February 2016 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Cryptomes searing critique of Snowden Inc.
by John Young 22 Feb '16

22 Feb '16

Cryptome's searing critique of Snowden Inc. http://timshorrock.com/?p=2354 https://soundcloud.com/rebootfm/interview-with-cryptome-2016-02-06

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CFP is out for The Eleventh HOPE
by Greg Newby 22 Feb '16

22 Feb '16

Many on the CP list have been presenters in the past. Speaker submissions are open (title, abstract, bio to speakers(a)hope.net) The event is July 22-24 in New York at the HOtel PEnnsylvania: http://xi.hope.net/ http://xi.hope.net/speakers/ It promises to be a good time. - Greg

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[OT] Are the empty subject replies to jya accessible from UI in the web archive?
by Georgi Guninski 22 Feb '16

22 Feb '16

Can't access the empty subject replies to jya's empty subject from UI on the web archive (manually they are accessible). https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2016-February/date.html The source is: <li><a href="012250.html"> </a> Any browser which can follow links like that from the UI?

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Crypto Beguilement
by John Young 22 Feb '16

22 Feb '16

Coms eagerly post-Snowden promising crypto does not mean they have stopped helping gov-com secret spying by other means, au contraire. Crypto protects only a few of many means gov-coms have to spy on public, so should not divert from those, nor from 88% Snowden docs withheld. Govs may concede crypto public protection to assure other means remain effective. Promoting public crypto as a cloak appears to be the campaign underway, now as in the 1990s, so beguiling to crypto advocates to claim a win (for the industry-org-edu to continue doing openly and secretly what it does best).

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FBI disruption strategies - extra-judicial life destruction
by coderman 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

''' Disruption strategy involves “a range of tools including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject’s activities.” “The FBI’s overbroad and aggressive use of its investigative and surveillance powers, and its willingness to employ ‘disruption strategies’ against subjects not charged with crimes can have serious, adverse impacts on innocent Americans,” the ACLU concluded. “Being placed under investigation creates an intense psychological, and often financial, burden on the people under the microscope and their families, even when they are never charged with a crime,” it continued. “All the more so when a heinous crime like terrorism is alleged, and when the investigators are convinced the subject of their investigation is guilty but they just don’t have the evidence necessary for arrest.” The Congressional Research Service report noted that such methods are reminiscent of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, and particularly the COINTELPRO program, which engaged in “preventive, covert, intelligence-based efforts to target and contain people, groups, or movements suspected by the Bureau to be ‘rabble rousers,’ ‘agitators,’ ‘key activists,’ or ‘key black extremists.’” The FBI “relied on illegal means to curb constitutionally protected activity it deemed threatening to national security.” ''' https://theintercept.com/2016/02/18/fbi-wont-explain-its-bizarre-new-way-of… FBI Won’t Explain Its Bizarre New Way of Measuring Its Success Fighting Terror Jenna McLaughlin Feb. 18 2016, 11:18 p.m. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has quietly developed a new way to measure its success in the war on terror: counting the number of terror threats it has “disrupted” in a year. But good luck trying to figure out what that number means, how it was derived, or why it doesn’t jibe with any other law enforcement statistic, most notably, the number of terror suspects actually charged or arrested. In the section on “Performance Measures” in the FBI’s latest financial statement, the bureau reports 440 “terror disruptions” in the 12-month period ending on September 30, 2015. That’s compared to 214 in fiscal year 2014. And it’s more than three times the 2015 “target” of 125. In a vacuum, that would appear to suggest that the FBI’s terror-fighting mission — which sucked up $5.3 billion, or 54 percent of the bureau’s $9.8 billion budget in 2015 — is exceeding expectations. But that number — 440 — is much higher than the number of arrests reported by the FBI. The Washington Post counted about 60 terror-related arrests in 2015; a study by George Washington University found 71 arrests related to the Islamic State from March 2014 to the end of 2015. Of those arrests, many were of people trying to travel abroad or trying to help others do so. Many more involved people planning attacks that were essentially imaginary, often goaded by FBI informants. And according to a document from the Department of Homeland Security obtained by The Intercept in November, there was only one genuinely “foiled attack” in the United States between January 2014 and September 2015. And that one, involving would-be shooters in Garland, Texas, targeting a cartoon-drawing event inspired by the Prophet Muhammad, was stopped by the local police department. The FBI didn’t respond to emails asking basic questions such as what qualifies as a disruption, why the number is so much higher than the bureau’s recorded arrests, or how it comes up with its annual “target.” In a January 2015 Performance Report, Justice Department officials explained that the “targets reflect the number of expected disruptions based on the estimated threat, yet account for potential fluctuations.” The officials acknowledged that “disruptions can be a challenge to quantify for future years” because the number of potential plots is “outside of FBI control.” Nevertheless, they wrote: “Based on past data trends, coupled with current and emerging threat pictures, the FBI expects to achieve its FY 2015 and FY 2016 targets.” A strange way to provide transparency The “terrorism threat disruptions” metric is a relatively new arbiter of success for the FBI. In a 2013 Department of Justice document about strategic goals, fighting terrorism is identified as Strategic Goal 1, and “number of terrorism disruptions” is Strategic Objective 1.1. “To provide transparency to its work in the area of counterterrorism, the Department will disclose a key statistic: the number of terrorism disruptions,” the department announced. But the definition was vague: “A disruption is defined as interrupting or inhibiting a threat actor from engaging in criminal or national security related activity. A disruption is the result of direct actions and may include but is not limited to the arrest; seizure of assets; or impairing the operational capabilities of key threat actors.” And the department’s idea of transparency was problematic. Because the FBI’s “operational priorities are classified,” the document noted, “it is only possible to report aggregate data that lacks significant detail.” Experts interviewed by The Intercept suggested two possible explanations for the high number of terror disruptions. Gold stars One possibility, they said, is that the number is just a subjective way to make people at the FBI look good, or to rationalize the cost. “This is how the whole career system works in the FBI — statistics, performance,” said Coleen Rowley, a former FBI agent and whistleblower. Individuals use statistics to advance their careers, and the agency, in turn, uses them to justify its budget, she said. “In the agency, this is the way to advance.” The fact that the agency establishes a target for terrorism disruptions is also troubling, said Michael German, a former FBI agent and fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice. “That the FBI actually sets a performance goal stating the specific number of terrorist disruptions it wants to accomplish over the year would seem to create an incentive to gin up cases where no real threat might exist.” And if the number is inflated, it wouldn’t be the first time the Department of Justice or the FBI had been criticized for inaccurately estimating the impact of their counterterrorism efforts. In 2007, an inspector general investigation found that the entire Department of Justice — the FBI included — had messed up its bookkeeping efforts on terrorism. The FBI mistakenly included marriage fraud, immigration cases, and others in their records of anti-terror cases. And in 2013, Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz called out the office that oversees U.S. attorney’s offices for shoddy reporting that significantly overstated the number of terrorism convictions, counting cases that actually dealt with narcotics or money laundering or including defendants who had their charges dismissed. “These inaccuracies are important in part because DOJ management and Congress need accurate terrorism-related statistics to make informed operational and budgetary decisions,” Horowitz said in a statement accompanying the 2013 report. Easier to disrupt than arrest Another possible explanation for such a big number, however, is that it accurately reflects a new FBI approach to fighting terror that is occurring outside of public view — where the bureau decides someone is a threat and disrupts his or her life in some way that isn’t nearly as subject to oversight and accountability as an indictment or an arrest. “I’m sensing a significant change in counterterrorism policy in the U.S., where we’ve gone from ‘watch and report,’ to ‘let’s just disrupt them any way we can,’” David Gomez, a former FBI agent and profiler, as well as a former LAPD officer, told The Intercept. “This has cut short the way the FBI does long-term investigations. … They’re not doing that anymore.” The FBI has indeed been going through some changes. As a 2013 Congressional Research Service report explains, “Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.” This has led law enforcement agencies to use aggressive, proactive techniques to catch potential terrorists before a crime is committed. According to the CRS report, one technique is the “Al Capone” approach — putting people in jail for a minor crime rather than sticking around and waiting for evidence of a serious violent threat. Another method is the informant, or “agent provocateur,” who starts communicating with potential suspects, goading them into committing an act of terrorism in order to catch them in the act. “Where the person targeted really is a terrorist, that might make sense,” said German. “But often when evidence that a person is a terrorist is lacking — that’s because he isn’t a terrorist.” German, in an email, asked: “Has the FBI secretly prevented people from getting jobs, hazmat licenses, gun permits, security clearances, or barred their travel where no charges were brought, providing no opportunity for them to challenge the accusations against them or prove their innocence? And then chalked that up as a successful ‘disruption’ so they would get a pat on the back and more resources from Congress, regardless of whether the person was actually guilty?” A 2009 FBI document obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union explicitly allows field offices to engage in “disruption strategies” at the conclusion of a terror assessment or investigation, after “all significant intelligence has been collected, and/or the threat is otherwise resolved.” Disruption strategy involves “a range of tools including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject’s activities.” “The FBI’s overbroad and aggressive use of its investigative and surveillance powers, and its willingness to employ ‘disruption strategies’ against subjects not charged with crimes can have serious, adverse impacts on innocent Americans,” the ACLU concluded. “Being placed under investigation creates an intense psychological, and often financial, burden on the people under the microscope and their families, even when they are never charged with a crime,” it continued. “All the more so when a heinous crime like terrorism is alleged, and when the investigators are convinced the subject of their investigation is guilty but they just don’t have the evidence necessary for arrest.” The Congressional Research Service report noted that such methods are reminiscent of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, and particularly the COINTELPRO program, which engaged in “preventive, covert, intelligence-based efforts to target and contain people, groups, or movements suspected by the Bureau to be ‘rabble rousers,’ ‘agitators,’ ‘key activists,’ or ‘key black extremists.’” The FBI “relied on illegal means to curb constitutionally protected activity it deemed threatening to national security.” The goal of “disruption” has typically been reserved for FBI agents pursuing people like drug traffickers — where “impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in the organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation,” counts as disruption. But that standard doesn’t really apply to the “lone wolves” or small groups that make up most of the FBI’s terror suspects. Great expectations The FBI is under a lot of pressure these days — charged with preventing every possible terrorist attack before it happens, while withstanding public scrutiny of its methods. Gomez, the former FBI agent, cuts the bureau some slack. “As a policeman, we used to have a saying about local drug dealers — we put them in jail for everything, use of heroin, a misdemeanor,” Gomez said. “They’re doing life in prison 60 days at a time.” The FBI is “going to be under severe criticism” one way or the other, he said. “You can’t win.” Rowley, though critical of the strategy, said she was also sympathetic. “It’s a bad position of, oh, you better prevent every act of terrorism,” she said. Contact the author:

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Heavily redacted Snowden impact assessment leaves out Snowden's name
by Michael Best 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

In case anyone missed it, here's the short article, document's embedded at the bottom: https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/feb/18/snowden-inventory/ -- Veritas aequitas liberabit vos Veri universum vici That 1 Archive <http://that1archive.neocities.org/> @NatSecGeek <https://twitter.com/NatSecGeek> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: SKS 1.1.5 Comment: Hostname: pgp.mit.edu mQINBChG9zoBEADKzALG4UHCjY6L9OFUxWRVGGCW7LY71K2EAK/0jkRh1wPkJ4chPaVJ3vVD nJ0d8HxsyR5R3+y7GH6GCc/tK0IDPJah+xpQnraS1nWUvAlSaaxsBK4hJfuVGyfBg/joQVKU OhpqJLQhRIkUWk30QC94IbOKiCTb6V4pStLYyrLieewjT481vvRIYp/48IS5eiveZW0/IpcA HBON7xJw6P1murC8PNOJSWRCp9FJhcs3wIPG3cFTfsxSZnGcoivMgFLtGAfLbztpZkcHEMOR 4qamVvirzYGHma0UlOzyNr7xpxyLXFsU5kKzQ8Az2nP1GG7vuqXSjPNLIvvHFL+g+gKuCe9W xTa9Ac038RRSiBGdDrvTFpQ/h9h5GWIHP7nsA4TCeZSpL81aqp7Cb0MK3KPQmteTPIujVCnx jXXHrOe9Tj6iYUU8edApISyBEVFZMd+EtfDEDf/ZwDjzSGE85vv1dZ/ck7iJvS8FwM8hsRBG U9huCKiItGs26teUJ2Sum49YaEiDL4QLQhJ+FbsAusxJg+V3GE/4w75K/6/czT0p10Mf66Uo fRFTvYRE7S6CNDxzTI4q7+pnRlxMBduGC33KY4eq4Py/O3LWHBDxZ+LffIa/tWcB/7oZ6yDo bdWleNk5wnJdPGr6lUTHTM4tpDIEcXYpvjzyLcMtg4tFm/Dc0QARAQABtGVNaWNoYWVsIEJl c3QgKFByaXZhdGUsIG5vdCBzZWN1cmUuIEZvciBzZWN1cmUgZW1haWwsIHJlcXVlc3QgYSBv bmUtdGltZSBrZXkuKSA8dGhlbWlrZWJlc3RAZ21haWwuY29tPokCPQQTAQoAJwUCKEb3OgIb AwUJNXc1AAULCQgHAwUVCgkICwUWAgMBAAIeAQIXgAAKCRCiYH9hY4dAS3e+D/sFwyJER4/4 ZnHYC/1EzCpHeDikSmULEgsvNgzo73thOV9/Q2I8mCJTlQjsK4rZ2YiDzi4b0CN8kzjpxtVz BsBsxfyPLrdH4VoqeqeBVzbwHxSk7bYUI3vFt+e3gBgpAxbVfPXCnYUnWPRlr9dc/JZoPJH4 p8yRIqktehbAE3Fa3gkfrXJ5e6+/nKlQhikyvo9VuErrLpPMXBzOq4/2LVfurkcOzlp1RBjs hWr6B98EiOXs44ZGLEkINxJiW8koFhw/WDuON8LKi/DtLiqqtBVTjrkqKCuKzSAVncGGcEVO 3Om3aOIOvG0do/wQKYXnpbeGsHwx2PGrJ7H+lb2bIb5KhbZkbG4rMTjsVnuGN+IF4BxBhmGz MYoooWy4VCLL0o8keomU8JPXt+fZDqJ9sNjY/asTsjOa6aE3bIa6w3mWUeefGwA25oXur3Rr L3wmu1pPzCejumfA1X93dS9UZS3xni+7W34g6YbsREuaZ+YBxFLN227JXAx2pEdjLsuVOaqM 9CO7ARHsxDZoE9U7n0s3txnSw/2YYwjEK1wDhdLnHBL3ZzaAcaHnpzsTYQAVW7uXKKHhzeSK GP3O4ByCisM/7WLFvIIpaNNs85jI1PvKH0GutSTl9xXDfWuYMl9rwwbteBB/oGSxlIFe0pqq IDNfAJdR/HjTLqrTES2wdXJS1bkCDQQoRvc6ARAAmltXrhVfpePdIFrfEHCet4nkQvmRI+AX rUgiNlxQDW8M5FzlUfT2xpMXHMWuKehTYpFq7bNbFi+fwBhMajgvgDsTuLInftKSFp+sisbR n8psv7CpGB4jp0Xd4y1Wm/HejV/kga0kcUVVetaqyzgZedn1UnccQRzDBVWW2j2ed+hi/8g0 /d7mbVG81yzJo8tLidM90xFF7JGlijm0dBAqmhD4UgkxSnJQ3PK5onqdjdbx7HkP68RrkeTQ vhWK1978qzdSl9ljJ0jLnoAaDNPs5Dj/TyYCtqoKHUqMbTwU5nIQnJG7geMeSw/7OVnKlypF Rs/JesZzMBooZTRxZJuIB/q0wOfE/MYTwGSwLs2brUwJFJ6bSYmerZ+81S8W/Y4mehJ3o6Vl SabrrVN+LlBfUuRqd5U909WECzk6HVnwnRfL07zD+1y5cLU+e4MQs2227kLriTIxtDZ/umeG hKQgNgFGTAPHJxA96xGvQ8Ovv+XEivlO0jxBNMIiopNSlMDE+k3nigWHuavt9LUUCOd45aw7 0pgKstQQgpFfVAwV98LPpUKxa61q6wQiQHAcP7YxuQG0dsr4nUq2xids5l1IpOLzZJ3nRThM k7alkljBbqphbocV3FsSXOkpcSWns94k1QGmrPzEPLF0FHFBG6whWoaoEySMkdsN1zVu4GMU o2EAEQEAAYkCJQQYAQoADwUCKEb3OgIbDAUJNXc1AAAKCRCiYH9hY4dASzTaEACKXVgc8KmZ xWyYTUQgIwrj3J/re68uIilq0iBBDocgEZZpxyf6lD1V3IKBjAPpWyYHMrrrLY64rFDR+8DE Xyhm1Wv2S6YJuWJtyAlS4bciXjJE6evirIH5GoFq++vzsufRaudAoQ56hJ0+Z3dNMMWZ6YuP zWNNL2tvpdo3Nvd8bqiADWSffFdIPv5Yj/mZsXmaDN+7iWYlAdCrubGyGzFHlCh26Ghu6SS0 /u8x1/Oi7ma7fUMFnEsFiYjwBkD3pQKK1dm7j2f1OMxi8uky8vgBgx40aeJkoUgEvIHWsCIi CWVTyfiGeWIcKbK7tYP5jsjV5fUv+TaQ1pApt++Pyop1aogfQ8icNBQQkdX6E4gNhnPOPTM8 FTl69Tq5Ori5+TM8VM0iPGiydlcAXIAD3OyR4tZM12Ga1AtppKjx31EyDB4SPzUmDWRy5WgG NRH3+RgiK/iXVcvLdFIKj3/AvctSLdbayyaFD8zrE/wcMzLfie+iE231+rG/7gmcR3H1rcYE vxvmWAPikLQKiMUpPBNSvfLPUTrwNSGiZ5ieAAPgOooc3u5nohwZmEW1pg6HirZgIAgAYuyL aLgnikwH70guiQ4Ufsih3gy0ddsUwliUTtbYQyX0OBQoTUyaiXPy0Wu2FJfsxiW8X9Lu9pIH KOwU9K76VKot+UikGqeFQsS/Ig== =M+du -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d
by grarpamp 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

Sign a message to me...

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Re: [Fwd: Multiple Internets]
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

-------- Original Message -------- From: Ted Smith <tedks(a)riseup.net> Apparently from: cypherpunks-bounces(a)cpunks.org To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Subject: Re: [Fwd: Multiple Internets] Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 12:02:57 -0500 >I'm a little skeptical of wireless mesh networks as a general solution to this sort of problem, because they're inherently chatty, and have very limited reach. Wireless meshes are usually short range but there is no architectural reason they can't be linked by LoS or even longer distances connections. One area familiar to hams in the VHF/UHF bands is troposcatter. Tropo is similar to the more common HF phenomenon ionospheric reflection ("skip") but instead uses refraction changes in lower layers of the atmosphere due to temperature/density differences. Tropo is shorter range (generally 100-500 km) than skip and less RF efficient but tends to be more reliable and because it operates using much higher frequencies can support much higher bandwidth (data rates). All the VHF/UHF ham bands and several unlicensed bands (900 MHz, U.S. only), 2.4 GHz and 5.7 GHz can all support tropo though reflection efficiency tends to be greatest at the lower frequencies. Until the advent of satellites tropo use was widespread by commercial and military. Now that anti-satellite tech is becoming more widespread (e.g., recent Chinese launches) tropo is again being investigated http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/07/army-troposcatter-communi… I'm considering tropo experiments in one of the ham or ISM bands. Please PM if you might have SDR or RF skills, time and some money to throw toward this. Speaking of skip, in my PP Hacker Conference slides http://s000.tinyupload.com/?file_id=03580328025747098705 I discuss a variant, NVIS (Near Vertical Incident Skywave), first developed by the Germans during WW II, which allows HF stations operating between 2 - 12 MHz to bounce signals off the ionosphere for intermediate rage (25-100 km) non-LoS communications. WW

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Re: Apple Vs FBI: We tried to help the FBI but someone changed phone's iCloud password
by Rayzer 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

Digitalfolklore wrote: > remember the apartment was never secured...maybe the password was > written down on the back of a receipt that got tossed out when the > apartment was over run by press > > VH > Or something stoopid like that. A few years ago when I was still writing news copy for an alt radio news personality I was personally following the Waxman investigation into Blackwater. Publicly over the Nisoor Square shooting, but they were going to cover other issues behind closed doors such as Blackwater's gun-running (CPA Glocks w/o serial numbers to Turkish city crime gangs for a start), which had been followed by McClatchy news service, and I was using their copy on my blogger posts. One morning, right before the hearings were about to begin, I was checking my site counter and discovered a hit from PentagonMil on one of those posts... What? Me worry? But what followed next should disturbing to anyone who thought the feds understood infosec or had someone on payroll who understands. Apparently the person who viewed it first saved it to their desktop complete with the site counter jscript, and the next few hits after that, instead of showing a typical http path, showed the path through pentagonmil to the desktop names of people the original viewer had passed the page around to. The pentagon was letting my saved blog page 'phone home'. They hadn't blocked outgoing script action. Pretty pitiful hunh? RR "Through counter-intelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential trouble-makers ... And neutralize them, neutralize them, neutralize them" > >> -------- Original Message -------- >> Subject: Apple Vs FBI: We tried to help the FBI but someone changed >> phone's iCloud password >> Local Time: February 21, 2016 6:08 am >> UTC Time: February 20, 2016 7:08 PM >> From: Rayzer(a)riseup.net >> To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org >> >> Transliteration... The feds tampered with the phone and apparently >> fucked up their own investigation. >> >> > The idea was to force the iPhone 5C to auto-backup to Farookâs >> > iCloud account. With a legal court order, Apple can and does turn over >> > iCloud data. For some reason, Farook had not backed up the phone for >> > roughly six weeks prior to the attack. The executive said Apple does >> > not know whether the auto-backup was disabled or enabled, but he did >> > say that the previous iCloud backups, which were handed over to >> > investigators, were sporadic. >> > >> > Apple suggested that the FBI take the iPhone 5C, plug it into a wall, >> > connect it to a known Wi-Fi network and leave it overnight. The FBI >> > took the phone to the San Bernardino County Health Department, where >> > Farook worked prior to the December 2, 2015 attack. >> > >> > When that attempt did not work, Apple was mystified, but soon found >> > out that the Apple ID account password had been changed shortly after >> > the phone was in the custody of law enforcement, possibly by someone >> > from the county health department. With no way to enter the new >> > password on the locked phone, even attempting an auto-backup was >> > impossible. Had this iCloud auto-backup method actually functioned, >> > Apple would have been easily able to assist the FBI with its >> > investigation. >> > >> > The executive only revealed this detail to reporters now because it >> > had thought it was under a confidentiality agreement with the >> > government. Apple seems to believe this agreement is now void since >> > the government brought it up in a public court filing. >> > >> http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/apple-we-tried-to-help-fbi-terro… >> >> --

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The leaked Hacking Team emails might be worth searching for public IPs
by Georgi Guninski 21 Feb '16

21 Feb '16

The leaked Hacking Team emails might be worth searching for public IPs. https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/498702 > openvpn.log:Sun Jan 25 14:54:56 2015 169.229.3.93:40500 MULTI: > multi_create_instance called > openvpn.log:Sun Jan 25 14:54:56 2015 169.229.3.93:40500 Re-using > SSL/TLS context > openvpn.log:Sun Jan 25 14:54:56 2015 169.229.3.93:40500 LZO > compression initialized $whois 169.229.3.92 OrgName: University of California at Berkeley

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