February 2021 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

sleazy FSFE Valentines campaign exposed
by Debian Community News Team 10 Feb '21

10 Feb '21

https://fsfellowship.eu/matthias-kirschner-fsfe-objectifies-women-valentine… https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26089392

1 0

Codecrypt: The post-quantum cryptography tool.
by coderman 10 Feb '21

10 Feb '21

https://gitea.blesmrt.net/exa/codecrypt Codecrypt The post-quantum cryptography tool. About This is a GnuPG-like unix program for encryption and signing that uses only quantum-computer-resistant algorithms: - McEliece cryptosystem (compact QC-MDPC variant) for encryption - Hash-based Merkle tree algorithm (FMTSeq variant) for digital signatures Codecrypt is free software. The code is licensed under terms of LGPL3 in a good hope that it will make combinations with other tools easier. Why this? Go read http://pqcrypto.org/ Links - infopage: http://e-x-a.org/codecrypt/ - package downloads: http://e-x-a.org/codecrypt/files/ Distro packages - Gentoo packages: https://packages.gentoo.org/packages/app-crypt/codecrypt with current ebuild usually available at http://e-x-a.org/codecrypt/files - Debian packages: apt-get install codecrypt - Arch linux: see https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/codecrypt/ - Windows port is maintained separately here: https://github.com/mike805/codecrypt-win32 Language wrappers: - Python bindings: https://github.com/mike805/codecrypt-python/ Documentation There is a complete, UNIXy manual page supplied with the package. You can view it online here: http://e-x-a.org/codecrypt/ccr.1.html Used cryptography overview To achieve the stated goal, codecrypt uses a lot of (traditional, but "quantum-secure") cryptographic primitives. Choices of primitives were based on easy auditability of design, simplicity and provided security. The git repo of codecrypt contains doc/papers with an unsorted heap of academic papers and slides about relevant topics. Stream ciphers used: - ChaCha20, the recommended choice from djb - XSynd stream cipher as an interesting and nontraditional candidate also based on assumptions from coding theory; used NUMS (it requires lot of NUMS) are explained in doc/nums directory in the repo. - Arcfour for initial simplicity of implementation. After recent statistical attacks I cannot recommend using any RC4 variant anymore, but provided padding and the "offline-only" usage of codecrypt keeps the usage mostly secure. CRHFs used: - Cubehash variants were selected for implementation ease, really clean design, quite good speed and flexibility of parameter choices. This is also the only hash possibility when Crypto++ library is not linked to codecrypt. KeyIDs are CUBE256 hashes of corresponding serialized public keys. - ripemd128 for small hashes - tiger192 is used as an alternative for Cubehash for 192bit hashes - There's always a variant with SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. Signature algorithms: - FMTSeq with many possibilities and combinations of aforementioned CRHFs - SPHINCS256 support is scheduled for next release Encryption algorithms: - MDPC McEliece on quasi-cyclic matrices. The implementation uses some tricks to speedup the (pretty slow) cyclic matrix multiplication (most notably libfftm3 in this version). For padding using the Fujisaki-Okamoto scheme, the cipher requires a stream cipher and a CRHF, used ciphers and CRHFs are specified in the algorithm name -- e.g. MCEQCMDPC128FO-CUBE256-CHACHA20 means that the parameters are tuned to provide 128bit security, uses CUBE256 hash, and ChaCha20 stream cipher. - Quasi-dyadic McEliece was included in codecrypt as an original algorithm, but is now broken and prints a warning message on any usage. Caveats: Cryptography is not intended for "online" use, because some algorithms (especially the MDPC decoding) are (slightly) vulnerable to timing attacks. Quick How-To Everything is meant to work mostly like GnuPG, but with some good simplicity margin. Let's play with random data! ccr -g help ccr -g sig --name "John Doe" # your signature key ccr -g enc --name "John Doe" # your encryption key ccr -K #watch the generated keys ccr -k ccr -p -a -o my_pubkeys.asc -F Doe # export your pubkeys for friends #(now you should exchange the pubkeys with friends) #see what people sent us, possibly check the fingerprints ccr -inaf < friends_pubkeys.asc #import Frank's key and rename it ccr -ia -R friends_pubkeys.asc --name "Friendly Frank" #send a nice message to Frank (you can also specify him by @12345 keyid) ccr -se -r Frank < Document.doc > Message_to_frank.ccr #receive a reply ccr -dv -o Decrypted_verified_reply.doc <Reply_from_frank.ccr #rename other's keys ccr -m Frank -N "Unfriendly Frank" #and delete pukeys of everyone who's Unfriendly ccr -x Unfri #create hashfile from a large file ccr -sS hashfile.ccr < big_data.iso #verify the hashfile ccr -vS hashfile.ccr < the_same_big_data.iso #create (ascii-armored) symmetric key and encrypt a large file ccr -g sha256,chacha20 -aS symkey.asc ccr -eaS symkey.asc -R big_data.iso -o big_data_encrypted.iso #decrypt a large file ccr -daS symkey.asc <big_data_encrypted.iso >big_data.iso #password-protect all your private keys ccr -L #protect a symmetric key using another symmetric key ccr -L -S symkey1 -w symkey2 #password-protect symkey2 with a custom cipher ccr -L -S symkey2 -w @xsynd,cube512 Option reference For completeness I add listing of all options here (also available from ccr --help) Usage: ./ccr [options] Common options: -h, --help display this help -V, --version display version information -T, --test perform (probably nonexistent) testing/debugging stuff Global options: -R, --in set input file, default is stdin -o, --out set output file, default is stdout -E, --err the same for stderr -a, --armor use ascii-armored I/O -y, --yes assume that answer is `yes' everytime Actions: -s, --sign sign a message -v, --verify verify a signed message -e, --encrypt encrypt a message -d, --decrypt decrypt an encrypted message Action options: -r, --recipient encrypt for given user -u, --user use specified secret key -C, --clearsign work with cleartext signatures -b, --detach-sign specify file with detached signature -S, --symmetric enable symmetric mode of operation where encryption is done using symmetric cipher and signatures are hashes, and specify a filename of symmetric key or hashes Key management: -g, --gen-key generate keys for specified algorithm -g help list available cryptographic algorithms -k, --list list the contents of keyring -K, --list-secret -i, --import import keys -I, --import-secret -p, --export export keys -P, --export-secret -x, --delete delete matching keys -X, --delete-secret -m, --rename rename matching keys -M, --rename-secret -L, --lock lock secrets -U, --unlock unlock secrets Key management options: -F, --filter only work with keys with matching names -f, --fingerprint format full key IDs nicely for human eyes -N, --name specify a new name for renaming or importing -n, --no-action on import, only show what would be imported -w, --with-lock specify the symmetric key for (un)locking the secrets -w @SPEC ask for password and expand it to a symmetric key of type SPEC for (un)locking the secret Disclaimer Codecrypt eats data. Use it with caution. Read the F manual. Author is a self-taught cryptographer.

1 1

Re: With a little help of friends...
by John Young 10 Feb '21

10 Feb '21

Stick around, there have been onslaughts of repugnant creeps and geeks and misfits since cpunks beginning. They dump their shit then move on, a few come back with even stinkier droppings. Set your filter to trash, spamblock, kill the motherfuckers, well, not the last, that is the kind of narcissistic compliment they most beg for. Courtesy enrages and disempowers them, so keep that up. A guide to the self-pleasuring, circle-jerking pseudonymous-needy bullies: https://cryptome.org/2012/07/gent-forum-spies.htm At 08:30 AM 2/6/2021, Cecilia Tanaka wrote: >Still alive.Â Thanks until the end, now or >never. My kind of stalkers are not good people. >I am convinced of their guilty.Â Killers, torturers. > > >Please, save my beloved ones.Â Â I know you all are much better than me.Â > >Many thanks.Â If the worse happens, it was a >honor and a happiness to meet you all, virtually >or in person.Â Always will love you.Â The world is not so big.Â >

4 4

" I think assassination markets to kill political leaders will be popular "
by professor rat 09 Feb '21

09 Feb '21

Recently, a developer at Augur made the following observations: I think assassination markets to kill political leaders will be popular..." https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/765p5l/augur_developer_assassina… DISCLOSURE - I hold some REP - the Augur currency.

1 0

Global Thermonuclear Cryptowar
by professor rat 09 Feb '21

09 Feb '21

https://www.coindesk.com/un-says-north-korea-funded-nuclear-weapons-with-cr… over $316 million in crypto was stolen by North Korea-linked hackers last year. At this point failure to launch APster is looking like a mass-suicide-pact. Send a message to this " Wrong-Un ". Kill Rasputin. https://stiffs.com/celebrity/vladimirputin

1 0

SlashGear: This SpaceX Starlink limit has killed my satellite internet dream for now
by jim bell 09 Feb '21

09 Feb '21

SlashGear: This SpaceX Starlink limit has killed my satellite internet dream for now. https://www.slashgear.com/spacex-starlink-cell-location-limit-digital-nomad…

2 1

Tesla goes in - new Btc ATH at 43k
by professor rat 08 Feb '21

08 Feb '21

https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-hits-43k-all-time-high-as-tesla-inve…

1 0

Bloomberg bs about spy-chip remains unredacted
by professor rat 07 Feb '21

07 Feb '21

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BEzbuyloL1gJ:https://w… This is the latest Bloomberg bs about networked computing; strictly for shits and giggles.

1 0

SlashGear: Amazon responds to claims that it’s attempting to stifle satellite Internet competition
by jim bell 07 Feb '21

07 Feb '21

SlashGear: Amazon responds to claims that it’s attempting to stifle satellite Internet competition. https://www.slashgear.com/amazon-responds-to-claims-that-its-attempting-to-…

1 0

Bloomberg: A Swiss Company Says It Found Weakness That Imperils Encryption
by jim bell 07 Feb '21

07 Feb '21

Bloomberg: A Swiss Company Says It Found Weakness That Imperils Encryption. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-07/a-swiss-company-says-it-…

1 0