May 2014 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Fwd: is truecrypt dead?
by J. Tozo 02 Jun '14

02 Jun '14

Is anyone aware of what is happening to truecrypt project? from their site: "The development of TrueCrypt was ended in 5/2014 after Microsoft terminated support of Windows XP. Windows 8/7/Vista and later offer integrated support for encrypted disks and virtual disk images. Such integrated support is also available on other platforms (click here for more information). You should migrate any data encrypted by TrueCrypt to encrypted disks or virtual disk images supported on your platform." " -J

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The next gen P2P secure email solution
by grarpamp 02 Jun '14

02 Jun '14

This thread pertains specifically to the use of P2P/DHT models to replace traditional email as we know it today. There was a former similarly named thread on this that diverged... from the concept and challenge of P2P/DHT handling the transport and lookups... back to more traditional models. This thread does not care about those antique models, please do not take it there. In short, we're attempting to examine and develop some form of new transport that looks somewhat like a mix between secure anonymous networks, string@pubkey node addressing, massive decentralized dht-like scaling and finally a user facing daemon that moves messages into and out of local spools for use by normal user/system tools. Pasting in a very rough and unflowing thread summary to date for interested people to pick up and discuss, draft, etc. ===== grarpamp... > [pgp/smime email encryption, etc] > What is the gap we have to close to turn this on by default? How many times has this been rehashed the last six months? You can't fix email as we know it today using todays bolt-ons, protocols and corporate stakeholders/services trying to profit from it. The only way to have any real global seamless success is to go ground up with a completely new model. IMO, that will be some form of p2p message system where every address is a crypto key, masked for grandma by her contact list, decrypted out your p2p daemon and piped into your local mail processing (MUA/filter/lists) and filesystem (encryption). At least that way your local mail tools will still work (no one will give those up anyway). The problem is the antique centralized backend, it needs bypassed. You've got neat stuff like Tor, bittorrent, bitcoin, etc already... so boost email into the 2020's the same way. Then let the old world email services try to keep up, and slowly die like everything else. ===== grarpamp... On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 1:01 AM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: > On 23/11/13 15:30 PM, Ralf Senderek wrote: >> On Sat, 23 Nov 2013, David Mercer wrote: >> >>> But of course you're right about actual current usage, encrypted email >>> is an >>> epic fail on that measure regardless of format/protocol. >> >> Yes, but it's about time we do something about that. Do we *exactly know >> why* it is such a failure? > > It's an interesting question, and one worth studying for pedagogical > motives. From my experiences from both sides, it is clear that both sides > failed. But for different reasons. > Hence, I've concluded that email is unsecurable. Obviously. It will never be able to escape the non-body header content and third party routing, storage and analysis with any form of patching over today's mail. And it's completely ridiculous that people continue to invest [aka: waste] effort in 'securing' it. The best you'll ever get clients down to is exposing a single 'To:' header within an antique transport model that forces you to authenticate to it in order to despam, bill, censor and control you. That system is cooked, done and properly fucked. Abandon it. What the world needs now is a real peer to peer messaging system that scales. Take Tor for a partial example... so long as all the sender/recipient nodes [onions] are up, any message you send will get through, encrypted, in real time. If a recipient is not up, you queue it locally till they are... no third party ever needed, and you get lossless delivery and confirmation for free. Unmemorable node address?, quit crying and make use of your local address book. Doesn't have plugins for current clients?, so what, write some and use it if you're dumb enough to mix the old and new mail. The only real problem that still needs solved is scalability... what p2p node lookup systems are out there that will handle a messaging world's population worth of nodes [billions] and their keys and tertiary data? If you can do that, you should be able to get some anon transport over the p2p for free. Anyway, p2p messaging and anonymous transports have all been dreamed up by others before. But now is the time to actually abandon traditional email and just do it. If you build it, they will come. ===== fabio... I'm strongly against most the ideas to abbandon current email systems, because the results will be to create wallet garden. We need something interoperable with existing systems or the system will just be used by a bunch of paranoid people or fostered by the marketing of few cryptography company acquiring customers, not user. ===== grarpamp... It would be interoperable with current end user interfaces/tools, but not directly with you(a)some.dotcom. As with everything else, today's seeds grow into tomorrows garden, sometimes you just have to thorougly plow under last year's chaff first, that's by design. ===== viktor... E-mail is basically business correspondence. - E-mail is stored. - E-mail is sent to many people outside your personal social network. - Business recipients of email are often subject to corporate and/or regulatory policy constraints that are in conflict with end-to-end encryption. The above list of features can be greatly expanded, and the consequences elaborated, but I doubt may on this list truly need to be re-educated about email. So I will confidently predict that end-to-end secure email will remain a niche service used by a tiny minority. ... Even businesses that one might expect to implement at least encryption to the "gateway", are in many cases choosing to out-source their gateway to 3rd-party providers (anti-spam and anti-virus offerings only work with un-encrypted email, and in many cases the provider also operates the entire mail store). .... [and others also said: tls, dane, skype, smime, ca's, smtp, etc] ===== Jerry... Medical, Financial ===== grarpamp... Nothing here changes, only the backend transport between nodes. Once your node decrypts the message to your local system pipes, you can do all this and more with it. Including running a 'business' node and doing whatever you want with the plaintext after your node daemon passes it to you. This is not about those ancient protocols. It's also about 'messaging' not strictly 'email'... those lines are already well blurred, no need to distinguish between them anymore. A 'light' messaging client could simply ignore the non transport email headers, or use your standard msg@nodekey address. Please do not continue to talk about antique tradional centralized systems in this thread, except of course to bash and route around them. The speed of a real P2P/DHT replacement at scale is a research challenge. ===== coderman... this would make an interesting bet! i too believe this to be impossible given the constraints. ===== grarpamp... I'm not so sure about this, look at all the global resources being poured into traditional email, and attempts to 'fix' it. Now redirect fractional 1% of those resources and put them into a P2P replacement. That's ftw. ===== natanael... Say hello to Bote mail on I2P. I2P provides encrypted anonymizing networking, Bote mail provides DHT based serverless encrypted mailing with public crypto keys as addresses (ECDSA or NTRU). http://i2p2.de and i2pbote.i2p (if you don't have I2P installed, add .us to visit it via an inproxy). There is also I2P Messenger that is encrypted P2P IM within I2P also using public keys as addresses. ===== cane... You may have a look of "I2P Bote" it is severless, encrypted mail system, address is the public key, P2P based... nice tool. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I2P#E-mail ===== grarpamp... > You may have a look of "I2P Bote" it is severless, encrypted mail > system, address is the public key, P2P based... nice tool. As in another post of mine, I'll be looking at that again. My first take was that it stores the messages in the DHT, which didn't seem scalable or reliable at all. I may be wrong as I read more later. > Afterwards you can add the "I2P Bote plugin", the serverless mail > system. SMTP- and POP3 support was on the ToDo list some times ago, I I think that's working now. And is the general idea, create a strong overlay network with a frontend MUA's can speak to. As an aside: If you can make that overlay net present an IPv6 tunnel interface on the local host, that lets you use any IPv6 enabled app over it. I'm doubting the world needs a dozen application specific overlay networks. More like just a few classes of network. - message based store and forward - low latency IPv6 transport - data storage and retrieval ===== natanael... Bote mail doesn't have to be used for it's anonymous properties, for me that is just a bonus. For many people it is more than enough to be able to know that it is impossible for anybody else than the intended recipient to read the message thanks to public key addressing. Guaranteed end-to-end security if you can verify the address. I don't think anything that doesn't fundamentally rely on public key addressing is the (long term) future. There will inevitably issues otherwise, including more issues of the type we have with CA:s today. For those who want to make it more user friendly, nothing stops you from adding a transparent "address translation layer" where servers are involved. When you want to send a message to a person with a human readable address at a server, then the server could then reply with the public key based address to the mail client, and the user would have the option to see what that address is. It could even be logged by the client, with TOFU/POP style trust system that reduces the amount of trust you have to place in the server. No need to trust anybody with plaintext. ===== grarpamp... I suggest such interfacing with the current legacy system will only prolong it's long past due extinction. Build a better system and let them come to you, not the other way around. And bolting in exits will only make it harder to do correctly and optimally what you need to do as a P2P system. Please, just forget about interfacing with the legacy transport system. If you really need that you can run your own p2p daemon node that acts as your automated gateway between the two. This is mostly about design of the p2p side, not that. ===== james... It is my understanding of the proposed replacement for email. Magic email addresses that in fact correspond to an identifier of a public key, for example the hash of a rule that identifies the public key, and which result in your message not in fact being passed along by email protocols. ===== grarpamp... If you're not going to send directly to the very long account@nodepubkey, then yes, you'll need to create another layer on top to hold your h(key). However, the key must still be obtainable behind that since that is what the messages will ultimately be encrypted and routed to. It's not much of a stretch beyond that to ensure userland mail tools can handle say 8k long addresses. I'm not against such a [vanity/shorthash] layer. ===== natanael... Bote mail and I2P messenger are two pieces of serverless software that ALREADY is public key addressed within I2P. Have you tried them? You need to add the public keys of the recipients to be able to send a message to start with, although the DHT based search system Seedless allow you to publish Bote mail addresses to the network. (IMAP support for Bote mail is planned but not yet implemented, right now it has a local web interface.) Maybe Namecoin could work together with them to enable you to register your key addresses to your nickname in a secure manner, but then you still have to have a globally unique nickname and tell people the exact spelling. ===== > ralf... > If you are so sure, can you tell us how the next generation secure email > solution will solve the "trust problem", please. grarpamp... Though unclear, that sounds like the old trust of a CA/PKI system problem. > How does the p2p daemon > find the correct crypto key, so that every user can rely on its invisible > performance? In general I suggest that people wish to use messaging with each other once they already know them (or have some other trusted web to them). As in, Hey John, nice to meet ya today, what's your key (address), I'll message you later. Or Hey Jane, what's John's address. Same for employers, businesses, etc. Such peer groups bootstrap and grow very fast. Thus the perceived need for a cold lookup of Ralf, isn't much of a real one. Once you know the address (node crypto key), you put it 'To: <key>', mua hands to spool, p2p daemon reads spool, looks up key in DHT and sends msg off across the transport to the far key (node) when it is reachable. Hopefully the transport looks like I2P/Tor in being a secure random hop layer. In fact, those could probably be used today, they have the keys as nodes and user facing ports for inbound/outbound daemons. They just need scaling work to n-billion nodes (users, aka: the hard part). People are already plugging postfix, bittorrent, etc into these networks. Tor is not currently addressible at the user level by the full key, it 'shortens' the key into a 16char onion address. As you may be hinting at... yes, that is bad... collisions, and needing secondary lookup layers into the full key. Tor may be moving to full key addressibility soon, see tor-dev for that. I2P (and Phantom, and probably GnuNet) are addressible with full keys. So you can send to 'account@key' with them if you want, and keep the John/Jane/Ralf human style lookups in your MUA addressbook (once you know them) without needing a secondary lookup layer into the full key. No, I am not sure. But when looking at some of the p2p transport layers that have come along so far, it seems like a fairly strong possibility for a new backend transport model while retaining user level mail tools... mutt, maildrop, mailman, Thunderbird, etc. Most of what you'd need there is support for very long addresses and split horizon handoff to local daemon/spool based on recognizing what the destination net is... .onion, .i2p, etc. I'd like to read what Pond and I2P-Bote are doing with some parts of this as well. I don't believe you need a trusted CA/PKI service to successfully bootstrap users and their addresses/keys into a new global messaging system. If I want to know what some unknown like Bruce's key is, I'll look it up on his website, social net, list posts, etc. If that's what you mean. ===== bill... I feel like I walking in halfway into a conversation, I'm guessing this started on the cryptography list that I'm not on. Your DHT comment caught my attention though. What in particular about DHTs don't seem scalable or reliable? Seems like DHTs are regularly in the 5-10M range and I don't see any reason that DHTs couldn't be 10 times that. Any reasonable churn rate and reliability could be handled with replication. The bit-torrent DHT for instance claims that 45% of users that bootstrap from a central node are reachable 15 minutes later. So typical setups involve 8 nodes per bin, and 20 bins. So every 15 minutes you ping 160 hosts, only reach 45%, and do some work to repopulate the missing slots. Given the simplicity of the bit-torrent DHT I think there's plenty of room for improvement. Larger routing tables are obvious (at the cost of more network bandwidth to track peers). The most promising idea for DHT improvements I've seen is to divide peers into 3 latency groups. High, medium, and low. Much like L1 cache, L2 cache, and main memory. That way common queries are very fast, yet all queries still to find keys globally. ===== grarpamp... Bittorrent is already in the 100m node range. That's not enough. This needs to replace every possible messaging user on the planet over the duration of their actiive lifetime. That's at least a couple billion nodes. Don't forget, you can always use disk to cache things. ===== > james... > Need a system for handing one's keys around that protects end users from > the horrifying sight of actual keys or actual strong hashes of keys. john... But at the same time the system has to not say, "I can't deliver your message to that person because an invisible gnotzaframmit that I won't describe to you seems to be unavailable to me in the flabogrommit." grarpamp... Address books as usual. Name layer if need be. We are humans, we learn new lexicons, we write manuals, that part is nothing to be afraid of. Being afraid only holds you back. ===== > grarpamp... > I don't believe you need a trusted CA/PKI service to successfully > bootstrap users and their addresses/keys into a new global messaging > system. If I want to know what some unknown like Bruce's key is, I'll > look it up on his website, social net, list posts, etc. If that's what you > mean. > guido... > You can use an untrusted CA to bootstrap. I show how it can be done at: > > http://eccentric-authentication.org/Brucon-Eccentric.pdf ralf... This is an interesting idea, because it provides certificates on demand for ordinary users, if they decide to sign up to a certain site. The certs are then being used for other purposes, so the site does act as a bootstap for using crypto. The one thing that this proposal relies on is the availability of a common piece of software (user agent) that stores the private key for the user. It's this part of the picture where things get tricky. grarpamp... There can be no non-distributed/redundant elements in this p2p system, aka: no 'sites', certainly none with a realworld IP on them, and none where very high percentages of them vanishing will disrupt the system for others. This must replace email, therefore system disruption is intolerable. =====

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Re: Our nameless project.
by davidroman96 01 Jun '14

01 Jun '14

On 01/06/14 01:19, Bill Stewart wrote: > At 10:15 AM 5/31/2014, davidroman96 wrote: >> We know that the sources ips generally are dropped, this is the only >> problem that we have. >> But if multiple hosts can use the same ip how the connection can be >> traced? Only the ISP have the information, the receiver don't know >> anything a part from the content of the packet. > > That's part of the problem - > the receiver doesn't know anything, even the contents of the packet, > because any good ISP will drop the packets instead of allowing the > sender to send them. > If you can find a collection of bad ISPs who can send forged-source > packets to each other > across the public Internet, maybe you have some chance, > but that kind of bad ISP is also a target for spy agencies and for > criminals. > > > Normally, UDP is fine, but it isn't TCP. > A popular thing for UDP applications to do is to reinvent TCP badly. > If you need to do TCP things, and only have UDP for some reason, > you can reinvent most of TCP well, but only if you understand it well. > The UDP versions of Bittorrent, for instance, were written by people who > not only understood TCP and UDP well, but experimented a lot with scale. > > A very good ISP will not only drop forged-source packets, > they'll hunt down the sender and kill it. > Somebody mentioned Netflow - many large ISPs record that level of > information, > with the source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, protocol, > and router information, > and sometimes also link-layer addresses if the link layer uses them. > If you sent a packet from 192.9.200.1, your ISP will probably drop it > at the originating router, > and will log an error message that says it dropped that on your access > line, > and if it sees a lot of them, they'll go check out why. > If you use a small ISP that doesn't bother checking for forged source > addresses, > they'll be using a larger ISP for long-haul connections that will notice. > > We know that ISP have the 100% of information, but the idea was to give less information to the receiver. Even yet I couldn't find any transparent ISP, seems that all ISPs are trolls xD, maybe pirateISP are more transparent¿?...

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Our nameless project.
by davidroman96 31 May '14

31 May '14

I want to present an idea to improve anonymity and privacy on the intrernet that me and my companion are building. How it works: To improve anonymity, the diferent hosts are connected with groups of multiple hosts that comunicate each other spoofing the source ip and broadcasting the messages that have to be sent to some host. With this method the reciever don't know who want to download X file and if the NSA or FBI get the logs of the reciever they can not use it for trace the origin. The sender don't know who have X file because they have sent a broadcast request for download a file and will recieve the file with spoofed ip, is 99% anonnymous, the only problem is that the ISP can always know if you are using this program. For the cryptography we use SHA-3 (keccak) for hashing, AES, ECDSA and the better algorithms and methods that we know (we are only amateur cryptologists). With cryptography is easy to protect data against the ISP MitM but it's more dificult to send private messages to a single person. For this reason the topology for the network is of isolated groups with their own private key for the members, obviously a group can be public. Of course a group of 2 people is useless because there are not anonymity xD Bigger groups, more entropy, more anonimity. For the "POC" we are using UDP. UDP only can send small packets of ~64kb, therefore, it can be used for a chat but is too slow to download big files. We have sacrified speed to increase anonymity and privacity. We have "tested" it in a small group of people and for this reason we can not say if it works or not, but in theory it works! And that is the idea :) , what do you think? PD:Sorry for my english :P

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Curious Intellectual Property Food-for-thought: "Live-forever Pingers"
by jim bell 31 May '14

31 May '14

Some people debate whether 'intellectual property' (such as patents) should exist. The standard for patenting is said to be: An invention, to be patentable, should be "new, useful, and unobvious to those skilled in the art". A month ago, when it became obvious that finding Air Malaysia Flight 370 could be difficult, the 30-day limit of the electronic pingers got me to thinking. Why? Instead of pinging for 30 days, why not have them ping increasingly slowly, so that the pinger would last 'forever'. Considered discretely, let it ping at the normal rate for 1 week, at half the rate for the next week, at quarter the rate for the subsequent rate, etc. Or, have a continuous equivalent of this, a ping-rate which slows to approximate this rate over time. This kind of pinger would 'never' run out. Should this idea be patentable? Is it new? I haven't heard of it. Is it useful? It is now clear why it would be useful...now!!! Is it 'un-obvious'? Well, despite the fact that I just thought of it a month ago, and I had never heard it proposed before, I wonder why it shouldn't be called 'obvious'. If anything, I think it's amazing that it hasn't been implemented before. People who work in aeronautics and electronics are smart and imaginative...at least I thought they were...until now? It should also be possible to include in the ping, information (transmitted by pulse-position information) about the last lat/lon received by the aircraft. Jim Bell

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Re: NSL's [was TrueCrypt]
by grarpamp 30 May '14

30 May '14

On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:52 PM, Cathal Garvey <cathalgarvey(a)cathalgarvey.me> wrote: > The problem as I see it is that those who have chosen to battle NSLs on > constitutional grounds have undermined their own assertion of > constitutional right by keeping the NSLs secret while they await their > day in court. > > If you believe you have a constitutional right not to be bullied by > secret police and being forced to keep that a secret, then you should > just come out and say what's happening. That way, the highly political > court that's going to try to indict you anyway will at least have to > operate under public scrutiny and criticism. All true. And it's not as if the penalty, even if considered criminal, would be anything more than trivial [1]. Further, if you are a business owner who is judged against - personally, you are your own employer so nobody can fire you. - business license pulled, liquidate and sell it back to yourself. A jury would likely "you're here for publishing this? Lol, go home." The actual risk seems rather low. I'd do it just for the fame. [1] Feel free to supply links to US code. > Of course, the rational thing to do is to keep quiet and do as > instructed by the stasi Only if you are certain you will win 'soon'. History shows waiting yields a long hard bloody road. > or to flee the country to somewhere that > recognises amnesty from history's largest and best armed superpower. > Good luck with the latter. The US isn't doing so hot right now in the world reputation dept, so your odds of washing up on anyones shore and being welcomed to stay for protesting your dissatifaction, are probably approaching good.

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Truecrypt tinfoil hat testing
by NullDev 30 May '14

30 May '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 With exquisite timing, I bought a new external HDD yesterday (28.05.14) and set about encrypting it with TrueCrypt. I installed via the terminal as I'm on Linux, ie: wget http://www.truecrypt.org/download/truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz I extracted it, and encrypted my drive. The TrueCrypt website was looking it's normal self at that point: I referred to it a few times during the encryption. However, no sooner had it finished at about 4pm UK time yesterday, I received the first email from someone on the list about Truecrypt pulling the plug. Their site had been changed to the one we see today, recommending we switch to an alternative like, ahem, something as fabulously secure as Bitlocker. Ironic timing, huh? So, I have what was possibly the last download of a version 7.1a tarball before everything went titsup, and if you read what The Register said about Truecrypt's V.7.2 being corrupted/infected/backdoored here: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/28/truecrypt_hack/ Then theoretically I have something to wonder about. However, it would appear that the date, checksum and verification are ok on what I downloaded. It *seems* clean. It would be interesting to see if it's in anyone's scope to compare the source code with other versions of 7.1a for Linux: it's beyond mine, apologies. If anyone wants me to send them the tarball I'll be happy to oblige. Let me know if I can be of assistance. Best, NullDev -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTh5c/AAoJELavgB137JPDHEsIAI2Dt4qVnWZb4FUxUOZBN4cs WfXXofFRodZ0e1yK/IxmrwShp/d9eNJdBx/aGuERoAQ1jlLjRNsyfmzpF7zJMYsb PD/uS2ZiXXP8UjbWNAEBOhrBV1dPGSj86twpsVXMFuBrzbKZHMmWKHxp9cNpwMLQ WbPIqVaDGVb4V5d/yyFPk9/uELReIQKobML6hzGgxlWRc5XH/9403YcSc0iMe0bp oSpOd69hRddvLssX76TUxbyS1k+hc2+zXxsaxqd8lS3J7F6YRzZHTRD/BEqTva8Y OseOVwYGBX+kEUeXEh13yzsHao9RR6DFEhZL7yVAJb88GQvMgT6f+4IO6TJcJ8A= =P4+W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NSL's [was TrueCrypt]
by grarpamp 30 May '14

30 May '14

> Have NSLs held up in court against the First Amendment? > It's already constitutional that freedom of speech cannot be prevented > except to prevent immediate, tangible harm to others. > If you want > to challenge them, publish one on your blog and say "sue me, let's see what > the supreme court says". This above is exactly one of the key issues. Either - You have the right to speak freely under the 1st, or you don't. - NSL's are 4th compliant warrants, or common orders/subpoenas, having all been reviewed and issued by a judge having jurisdiction, subject to challenge, etc... or they aren't. - The FISA court is a proper court established, operating and regulated under the judicial branch, beholden to the Supreme, or it isn't. Some say: You do, they're toilet paper, it's legislative or executive. With thousands of letters issued there are similarly many chances to challenge it, yet so far it seems only a few have started on the direct route and everyone else seems too chicken. That ratio could really be improved. [For the schemers, and though not really a proper stand up fight, there are probably even a few dual citizens who have received them who could just as happily relocate back home offshore and publish (if not fight) from there. You at least retain the first person perspective that way.] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Letter http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillan… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act

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Re: [cryptome] Hector Sabu Monseur Sentencing Transcript
by shelley＠misanthropia.info 29 May '14

29 May '14

On Tue, May 27, 2014, at 11:59 AM, John Young wrote: > Held today, 11AM. So one script-kiddie, pig-kissing snitch managed to help thwart "hundreds" of "cyber attacks" (translation: /b/tard summer crew, stupid enough to still use LOIC), while the NSA's whole Stasi-on-steroids spying infrastructure couldn't find one needle in that haystack of all our calls and emails? Well, isn't that special...

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Re: is truecrypt dead?
by shelley＠misanthropia.info 29 May '14

29 May '14

Krebs has put a post about it: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/true-goodbye-using-truecrypt-is-not-secu… excerpt: "Doubters soon questioned whether the redirect was a hoax or the result of the TrueCrypt site being hacked. But a cursory review of the site’s historic hosting, WHOIS and DNS records shows no substantive changes recently. What’s more, the last version of TrueCrypt uploaded to the site on May 27 (still available at this link) shows that the key used to sign the executable installer file is the same one that was used to sign the program back in January 2014 (hat tip to @runasand and @pyllyukko). Taken together, these two facts suggest that the message is legitimate, and that TrueCrypt is officially being retired. That was the same conclusion reached by Matthew Green, a cryptographer and research professor at the Johns Hopkins University Information Security Institute and a longtime skeptic of TrueCrypt — which has been developed for the past 10 years by a team of anonymous coders who appear to have worked diligently to keep their identities hidden. “I think the TrueCrypt team did this,” Green said in a phone interview. “They decided to quit and this is their signature way of doing it.”

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