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Re: Is email really that hard?
by Zenaan Harkness 23 Feb '17

23 Feb '17

On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 03:42:21PM -0500, John Newman wrote: > > > > On Feb 22, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Mirimir <mirimir(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > > >> On 02/22/2017 12:10 PM, Razer wrote: > >> > >> > >> On 02/22/2017 10:54 AM, Mirimir responds to Eugen Leitl: > >>>> It's allright, I haven't read anything worthwhile here in years. > >>> I hope that you're exaggerating;) > >>> > >> > >> I'm just wondering if Eugen Leitl ever contributed anything useful, or > >> he's just a lurker/whiner who hasn't contributed anything worthwhile > >> himself. > > > > I find lots of good stuff from him, but not since the list went to shit. > > > >> And I concur. There's an attempt to hijack the list by alt-right > >> trolls that seemed to begin when the majority of people who actually > >> post supported io during his vilification by institutional slander. > > > > Yes, that was the timing. But it's puzzling. I mean, are the alt-right > > trolls part of the anti-io cabal? But Z*n and Alex were io supporters! > > Maybe they were double agents ;) Or maybe they aren't really either, but > > rather ED/*chan assholes, just in it for the lulz. Hard to say. > > > > I'm reminded of Jack Barsky, the former Soviet spy who coded for years > > for IBM etc.[0,1] This from the Guardian piece is very interesting: > > > > | In the 1980s, Barskyâ<80><99>s most interesting potential recruits were > > | radical rightwing ideologues; here, Soviet agents would pose as > > | activists from the radical right. â<80><9c>There was one individual I > > | reported on who Iâ<80><99>m convinced would have fallen for that, because > > | he was so strongly rightwing,â<80><9d> he says. But Barsky doesnâ<80><99>t know if > > | any of them proved useful sources for the KGB; it was operational > > | procedure that the agent who did the profiling and the agent who > > | tried to recruit them were different people. He continued to send > > | the profiles; the rest remained a mystery. > > > > So I wonder how much of the alt-right are actually Russian agents. That > > would be such a fucking coup! USA, pwned ;) > > > > Interesting theory ;). Z*n used to post strictly russian propaganda bullshit, then slowly converted to his current (as of when i blocked him anyway) Trump alt-right anti-semitic fascist nazi persona. <long line bitch slap for you Jon) The problem with USAians is the lack of arrogance in their assumptions. If they really spiced it up, they'd finally realise that the whole rest of the world became KGB spies decades ago. Welp, better to realise late than never :/ > Maybe the FSB asked him to switch it up ;) If I told you I ... > I never thought Alex was smart enough to be his handler, in fact his responses were so moronic and transparent it seems he's stopped posting. Again, maybe at the FSB's direction ;) Our ways are far too intelectuall for a schooled lad like yourself :D > The wonderful world we live in. Isn't it just.

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[RUS] afterthought of Putin, FSB "stopped the work of 53 foreign intelligence officers and 386 agents" in Russia, last year alone
by Zenaan Harkness 23 Feb '17

23 Feb '17

Imagine the field the day the Western MSM would have had if this were Clapper, Flynn, McMaster or some USA "intelligence" head saying the same thing. Gives a sense of the stoic strength and Russia/Russians face their own realities with... Respect to Russia. Vladimir Putin and FSB make an offer to Donald Trump http://theduran.com/vladimir-putin-fsb-make-offer-to-donald-trump/ (Trump remains ever committed to trying to "make a deal" with Russia: White House: Trump wants to make a deal with Russia on ISIS and economy http://theduran.com/white-house-trump-wants-make-deal-russia-isis-economy/ ) And speaking of the threats again Russia, and 4 diplomats murdered (I'm assuming) in 3 months, most recently one the world's all time greatest diplomats, Vitaly Churkin to the UN, Russia should (perhaps, if it's in their interests), not immediately replace this diplomat except on an as-needs (for Russia) basis. The "diplomatic needs" of other countries could be met on Russian soil for a while. Might not be practical, just a thought from a friend. http://theduran.com/6-best-moments-from-vitaly-churkin-russia-un-ambassador/ http://theduran.com/breaking-vitaly-churkin-russias-un-ambassador-dies-sudd… http://theduran.com/vitaly-churkin-dies-heart-attack-office-russian-mission…

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TheDuran covers MILO's Breitbart resignation
by Zenaan Harkness 23 Feb '17

23 Feb '17

Milo Yiannopoulos has his book canceled, resigns from Breitbart http://theduran.com/milo-yiannopoulos-book-canceled-resigns-breitbart/ Breitbart: http://www.breitbart.com/big-journalism/2017/02/21/milo-resigns-breitbart-n… http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2017/02/21/milo-apologizes/ http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2017/02/21/milo-victim-child-abuse/ http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2017/02/19/milo-one-gay-brit-done-more-for-co…

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"We Won't Block Pirate Bay" Swedish Telecom Co
by Razer 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

This email in plain, or rich text. As always. Last week, a Swedish Patent and Market Court of Appeal ordered The Pirate Bay and streaming portal Swefilmer to be blocked by internet service provider Bredbandsbolaget for the next three years. <https://yro.slashdot.org/story/17/02/16/2056212/swedish-court-rules-block-t…> The order was not well supported by other internet service providers in Sweden, as it appears they don't like the idea of becoming copyright policemen. TorrentFreak reports: > Last week ISP Bahnhof absolutely slammed the decision to block The > Pirate Bay, describing the effort as signaling the "death throes" of > the copyright industry. It even hinted that it may offer some kind of > technical solution to customers who are prevented from accessing the > site. For those familiar with Bahnhof's stance over the years, this > response didn't come as a surprise. The ISP is traditionally > pro-freedom and has gone out of its way to make life difficult for > copyright enforcers of all kinds. However, as one of the leading > telecoms companies in Sweden and neighboring Norway, ISP Telia is more > moderate. Nevertheless, it too says > <https://torrentfreak.com/wont-block-pirate-bay-swedish-telecoms-giant-says-…> > it has no intention of blocking The Pirate Bay, unless it is forced to > do so by law. "No, we will not block if we are not forced to do so by > a court," a company press officer said this morning. Telia says that > the decision last week from the Patent and Market Court affects only > Bredbandsbolaget, indicating that a fresh legal process will be > required to get it to respond. That eventuality appears to be > understood by the rightsholders but they're keeping their options open. https://yro.slashdot.org/story/17/02/21/2157202/we-wont-block-pirate-bay-sw…

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Domestic Spying: CIA guidelines out-of-compliance for 2 years after Congress passed Section 309
by Razer 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

H/t: Emptywheel: https://twitter.com/emptywheel/status/834446983624552449 and @thecipherbrief https://twitter.com/thecipherbrief/status/834434575837360129 New CIA guidelines set restrictions for incidentally collected intelligence on U.S. persons after 5 years (Technology Advances Prompt Changes in CIA Collection Procedures) Robert J. Eatinger, Jr., Former Senior Deputy General Counsel, CIA In the final few days of the Obama Administration, CIA Director John Brennan, after consulting with the Director of National Intelligence, brought years of CIA and interagency efforts to a close by updating the CIA’s decades-old procedures for collecting, retaining, or disseminating information concerning United States (U.S.) persons. These updated procedures are promulgated in a document entitled, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333. In a departure from the past, Director Brennan made these procedures available to the public on the CIA’s Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties webpage. Before discussing those changes, it may be helpful to start with a basic understanding of the requirement for these procedures. A few commentators have portrayed Executive Order 12333 as a sort of mysterious, open-ended authorization for U.S. intelligence agencies to engage in secret, questionable activities outside of any judicial or congressional oversight regime. In other words, some have intimated that it is intended to facilitate and hide intelligence abuses. It is, in fact, the opposite. Its purpose is to avoid abuses. Executive Order 12333 is the latest in a string of executive orders that began in 1976 when President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 in response to the findings and recommendations of congressional investigations into alleged abuses of Americans’ rights by U.S. intelligence agencies (frequently identified as the Church and Pike Committees). Among the findings was that a fundamental flaw in the governance of the U.S. intelligence community permitted intelligence abuses. Executive Order 11905 defines the powers of each intelligence community entity, thereby limiting them. It then imposes some limits on how those powers may be exercised. Every President since has either promulgated his own executive order, or adopted or amended the existing order. Executive Order 12333, was issued in 1981 by President Ronald Reagan and significantly amended in 2008 by President George W. Bush. None of these executive orders were classified and all were published in The Federal Register. Executive Order 12333 sets the basic mission statement of the intelligence community, which includes following the law and respecting rights. It requires the elements to collect reliable intelligence that provides the President and national leadership “with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats.” Executive Order 12333 further directs the intelligence community to collect that intelligence using “[a]ll means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons,” and reminds the community of its “solemn obligation . . . to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.” Executive Order 12333 limits the types of and methods by which information concerning U.S. persons may be collected, retained, or disseminated. It then authorizes elements to engage in such collection, retention, and dissemination only as permitted by procedures approved by the Attorney General. The Attorney General formally approved CIA’s 12333 Procedures on January 17, 2017. The CIA’s 12333 Procedures supersede procedures that had been written in 1982 and sparingly updated since. The changes made in the updated procedures reflect not only developments in U.S. law and policy, but also advances in collection methods due to changes in technology and privacy interests unforeseen in 1982, which did not contemplate the ubiquitous use of mobile phones, computers, and other digital media devices or evolving views of privacy and thus did not seek to address “big data” or “bulk” collection. Sections 5 and 6 in CIA’s 12333 Procedures contain procedures specifically addressed to these developments. These sections also satisfy the requirements to create procedures that limit to five years the retention of any nonpublic telephone or electronic communication acquired without the consent of a person who is a party to the communication except in defined circumstances (Section 309). Section 5 and 6 also contain new procedures to address privacy interests implicated by foreign intelligence collection methods required in a globally interconnected digital world that did not exist in 1982. As the CIA Statement notes, in 1982, “a clandestine operation may have resulted in the CIA collecting a limited number of hard copy documents. Today, in addition to traditional intelligence scenarios, a single storage device may contain the equivalent of millions of pages of information, hours of video, thousands of photos, or more.” The dominance of the digital environment has resulted in circumstances in which foreign intelligence on terrorists, proliferators, and other foreign intelligence targets reside within data streams and digital repositories that also contain substantial volumes of information concerning U.S. persons. In order to find the foreign intelligence information, however, intelligence agencies at times must capture the entire data stream or digital repository (“bulk collection”) because technical, practical, or operational realities do not permit targeted collection. Such collection captures not only the information of intelligence value that the intelligence agency wants, but also the information concerning U.S. persons that the intelligence agency does not want. In such cases, the U.S. person information in the bulk collection is considered to be “incidental collection,” because its acquisition was not the purpose of the collection operation. While such incidentally acquired U.S. person information is presumed not to be of foreign intelligence interest or value, its residence on an intelligence agency server raises privacy concerns. The Sections 5 and 6 procedures seek to address these concerns. Section 5 protects privacy interests by establishing procedures to minimize the use of bulk collection to circumstances in which it is necessary and ensure proper audit, thereby seeking to prevent CIA from acquiring unwanted U.S. person information in the first place, except when necessary. Section 5 requires the preparation of specific documentation prior to or as soon as practicable after any intelligence activity that results in bulk collection or acquires more information than the CIA’s can evaluate promptly, or qualifies for retention without individualized review. The documentation must contain certain information necessary for identified senior officials to determine whether to approve the collection. Assuming the collection has been determined to be permissible, Section 6 addresses privacy concerns by establishing handling requirements and retention limits for the portion of the bulk collection containing U.S. person information of no intelligence value or interest: the unevaluated information. Section 6 creates two different types of handling requirements for unevaluated information; one for “routine” handling and one for “exceptional” handling. Exceptional handling requirements apply to intelligence collections either of nonpublic communications that were acquired without the consent of a party to the communication, or that are anticipated to contain U.S. person identifying information that is significant in volume, proportion, or sensitivity. The exceptional requirements include segregating the unevaluated information, limiting access to CIA employees who receive special training, creating an auditable record of activity, and importantly, requiring such information to be destroyed no later than five years after collection, permitting extensions in limited circumstances. The five-year limit in Section 6 is but one example of how specifics in the new procedures attempt to find the right balance of intelligence and privacy interests. Each procedure involves an effort to find the right tradeoffs to allow lawful intelligence collection and protect privacy and civil liberty rights and interests. The tradeoff was between the risk to a loss in intelligence capabilities by destroying information at five years against the risk to compromising privacy interests by keeping the information longer. Deleting all unevaluated information specifically concerning U.S. persons has little to no intelligence downside because intelligence agencies will never want or have reason to search their intelligence holdings. The five-year period to destroy all unevaluated information, however, will remove not only information concerning U.S. persons but also any information potentially concerning valid intelligence targets, such as international terrorists, from the intelligence agencies holdings. In this latter case, however, intelligence agencies will want and may have a reason to search its holdings for information on these targets. The deletion of that information could thus have an adverse intelligence impact, particularly on counterterrorism and counterproliferation intelligence reporting, as well as on the conduct of human intelligence operations, all of which are important activities of the CIA. The CIA could be expected to search all of its holdings upon receiving intelligence identifying a previous unknown person as a suspected terrorist or proliferator. Under the five-year retention period, when the CIA conducts the search, any unevaluated information on that person that may have been acquired during a bulk collection activity over five years ago will have been deleted; CIA’s search will not retrieve that information. Thus, CIA might gain an incomplete or misleading understanding of the individual, his place in a terrorist network, and his contacts. Or, CIA may send intelligence officers to conduct dangerous human intelligence operations to collect information it once had. The loss of five-year old information could also adversely impact the spotting, assessing, recruiting, and running of human sources. Safe and effective source operations are enhanced by the amount of information available to CIA and the handling officer(s). How often the five-year retention limit might result in a loss of important information is unknowable. The five-year retention period in Section 6 was not set by the CIA, DNI, or Attorney General, however, it was set by Congress through Section 309. Certainly, differing mission requirements among the individual intelligence community elements translate into differing retention needs. Some intelligence entities likely could accomplish their mission and destroy unevaluated information in less than five years. Others may need to retain information longer than five years. Without question, the congressional intelligence committees sought and considered the input of the intelligence community entities before setting a retention limit. Congress has provided that intelligence agency heads may retain information longer than five years if the head determines a longer retention “is necessary to protect the national security of the United States” and certifies in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for that determination, the new retention period, the particular information to be retained; and the measures that will be taken to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons and persons located inside the United States. Given the uncertainties of adequately assessing the relative risks to intelligence operations and privacy, and the diversity of considerations among intelligence agencies, if a single retention period was to be imposed on the entire intelligence community, the right body to do so was the one comprised of the People’s representatives: the Congress. The Author is Robert J. Eatinger, Jr. Bob is the founding Principal of SpyLaw Consulting for Business, LLC. Previously, Bob was the Senior Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. He served as CIA’s Acting General Counsel from October 2013 to March 2014. Before being named the Senior Deputy General Counsel, he served as CIA’s Deputy General Counsel for Operations from September 2009 to June 2013. Bob also served on active duty in the United States Navy, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, and retired in 2013 as a Captain with 30 years of service. https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/network-take/technology-advances-prom…

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Fwd: Re: Is email really that hard?
by Razer 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

"Just because I ask a friend about him Just because I spoke his name somewhere Just because I rang his number by mistake today He thinks I still care Just because I haunt the same old places Where the mem'ry of him lingers everywhere Just because I'm not the boy/girl I used to be He thinks I still care" http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/annemurray/hethinksistillcare.html Rr Ps. The reason I send in html will be amply illustrated when you have to scroll waaaay to the right to read what what this offlist troll wrote. The idea of having to hand-re-wrap other poster's text when quoted is laughable and certainly suppresses posting of context quotes. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Is email really that hard? Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 13:50:46 -0500 From: Joshua Case <jwcase(a)gmail.com> To: Razer <g2s(a)riseup.net> > > I'm subject to antisemitic epithets, misconstrued political affilations, tail-ended trolling by various and sundry vicious midgets like Juan and Zen, and ALL SORTS OF GARBAGE here, and you send HUGE BOILERPLATES of songs and cutesy platitudes in response, and I'M 'the problem'? I don't think you're "the" problem, I really, if you can imagine it, don't think of you much at all. If you were sincere and not whatever is is that you are, a troll, I guess - I think you'd realize that we all have the same news sources that you do but I do think you're confused about what the intent of this mailing list was.

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GE, Intel, ATT... Deploying Surveillance Cities In Your Country
by grarpamp 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

http://fortune.com/2017/02/22/san-diego-ge-intel-att/ General Electric will put cameras, microphones, and sensors on 3,200 street lights in San Diego this year, marking the first large-scale use of "smart city" tools GE says can help monitor traffic and pinpoint crime, but raising potential privacy concerns. Based on technology from GE's Current division, Intel and AT&T, the system will use sensing nodes on light poles to locate gunshots, estimate crowd sizes, check vehicle speeds and other tasks, GE and the city said on Wednesday. The city will provide the data to entrepreneurs and students to develop applications. Companies expect a growing market for such systems as cities seek better data to plan and run their operations. San Diego is a test of "Internet of things" technology that GE Current provides for commercial buildings and industrial sites.

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Fwd: Re: Is email really that hard?
by Razer 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Is email really that hard? Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 12:35:51 -0500 From: Joshua Case <jwcase(a)gmail.com> To: Razer <g2s(a)riseup.net> It really isn't about "going" anywhere - you are actively filling up my mailbox with shit. You have, not singlehandedly - taken a stream that used to be useful and turned it into noise. What compels you? Are you an agent just plain set on disrupting coordinated resistance by rotting useful paths of education with crap and noise? > On Feb 22, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Razer <g2s(a)riseup.net> wrote: > > > > On 02/22/2017 09:10 AM, Eugen Leitl opined: >> >> I really made a mistake back then. This list should have never been resurrected in the current form. >> > > You're trolling for a flamewar fuckwad. > >> >> Tolerance and patience will kill even the best list. > > Get lost Fascist. > >> >> This is not the way to keep a list healthy and sane. Pretty soon there >> will be zero traffic passing your filters. > > YOUR filters. > >> >> It's allright, I haven't read anything worthwhile here in years. >> > > Right. Get lost if you're not finding any useful content. > > Rr

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Got a GIG!
by Razer 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

My suggestion on Twitter that "Immigrants" to Sweden are really War Refugees has stirred up a flock of NeoNazi trolls who don't think destroying the Middle East is war. Little did they know that suggestion was a 'headlight' and it's Frog Gigging Season!

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Re: [WAR] A brief bit of Hillary history.
by Zenaan Harkness 22 Feb '17

22 Feb '17

My question was, is and shall continue to be, who of the various candidates in the upcoming USA elections, who might get elected to run the USA war machine, would be the least likely candidate to push Russia and or China and or the rest of the world into World War 3, when the economic crunch time for North America finally hits the fan. We know a massive global financial crash is coming, and in previous points of financial collapse, history shows us an almost certainty of a major war following. This bodes EXTREMELY PRECARIOUSLY for all of us on this little blue planet, and suggests that those who vote in the upcoming North American elections ought think carefully about the question above. Those who are onlookers might consider being in contact with anyone they know who will be involved/ voting in the upcoming USA elections, and discover their thoughts on this fundamental question - who is most and who is least likely to start World War 3. Also, look into the preference voting system (like we also have in Australia) if you will be voting, and figure out how your candidate's votes might be applied to other candidates, should your chosen candidate not receive enough votes to be elected. That, or choose your own preferences! Be informed, and let's do our bit towards avoiding World War 3 - if this issue of the potential for the next world war is not handled by us humans, we may just find that sometime in the next 4 years, that we are all faced with a reality where NO OTHER QUESTION EVEN MATTERS, and it's too late to argue or say sorry or I told you so or anything else so pathetic in the face of the lack of the action required to have stopped the problem in the first place. Good luck fellow humans, Zenaan ----- Forwarded message ----- Subject: FW: nothing has changed! they are all the same. http://jacksonville.com/reason/fact-check/2014-03-08/story/fact-check-was-h… ----- End forwarded message -----

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