > https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-spyware-was-used-to-tr… > > https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-spyware-used-against-saudi-arabian-di… > > https://www.mintpressnews.com/saudi-arabia-secretly-purchased-250m-spy-pack… > > > > > > in this day and age a CIA-agent (and NSA, FBI etc) identification app > > would be relatively easy to create - turbo charging what Agee did in > > the '70s. > > > > For example one obvious group are the legacy stream media plants, > > Luke Harding and or Dan Collyns (is that a real name, Collyns?) for > > two face planting manipulator examples to start with: > > > > > > The Guardian Faceplants As Manafort's Passport Stamps Don't > > Match "Fabricated" Assange Story > > https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-11-29/guardian-faceplants-manaforts-pas… > > > > …WikiLeaks immediately fired back at The Guardian - betting the > > paper "a million dollars and its editor's head that Manafort > > never met Assange." > > > > This is going to be one of the most infamous news disasters > > since Stern published the "Hitler Diaries". > > — WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) November 27, 2018 > > > > > > It is evident that those who proclaim "Russia hacked the USA's 2016 > > elections" are compromised, idiots, (CIA or Hitlery) agents, or some > > combination. > > > > A problem with human "annotations" if you like is the problem of > > "the tyranny of the mob" which it times of stress descends into witch > > hunting lynch mobs - so empower that at your peril, > > > > yet on the other hand, evil only thrives in secrecy and the Satanists > > seem to corral an extraordinary large number of humans into the "eff > > the optics of the Butcher of Benghazi and her oral lynching of a 12 > > year old (at the time) rapee, I'm With Her" - this level of mass > > programming is truly impressive, shocking, etc. - evidently many > > folk simply don't think, they are CNNPCs, MSNPCs, as in literally. > > > > Exposure, transparency, truth and facts must be the fundament of any > > sane "community or tribal grouping" (politics), and so from this > > foundation, turbocharging publishing of empire-embarrassing facts as > > Agee and Assange have done, and the trasparency that a "CIA and other > > agent crowd sourced identification" app would bring to the table, > > despite any possible, or even probable, problems, are necessary and > > important, with the benefits far outweighing those potential > > problems. > > > > Besides, the hypocrisy of Western "democracy" ought be utterly > > exposed and crushed into the dark halls of history - as humans at > > least trying to think about things (and to whatever limited the > > degree we actually achieve something resembling "thought"), we owe it > > to ourselves and future "try to think"ers to clean out the rot. > > > Chapter 2 of Assange, Luke Harding and Dan Collyns of MI6, sorry I > mean The Guardian, and the neurotic moronic revenge charges being > concocted to Send A Message in the style of CNN's "offers your can't > refuse" - impressive in its chutzpah, brazen disregard for all > decency and even any remote hint of righteousness: > > > PCR Fumes "There Is No Case Against Assange, > So Lies Replace Evidence" > https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-11-29/pcr-fumes-there-no-case-against-a… Oh ... yeah. You know you love it! The Guardian's Reputation In Tatters After Forger Revealed To Have Co-Authored Assange Smear https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-12-06/guardians-reputation-tatters-afte… Names to remember, folks: Luke Harding/CIA Fernando Villavicencio/CIA MSM Is Getting Weirder, More Frantic, And More Desperate By The Pussy^BDay https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-12-06/msm-getting-weirder-more-frantic-…

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Facebook’s internal documents show its ruthlessness
by jim bell 07 Dec '18

07 Dec '18

https://www.engadget.com/2018/12/05/facebook-internal-emails-documents-mark… [partial quote follows] As expected, the UK Parliament has released a set of internal Facebook emails that were seized as part of its investigation into the company's data-privacy practices. The 250-page document, which includes conversations between Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other high-level executives, is a window into the social media giant's ruthless thinking from 2012 to 2015 -- a period of time when it was growing (and collecting user data) at an unstoppable rate. While Facebook was white-listing companies like Airbnb, Lyft and Netflix to get special access to people's information in 2013, it went out of its way to block competitors such as Vine from using its tools. When Twitter launched Vine, the app had access to Facebook's Friends API, which let Vine users see which of their Facebook friends were using the then-new app. But after approval from Zuckerberg himself, that access was cut off. "Unless anyone raises objections, we will shut down their [Vine's] Friends API access today. We've prepared reactive PR, and I will let Jana know our decision," Justin Osofsky, Facebook's vice president of global operations and media partnerships, said in an email at the time. Zuckerberg replied, "Yup, go for it." [end of partial quote] Jim Bell

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