March 2022 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

[ot][spam][crazy] The Trials of Controlling a Programmer
by Undiscussed Horrific Abuse, One Victim of Many 20 Apr '22

20 Apr '22

I have an LPC flasher (a chip programmer) I've been using to learn coreboot and to try to drop a little life into an old board. After a month or more of use, my programmer just won't program anymore. When I try to flash things flashrom complains that no flash chip was detected. Note: the spacebar on my hardware-keyboard phone is also breaking, so I may be less verbose. Similarly, my raspberry pi won't seem to load gnome, and I still haven't figured out how to get neomutt to download email. The neomutt challenge seems the easiest, but is kind of different. Anyway, the programmer is breadboarded based on a teensy board, and the LPC socket was sometimes showing the issue previously, refusing to find the LPC chip unless I reinserted it a number of times. Long ago I would have been excited to troubleshoot an LPC socket. It would perhaps have been an excuse to build a logic analyser with tiny LPC leads. Nowadays most of my brain refuses to move carefully with intensity comparable to trauma, and for that and other dangerous and unknown reasons, my hands and fingers shake and jerk and my visual perception is quite poor, partly from my eyes doing the same. This coreboot task has been really great. It can be many months between having a project that feels like a doable, productive challenge, where I can often barely control my body let alone my mind. But I need a programmer if I want to keep porting the bios for my motherboard. I used some small jumper wires to try to test some of the leads around an lpc chip once. Unfortunately I didn't verify the chip wasn't one I had burned out, a different issue. Additionally, I wasn't [amnesia shift here, hello! we're describing working on fixing the plcc flasher] sure my jumper wires were touching the chip and not the socket which are very very near. But I did try to gently bend some leads to resolve connection issues, and thinking on that I guess that means I might have a way to consider whether I'm testing the chip leads or socket leads. Anyway, it still didn't work,even with a known-working chip, but I didn't examine it with a known-working chip. Then later, I tested connections from the chip seating all the way to the teensy board, and found a number that were failing due to wear on the breadboard, and adjusted and squeezed these until they conducted. But it still wouldn't detect a known-working chip. I then removed it from the breadboard and wired it up hanging in the air with female jumper wires. This is not working either. I also have two pcbs of this tool I tried to solder, but I have broken the smd pads off on both from being uncareful while doing so. When I try to be careful, it can stimulate my spasms further in various ways, a gently developing frustration of some years now. There used to be sold flashers for LPC chips, but I haven't found any, which is a blessing in some ways, for open hardware and all. I was thinking of buying an arduino, for which flasher code exists. I actually should _have_ arduinos somewhere, unused for years, uncertain where. I was also thinking of porting a flasher to use my raspberry pis gpio pins. But these other flasher board ideas don't seem to have much return right now, when I have reason to believe the problem could be in the socket. I also have a small handful of smd sockets. Hard to solder without a pcb. I could also attempt to desolder the pcb from my breadboardable socket. I think another breadboardable socket is in the mail, but I worry I will forget I am working the task if I stop working it. I'd like to compare the electrical activity at the chip pins to what the device is supposed to send somehow. Maybe I could try to add debug information to flashrom's serprog protocol, although I'm feeling that might be inefficient.

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DropGangs: Post and Parcel Delivery Services Fully Monitored [re: WikiLeaks was: FreeAssange.net]
by grarpamp 17 Apr '22

17 Apr '22

> Guess who had a PO Box next to Wikileaks > > https://www.theage.com.au/national/world-leaders-would-love-the-key-to-this… > > They avoided a drone strike on the university by demolishing the > Melbourne Uni post office voluntarily: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWuKVaT13s > > After they destroyed that, they took out the local pub too: > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yCKYW5YUWw The USA USPS takes automated pictures of all items passing through its facilities, OCR them, stores them forever, and gives them away to whoever they like that comes asking. Mail and delivery services worldwide are now doing similar, including requiring and recording government photo ID to send parcels and letters, storing all camera footage, facial, and ALPR logs, of the facilities forever, etc.

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Jan6: Feds Admit to Running Secret DOJ Commandos
by grarpamp 14 Apr '22

14 Apr '22

Feds Finally Admit to Running Secretive DOJ “Commandos” at Jan. 6 Trump Protests https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/01/breaking-feds-finally-admit-runnin… https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-secret-commandos-shoot-kill-authority-we… The Department of Justice admitted this week to running secretive DOJ “commandos” at the January 6 protests in Washington DC. Four Trump supporters died that day including two women who were killed by Capitol Hill Police. A third woman was nearly killed but was rescued by Green Beret Jeremy Brown. SHOCKING VIDEO: J6 Political Prisoner and Green Beret Jeremy Brown Rescued Female Trump Supporter from DEADLY US Capitol Police Beating – WOMAN WAS NEARLY KILLED The DOJ Commandos were given “shoot to kill” orders. TRENDING: BREAKING: Georgia Investigators have 'Ballot Trafficker' Who Is Talking -- Admits to Being Paid THOUSANDS in 2020 Election Ballot Boxes Ballot Harvesting Scheme -- 242 Ballot Traffickers Detected Now they’re admitting the government did in fact have commandos at the capitol on Jan. 6. After nearly a year this information is finally coming out. And they accused this website and others of being conspiracy nuts for reporting on the feds in the crowd that day. We will likely never know how many feds were working that day to sabotage the peaceful protests. Newsweek reported: On Sunday, January 3, the heads of a half-dozen elite government special operations teams met in Quantico, Virginia, to go over potential threats, contingencies, and plans for the upcoming Joint Session of Congress. The meeting, and the subsequent deployment of these shadowy commandos on January 6, has never before been revealed. Right after the New Year, Jeffrey A. Rosen, the acting Attorney General on January 6, approved implementation of long-standing contingency plans dealing with the most extreme possibilities: an attack on President Donald Trump or Vice President Mike Pence, a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, and a declaration of measures to implement continuity of government, requiring protection and movement of presidential successors. Rosen made a unilateral decision to take the preparatory steps to deploy Justice Department and so-called “national” forces. There was no formal request from the U.S. Capitol Police, the Secret Service, or the Metropolitan Police Department—in fact, no external request from any agency. The leadership in Justice and the FBI anticipated the worst and decided to act independently, the special operations forces lurking behind the scenes. “I believe that DOJ [Department of Justice] reasonably prepared for contingencies ahead of January 6, understanding that there was considerable uncertainty as to how many people would arrive, who those people would be, and precisely what purposes they would pursue,” Rosen later told Congress. He stressed that his department “no frontline role with respect to crowd control,” that they were focused on “high-risk” operations. The contingency units meeting on January 3 included the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team, the FBI’s national “Render Safe” team, an FBI SWAT team from the Baltimore Field Office, Special Response Teams from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Marshals Service Special Operations Group… …FBI tactical teams arrived on Capitol Hill early in the day to assist in the collection of evidence at sites—including the Republican and Democrat party national headquarters—where explosive devices were found. FBI SWAT teams and snipers were deployed to secure nearby congressional office buildings. Other FBI agents provided selective security around the U.S. Capitol and protection to congressional members and staff. A tactical team of the Hostage Rescue Team was one of the first external federal agencies to actually enter the Capitol after protestors breached the building. In addition to augmentation of emergency security assets, one team coordinated with the U.S. Capitol Police and Secret Service to provide additional safeguarding of Vice President Pence, who had been moved to the underground parking structure beneath the Capitol, from where he was supposed to evacuate. But Pence refused to leave the building and stayed underground instead. The presence of these extraordinary forces under the control of the Attorney General—and mostly operating under contingency plans that Congress and the U.S. Capitol Police were not privy to—added an additional layer of highly armed responders. The role that the military played in this highly classified operation is still unknown, though FBI sources tell Newsweek that military operators seconded to the FBI, and those on alert as part of the National Mission Force, were present in the metropolitan area. The lingering question is: What was it that the Justice Department saw that provoked it to see January 6 as an extraordinary event, something that the other agencies evidently missed.

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Ukrainian Nazi Army
by zeynepaydogan 08 Apr '22

08 Apr '22

https://twitter.com/mapsukraine/status/1505846864322699267?s=21 Famous Ukrainian e-celeb bandera and azov member Artyom Bonov has left Ukraine for Poland, he became known for making threats against Chechen Russian fighters and claimed to play soccer with their heads. He has fled Ukraine and is now in Poland.

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Communication in a world of pervasive surveillance: Sources and methods: Counter-strategies against pervasive surveillance architecture
by Jacob Appelbaum 08 Apr '22

08 Apr '22

Communication in a world of pervasive surveillance Citation for published version (APA): Appelbaum, J. R. (2022). Communication in a world of pervasive surveillance: Sources and methods: Counter- strategies against pervasive surveillance architecture. Eindhoven University of Technology. Document status and date: Published: 25/03/2022 Document Version: Publisher’s PDF, also known as Version of Record (includes final page, issue and volume numbers) Please check the document version of this publication: • A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement: www.tue.nl/taverne Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at: openaccess(a)tue.nlproviding details and we will investigate your claim. Wer die Wahrheit nicht weiß, der ist bloß ein Dummkopf. Aber wer sie weiß und sie eine Lüge nennt, der ist ein Verbrecher." 1 — Bertold Brecht, Das Leben des Galilei, Seite 71 Appelbaum, Jacob R.. /Communication in a world of pervasive surveillance : Sources and methods: Counter-strategies against pervasive surveillance architecture. Eindhoven : Eindhoven University of Technology, 2022. 327 p. https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/communication-in-a-world-of-pervasi… Best Regards

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Re: [External Message Added] City of Miami public records request #22-459
by Gunnar Larson 01 Apr '22

01 Apr '22

Dear Madam or Sir: How much is the fee for future search services? Thank you very much, Gunnar Larson -- *Gunnar Larson - xNY.io <http://www.xny.io/> | Bank.org <http://bank.org/>* MSc <https://www.unic.ac.cy/blockchain/msc-digital-currency/?utm_source=Google&u…> - Digital Currency MBA <https://www.unic.ac.cy/business-administration-entrepreneurship-and-innovat…> - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001 On Mon, Mar 7, 2022 at 8:24 PM PublicRecords(a)miamigov.com < support(a)nextrequest.com> wrote: > -- Attach a non-image file and/or reply ABOVE THIS LINE with a message, > and it will be sent to staff on this request. -- > City of Miami Public Records > A message was sent to you regarding record request #22-459: > > Good evening, > > > > The search terms you requested produced 13,092 e-mails. I revised the > search terms in an effort to narrow down the search results and pull fewer > emails. Normally, the City charges a fee to run additional searches, as > each search can take a while. We can waive that fee to help narrow down > this results this time; however, please note that further searches will > require a fee to rerun. Please let us know if the search terms below are > fine, and we'll run a revised search this one time. > > 1/1/2021 – 2/7/2022 > > ("Harvard Management Company” OR > > “Digital World Acquisition Corp*” OR “DWAC”) > > AND (“Citycoin” OR “Miamicoin” OR “STX” OR “Stack”) > > > > Thank you. > > View Request 22-459 <https://miami.nextrequest.com/requests/22-459> > https://miami.nextrequest.com/requests/22-459 > > POWERED BY NEXTREQUEST <https://www.nextrequest.com> > > The All in One Records Requests Platform > > *Questions about your request?* Reply to this email or sign in to contact > staff at City of Miami. > > *Technical support:* See our help page > <https://help.nextrequest.com/knowledge/requester-resources> > >

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[Leak] SpringCore0day
by zeynepaydogan 01 Apr '22

01 Apr '22

The vulnerability exists in the Spring core with the JDK version greater or equal to 9.0. pass: infected

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Cryptocurrency: US HR7231 Proffers "Private Anonymous ECASH and HW"
by grarpamp 31 Mar '22

31 Mar '22

And thus it began... https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/03/28/us-lawmakers-introduce-ecash-bil… https://www.theregister.com/2022/03/28/us_digital_dollar/ https://lynch.house.gov/2022/3/rep-lynch-introduces-legislation-to-develop-… https://lynch.house.gov/_cache/files/5/0/500162f9-7fce-4981-b9b9-16bf22e10e… https://lynch.house.gov/_cache/files/1/7/17e47e5a-2bff-42c1-b509-eb8a50931f… H.R. 7231, the Electronic Currency and Secure Hardware (ECASH) Act SUMMARY In view of the continued expansion of digital payment and currency technologies and in line with efforts undertaken by the Federal Reserve and Biden Administration to explore diverse digital dollar designs and deployment options, the Electronic Currency and Secure Hardware (ECASH) Act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and issue an electronic version of the U.S. Dollar (e-cash) for use by the American public. · To maximize consumer protection and data privacy, this innovative legislation requires Treasury to incorporate key security and functionality safeguards into the e-cash system that are generally associated with the use of physical currency including anonymity, privacy, and minimal generation of data from transactions. · In the interest of greater financial inclusion, the bill mandates that e-cash must be interoperable with existing financial institution and payment provider systems, capable of executing peer-to-peer offline transactions and distributed directly to the public via secured hardware devices. · To safeguard e-cash against illicit financial activities, the bill requires e-cash compliance with existing anti-money laundering and countering terrorist finance regimes. ELECTRONIC CURRENCY INNOVATION PROGRAM · Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the Electronic Currency Innovation Program to direct, oversee, and coordinate the development and implementation of e-cash and enabling architecture, technologies, and platforms. · Treasury is fully suited to lead e-cash development given that the agency already produces hard currency and successfully implements the U.S. Debit Card Program including the Economic Impact Payment prepaid debit cards issued to Americans under the CARES Act. · The director of the ECIP is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 5-year term. PILOT PROGRAM · Requires Treasury to initiate a two-phase e-cash pilot program within 90 days of enactment with the deployment of e-cash to the American public expected no later than 48 months after enactment. · Phase 1: Consists of at least three "Proof-of-Concept" pilot programs designed to determine the initial feasibility of e-cash design and deployment. These pilots may be conducted in partnership with universities, non-profit organizations, insured financial institutions, financial technology firms, non-bank payment providers focused on expanding financial inclusion, and other entities. They may also be conducted in partnership with existing federal, state, or local government fund disbursement or payment program including those that rely on the U.S. Debit Card Program. At least two of the technologies selected for the pilot program must be based on secured hardware-based architectures that do not involve any common or distributed ledger, at least one must include a stored-value magnetic or pin card option for storage and payment, and at least one must include a cell phone or SIM card option for storage and payment. · Phase 2: Consists of at least one large-scale "Field Test" pilot program deployment to a segment of the American public. These pilots may be conducted in partnership with federal, state, local, and foreign governments, international regulatory bodies, and the entities eligible to partner in Phase 1. · Objectives: The general purpose of the pilot programs is to assess the viability and capacity of various e-cash technologies to incorporate the security and functionality safeguards that are generally associated with the use of physical currency; deploy rapidly and efficiently; and maintain compatibility with existing financial institution and payment provider systems. ELECTRONIC DOLLAR The bill mandates several e-cash features, e.g.,: · Legal Tender: E-cash must be legal tender, created and issued into circulation by Treasury, and payable to bearer. · Financial Inclusion: E-cash must be distributed and used directly by the American public via widely available hardware devices. It must also be capable of peer-to-peer, offline transactions and interoperable with all existing financial institution and payment provider systems. Moreover, in developing e-cash, the Security must priorities technologies that promote universal access and usability particularly as relating to individuals with disabilities, low-income individuals, and communities with limited access to internet or telecommunications networks. · Privacy: E-cash must incorporate key security and functionality safeguards that are generally associated with the use of physical currency including anonymity, privacy, and minimal generation of data from transactions. E-cash must also be distributed through secure hardware devices that are secured locally via cryptographic encryption or other similar technologies and cannot contain personal identifiable information or be subject to surveillance, transactional data collection, or censorship-enabling features. Establishes a "Monetary Privacy Board" which will review decisions and actions of the ECIP and ensure that the actions are consistent with the Act and commit to preserving the privacy interest of individuals that use e-cash. Moreover, establishes a Monetary Privacy Board to review e- cash development actions and decisions and evaluate the extent to which they preserve individual privacy. · Consumer Protection: Merchants may not impose any fee for using e-cash payments or purchases. Disclosures by the government and any third-party authorized to distribute e-cash devices regarding usage, fees, interoperability, security, privacy, data collection, and other areas identified as relevant by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection must be clear, readily understandable, and made in writing. · AML/CTF: E-cash must be classified and regulated in a manner similar to physical currency and would therefore be subject to existing anti-money laundering, counterterrorism, Know Your Customer, and financial transaction reporting requirements and regulations. · Transparency/Oversight: In developing e-cash, Treasury must prioritize the use of hardware and software technologies issued under open-source licenses. Also establishes a Digital Dollar Council within Treasury to coordinate with other relevant U.S. departments and agencies on e-cash related activities.

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Cryptocurrency: How To Get US Congress To Support Crypto Laissez-Faire No Regulation
by grarpamp 31 Mar '22

31 Mar '22

Mail them each a $1000 wallet. Do the math... cheap, simple, works. Advancing the hands-off adoption of distributed privacy-capable uncensorable unconfiscatable cryptos... never so deviously fun and deliciously effective... over 500 new hodlers redpilled, addicted, FOMOing in, bumping their new fave tune... ;) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWAwK2fHArc Attn crypto world... do this, ftw.

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USG getting jiggy with cryptoanarchy
by professor rat 31 Mar '22

31 Mar '22

No ticket - no laundry! https://dailyhodl.com/2022/03/30/house-democrats-propose-new-anonymity-base…

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