October 2013 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [cryptography] The Unbreakable Cipher
by Collin RM Stocks 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

On 09/25/2013 03:51 PM, Jonathan Katz wrote: > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Greg Rose <ggr(a)seer-grog.net > <mailto:ggr@seer-grog.net>> wrote: > > > On Sep 25, 2013, at 9:40 , Jonathan Katz <jkatz(a)cs.umd.edu > <mailto:jkatz@cs.umd.edu>> wrote: > > "Every cipher is breakable, given enough traffic": in principle, > yes, as long as the traffic (formally, the entropy of the traffic) > is larger than the key length. > > You misstated this. It's breakable if the *redundancy* of the > traffic is larger than the key length. > > > Not so; this is most easily seen by taking the uniform distribution over > n-bit messages, in which case the entropy is n and the redundancy is 0. > > regards, > Greg. > > > > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography(a)randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > If the message is chosen from a uniform distribution over n bits (and assuming that the message is not used for something else after it is deciphered), the adversary will not be able to distinguish a correctly deciphered message from an incorrectly deciphered message, no matter how short the key is in comparison to the data. Now, you could easily argue that there is absolutely no reason to send a message with those properties, but that isn't really the point. -- KmNJcjeUDRXMu6riH0KAK9Og8WAaAT8oXcbnFIij5djCP4v+6GTFxnHoHzvW NTL+4ZPiGUqerypkfsDfEOcO+i6ZlY59G79tEMwR0fsKO9w9MLbv6Odz5RxY JZgUsZJ8lZWx/zBsL4oqU60k+EFbV14fSUVoaRpazy1ozgQFdi2SdfHTB41y 7SsMX/JlevnnBj/GhUyFlXPr2kwechOSy5W74iVbUaOpeYMqNIx3jCmZfjez Gi+sS8ghQB8y5b9NgYTlR7HBh+leObqQX/R5bAkyPyh2oDOlFbD2HQiCsiB9 Uj/qLtG3CaZQVtkCSC1s3NschLBgWHfQ9xkb3Peqzg==

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three crypto lists - why and which
by Adam Back 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

I am not sure if everyone is aware that there is also an unmoderated crypto list, because I see old familiar names posting on the moderated crypto list that I do not see posting on the unmoderated list. The unmoderated list has been running continuously (new posts in every day with no gaps) since mar 2010, with an interesting relatively low noise, and not firehose volume. http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography The actual reason for the creation of that list was Perry's list went through a hiatus when Perry stopped approving/forward posts eg http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/ originally Nov 2009 - Mar 2010 (I presume the mar 2010 restart was motivated by the creation of randombit list starting in the same month) but more recently sep 2010 to may 2013 gap (minus traffic in aug 2011). http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/ I have no desire to pry into Perry's personal circumstances as to why this huge gap happened, and he should be thanked for the significant moderation effort he has put into create this low noise environment, but despite that it is bad for cryptography if people's means of technical interaction spuriously stops. Perry mentioned recently that he has now backup moderators, OK so good. There is now also the cypherpunks list which has picked up, and covers a wider mix of topics, censorship resistant technology ideas, forays into ideology etc. Moderation is even lower than randombit but no spam, noise slightly higher but quite reasonable so far. And there is now a domain name that is not al-quaeda.net (seriously? is that even funny?): cpunks.org. https://cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/ At least I enjoy it and see some familiar names posting last seen decade+ ago. Anyway my reason for posting was threefold: a) make people aware of randombit crypto list, b) rebooted cypherpunks list (*), but c) about how to use randombit (unmoderated) and metzdowd. For my tastes sometimes Perry will cut off a discussion that I thought was just warming up because I wanted to get into the detail, so I tend more prefer the unmoderated list. But its kind of a weird situaton because there are people I want views and comments from who are on the metzdowd list who as far as I know are not on the crypto list, and there's no convenient way to migrate a conversation other than everyone subscribing to both. Cc to both perhaps works somewhat, I do that sometimes though as a general principle it can be annoying when people Cc to too many lists. Anyway thanks for your attention, back to the unmoderated (or moderated) discussion! Adam

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Re: Surveillance
by Juan Garofalo 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

--On Monday, September 30, 2013 7:46 PM -0700 coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 7:38 PM, Juan Garofalo <juan.g71(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> ... >> So, the question should be : apart from the anglo-americans, and >> perhaps the chinese, is there any other cyber police state out there? > > > russia, of course. and ... > > perhaps the question you need to ask is who isn't a cyber police state? > > even the third world is buying tools from the first for this purpose... > I guess you're right in a way, but, is there a european equivalent to the utah datacenter for instance? Does japan have its own (smaller but still substantial) version of it? China? Even russia? I understand that european governments expect the ISPs to spy on their customers ('data retention laws') which seems to suggest that they[governments] are not doing it themselves? wikipedia, lousy source, but still "On 2 March 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled the law unconstitutional as a violation of the guarantee of the secrecy of correspondence.[18] As such, the directive is not currently implemented in Germany."

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Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography(a)dukhovni.org> ----- Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 04:15:50 +0000 From: Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography(a)dukhovni.org> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Reply-To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 10:07:14AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote: > Therefore, everyone should use Curve25519, which we have every > reason to believe is unbreakable. Superceded by the improved Curve1174. http://cr.yp.to/elligator/elligator-20130527.pdf -- Viktor. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> ----- Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 10:07:14 +1000 From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> To: Perrys crypto list <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.0 Reply-To: jamesd(a)echeque.com Gregory Maxwell on the Tor-talk list has found that NIST approved curves, which is to say NSA approved curves, were not generated by the claimed procedure, which is a very strong indication that if you use NIST curves in your cryptography, NSA can read your encrypted data. As computing power increases, NSA resistant RSA key have become inconveniently large, so have to move to EC keys. NIST approved curves are unlikely to be NSA resistant. Therefore, everyone should use Curve25519, which we have every reason to believe is unbreakable. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [tor-relays] Relay security, re: local network
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

----- Forwarded message from The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> ----- Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 21:34:02 -0400 From: The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Relay security, re: local network Organization: Virtual Adept Networks, Unlimited User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130514 Thunderbird/17.0.6 Reply-To: tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 09/27/2013 05:29 AM, Martin Kepplinger wrote: > a (real) IP. Rent a vserver with root access for about 10 bucks a > month, you wont even need a machine yourself. Or find some > "housing" service where you can put your own little machine that > get's its own IP. And keep the installation simple. Run tor only. > And read the 2 or 3 pages on That reminds me of a question I've been meaning to ask lately... Has anyone tried running Tor on top of OSv (http://osv.io/)? As I understand it, OSv is an ultra-small OS which is Linux API-compatible and designed for running a single app only atop a virtualization stack. For example, it should, in theory, be possible to run the Tor daemon within a copy of OSv, that would be the only application running inside of that VM, and it should be running like greased lightning because it would be the only process running in that VM. Granted, it is fairly new so I do not believe anyone has done any serious security analysis of OSv, but it seems like it would be an ideal candidate for a very high performance Tor node. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS] Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/ PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "Look up! The stars aren't going to come out tonight!" --Doktor Sleepless -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iEYEARECAAYFAlJKJooACgkQO9j/K4B7F8E6xQCeLS6L4gmFrWaQrS6luBxbnJT7 ESYAnj+k3gf5B/yeU8jvszr0cGMnJLk8 =R8+r -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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D-Central
by Eugen Leitl 01 Oct '13

01 Oct '13

Probably vaporware/hoaxware http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57605233-83/john-mcafees-$100-d-central-ai…

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