September 2013 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: The Unbreakable Cipher (2)
by brian carroll 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 9:11 AM, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > > Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict > traffic > volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that. > Presuming that NSA and cohorts have investigated this effect. > no- not for a multilinear/nonlinear bit set approach. voluminous data exchange and not censoring throughput (given ability to correlate elsewhere, delayed or real-time; thus store+forward) and allowing inaccurate modeling of data via ideological rationalizations turns that limited analysis back against itself as truth is secure, folding the framework via collapsing pseudo-truth and falsity, recontextualizing the shared situation, establishing new zones of interaction and unmapped boundaries that do not coherently correlate within existing models of analysis, instead breaking them. versus propping them up via following their rules and dictates that seek to limit and censor interactions as a basis for secrets or sustaining false-perspectives, seemingly often for self-preservation of legacy systems versus allowing collapse, deterioration or loss of control over what occurs- freedom in relation to governance versus its constriction, choking what can happen, to keep it finite, bound, gagged hypothetical, the massive influx of data (in truth) that is wrongly assessed (as pT) via limited observer established zone of secure interaction by default of its own false framework and incapacity to account for what does not exist in its categorization- any move toward accommodation is ideological weakness and falsifies belief system. it is to overwhelm with data that cannot be grounded in the false framework and its ungrounded evaluation undermines the existing inaccurate view because it yields less and less in the limited perspective. flooding the corrupt oversight with what amounts to pseudo-truth, allowing any and all correlations to fever circuits- it breaks the rationalization model by forcing decision-making that tends towards falsity, as it is ungrounded and the more it decides, the more it persists and expands itself in error. transparency in truth, a shared domain, remains a secret and a secure realm insofar as it cannot be accessed, perceived, or altered in the dimensions it exists- seemingly only censored, stopped, or attacked which forces polarization, ramps up potential dynamics, and creates conditions for extreme actions that can force or break hidden systems via operating beyond their known boundary or losing stealth advantage in some ways it may be like reverse radar, what they see is the entire radar field as the signal, potentially, unable to distinguish its value or meaning or interpret what is happening in vast many different frames simultaneously, keying in and out, leading to massa confusa... (perhaps equivalent to big bang inflation of a paralleled universe) ♃ ♃

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Re: [liberationtech] The missing component: Mobile to Web interoperability (in Internet Freedom Technologies)
by Eugen Leitl 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> ----- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 01:52:14 -0400 From: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)mailman.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] The missing component: Mobile to Web interoperability (in Internet Freedom Technologies) User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 09:32:46PM -0700, coderman wrote: > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:34 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika(a)yahoo.com> wrote: > > ... > > Roger Dingledine has said that his biggest fear is that the > > NSA has found a way to break Tor, > > citation? ;) You left out the rest of his sentence (and maybe some different punctuation would have helped too). Once upon a time, we argued that sure, maybe NSA could break Tor if they put enough resources into it, but at least we could rely on the fact that if the FBI called them up on the phone and asked for some help with a case, they sure wouldn't admit to it. And also, if they *did* have an attack, surely they wouldn't "spend" their super-secret knowledge on just any old situation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ultra It's similar reasoning that might make you comfortable jaywalking in front of a secret service agent -- surely they have more important things to be doing with their time, or with our tax dollars, than coordinating with the local police to bust you for something irrelevant, right? And now here we are learning about a growing number of cases where NSA actually does provide intelligence for cases that are totally outside their scope or mandate, with sentences that start with "you didn't hear it from me, but". So the snippet of quote above is out-of-context -- I do think that an organization that puts a lot of energy into surveilling large parts of the Internet can probabilistically correlate some Tor traffic flows, but I wouldn't call that threat my biggest fear. That said, I do really worry about the slippery slope where everybody collects their own huge database of Internet traffic and then eagerly shares their analysis with everybody else. It shifts the balance of power even more in favor of the surveillance state(s). --Roger -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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The Unbreakable Cipher
by John Young 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

NSA Technical Journal published "The Unbreakable Cipher" in Spring 1961. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/The_Unbreakable_Cipher.… Excerpts: [Quote] David Kahn, "Lyen Otuu Wllwgh WI Etjown" pp. 71, 83, 84, 86, 88 and 90 of the New York Times Magazine November 13, 1960 says that an unbreakable cipher system can be made from one time key "that is absolutely random and never repeats." ... For each cipher system there is an upper bound to the amount of traffic it can protect against cryptanalytic attack. What is "cryptanalytic attack"? It is a process applied to cipher text in order to extract information, especially information contained in the messages and intended to be kept secret. If some of the information is gotten by other means and this results in more being extracted from the cipher, this is (at least partially) a successful attack. If certain phrases can be recognized when they are present, this is successful cryptanalysis. If a priori probabilities on possible contents are altered by examination of the cipher, this is cryptanalytic progress. If in making trial decipherments it is possible to pick out the correct one then cryptanalysis is successful. ... Another example is that of Mr. Kahn, one-time key. Here the limit is quite clear; it is the amount of key on hand. The key arrives in finite "messages," so there is only a finite amount on hand at anyone time, and this limits the amount of traffic which can be sent securely. Of course another shipment of key raises this bound, but technically another cipher system is now in effect, for by my definition a cipher system is a message. A sequence of messages is a sequence of cipher systems, related perhaps, but not the same. ... [Answer to the question:] "Does there exist an unbreakable cipher" would be this, "Every cipher is breakable, given enough traffic, and every cipher is unbreakable, if the traffic volume is restricted enough." [End quote] Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict traffic volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that. Presuming that NSA and cohorts have investigated this effect.

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Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet (2)
by brian carroll 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

> So beyond mathematically-enthroned encryption what lies awaiting > disclosure. > forgot to mention as referenced, the role of music as a form of cultural communication with potentially secret dimensions this whether classical, with entire societies networked around a given aesthetic hub or node, else within traditions themselves of various society's and the institutions these can become or the universalization of rock & roll music and the 'rock concert' as a seeming height of 20th century western popular culture, tied into mass media and media archives and vast shared communication, to include role of drug culture and consciousness and politics, including counterculture agenda, and role of trends and fashion that align with this as a form of monocultural megadevelopment who knows, perhaps those strobe and laser light displays are outputting more data, or a guitar solo is a data transmission on some other level, as carrier wave for hidden signaling. it seems for deadheads, for instance, acid may open up their experience of the music that otherwise may be intolerable and likewise maybe there are lissajous figures spinning in skulls as the result of entrainment of populations via these mind and brain-washing techniques of neurology brought into the context of mass music and its technical devices, so to program populations without their even knowing it. in this way 'communications science and engineering' may have more to do with signaling in music or as a means for programming behavior, than the music itself, if taken in a covert context. add sex, drugs, popularity and money and group-behavior and you got a platform to exploit and run against others in their own channels, (though it could tend towards baseness, bottom feeding and constitute a dumb-system by comparison to others) speculation of course. just like that wireless speaker is in no way connected to a retail dual-use spying agenda

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Snowden walked away with the U.S. IC Intellipedia
by John Young 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

A sends: "Snowden walked away with the U.S. IC Intellipedia." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia Information on the validity of this claim invited: cryptome[at]earthlink.net

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Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet
by brian carroll 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

> So beyond mathematically-enthroned encryption what lies awaiting > disclosure. > * data-loggers within dental work, synced via multiband x-rays (+ secret other, say tetrahertz), this much easier facilitated via digital equipment note: could be synced to infrastructure tagging or mapping networks via RFID-like send/receive and also monitor biological events of the person * the often interesting TV series "It Takes a Thief" with Robert Wagner had one episode of a fashion designer who (if remembering correctly) stitched a pattern into a new dress that was then photographed or it may have had something to do with a microdot, James Earl Jones was the designer in that episode * the possibility of food for data transmission related to eating certain Asian food and having a gland open on the roof of my mouth- seemingly a specific chemical and what could happen if that were related to triggering of various related socio-behavioral programming, etc. * the future possibility, given data transfer by touch, of data capsules or pills that are digested and relay code that is informational into accompanying cyborg implant, else also behavioral routines triggered by food or drugs, that of an informational domain (which in a context of medicine and the body could be very wide ranging). heck, what about non-lethal overtones of morse code onto pacemaker or other devices, as form of signaling * microphoned dinner tables to relay info to flower vase, also tapping out code onto surface for solitar diners * clothing design, again, if embedded systems for data relay, also with jewelry. seemingly it could be anything. different kinds of materials or stitching, fashion styles as communication systems, delineating networks and establishing standards, references, and protocols, hidden technology or encrypted 'data', non-electronic or to be mediated electronically- say thread that glows in black light only, one-time pad, person walks past special camera-trap to relay data w/out even knowing * genetics themselves, various data sets as langauge including categorization as a means of encrypting perspectives, setting boundaries within contingent modeling of pseudo-truth, thus thresholds/boundaries for what can be perceived from the inside and outside; as this relates to disease, health systems, insurance, death panels, hidden eugenics of targeted populations * infrastructure itself as pre-internet sensor network with capacity for secret communications, especially with the mystery networked sensor boxes logging mystery data. could trace chemicals in products to pattern match and refine facial recognition, retail pollution of industrial scent as perfumes (another potential communication system), deodorants, shampoos combined mark, assist tracking * vehicles themselves if carrying paired black-box tech with shared non-identifiable encryption formats, such that a drive-thru or drive-by could involve data exchange, as this could likewise potentially relate to modification of street lights, electronic gates, toll booths, traffic lights and potentially any form of electronic signage (as this also relates to NFC and RFID for tracking, signaling). thus vehicles as data loggers and data carriers which may or may not involve drivers knowledge. if so, covert data exchange could seemingly exist outside of known encryption formats as a strengthening of security by the obscurity (akin to inventing secret, private language) whereas known algorithms could indicate, compromise systems via existing standards ("this is secret data!") * issue of black market and courier services, in some sense transfer of weapons and illegal drugs assumes an extreme form of privacy, security, and secrecy such that a small amount of opium could be couriered to a US resident and paid for by "anonymous" money, and in some sense similar to being ~encrypted, assuming or betting against disclosure of surveilling of packaging by companies, or of data inside encrypted archives thus like betting on the odds of the long-game * then there is peer-to-peer signaling in itself, public and- or private, one to one or one to many or relay or delayed via written, oral, sound-based, food, fashion, or other communication -- of the realm of symbolic language where something stands-in for something-else or 'shared meaning' can be effectively communicated yet exist beyond the boundary of others perception; a shared framework of "truth" (whether true or not) is required as a protocol to match up shared dimensions; overt is hand gestures, hand signals, body movements, postures, poses, facial expressions, as language * i tend to think there is potential for any language-based interaction to involve signaling that is observed differently by others, based on their relation to the event or reading of it- for instance, juggling. it is a pattern-based activity that has known and identifiable sequences that can be a way of communicating (by those so skilled) or could involve use of color or number or other dynamics to signal or secretly message another who operates or understands the same 'cipher system'. LED equipment that can be programmed, or even IR or UV that may not appear activated yet could be photographed or video'd in those frequencies could then reveal a data stream, or potentially involve persistence of vision or even a data-burst relayed or captured by camera or cellphone * anything, like RC planes or models driving down a street and triggering a data exchange, with vehicle house router house monitoring system, infrastructure, as a potential; * maybe reconsider Grandma's framed needlepoint sometime or the role of collectibles or the anthro- and archaeological involved in antiques as potential forms of secret data exchange, in that that period furniture or rare object may signify something to someone and trigger a meaningful relational exchange that could, in certain instance, function and establish a data network and allow hidden communication and conscious to exist, persist and in this way- aesthetic probably trumps all things electronic in terms of the bandwidth involved in pure sensory experience, thought, knowledge, shared consciousness, and secret views that to the outsider may exist as encrypted, beyond awareness and understanding or even value, even while it could be primary (basis for shared awareness, decision making, action for others)

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Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet
by grarpamp 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

On 9/25/13, Greg Rose <ggr(a)seer-grog.net> wrote: > Even under the much-relaxed export laws of the US, deriving spreading > information cryptographically is a prohibited export. Which isn't to say it > is not a good idea. The US only applies to itself. Further, over the air, it's noise, the crypto is undetectable and unprovable. And it's (guerilla) software, not physical commercial product. Nor is this the old 'FCC says you can't encrypt ham bands' argument/tech.

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Re: The Compromised Internet
by John Young 25 Sep '13

25 Sep '13

Yes, along those lines. Free of the totally seductively entrapping internet and monomanical PK promiscuity. The slew of innovations to milk the internet and crypto are way stations toward surpassing vulns of both used in concert. Both mutually delude. Each might lead to better alone, paired with different and less familiar means. At 04:29 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote: >Free and Open 4G radios/base stations are actually quite exciting >for this reason. The thing which actually prevents mesh networks >from working is mathematical: past a certain network size, path >finding becomes too computationally expensive, so wifi based mesh >networks can only cover a certain radius before they stop working. >With the 4G spectrum, however, the distances between hops vastly >increases, meaning that city-wide mesh networks can grow and remain >performant. This allows for free communication and file transfer >without centralized authorities. Obviously there are still threats, >but there is a lot of freedom gained from network autonomy.

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Re: [cryptography] The Compromised Internet
by John Young 25 Sep '13

25 Sep '13

At 04:36 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote: > What threat are you trying to prevent that isn't already solved > by the use of cryptography alone? Transceiver vulnerabilities of the Internet, seemingly inherently insecure by design. So looking for possibilities of moving encrypted goods by other means not betrayed by faulty shipment and addled by ubiquity and familiarity. Not that that is original by any stretch, wizards are jawing about a new internet, secure by design. May take a while, so workarounds of the present piece of carrion might be useful. Not to overlook a new-fangled Snowden loosening the controls of comsec technology beyond his and our PK-packet-tech era comprehension. So beyond mathematically-enthroned encryption what lies awaiting disclosure. Oldies might suffice if dutifully studied and elaborted. Thus the reference to NSA's backroom of pre-internet-PK comsec tech which could be in the forefront, cutting/bleeding edge.

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Re: [guardian-dev] APK signing keys are vulnerable WAS: pgp, nsa, rsa
by Eugen Leitl 25 Sep '13

25 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Hans-Christoph Steiner <hans(a)guardianproject.info> ----- Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 16:19:58 -0400 From: Hans-Christoph Steiner <hans(a)guardianproject.info> To: guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org Subject: Re: [guardian-dev] APK signing keys are vulnerable WAS: pgp, nsa, rsa Organization: The Guardian Project User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.0 Also, we should document how to generate a good signing key. Pd0x just recommended this in #guardianproject: keytool -genkey -v -keystore test.keystore -alias testkey -keyalg RSA -keysize 8192 -sigalg SHA256withRSA -dname "cn=Test,ou=Test,c=CA" -validity 10000' .hc On 09/23/2013 03:15 PM, Natanael wrote: > How are you planning on doing it? Will you let the old app notify the user > about having to install a new app, maybe pointing to Google Play or > offering a direct download? After verifying that the import worked, you can > also offer to open the app details in Android for the old app so quick > uninstallation is easy. Have you written down the details anywhere yet? I'd > like to see how you're planning on doing it. > > Den 23 sep 2013 20:44 skrev "Abel Luck" <abel(a)guardianproject.info>: >> >> Yup, we just outlined this process in IRC :) >> >> Anyone have a snippet of Java that lets an app check another app's >> signing key? >> >> ~abel >> >> >> Natanael: >>> I can only see one option that is plausible - update the old app, signed >>> with the old key, to be able to export it's data. You can't install a > new >>> app in the place of the old one and just keep data, Android will require >>> that you uninstall the old app before you install the new one if their >>> package names are identical but signing keys differ. >>> >>> To improve security for the data transfer to some degree, we could use >>> Intents to let the new app request the data from the old app, and > ideally >>> the old app would verify which key the new app is signed with, and > prompt >>> the user for authorization. Then the user would only need to install the >>> new app, open it and select "Import from the old app", click OK, and > then >>> uninstall the old app. >>> Den 23 sep 2013 19:47 skrev "Abel Luck" <abel(a)guardianproject.info>: >>> >>>> Daniel McCarney: >>>>>> Wow, that is bad news indeed. It would be awesome to have >>>> androidobservatory.org also display full info about the signing keys, >>>> like the algorithm used, the bitness, generation date, etc. so we can >>>> easily check which keys are vulnerable. >>>>> >>>>> Working on rolling that functionality out. I had to rewrite the app >>>> import >>>>> pipeline so that I could store that information. I have the data >>>> collected but >>>>> it isn't user facing yet. I can tell you that looking at the ~6,000 >>>> unique >>>>> certificates in the observatory data about 75% are RSA 1024. >>>>> >>>>> As far as I'm aware it isn't possible to learn the key generation date >>>> from the >>>>> certificate data in the PKCS7 structure stored in the META-INF > directory >>>> of an >>>>> APK. >>>>> >>>>>> I figure if the NSA can break 1024 bit RSA, its only a matter of time >>>> before China also has that capability. China are experts at industrial >>>> espionage, and they certainly know how to make chips. It is very >>>> conceivable that they could acquire the NSA's RSA cracking chip design > and >>>> then build it domestically. Then I imagine that China would also be >>>> willing to sell those chips to allies, or perhaps even the highest > bidder. >>>>> >>>>> Yeah, the current NIST[1] advice on key sizes is very clear that 1024 >>>> bit RSA >>>>> should be deprecated (though evidently NIST might not be an unbiased >>>> source of >>>>> information...). >>>>> >>>>>> We'll have to make sure our signing key is not 1024 bit, and if so, >>>> work on a migration plan. The easiest way to start is to sign all new > apps >>>> with a new key. >>>>> >>>>> The pubkey in the cert used for the core Guardian Properties > (ChatSecure, >>>>> Obscuracam, etc) is definitely 1024 RSA. So is the pubkey in the cert >>>> used for >>>>> Orweb. It would definitely be a good idea to start talking about >>>> migration >>>>> plan, (and using a strong keysize in a new cert for all new > properties) >>>>> >>>>> - Dan >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hm, this seems quite important. Is there any established docs on how to >>>> perform a key migration without data loss? >>>> >>>> Also, I think we should make a blog post advisory out of this. >>>> >>>> ~abel >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Guardian-dev mailing list >>>> >>>> Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org >>>> List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev >>>> >>>> To Unsubscribe >>>> Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org >>>> Or visit: >>>> > https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/natanael.l%40gmail.… >>>> >>>> You are subscribed as: natanael.l(a)gmail.com > > > > _______________________________________________ > Guardian-dev mailing list > > Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org > List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev > > To Unsubscribe > Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org > Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/hans%40guardianproj… > > You are subscribed as: hans(a)guardianproject.info > -- PGP fingerprint: 5E61 C878 0F86 295C E17D 8677 9F0F E587 374B BE81 _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/eugen%40leitl.org You are subscribed as: eugen(a)leitl.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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