July 2021 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

[ot][spam] escaping the matrix from within
by Karl 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

"I think this whole world might be a simulation." "I saw a movie about that. You can escape and work with a bunch of rebels to take down the computerised apocalypse." "How do you escape?" "You have to swallow a special rebel pill that makes you unplug." "What, like public key cryptography or blockchains?" "Uhh, where do I get those in pill form?"

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Twitter Jack Dorsey Censored Users at the Request of the State
by grarpamp 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

https://u8z8g8c2.rocketcdn.me/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/11889-Supplemental… UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS CASE No. 1:20-CV-11889-MLW Twitter Censored Users at the Request of the State "Twitter Trusted Partnership Program and the Twitter Partner Support Portal (PSP). In 2017, Cohen and others began formulating and designing the framework for silently violating the free speech rights of US persons by first characterizing speakers as "Influence Operators" (IOs) thereby fabricating a sinister connotation where none exists, as the ideological framework to justify canceling speakers who exercise their right to express their opinion." Elections Influence Operations Playbook for State and Local Officials The National Association of State Election Directors, and the Secretary of State of Massachusetts, are being sued for partnering with Twitter to censor critics of the state. State election officials developed a system to assess the “threat level” of speech critical of them, or any comments that expressed skepticism of election security. Then they struck a deal in which Twitter agreed to delete Tweets, and ban users, at the request of government officials. The court documents make clear that Twitter attempted to insulate the state actors from the censorship, instead operating under the guise that Twitter’s internal moderators had found the content violated its terms. It’s one thing for a private company to trample free speech. But when the government does it, that clearly violates the constitution.

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[wrong] [draft] [spam] The goal of using cryptography at all.
by Karl 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

Since this list is so weird, people talking strange (including me), no signatures, etc etc, it would be good to get better communications going. There are many better communication systems. To know your messages are meant for you by the person who claims to have sent them, it's really good to be able to keep a private key that is actually private. This is hard for me to do. What device I'm on switches. Right now my device is an android phone that runs very very slowly and often misbehaves. A private key kept on this phone, which sometimes does things on its own while I am looking at it, and sometimes may wait a few minutes to respond to touching a button, would make security more complex. I would barely have confidence that the private key was private, because I don't know how to make the phone behave reliably.

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Encrypted chat data helps German police arrest 750
by jim bell 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

https://thehill.com/homenews/news/561959-encrypted-chat-data-helps-german-p…

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Private free-space communication.
by jim bell 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

https://phys.org/news/2021-06-quantum-cascade-lasers-private-free-space.html Jim Bell's comment: I remember a device called a "gunnplexer" in the late 1970s.http://www.microwave-museum.org/exhibits/mwm0022.htm It allowed two-way communication over the Gunn-oscillator frequency, usually 10.25 GHz.------------------- I have long thought that designers of WiFi routers should have incorporated an ability to communicate between nearby units. The vast majority of WiFi routers are within hearing distance of other routers.

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Zimmerman not a cypherpunk - Finney not a libertarian
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

To counter lies spread by known NAZBOL turd, John Young on this list. For the record Phil Zimmerman specifically distanced himself from the Cypherpunks and Hal Finney from Libertarianism. This is to stop any nocoiner, mischief-making, KNOWN FASCIST from obscuring the true history of cryptoanarchy. All Marxists hate all anarchists and so no Marxist arsehole ( like John Young ) or 'recovering Marxist " ( like James Arsehole Donald ) can be trusted in any anarchist space. They've been physically attacking us since 1917. We have a right to destroy all those who would destroy us. https://libcom.org/history/black-guards

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Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

"... Makes sense that pigshit shoveler Glenn Greenwald was the slop poisoner, Pierre Omidyar the wallowing pigmaster. ..." Like that time Omigod wrote he wanted to see ' 20 million mud-people ' killed and Glenin published it...oh wait...no, sorry... That was Tim " Mongo ' May and his mincing little poodle, John " Cryptome " Young.

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Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

Self-redacted ERIC Hughes ran like a rabbit and died like a deserter. Every coward should go out like that. Right John? Then what about that joke called GILMORE! TSA activism so tepid it barely qualifies as liberal. This is how losers redact themselves. Right John? AMIRITE!? " Circle of Eunuchs ' is not just some abstract thing dreamed up by CJ.

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Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

"... Had not considered that Tim May was literaturely assassinated ..." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZO2JhUI-6cI Here's mud in your eye then, John

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Spy vs Spy vs Everyone
by grarpamp 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JNrjKqrAn-I Secret Agent Man https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-M2hs3sXGo How Not To Be Seen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4q09ZmeCF8 Spy Gadgets https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro7vdOMmMSs Spy vs Spy http://www.montypython.50webs.com/scripts/Series_3/58.htm Old Lady Snoopers >From the Dept of Ignorably Obvious Dept... Intel/Actors/TLA's Using Cock.Li and Other Services https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyv87z/cockli-admin-russian-intelligence-sv… https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-116a 'Cock.li' Admin Says He’s Not Surprised Russian Intelligence Uses His Site A joint FBI-DHS-CISA report said that the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service behind the SolarWinds hack, uses Cock.li. Hacking. Disinformation. Surveillance. CYBER is Motherboard's podcast and reporting on the dark underbelly of the internet. On Monday the FBI, DHS, and CISA—the U.S. government agency focused on defensive cybersecurity—published a report laying out the tools, techniques, and capabilities of the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service that the U.S. has blamed for the wide-spanning SolarWinds supply chain hack. That report said that the SVR makes use of a specific anonymous email service called cock.li. The administrator of cock.li has now told Motherboard that this is the first time he has heard of the SVR using his service, but that "it's hard to surprise me nowadays." "This is the first time I've heard for sure that Russian intelligence is using cock.li, but it's not surprising, since the CIA uses it too," Vincent Canfield, the administrator of cock.li, said in a Twitter direct message. Canfield declined to provide evidence that American intelligence agencies use the service. Cock.li is an established, albeit obscure, meme email service. In 2015, Motherboard reported how Canfield said that German authorities had seized a hard drive from one of his servers after someone used the service to send a hoax bomb threat. Following the threat, all public schools in Los Angeles closed for a day. Two years later Canfield said SoundCloud removed audio of a phone call he had with the FBI concerning a bomb threat made against the Miami FBI office. The site allows users to also create XMPP accounts, which can be used for encrypted instant messaging, and lets them sign up while using the anonymity network Tor or other proxies. Many other email services block users who sign up using a VPN, for instance. Canfield claimed the service has over a million users, including with domains that aren't listed on the site's front page. The tagline of the service is "Yeah it’s email with cocks." Under the heading "General Tradecraft Observations," the joint FBI-DHS-CISA report says that "SVR cyber operators are capable adversaries." "FBI investigations have revealed infrastructure used in the intrusions is frequently obtained using false identities and cryptocurrencies," it continues. "These false identities are usually supported by low reputation infrastructure including temporary e-mail accounts and temporary voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephone numbers. While not exclusively used by SVR cyber actors, a number of SVR cyber personas use e-mail services hosted on cock[.]li or related domains." Some of cock.li's other domains include "national.shitposting.agency" and "wants.dicksinmyan.us". "Anonymous e-mail is a necessary tool enjoyed by people across the world, including governments. It's a critical building block to a free Internet and if it's not provided by independent companies like ours these state actors are likely to operate their own e-mail providers, Crypto AG style," Canfield continued, referring to a historical case where the CIA secretly ran an encryption company in Switzerland in order to intercept others' communications. "We're proud to have worked with dozens of governments by educating them on the nature of anonymous e-mail, and while data is never handed over without legal obligation in our jurisdiction, these reports have still helped to stop thousands of bad actors and these governments have thanked us as a result," Canfield said, adding that those who have information about users violating cock.li's terms of service can contact an abuse address. Cock.li's terms of service says that users may be banned for "Conducting any activity that breaks the laws in which cock.li is governed," and "Encouraging others to break cock.li's rules or the law using cock.li." After publication of the joint report, Kyle Ehmke, a researcher with cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect, tweeted that "it's worth noting that 4400+ domains (current and historic) have been registered using a cock[.]li address. SVR registration among those almost certainly are a small percentage." Alert (AA21-116A) Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders Original release date: April 26, 2021 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) assess Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors—also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT 29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium—will continue to seek intelligence from U.S. and foreign entities through cyber exploitation, using a range of initial exploitation techniques that vary in sophistication, coupled with stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks. The SVR primarily targets government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations, and information technology companies. On April 15, 2021, the White House released a statement on the recent SolarWinds compromise, attributing the activity to the SVR. For additional detailed information on identified vulnerabilities and mitigations, see the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and FBI Cybersecurity Advisory titled “Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks,” released on April 15, 2021. The FBI and DHS are providing information on the SVR’s cyber tools, targets, techniques, and capabilities to aid organizations in conducting their own investigations and securing their networks. Threat Overview SVR cyber operations have posed a longstanding threat to the United States. Prior to 2018, several private cyber security companies published reports about APT 29 operations to obtain access to victim networks and steal information, highlighting the use of customized tools to maximize stealth inside victim networks and APT 29 actors’ ability to move within victim environments undetected. Beginning in 2018, the FBI observed the SVR shift from using malware on victim networks to targeting cloud resources, particularly e-mail, to obtain information. The exploitation of Microsoft Office 365 environments following network access gained through use of modified SolarWinds software reflects this continuing trend. Targeting cloud resources probably reduces the likelihood of detection by using compromised accounts or system misconfigurations to blend in with normal or unmonitored traffic in an environment not well defended, monitored, or understood by victim organizations. Technical Details SVR Cyber Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Password Spraying In one 2018 compromise of a large network, SVR cyber actors used password spraying to identify a weak password associated with an administrative account. The actors conducted the password spraying activity in a “low and slow” manner, attempting a small number of passwords at infrequent intervals, possibly to avoid detection. The password spraying used a large number of IP addresses all located in the same country as the victim, including those associated with residential, commercial, mobile, and The Onion Router (TOR) addresses. The organization unintentionally exempted the compromised administrator’s account from multi-factor authentication requirements. With access to the administrative account, the actors modified permissions of specific e-mail accounts on the network, allowing any authenticated network user to read those accounts. The actors also used the misconfiguration for compromised non-administrative accounts. That misconfiguration enabled logins using legacy single-factor authentication on devices which did not support multi-factor authentication. The FBI suspects this was achieved by spoofing user agent strings to appear to be older versions of mail clients, including Apple’s mail client and old versions of Microsoft Outlook. After logging in as a non-administrative user, the actors used the permission changes applied by the compromised administrative user to access specific mailboxes of interest within the victim organization. While the password sprays were conducted from many different IP addresses, once the actors obtained access to an account, that compromised account was generally only accessed from a single IP address corresponding to a leased virtual private server (VPS). The FBI observed minimal overlap between the VPSs used for different compromised accounts, and each leased server used to conduct follow-on actions was in the same country as the victim organization. During the period of their access, the actors consistently logged into the administrative account to modify account permissions, including removing their access to accounts presumed to no longer be of interest, or adding permissions to additional accounts. Recommendations To defend from this technique, the FBI and DHS recommend network operators to follow best practices for configuring access to cloud computing environments, including: Mandatory use of an approved multi-factor authentication solution for all users from both on premises and remote locations. Prohibit remote access to administrative functions and resources from IP addresses and systems not owned by the organization. Regular audits of mailbox settings, account permissions, and mail forwarding rules for evidence of unauthorized changes. Where possible, enforce the use of strong passwords and prevent the use of easily guessed or commonly used passwords through technical means, especially for administrative accounts. Regularly review the organization’s password management program. Ensure the organization’s information technology (IT) support team has well-documented standard operating procedures for password resets of user account lockouts. Maintain a regular cadence of security awareness training for all company employees. Leveraging Zero-Day Vulnerability In a separate incident, SVR actors used CVE-2019-19781, a zero-day exploit at the time, against a virtual private network (VPN) appliance to obtain network access. Following exploitation of the device in a way that exposed user credentials, the actors identified and authenticated to systems on the network using the exposed credentials. The actors worked to establish a foothold on several different systems that were not configured to require multi-factor authentication and attempted to access web-based resources in specific areas of the network in line with information of interest to a foreign intelligence service. Following initial discovery, the victim attempted to evict the actors. However, the victim had not identified the initial point of access, and the actors used the same VPN appliance vulnerability to regain access. Eventually, the initial access point was identified, removed from the network, and the actors were evicted. As in the previous case, the actors used dedicated VPSs located in the same country as the victim, probably to make it appear that the network traffic was not anomalous with normal activity. Recommendations To defend from this technique, the FBI and DHS recommend network defenders ensure endpoint monitoring solutions are configured to identify evidence of lateral movement within the network and: Monitor the network for evidence of encoded PowerShell commands and execution of network scanning tools, such as NMAP. Ensure host based anti-virus/endpoint monitoring solutions are enabled and set to alert if monitoring or reporting is disabled, or if communication is lost with a host agent for more than a reasonable amount of time. Require use of multi-factor authentication to access internal systems. Immediately configure newly-added systems to the network, including those used for testing or development work, to follow the organization’s security baseline and incorporate into enterprise monitoring tools. WELLMESS Malware In 2020, the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States attributed intrusions perpetrated using malware known as WELLMESS to APT 29. WELLMESS was written in the Go programming language, and the previously-identified activity appeared to focus on targeting COVID-19 vaccine development. The FBI’s investigation revealed that following initial compromise of a network—normally through an unpatched, publicly-known vulnerability—the actors deployed WELLMESS. Once on the network, the actors targeted each organization’s vaccine research repository and Active Directory servers. These intrusions, which mostly relied on targeting on-premises network resources, were a departure from historic tradecraft, and likely indicate new ways the actors are evolving in the virtual environment. More information about the specifics of the malware used in this intrusion have been previously released and are referenced in the ‘Resources’ section of this document. Tradecraft Similarities of SolarWinds-enabled Intrusions During the spring and summer of 2020, using modified SolarWinds network monitoring software as an initial intrusion vector, SVR cyber operators began to expand their access to numerous networks. The SVR’s modification and use of trusted SolarWinds products as an intrusion vector is also a notable departure from the SVR’s historic tradecraft. The FBI’s initial findings indicate similar post-infection tradecraft with other SVR-sponsored intrusions, including how the actors purchased and managed infrastructure used in the intrusions. After obtaining access to victim networks, SVR cyber actors moved through the networks to obtain access to e-mail accounts. Targeted accounts at multiple victim organizations included accounts associated with IT staff. The FBI suspects the actors monitored IT staff to collect useful information about the victim networks, determine if victims had detected the intrusions, and evade eviction actions. Recommendations Although defending a network from a compromise of trusted software is difficult, some organizations successfully detected and prevented follow-on exploitation activity from the initial malicious SolarWinds software. This was achieved using a variety of monitoring techniques including: Auditing log files to identify attempts to access privileged certificates and creation of fake identify providers. Deploying software to identify suspicious behavior on systems, including the execution of encoded PowerShell. Deploying endpoint protection systems with the ability to monitor for behavioral indicators of compromise. Using available public resources to identify credential abuse within cloud environments. Configuring authentication mechanisms to confirm certain user activities on systems, including registering new devices. While few victim organizations were able to identify the initial access vector as SolarWinds software, some were able to correlate different alerts to identify unauthorized activity. The FBI and DHS believe those indicators, coupled with stronger network segmentation (particularly “zero trust” architectures or limited trust between identity providers) and log correlation, can enable network defenders to identify suspicious activity requiring additional investigation. General Tradecraft Observations SVR cyber operators are capable adversaries. In addition to the techniques described above, FBI investigations have revealed infrastructure used in the intrusions is frequently obtained using false identities and cryptocurrencies. VPS infrastructure is often procured from a network of VPS resellers. These false identities are usually supported by low reputation infrastructure including temporary e-mail accounts and temporary voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephone numbers. While not exclusively used by SVR cyber actors, a number of SVR cyber personas use e-mail services hosted on cock[.]li or related domains. The FBI also notes SVR cyber operators have used open source or commercially available tools continuously, including Mimikatz—an open source credential-dumping too—and Cobalt Strike—a commercially available exploitation tool. Mitigations The FBI and DHS recommend service providers strengthen their user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of their services. Resources NSA, CISA, FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks CISA: Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise CISA Alert AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments FBI, CISA, ODNI, NSA Joint Statement: Joint Statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Security Agency CISA Alert AA20-352A: Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations CISA Insights: What Every Leader Needs to Know about the Ongoing APT Cyber Activity FBI, CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting U.S. Think Tanks CISA: Malicious Activity Targeting COVID-19 Research, Vaccine Development NCSC, CSE, NSA, CISA Advisory: APT 29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development Revisions April 26, 2021: Initial Version

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