October 2023 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Crypto Mixers as National Security Threats, Fuck Yeah!
by pro2rat＠yahoo.com.au 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

When cypherpunks are called terrorists we will be doing our job https://decrypt.co/news-explorer?pinned=349491&title=us-wants-to-classify-c… Reposts not yet more death threats to US protected persons ( Snork! )

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BitVM: Compute Anything on Bitcoin
by Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

On 10/15/23, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev(a)lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Good morning Robin et al, > > It strikes me that it may be possible to Scriptless Script BitVM, replacing > hashes and preimages with points and scalars. > > For example, equivocation of bit commitments could be done by having the > prover put a slashable fund behind a pubkey `P` (which is a point). > This slashable fund could be a 2-of-2 between prover and verifier `P && V`. > > Then the prover provides a bit-0 point commitment `B`, which is a point. > If the prover wants to assert that this specific bit is 0, it has to provide > `b` such that `B = b * G`. > If the prover wants to instead assert that this bit is 1, it has to provide > `b + p` such that `B = b * G` and `P = p * G`. > If `b` (and therefore `B`) is chosen uniformly at random, if it makes > exactly one of these assertions (that the bit is 0, or that the bit is 1) > then it does not reveal `p`. > But if it equivocates and asserts both, it reveals `b` and `b + p` and the > verifier can get the scalar `p`, which is also the private key behind `P` > and thus can get the fund `P && V`. > > To create a logic gate commitment, we have the prover and validator provide > public keys for each input-possibility and each output-possibility, then use > MuSig to combine them. > For example, suppose we have a NAND gate with inputs I, J and output K. > We have: > > * `P[I=0]` and `V[I=0]`, which are the public keys to use if input I is 0. > * `P[I=1]` and `V[I=1]`, which are the public keys to use if input I is 1. > * ...similar for input `J` and output `K`. > > In the actual SCRIPT, we take `MuSig(P[I=0], V[I=0])` etc. > For a SCRIPT to check what the value of `I` is, we would have something > like: > > ``` > OP_DUP <MuSig(P[I=1], V[I=1])> OP_CHECKSIG > OP_IF > OP_DROP > <1> > OP_ELSE > <MuSig(P[I=0], V[I=0])> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY > <0> > OP_ENDIF > ``` > > We would duplicate the above (with appropriate `OP_TOALTSTACK` and > `OP_FROMALTSTACK`) for input `J` and output `K`, similar to Fig.2 in the > paper. > > The verifier then provides adaptor signatures, so that for `MuSig(P[I=1], > V[I=1])` the prover can only complete the signature by revealing the `b + p` > for `I`. > Similar for `MuSig(P[I=0], V[I=0])`, the verifier provides adaptor > signatures so that the prover can only complete the signature by revealing > the `b` for `I`. > And so on. > Thus, the prover can only execute the SCRIPT by revealing the correct > commitments for `I`, `J`, and `K`, and any equivocation would reveal `p` and > let the verifier slash the fund of `P`. > > Providing the adaptor signatures replaces the "unlock" of the > challenge-response phase, instead of requiring a preimage from the > verifier. > > The internal public key that hides the Taproot tree containing the above > logic gate commitments could be `MuSig(P, V)` so that the verifier can stop > and just take the funds by a single signature once it has learned `p` due to > the prover equivocating. > > Not really sure if this is super helpful or not. > Hashes are definitely less CPU to compute. > > For example, would it be possible to have the Tapleaves be *just* the wires > between NAND gates instead of NAND gates themselves? > So to prove a NAND gate operation with inputs `I` and `J` and output `K`, > the prover would provide bit commitments `B` for `B[I]`, `B[J]`, and `B[K]`, > and each tapleaf would be just the bit commitment SCRIPT for `I`, `J`, and > `K`. > The prover would have to provide `I` and `J`, and commit to those, and then > verifier would compute `K = ~(I & J)` and provide *only* the adaptor > signature for `MuSig(P[K=<result>], V[K=<result>])`, but not the other > side. > > In that case, it may be possible to just collapse it down to `MuSig(P, V)` > and have the verifier provide individual adaptor signatures. > For example, the verifier can first challenge the prover to commit to the > value of `I` by providing two adaptor signatures for `MuSig(P, V)`, one for > the scalar behind `B[I]` and the other for the scalar behind `B[I] + P`. > The prover completes one or the other, then the verifier moves on to `B[J]` > and `B[J] + P`. > The prover completes one or the other, then the verifier now knows `I` and > `J` and can compute the supposed output `K`, and provides only the adaptor > signature for `MuSig(P, V)` for the scalar behind `B[K]` or `B[K] + P`, > depending on whether `K` is 0 or 1. > > That way, you only really actually need Schnorr signatures without having to > use Tapleaves at all. > This would make BitVM completely invisible on the blockchain, even in a > unilateral case where one of the prover or verifier stop responding. > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev(a)lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >

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[ot][spam][crazy] how do i make secure networks now that i've mugged all the hackers of their chains
by Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

there was a recent set of [2023-10-16 1936 ET] CVEs regarding bitcoin lightning network. i haven't more than glanced at them yet, but their discuss a vulnerability in lightning that can provide for compromise of the integrity of funds. somebody pointed out some years ago what others already knew, which is that lightning does not have the level of security of [2023-10-16 1938 ET] .... anyway, long story short, bitcoin has been stuck in a draft state for years now, likely because of the heavy addition of profit and political motives to its influences. now, i could adopt some unpleasantly affect and come in, arrogance blazing, and propose a better protocol (and i imagine many have tried to do this), but honestly i am too muddled with dissociative stuff to actually do that accurately anymore. how might you do it, if you didn't have an obsessive cryptohacker to write you beyond-classified secure constructs like used to be the norm in community research? how would you do it, if you were a crazy messed up confused person, like me? [2023-10-16 19:40] ... a little sadly, the security of these things is similar to (i happen to be playing chess these days) a chess game. you have to actually think of all the ways something can be broken, and address them. there are a few rules of thumb, too. these rules of thumb were commonly known in the 90s and 00s on lists like this one, but [obviously things are different]. but it's something like: - assume it's possible. everything can be broken: everything can be secured: -- you keep finding ways to break it and addressing them until you get so deep into how things can be broken that nobody would try to do it in your current environment -- you watch the changes in the environment and _UPDATE THE DESIGN_ to address them (bitcoin stopped updating its design.) - keep the solution simple that's ... roughly it ;P so, lightning is not simple -- [2023-10-16 19:44 ET] it fundamentally changes the security model associated with bitcoin [sending this as-is, most thoughts didn't make it at this time, [important ideas might include that among politics, security, and profit, the different focuses interact and do different things, and that the obvious solution to bitcoin's issues is to obviously to use shared distribution like bittorrent and [strong eventually-consistent cryptography that can address global consensus at a later time?]] 2023-10-23

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Re: [spam][crazy][fiction][random] Non-Canon MCBoss Spinoffs
by Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many" <gmkarl(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 09:23:05 -0400 Subject: Re: [spam][crazy][fiction][random] Non-Canon MCBoss Spinoffs To: cypherpunks(a)lists.cpunks.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many" <gmkarl(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 17:40:05 -0400 Subject: Re: [spam][crazy][fiction][random] Non-Canon MCBoss Spinoffs To: mailbombbin <mailbombbin(a)gmail.com> Cc: ogkbbOLmpN <0xloem+ogkbbOLmpN(a)gmail.com>, cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)lists.cpunks.org>

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[ot][spam][crazy]
by Undescribed Horrific Abuse, One Victim & Survivor of Many 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

i made yet another partial ai seed and i was typing up both an itemized simplified description and a detailed one involving personal theory and code, of it to help preservation, but a finger spasm lost the whole typing again :/ the code is a mess right now and i'm having psychotic-like spasms associated, similar to normal self-modifying ai inhibition maybe i'll spam parts in this as a thread. i liked the organized thing tho. the whole goal of it was to do it really simplistically, really similar to things already existing, very few changes, move theories into spaces that were simple and similar, etc. Long story short, you can make a transformed model generate an improved transformer model of the same or larger size if you do something like the following: - shrink the size to handle only a tiny bit at once, (i used the largest 1-d slice length of the largest parameter) - make the input context huge so you can feed it a whole model - train on only 1 data pair at once - make a separate model or layers for each output model parameter so they can specialize - feed the output back into the input as needed so it can save its work and move on the biggest theoretical component was the idea that an arbitrarily small agent can use a random-access infinite scratchpad and a supply of high-level functions to accomplish an arbitrarily complex task (turing machine). the input context is the scratchpad. [interesting theory that you could maybe turn it into procedural code by reinterpreting it that way]

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Cypherpunks activists have been linking crypto with terrorism since 1994 - ALMOST THIRTY FUCKING YEARS!
by professor rat 20 Oct '23

20 Oct '23

The Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse refers to those who use the Internet to facilitate crime or (pejoratively) to rhetorical approaches evoking such criminals. The phrase is a play on Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. There is not a universally agreed definition of who the Horsemen are. Terrorists, pedophiles/child molesters, and organized crime like drug dealers, intellectual property pirates, and money launderers are cited commonly. One of the most famous definitions is in The Cyphernomicon by the cypherpunk writer and engineer Tim May . . . " https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Horsemen_of_the_Infocalypse#:~:text=The%…. Reposts not corpse media crap vomited-up from zombie crypto journalist morons

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Sacramento Anarchist Bookfair on November 5th.
by pro2rat＠yahoo.com.au 19 Oct '23

19 Oct '23

https://www.anarchistnews.org/content/updates-and-schedule-1st-annual-sacra… Reposts not maggot infested trash from depraved fascist moron grarpamps

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Purveyors of the indescribale are frauds
by pro2rat＠yahoo.com.au 19 Oct '23

19 Oct '23

Whether they operate in the religious, political or economic realm, those claiming knowledge of indescribable things are invariably criminal garbage running a fraud on the public. Amirite Karl? Don't answer if you work for the US govt.

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Cryptocurrency: SEC Wants Your Public Comments On Crypto ETF's
by grarpamp 19 Oct '23

19 Oct '23

There are over 16 ETF's in the queue. Next approval window is mid November, then a bunch entering January. Most are BTC, many ETH, then a dozen or so other cryptos, plus whatever else comes in the future after the precedent of the first one. https://bitcoinrealm.org/spot-bitcoin-etf-approvals-may-boost-crypto-market… They all have separate filings and comments etc. This rule change proposed to the SEC would allow for the creation of a Blackrock iShares Bitcoin ETF. If you are interested in making your voice heard and letting the SEC know what you think about the idea of a Bitcoin Exchange Traded Product, please see the information below. https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2023-016/srnasdaq2023016.htm https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2023-016/sr-nasdaq-2023-016-order-in… The SEC is asking for public comments in regards to the proposal, and you can submit them by filling out the online contact form for SR-NASDAQ-2023-016 or by sending an email to [rule-comments@sec.gov](mailto:rule-comments@sec.gov) (please include file number SR-NASDAQ-2023-016 on the subject line). Paper comments can also be sent if you so desire, send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–1090. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1980994/000143774923017574/bit20230… https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/19/2023-15252/self-regula… https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/04/2023-21948/self-regula…

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America is a theocratic shithole - like Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UK
by pro2rat＠yahoo.com.au 18 Oct '23

18 Oct '23

Marxist-communism in Cuba, sorry, the DPRK also resembles religion. Yes? Bakuninist God-and-the-State shows us the revolutionary subject. Later for capitalism - its not our job to obsess about economics. Leave such idiocies for morons. Our job is destroy nation-states. The worst first and as it happens they are all highly religious or outright theocratic dictatorships! https://www.anarchistnews.org/content/biographies-anarchist-fighters-iran%E… Reposts in the interests of globalized anarchist revolution and death to Amerikkka.

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