August 2013 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

[tahoe-dev] weekly dev chat notes from 2013-08-21
by Eugen Leitl 25 Aug '13

25 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> ----- Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 17:49:57 +0000 From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> To: Tahoe-LAFS development <tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org> Subject: [tahoe-dev] weekly dev chat notes from 2013-08-21 notes Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Dev Chat 2013-08-21 in attendance: Zooko (scribe), Jeff "psi2", Mark, zab, Brian Agenda Item 1: next week's Dev Chat for the next Weekly Dev Chat meeting, we're going to do an experiment: * invite people more widely (everyone who reads tahoe-dev, everyone who follows me (zooko) on twitter, etc.) * upload a recording of the dev chat to youtube * try to finish reviewing #1382 *before* the meeting so that we can focus the meeting on: * planning Tahoe-LAFS v1.11! Agenda Item 2: I2P patches Jeff and zab from the I2P project joined Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Dev Chat for the first time to help us integrate the patches that I2P needs in order to use an unmodified LAFS on I2P. Jeff tagged the specific tickets that are blocking the I2P people on that: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/query?status=assigned&status=closed&… We dug into #1010. We agreed to make a "[node]anonymize", which means "On startup, verify that all configuration options are compatible with anonymity. If any aren't, stop the process with a useful error message about the configuration option that is dangerous to anonymity.". Action item for me: add a comment to that proposing a configuration UI that I would like, then email Brian about it. Action item for Jeff: update the patch on #1010. https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1010# use only 127.0.0.1 as local address Agenda Item 3: Tahoe-LAFS v1.11.0 I don't want to release Tahoe-LAFS v1.11 with regressions that make it worse than Tahoe-LAFS v1.10. Currently, there are seven such regressions! https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/query?status=assigned&status=new&sta… The next step in the process of releasing v1.11 is to "elect" a Release Manager. And by "elect" we mean that someone somehow gets appointed to that role, and if they don't want to do it they have to fight a bear. Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep https://LeastAuthority.com Freedom matters. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

[tor-talk] IP Cloaking and the CFAA [Was: Appearing American]
by Eugen Leitl 25 Aug '13

25 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Scott Elcomb <psema4(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 13:46:51 -0400 From: Scott Elcomb <psema4(a)gmail.com> To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-talk] IP Cloaking and the CFAA [Was: Appearing American] Reply-To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org I just ran a quick scan through my mail archives and didn't see this story mentioned. (If it has, apologies for the dup - it was not a thorough scan) IP Cloaking Violates Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Judge Rules <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/08/ip-cloaking-cfaa/> "A federal judge has ruled that circumventing an IP address blockade to connect to a website is a breach of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the same law that was used to prosecute Aaron Swartzbefore he committed suicide earlier this year." Best, - Scott On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 10:54 AM, B Sairafi <sairafi.b(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Hello > > I'm using Tor Browser, and I need to be seen by a specific website as if > I'm in the US. Is this possible? I mean, is this a feature you already > have? > > I'm sorry if this is the wrong email address, I'm very confused! > > Thanks, > - B > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- Scott Elcomb @psema4 on Twitter / Identi.ca / Github & more Atomic OS: Self Contained Microsystems http://code.google.com/p/atomos/ Member of the Pirate Party of Canada http://www.pirateparty.ca/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] Bradley Manning's sentence: 35 years for exposing us to the truth
by Eugen Leitl 25 Aug '13

25 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> ----- Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 00:27:21 +0300 From: Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Bradley Manning's sentence: 35 years for exposing us to the truth Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:59 PM, Shelley <shelley(a)misanthropia.info> wrote: > Sure, but I think Manning has a zero chance of obtaining a pardon. Col. Morris Davis: “Military has detailed regs on confinement credits & parole eligibility. My best est is he'll do about 8-9 yrs, out by age 33-34.” https://twitter.com/ColMorrisDavis/status/370223513400913920 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morris_Davis If true, a pretty fitting sentence, I think, for indiscriminately publishing huge amount of classified information that potentially endangered many people, and considering that USA has unusually harsh sentences for a developed country. An interesting comment on Reddit, of all places: “Significant amounts of foreign service agent names were released. These are civilians working for their government in some official capacity (think spies, except not all of them are cloak and dagger types). These were people stationed in hostile countries (Pakistan, SE Asia, Middle East, Africa) and if their cover had been blown while in country they could have been sought out. Luckily, as I understand it most of the people that were exposed were notified by their handlers in advance (basically as soon as word go out that diplomatic cables had been compromised) and were extracted. A friend of mine works in a field that draws a lot of foreign service agents to it due to the nature of the work, and they were camped out in northern Pakistan with her crew. She woke up one morning (the morning after the diplomatic cables were released) and half her crew was gone. They got word in the middle of the night and left. They couldn't even tell the people they were with why they were gone, and I imagine it was quite unsettling to be there and be missing people all of the sudden.” http://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/1kszc9/bradley_manning_sentenced_to_3… -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] NSA Admits: Okay, Okay, There Have Been A Bunch Of Intentional Abuses, Including Spying On Love Interests | Techdirt
by coderman 24 Aug '13

24 Aug '13

LOVEINT!!! oh god this alone makes it all worth it,,, thank you Snowden! P.S. setup a bitcoin donation address. best regards, On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 9:21 PM, Yosem Companys <companys(a)stanford.edu> wrote: > http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130823/18432024301/nsa-admits-okay-okay-… > > NSA Admits: Okay, Okay, There Have Been A Bunch Of Intentional Abuses, > Including Spying On Love Interests > > from the and-we're-just-now-telling-congress dept > > So, this week, we wrote about the NSA quietly admitting that there had been > intentional abusesof its surveillance infrastructure, despite earlier claims > by NSA boss Keith Alexander and various folks in Congress that there had > been absolutely no "intentional" abuses. Late on Friday (of course) the NSA > finally put out an official statement admitting to an average of one > intentional abuser per year over the past ten years. The AP is reporting > that at least one of the abuses involved an NSA employee spying on a former > spouse. Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal suggests that spying on love > interests happens somewhat more often: > > The practice isn’t frequent — one official estimated a handful of cases in > the last decade — but it’s common enough to garner its own spycraft label: > LOVEINT. > > A handful is still significantly more than once. And it's a lot more than > the "zero" times we'd been told about repeatedly by defenders of the > program. > > While the NSA says it takes these abuses seriously, there's no indication > that the analyst was fired. > > Much more troubling is that it appears that the NSA only told its oversight > committee in the Senate about all of this a few days ago: > > The Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed this week on the willful > violations by the NSA's inspector general's office, as first reported by > Bloomberg. > > "The committee has learned that in isolated cases over the past decade, a > very small number of NSA personnel have violated NSA procedures — in roughly > one case per year," Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who > chairs the committee, said in a statement Friday. > > Of course, this is the same Dianne Feinstein who, exactly a week ago, said > the following: > > As I have said previously, the committee has never identified an instance in > which the NSA has intentionally abused its authority to conduct surveillance > for inappropriate purposes. > > Yeah. Because apparently the NSA chose not to tell the committee until a few > days later, despite it happening for years. > > And, of course, they release this all on a Friday night, hoping that it'll > avoid the news cycle... > > In the meantime, the NSA just made Senator Feinstein look like a complete > fool. She's been its strongest defender in Congress for years, and has stood > up for it time and time again, despite all of this questionable activity. > Then, last week, it lets her tell lies about it without telling her > beforehand that there had been such abuses. At this point, it's abundantly > clear that Feinstein's "oversight" of the NSA is a joke. She's either > incompetent or lying. Either way, it appears that the NSA is running circles > around her, and isn't subject to any real Congressional oversight. At some > point, you'd think that maybe she'd stop defending it and actually start > doing her job when it comes to oversight. You'd think the fact that it let > her make a complete fool of herself by claiming there had been no > intentional abuses should make Feinstein realize that the NSA situation is > out of control. But, tragically, this seems unlikely. Even her statement > seems to want to minimize the seriousness of the fact that she -- the person > in charge of oversight -- was completely kept in the dark about very serious > intentional abuses. Senator Feinstein just got hung out to dry by the NSA. > You'd think she'd stop going to bat for it and its lies. > > Either way, we've now gone from General Keith Alexander and Feinstein > claiming "no abuses," to them saying no "intentional" abuses, to this latest > admission of plenty of intentional abuses, including spying on lovers. > Perhaps, instead of lying, it's time for the NSA to come clean and to get > some real oversight. > > > -- > Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > companys(a)stanford.edu.

2 1

Re: [liberationtech] NSA Admits: Okay, Okay, There Have Been A Bunch Of Intentional Abuses, Including Spying On Love Interests | Techdirt
by coderman 24 Aug '13

24 Aug '13

On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 10:25 PM, James S. Tyre <jstyre(a)eff.org> wrote: > Best summary: https://twitter.com/slworona/status/370946271646711809 indeed; this codename gives the lie to all the congressional testimony, to all the claims of controls and judiciary oversight, to all the attestations of full compliance. it's beautiful in laying bare the capriciousness to which the entire intelligence juggernaut can be brought to bear against arbitrary individuals; personal pettiness more than sufficient.

1 0

Snowden Induced Mea Culpas
by John Young 23 Aug '13

23 Aug '13

Comsec experts should not be surprised at the Snowden revelations about NSA so far, most of which are venerable. What is surprising is their seemingly exaggerated surprise because many of them worked at or ran firms which were known to be heavily involved with official spying through dual-use technology and dual-purpose contracts. With USG and world governments, with banks and telecoms, with comsec, software and anti-virus firms, with universities and research institutes, with FOI organizations and public interest advisory boards, with vulture investors, TED and Aspen, with revolving doors among goverment, industry, education, journalism, banking and Wall Street, with RAND, NRL, the national laboratories, to name a few. In most instances these dual roles were not hidden. Or were they? What might be troubling about Snowden's possible revelations that is causing exaggerated surprise of these experts is the disclosure that the dual-uses and dual-roles in spying were more extensive than has been made public. That has been protected by highest secrecy about to be breached, not about the spy agencies but those used to camouflage and assist the spying by downplaying its pervasiveness by selling protection that could never be wholly effective, that the cybersec game was as rigged as gambling. That the backdoors, vulnerabilities, holes, faults, and errors were more craftily hidden and exploited with the complicity of the best and brightest while they deluded the the public for market share and FOI fame. That it was a charade to agitate for more security and privacy while undermining them. That Snowden has the documents about that ancient betrayal and will at some point make them available. That it would be wise to get ahead of this exposure by rushing to claim the spying has been greater than even we experts knew and comsec is a fraud by design. Crypto-AG the norm.

1 0

filesharing is terrism
by Eugen Leitl 23 Aug '13

23 Aug '13

http://www.itnews.com.au/News/354407,nz-police-affidavits-show-use-of-prism… NZ police affidavits show use of PRISM for surveillance By Juha Saarinen on Aug 23, 2013 5:46 AM (20 hours ago) Filed under Security Police affidavits related to the raid on Kim Dotcom's Mega mansion appear to show that New Zealand police and spy agencies are able to tap directly into United States surveillance systems such as PRISM to capture email and other traffic. The discovery was made by blogger Keith Ng who wrote on his On Point blog that the Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand (OFCANZ) requested assistance from the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the country's signals intelligence unit, which is charge of surveilling the Pacific region under the Five-Eyes agreement. A list of so-called selectors or search terms were provided to GCSB by the police [PDF, redacted] for the surveillance of emails and other data traffic generated by Dotcom and his Megaupload associates. 'Selectors' is the term used for the National Security Agency (NSA) XKEYSCORE categorisation system that Australia and New Zealand contribute to and which was leaked by Edward Snowden as part of his series of PRISM revelations. Some "selectors of interest" have been redacted out, but others such as Kim Dotcom's email addresses, the mail proxy server used for some of the accounts and websites, remain in the documents. Megaupload co-founders Bram van der Kolk and Sven Ecthernach was were also targeted for electronic surveillance, ditto Dotcom's wife Mona. Dotcom's mansion was raided by NZ police last year for crimes related to online piracy, based on indictments filed in the US. One note on the reports generated from the surveillance points to the system used capturing real-time traffic. Several of the documents are classified as "CONFIDENTIAL COMINT/NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY" with one being marked as "SECRET/COMINT/REL TO NZL, AUS, CAN, GBR, USA". The spying on Dotcom, his wife and van der Kolk was deemed to be illegal as all three are residents of New Zealand and the GCSB is precluded by current law from intercepting their communications. In the United States, declassified government documents have been released to the Electronic Frontier Fourndation that show the NSA operates an eavesdropping program that has direct access to internet communications. The documents are part of a statement by the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) which berates the NSA for misleading the tribunal on the extent of domestic spying on innocent people, saying such collection was unconstitutional. Copyright © iTnews.com.au . All rights reserved.

1 0

Re: [cryptography] Reply to Zooko (in Markdown)
by Eugen Leitl 23 Aug '13

23 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> ----- Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 15:21:47 +0000 From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> To: Jon Callas <jon(a)callas.org> Cc: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] Reply to Zooko (in Markdown) Dear Jon: Thank you for your kind words and your detailed response. I am going to focus only on the issue that I think is most relevant and urgent for your customers and mine. That urgent issue is: what's the difference between the now-canceled Silent Mail product and the products that you are still offering, such as Silent Text? I don't understand why the Lavabit shutdown and the related domestic surveillance disclosures imply that Silent Mail was unsafe in any way that wouldn't also mean Silent Text is unsafe. Before I go on, I'd like to point out a critical fact that some readers might not be aware of: Ladar Levison, the owner of Lavabit, now claims that he is being threatened with jail time *for having shut down the service*: http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/13/20008036-lavabitcom-owne… This changes the equation, because it means not only can the U.S. federal espionage authorities say "Backdoor all of your customers or close your business.", they can also say "Backdoor all of your customers or go to jail.". As the owner and CEO of a privacy-protecting service (https://LeastAuthority.com) and a U.S. citizen, and as the father of three precious boys who do not want to be separated from me for any length of time, this concerns me greatly. Now, maybe the U.S. espionage authorities wouldn't make that threat again. Maybe Ladar Levison's resistance will teach them that it was a mistake. I don't know, but we have to take into account this possibility for now. Your decision to shutter the Silent Mail product was made because of such possibilities. But your decision to *keep* the Silent Text service (and the others) still operating while shutting down the Silent Mail service would make sense only in the following scenario: Attacker: "We're here to compel you to give us access to the confidential communications of all of your customers." Silent Circle: "But, to do that we would have to change our client — for example, change its random number generator to produce output that we can predict — and then upload a software update to the Apple and Google app stores, and then wait for all of our customers to automatically upgrade to the new version!" Attacker: "Oh, well in that case nevermind." Why do you think that this scenario is plausible? I don't think it is plausible. Instead, I think the conversation would go like this: Silent Circle: "… and then wait for all of our customers to automatically upgrade to the new version!" Attacker: "Okay. Do that." Now, there is a big, complex, and interesting question about how to enable others to *verify* the security of software. It is not impossible, as you suggested. Good progress on enabling independent verification of security is being made, by Whisper Systems (https://whispersystems.org/) my own company LeastAuthority.com, the Tor Project (https://blog.torproject.org/blog/deterministic-builds-part-one-cyberwar-and…) Gitian (https://gitian.org/) Debian (https://wiki.debian.org/ReproducibleBuilds) and Bitcoin (https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Release_process) But before we get into the nuts and bolts of how to facilitate verification of end-to-end security, I want to hammer on the first issue: before going forth to try to improve an issue, we should first admit to our current customers and to the public that the issue exists. We shouldn't mislead our customers into thinking that they are safe from something that they are not. Silent Circle's closure of Silent Mail for the stated reason is inconsistent with its continued operation of the Silent Text service. The stated reason was that the US federal government could compel Silent Circle to backdoor the Silent Mail service. That same reason applies today to the Silent Text service and the other services that Silent Circle is still operating. To be clear, I'm not asking you to shut down your other services. I think that would be a loss for everyone. And I'm not asking you to magically fix all of the problems by tomorrow. I know, in part from your detailed letter, that you are currently working on improving some parts of your process, and I think that there are other techniques that you could use (including licensing your source code as Free and Open Source software) that would help. But I understand the challenges of running a business, actively serving customers, and performing sophisticated engineering all at once. I know that improvement takes time. What I'm asking you to do is to *be clear* with your customers and with the public about the current limitations. Currently, the US federal espionage agencies can compel Silent Circle to secretly provide access to all of Silent Circle's customers' private communications. That's too bad. But it is fixable! But to fix it starts with admitting what the problem is. Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder, CEO, and Customer Service Rep https://LeastAuthority.com Freedom matters. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

Re: [HacDC:Byzantium] Bitmessage?
by Eugen Leitl 23 Aug '13

23 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> ----- Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 10:19:30 -0400 From: The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> To: Byzantium(a)hacdc.org Subject: Re: [HacDC:Byzantium] Bitmessage? Reply-To: Byzantium(a)hacdc.org Organization: Virtual Adept Networks, Unlimited User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130514 Thunderbird/17.0.6 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/15/2013 03:48 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: > The main reason is that, despite people requesting it from the > author multiple times over the course of years, he has yet to > produce any kind of specification other than the code itself. It appears that Bitmessage is completely hosed. http://secupost.net/2325962497/bitmessage-security - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "I have a choice again: two hands that are both mine." --The Six Million Dollar Man -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlIXb3IACgkQO9j/K4B7F8FXfwCg75vnhkmB3o/XLEIz6hjscQlg c/cAoOu4h9rXW5ZEKVBM/gJEoEvoYCoV =4l6n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Project Byzantium (Emergency Mesh Networking)" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to Byzantium+unsubscribe(a)hacdc.org. To post to this group, send email to Byzantium(a)hacdc.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/group/Byzantium/. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/a/hacdc.org/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] Announcing Scramble.io
by Eugen Leitl 23 Aug '13

23 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from phreedom(a)yandex.ru ----- Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 15:53:42 +0300 From: phreedom(a)yandex.ru To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Announcing Scramble.io User-Agent: KMail/4.10.5 (Linux/3.9.11; KDE/4.10.5; i686; ; ) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> > One difficult problem in public-key encryption is key exchange: how to get > a recipient's public key and know it's really theirs. > My plan is to make make your email the hash of your public key. > For example, my address is *nqkgpx6bqscslher(a)scramble.io* > (I borrowed this idea from Tor Hidden Services.) This is what we need everyone to adopt. Your ID = your public key hash and not an account on some server you don't control. Glad to see more people adopt this idea. Any chance of interoperability with other projects with similar aims and ideas like Cables? [1] [1] http://dee.su/cables -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

1 0