July 2014 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

interesting thread on BND intercept at DE-CIX on denog@
by Eugen Leitl 18 Jul '14

18 Jul '14

The netops are not amused. You need to be a list member in order to access the archive. http://lists.denog.de/mailman/private/denog/2014-July/002049.html

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CPunks @ HOPE
by Rich Jones 18 Jul '14

18 Jul '14

Any folks out there going to be in New York this weekend? Say hi to the scruffy guy in the Death Grips shirt! R

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Re: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload
by Jonathan Wilkes 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

On 07/17/2014 04:11 PM, coderman wrote: > On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:41 PM, Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> wrote: >> ... >>> this is exactly why some who have received these payloads are sitting >>> on them, rather than disclosing. >> Hmmm, that seems pretty antisocial and shortsighted. While the pool of >> bugs is large, it is finite. > consider, having recv a payload: > - who do i trust to evaluate / dissect? This is the reason why I asked on this list and didn't attempt, for example, to try to capture the payload myself. If competent security specialists do the baiting and the evaluating/dissection, it's a non-issue. > - would it be better to fix a class of bugs than a specific instance? Well if you mitigate privately, how do you go about luring additional 0days out of FoxAcid's queue? And even then how do you know you've reached the queue, or are sufficiently deep into it that releasing bug reports won't burn potentially valuable information? But if you mean instead that the effort should be focused on redesigning browser security in some way to address a broader class of exploits of which FoxAcid is a part, how does keeping a payload private/unpatched further that goal? > - what information would be lost if burned? > > looking over the JTRIG and TAO catalogs you see how pervasive > vulnerabilities are in all our systems. there is a process at work > churning out weaponized exploits. That's a great reason to focus more effort on browser security (and security in general), finding sustainable and diverse models of funding for such efforts, etc. But I fail to see how that is relevant fixing a bug related to a specific payload. However, your comments do lead me to believe some private mitigation must be happening as we speak. There must be some valuable information being gleaned by not releasing details about the payloads. It's just difficult to surmise what that would be, given that the attackers know the cat is out of the bag and can probably guess that people are privately inspecting the payloads they are sending out. -Jonathan > > the only exception might be a heartbleed type bug, where the > vulnerability is pervasive and the risk high. (this is also the type > of bug least likely to be used capriciously against targets. you would > need to be high value to get a high value exploit your direction.) > > > >> Get bugs fixed and get developers to write >> fewer bugs going forward, and we'll rapidly deplete the pool of 0day and >> drive up the cost of FOXACID style deployments. > i was young once, too. ;) > > in all seriousness, we don't know how to build systems resistant to > the attacks of collaborating nation states. you can dodge some > attacks, some of the time, at best. > research continues... > > > >> Forcing deployments to move to more interesting bugs will also give >> insight into IAs' exploit sourcing methodologies. > this is absolutely true and useful, > and does not require making specific exploits public. > > > >> Hasn't someone already created an open "FOXACID observatory" tracking >> potential deployments of this and similar APT exploit deployments? > various security companies or research groups drop docs for publicity > or other self interest. the work some NGOs are doing to protect human > rights workers in foreign lands may touch on it now and then. (burning > HackingTeam's tech, for example) > > > >>> it is more useful to mitigate privately, and observe how/when an >>> exploit is used, than burn it publicly for zero effective security >>> improvement. >> That seems unlikely to be correct even in the medium term. > let's have a chat at a conference over strong drinks and plausible > deniability... > > > > to recap: > > - if you want to thwart FOXACID type attacks there are ways to do it > without knowing specific payloads. (architectural and broad > techniques, not fingerprints on binaries or call graphs) > > - burning specific payloads does nothing to protect against the > threat, as they are trivially replaced. (this is a continuous process > with envious resources) > > - all options for disseminating caught exploits involve trust in third > parties which you may not give. (sorry, i'm a skeptic by nature and > nurture :) > > - private use for signalling/discovery (see honey tokens, etc.) is > useful as a testing / integrity check in some ways, given no other > more useful options. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu.

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Re: [liberationtech] Foxacid payload
by coderman 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 1:11 PM, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > ... > - if you want to thwart FOXACID type attacks there are ways to do it > without knowing specific payloads. (architectural and broad > techniques, not fingerprints on binaries or call graphs) some specific examples: A: exploit reuse to arbitrary execution, persist via pivot D: run vulnerable app in Throw away Qubes VM, log traffic for inspection through gateway VM. exploit unable to persist, exploit vector captured. A: android intent misuse to elevate privs, then exfiltrate data. D: "root" your device to restrict intent use and network communication by application, preventing vulnerable app from being usefully exploitable. A: baseband exploit to device crypto key retrieval used D: apply software defined radio to confirm compromise at baseband level via suspect emissions, use SDR instead of proprietary radios to communicate. (you can't mitigate against a compromised baseband, in most cases.) "convenience is the cost of privacy" - who said this? very true in this instance. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu.

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<nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT
by Eugen Leitl 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

/s/terrist/spook ----- Forwarded message from nettime's blockwart <nettime(a)kein.org> ----- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 09:59:02 +0200 From: nettime's blockwart <nettime(a)kein.org> To: nettime-l(a)mx.kein.org Subject: <nettime> A message from the police: IF YOU SUSPECT IT, REPORT IT http://www.warwickshire.police.uk/currentIssues/campaigns/suspectreport Terrorists have to live somewhere. They store their equipment and materials somewhere. They need vehicles. They have people who help them - and these people might come and go at strange times of the day and night. They may make unusual financial transactions or use false documents to hide their real identities. They may be behaving differently to how you've known them to behave in the past. If you suspect it, report it. You can also give non-urgent information that may assist police investigations online through www.online.police.uk. Van – Terrorists need transport. If you work in commercial vehicle hire or sales, has a sale or rental made you suspicious? Passport – Terrorists use multiple identities. Do you know someone with documents in different names for no obvious reason? Mobile phone – Terrorists need communication. Anonymous, pay-as-you-go and stolen mobiles are typical. Have you seen someone with large quantities of mobile phones? Has it made you suspicious? Camera – Terrorists need information. Observation and surveillance help terrorists plan attacks. Have you seen anyone taking pictures of security arrangements? Chemicals – Do you know someone buying large or unusual quantities of chemicals for no obvious reason? Mask and goggles – Terrorists use protective equipment. Handling chemicals is dangerous. Maybe you’ve seen goggles or masks dumped somewhere. Credit card – Terrorists need funding. Cheque and credit card fraud are ways terrorists generate cash. Have you seen any suspicious transactions? Computer – Terrorists use computers. Do you know someone who visits terrorist-related websites? Suitcase – Terrorists need to travel. Meetings training and planning can take place anywhere. Do you know someone who travels but is vague about where they are going? Padlock – Terrorists need storage. Lock-ups, garages and sheds can all be used by terrorists to store equipment. Are you suspicious of anyone renting a commercial property? # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message -----

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Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance
by Eugen Leitl 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

http://blogs.computerworld.com/privacy/24145/leaked-gchq-catalog-exploit-to… Leaked GCHQ catalog of exploit tools for manipulation and mass surveillance By Darlene Storm July 16, 2014 1:22 PM EDTAdd a comment Just as civil liberties groups challenge the legality of the UK intelligence agency’s mass surveillance programs, a catalog of exploit tools for monitoring and manipulation is leaked online. The Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), a department within the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), “develops the majority of effects capabilities” for UK’s NSA-flavored intelligence agency. First Look Media first published the Snowden-leaked Wikipedia-like document full of covert tools used by GCHQ for surveillance and propaganda. JTRIG tools and techniques help British spies “seed the internet with false information, including the ability to manipulate the results of online polls,” monitor social media posts, and launch attacks ranging from denial of service, to call bombing phones, to disabling users' accounts on PCs. Devil’s Handshake, Dirty Devil, Reaper and Poison Arrow are but a few vicious-sounding JTRIG system tools, but the naming convention for others are just inane like Bumblebee Dance, Techno Viking and Jazz Fusion. Perhaps the British spies were hungry when coming up with Fruit Bowl, Spice Island, Nut Allergy, and Berry Twister? Most of the tools are "fully operational, tested and reliable,” according to the 2012 JTRIG Manual, but "Don't treat this like a catalog. If you don't see it here, it doesn't mean we can't build it." Like the previously leaked TAO exploits, it’s an eye-opener as to exploits that GCHQ can deploy. GCHQ spy tools, techniques and exploits in JTRIG manual Some of the especially invasive tools that are “either ready to fire or very close to being ready” include: Angry Pirate can “permanently disable a target’s account on their computer.” Stealth Moose can “disrupt” a target’s “Windows machine. Logs of how long and when the effect is active.” Sunblock can “deny functionality to send/receive email or view material online.” Swamp Donkey “silently” finds and encrypts all predefined types of files on a target’s machine. Tracer Fire is an “Office document that grabs the targets machine info, files, logs, etc and posts it back to GCHQ.” Gurkhas Sword is a tool for “beaconed Microsoft Office documents to elicit a targets IP address.” Tornado Alley is a delivery system aimed at Microsoft Excel "to silently extract and run an executable on a target's machine." Changeling provides UK spies with the “ability to spoof any email address and send email under that identity.” Glassback gets a target’s IP by “pretending to be a spammer and ringing them. Target does not need to answer.” Denial of Service: Rolling Thunder uses P2P for distributed denial of service. Predators Face is used for “targeted denial of service against web servers.” Silent Movie provides “targeted denial of service against SSH services.” Other JTRIG exploits include Screaming Eagle, “a tool that processes Kismet data into geolocation information” and Chinese Firecracker for “overt brute login attempts against online forums.” Hacienda is a “port scanning tool designed to scan an entire country or city” before identifying IP locations and adding them to an “Earthling database.” Messing with cellphones: Burlesque can “send spoofed SMS text messages.” Cannonball can “send repeated text messages to a single target.” Concrete Donkey can “scatter an audio message to a large number of telephones, or repeatedly bomb a target number with the same message.” Deer Stalker provides a way to silently call a satellite and GSM phone “to aid geolocation.” Imperial Barge can connect two target phones together in a call. Mustang “provides covert access to the locations of GSM cell towers.” Scarlet emperor is used for denial of service against targets’ phones via call bombing. Scrapheap Challenge provides “perfect spoofing of emails from BlackBerry targets.” Top Hat is “a version of Mustang and Dancing Bear techniques that allows us to pull back cell tower and Wi-Fi locations targeted against particular areas.” Vipers Tongue is another denial of service tool but it’s aimed at satellite or GSM phone calls. Manipulation and propaganda Bomb Bay can “increase website hits/rankings.” Gateway can “artificially increase traffic to a website;” Slipstream can “inflate page views on websites.” Underpass “can change the outcome of online polls.” Badger can mass deliver email messages “to support an Information Operations campaign.” Gestator can amplify a “given message, normally video, on popular multimedia websites” like YouTube. The “production and dissemination of multimedia via the web in the course of information operations” can be accomplished with Skyscraper. There are also various tools to censor or report “extremist” content. Online surveillance of social networks Godfather collects public data from Facebook. While Spring Bishop finds private photos of targets on Facebook, Reservoir allows the collection of various Facebook information. Clean Sweep can “masquerade Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries.” Birdstrike monitors and collects Twitter profiles. Dragon’s Snout collects Paltalk group chats. Airwolf collects YouTube videos, comments and profiles. Bugsy collects users’ info off Google+. Fatyak is about collecting data from LinkedIn. Goodfella is a “generic framework to collect public data from online social networks.” Elate monitors a target's use of UK's eBay. Mouth finds, collects and downloads a user’s files from achive.org. Photon Torpedo can “actively grab the IP address of an MSN messenger user.” Pitbull is aimed at large scale delivery of tailored messages to IM services. Miniature Hero is about exploiting Skype. The description states, “Active Skype capability. Provision of real time call records (SkypeOut and SkypetoSkype) and bidirectional instant messaging. Also contact lists.” If that’s not enough mass-scale surveillance and manipulation to irk you, there are more weaponized tricks and techniques in the JTRIG Manual.

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the NSA revelations all in one chart
by Eugen Leitl 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

http://projects.propublica.org/nsa-grid/ The NSA Revelations All in One Chart This is a plot of the NSA programs revealed in the past year according to whether they are bulk or targeted, and whether the targets of surveillance are foreign or domestic. Most of the programs fall squarely into the agency’s stated mission of foreign surveillance, but some – particularly those that are both domestic and broad-sweeping – are more controversial. Just as with the New York Magazine approval matrix that served as our inspiration, the placement of each program is based on judgments and is approximate. For more details, read our FAQ or listen to our podcast. Also, take our quiz to test your NSA knowledge.

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BadBIOS forensics
by Bluelotus 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

I am donating BadBIOS infected laptops, flashdrives, tampered live fedora CD, infected personal files (plain text files, MP3, PDF, jpg, tiff, doc), infected external DVD writer, etc. to any one interested in conducting forensics. I wrote threads on my limited ability to perform forensics in /r/badBIOS subreddit of reddit.com. My other threads are in other subreddits. Look at my submit history. My laptops were indicted, infected and implanted.

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Mathematicians discuss severing ties to the NSA
by Tom 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

FYI: http://www.ams.org/notices/201406/rnoti-p623.pdf -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean.

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Re: [Cryptography] What has Bitcoin achieved?
by grarpamp 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 6:41 PM, <dan(a)geer.org> wrote: > http://www.cnbc.com/id/101841875 > Breyer also predicted big things for digital currencies. > > He said the leader in the field may not end up being bitcoin, which > is the most prominent name now but has faced price volatility, theft > and scandal over the past year. Other providers will emerge. > > "I have zero doubt in the next five to seven years that we will see > at least half a dozen multibillion dollar digital currency companies," > he said. All currencies and property exhibit volatility, scandal and theft. It is a laugh to suggest otherwise, especially for anything 'new'. And of course there will be new digital currency 'companies'. Let's just call them what they will be, large central banks and govt's. But none of them will have the property that their currency is not under their control. Other than the obivous head start bitcoin has in the digital currency game, that is what bitcoin offers philosophically... freedom from control. No company can or will offer that with their currency. And people are choosing freedom to the tune of roughly $100M moved per day [1] when they could just as easily use the current centralized digital currencies of CC/ACH/wire. If bitcoin itself ends up not scaling well enough, or being anonymous enough, or resistant enough to centralization... another decentral digital currency will do better and take its place. The only real question is, will a decentralized currency such as bitcoin beat the centralizers in the race to global adoption by the masses? And similarly to reach point of no return adoption before centralizers realize it's too late to say no? You really don't want to let big central things emerge (here $trillion-dollar corps), bad things always happen with that. [1] http://bitcoincharts.com/bitcoin/ http://blockchain.info/charts http://www.coindesk.com/

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