January 2022 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Pussy Riot's Nadya Tolokonnikova calls for Navalny's release
by professor rat 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

Pussy terrorists https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/17/prominent-supporters-alexei-n… Me? I’d be hung, drawn and quartered for a KGB sheep just as well as a lamb. https://stiffs.com/celebrity/vladimirputin " When cypherpunks are called terrorists we will have done our job ' ( old crypto-anarchist proverb )

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Tor Stinks: Is Tor Trustworthy and Safe?
by grarpamp 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

https://restoreprivacy.com/tor/ Is Tor Trustworthy and Safe? December 14, 2021 By Sven Taylor — [246]48 Comments [247]Tor safe[248]Tor safe There is a lot of misinformation being promoted in various privacy circles about Tor. This article will examine some facts about Tor and assess whether it is the infallible privacy tool it’s made out to be by some. There is a growing chorus of people who blindly recommend Tor to anyone looking for online anonymity. This recommendation often ignores mountains of evidence suggesting that Tor is not the “privacy tool” it’s made out to be. No privacy tool is above criticism or scrutiny, and each has pros and cons. Unfortunately, Tor has garnered a cult-like following in recent years among people who pretend it's infallible. Honest criticism of Tor is often met with accusations of "FUD" and ad-hominem attacks, so as not to disrupt the collective [249]Groupthink. Never mind the fact that the Tor network is a popular hangout for [250]pedophiles and [251]drug dealers – along with the law enforcement these types attract. Today, Tor is being marketed as some kind of grass-roots privacy tool that will protect you against government surveillance and various bad actors. According to Roger Dingledine (Tor co-founder) and other key Tor developers, getting people (outside the US government) to widely adopt Tor is very important for the US government’s ability to use Tor for its own purposes. In this goal, they have largely succeeded with Tor being widely promoted in various privacy circles by people who don't know any better. But is Tor really a secure and trustworthy privacy tool? Here are the facts. 1. Tor is compromised (and not anonymous) That governments can de-anonymize Tor users is another well-known point that's been acknowledged for years. In 2013 the Washington Post broke an article citing reports that US government agencies had figured out how to de-anonymize Tor users on a "wide scale". From the [252]Washington Post: Since 2006, according to [253]a 49-page research paper titled simply “Tor,” the agency has worked on several methods that, if successful, would allow the NSA to uncloak anonymous traffic on a “wide scale” — effectively by watching communications as they enter and exit the Tor system, rather than trying to follow them inside. One type of attack, for example, would identify users by minute differences in the clock times on their computers. There are also reports of government agencies cooperating with researchers to "break" or somehow [254]exploit Tor to de-anonymize users: Then in July, a much anticipated talk at the Black Hat hacking conference was [255]abruptly canceled. Alexander Volynkin and Michael McCord, academics from Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), promised to reveal how a $3,000 piece of kit could unmask the IP addresses of Tor hidden services as well as their users. Its description bore a startling resemblance to the attack the Tor Project had documented earlier that month. Volynkin and McCord's method would deanonymize Tor users through the use of recently disclosed vulnerabilities and a "handful of powerful servers." On top of this, the pair claimed they had tested attacks in the wild. For $3,000 worth of hardware, this team from Carnegie Mellon could effectively "unmask" Tor users. And this was in 2015. In 2016, a court case brought more information to light about how the US federal government hired software engineers to effectively crack Tor and de-anonymize users. [256]Tor is not anonymous[257]Tor is not anonymous ARS Technica also [258]discussed this case in February 2016 where they noted: A federal judge in Washington has now [259]confirmed what has been [260]strongly suspected: that Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) researchers at its Software Engineering Institute were [261]hired by the federal government to do research into breaking Tor in 2014. The following year, in 2017, more evidence came forward showing how the FBI can see what you're up to on Tor. There are also researchers who [262]devised attacks allowing them to de-anonymize 81% of Tor users in the wild. This [263]article came out in 2014, before the Carnegie Mellon research was carried out. [264]Tor attack NSA[265]Tor attack NSA And there's more... 2017 court case proves FBI can de-anonymize Tor users The means by which the FBI is able to de-anonymize Tor users and discover their real IP address remains classified information. In a 2017 court case, the FBI refused to divulge how it was able to do this, which ultimately led to child abusers on the Tor network going free. From the [266]Tech Times: In this case, the FBI managed to breach the anonymity Tor promises and the means used to collect the evidence from the dark web make up a sensitive matter. The technique is valuable to the FBI, so the government would rather compromise this case rather than release the source code it used. "The government must now choose between disclosure of classified information and dismissal of its indictment," federal prosecutor Annette Hayes said in a court filing on Friday. The cat is out of the bag. The FBI (and presumably other government agencies) has proven to be fully capable of de-anonymizing Tor users. Most Tor promoters simply ignore these different cases and the obvious implications. 2. Tor developers are cooperating with US government agencies Some Tor users may be surprised to know the extent to which Tor developers are working directly with US government agencies. After all, Tor is often promoted as a grass-roots privacy effort to help you stay "anonymous" against Big Brother. One journalist was able to clarify this cooperation through FOIA requests, which revealed many interesting exchanges. Here is one email correspondence in which Roger Dingledine discusses cooperation with the DOJ (Department of Justice) and FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), while also referencing "backdoors" being installed. [267]fbi tor browser[268]fbi tor browser You can see more details from this correspondence [269]here. In another exchange below, Tor developer Steven Murdoch discovered a vulnerability with the way Tor was handling TLS encryption. This vulnerability made it easier to de-anonymize Tor users, and as such, it would be valuable to government agencies. Knowing the problems this could cause, Steven suggested keeping the document internal, ...it might be a good to delay the release of anything like `this attack is bad; I hope nobody realizes it before we fix it'. Eight days later, based on the emails below, Roger Dingledine alerted two government agents about this vulnerability: [270]is tor safe[271]is tor safe While there is disagreement as to the seriousness of these issues, one thing remains clear. Tor developers are closely working with the US government. The journalist who collected the FOIA documents also [272]suggests that, "Tor privately tips off the federal government to security vulnerabilities before alerting the public." Whether or not you agree with the ultimate conclusion of this researcher, the facts remain for anyone who wants to acknowledge them. The big issue is the close cooperation between Tor developers and US government agencies. You can see numerous exchanges between Tor developers and US government agencies [273]here. ([274]Backup copy of documents.) And if you really want to dive in, check out the [275]full FOIA cache here. 3. When you use Tor, you stand out like a glow stick Meet Eldo Kim. He was the Harvard student who assumed Tor would make him "anonymous" when sending bomb threats. [276]eldo kim[277]eldo kim Kim didn't realize that when he connected to Tor on the university network, he would stand out like a f***ing glow stick. The FBI and the network admins at Harvard were able to easily pinpoint Kim because he was using Tor around the time the bomb threat email was sent through the Tor network. From the [278]criminal complaint: Harvard University was able to determine that, in the several hours leading up to the receipt of the e-mail messages described above, ELDO KIM accessed TOR using Harvard’s wireless network. [279]Case closed. Eldo Kim is just one of many, many examples of people who have bought into the lie that Tor provides blanket online anonymity - and later paid the price. Had Kim used a bridge or VPN before accessing the Tor network, he probably would have gotten away with it (we'll discuss this more below). 4. Anybody can operate Tor nodes and collect your data and IP address Many proponents of Tor argue that its decentralized nature is a benefit. While there are indeed advantages to decentralization, there are also some major risks. Namely, that anybody can operate the Tor nodes through which your traffic is being routed. There have been numerous examples of people setting up Tor nodes to collect data from gullible Tor users who thought they would be safe and secure. Take for example Dan Egerstad, a 22-year-old Swedish hacker. Egerstad set up a few Tor nodes around the world and [280]collected vast amounts of private data in just a few months: In time, Egerstad gained access to 1000 high-value email accounts. He would later post 100 sets of sensitive email logins and passwords on the internet for criminals, spies or just curious teenagers to use to snoop on inter-governmental, NGO and high-value corporate email. The question on everybody's lips was: how did he do it? The answer came more than a week later and was somewhat anti-climactic. The 22-year-old Swedish security consultant had merely installed free, open-source software - called Tor - on five computers in data centres around the globe and monitored it. Ironically, Tor is designed to prevent intelligence agencies, corporations and computer hackers from determining the virtual - and physical - location of the people who use it. People think they're protected just because they use Tor. Not only do they think it's encrypted, but they also think `no one can find me'. To not assume government agencies are doing this right now would be extremely naive. Commenting on this case, security consultant Sam Stover [281]emphasized the risks of someone snooping traffic through Tor nodes: Domestic, or international . . . if you want to do intelligence gathering, there's definitely data to be had there. (When using Tor) you have no idea if some guy in China is watching all your traffic, or some guy in Germany, or a guy in Illinois. You don't know. In fact, that is exactly how Wikileaks got started. The founders simply setup Tor nodes to siphon off more than a million private documents. According to [282]Wired: WikiLeaks, the controversial whistleblowing site that exposes secrets of governments and corporations, bootstrapped itself with a cache of documents obtained through an internet eavesdropping operation by one of its activists, according to a new profile of the organization's founder. The activist siphoned more than a million documents as they traveled across the internet through Tor, also known as "The Onion Router," a sophisticated privacy tool that lets users navigate and send documents through the internet anonymously. Are governments running Tor nodes for bulk data collection? Egerstad also suggests Tor nodes may be controlled by powerful agencies (governments) with vast resources: In addition to hackers using Tor to hide their origins, it's plausible that intelligence services had set up rogue exit nodes to sniff data from the Tor network. "If you actually look in to where these Tor nodes are hosted and how big they are, some of these nodes cost thousands of dollars each month just to host because they're using lots of bandwidth, they're heavy-duty servers and so on," Egerstad says. "Who would pay for this and be anonymous?" Back in 2014, government agencies seized a number of different Tor relays in what is known as "Operation Onymous". From the [283]Tor Project blog: Over the last few days, we received and read reports saying that several Tor relays were seized by government officials. We do not know why the systems were seized, nor do we know anything about the methods of investigation which were used. Specifically, there are reports that three systems of Torservers.net disappeared and there is another report by an independent relay operator. Commenting on this case, [284]ARS Technica noted in 2014: On July 4, the Tor Project identified a group of Tor relays that were actively trying to break the anonymity of users by making changes to the Tor protocol headers associated with their traffic over the network. The rogue relays were set up on January 30, 2014—just two weeks after Blake Benthall allegedly announced he had taken control of Silk Road 2.0 and shortly after the Homeland Security undercover officer who infiltrated Silk Road 2.0 began getting paid to be a site administrator. The relays not only could have de-anonymized some users, but they also “probably tried to learn who published hidden service descriptors, which would allow the attackers to learn the location of that hidden service,” Tor project leader Roger Dingledine [285]wrote in a July 30 blog post. This issue continues to gain attention. In this [286]Gizmodo article from 2021, we find the same problems. Bad actors can and do operate Tor nodes. Additional reading: [287]A mysterious threat actor is running hundreds of malicious Tor relays No quality control! The fundamental issue here is there is no real quality control mechanism for vetting Tor relay operators. Not only is there no authentication mechanism for setting up relays, but the operators themselves can also remain anonymous. Assuming that some Tor nodes are data collection tools, it would also be safe to assume that many different governments are involved in data collection, such as the Chinese, Russian, and US governments. See also: [288]Tor network exit nodes found to be sniffing passing traffic 5. Malicious Tor nodes do exist If government-controlled Tor nodes weren't bad enough, you also have to consider malicious Tor nodes. In 2016 a group of researchers presented a paper titled "[289]HOnions: Towards Detection and Identification of Misbehaving Tor HSDirs", which described how they identified 110 malicious Tor relays: Over the last decade privacy infrastructures such as Tor proved to be very successful and widely used. However, Tor remains a practical system with a variety of limitations and open to abuse. Tor’s security and anonymity is based on the assumption that the large majority of the its relays are honest and do not misbehave. Particularly the privacy of the hidden services is dependent on the honest operation of Hidden Services Directories (HSDirs). In this work we introduce, the concept of honey onions (HOnions), a framework to detect and identify misbehaving and snooping HSDirs. After the deployment of our system and based on our experimental results during the period of 72 days, we detect and identify at least 110 such snooping relays. Furthermore, we reveal that more than half of them were hosted on cloud infrastructure and delayed the use of the learned information to prevent easy traceback. When conspiracy "theory" becomes conspiracy fact. The malicious HSDirs identified by the team were mostly located in the United States, Germany, France, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Just a few months after the HSDir issue broke, a different researcher identified a malicious Tor node injecting malware into file downloads. [290]tor malware[291]tor malware According to [292]ITProPortal: Authorities are advising all users of the Tor network to check their computers for malware after it emerged that a Russian hacker has been using the network to spread a powerful virus. The malware is spread by a compromised node in the Tor network. ...It has emerged that one of these exit nodes had been modified to alter any program downloaded over the network. This allowed the attacker to put his own executable code in such programs, and potentially take control of victims' computers. Due to the altered node, any Windows executable downloaded over the network was wrapped in malware, and worryingly even files downloaded over Windows Update were affected. Use at your own risk. [293]tor network not safe[294]tor network not safe See also: [295]OnionDuke APT Malware Distributed Via Malicious Tor Exit Node 6. No warrant necessary to spy on Tor users Another interesting case highlighting the flaws of Tor comes form 2016 when the FBI was able to infiltrate Tor to bust another pedophile group. [296]tor hacked[297]tor hacked According to [298]Tech Times: The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can still spy on users who use the Tor browser to remain anonymous on the web. Senior U.S. District Court Judge Henry Coke Morgan, Jr. has ruled that the FBI does not need a warrant to hack into a U.S. citizen's computer system. The ruling by the district judge relates to FBI sting called Operation Pacifier, which targeted a child pornography site called PlayPen on the Dark web. The accused used Tor to access these websites. The federal agency, with the help of hacking tools on computers in Greece, Denmark, Chile and the U.S., was able to catch 1,500 pedophiles during the operation. While it's great to see these types of criminals getting shut down, this case also highlights the severe vulnerabilities of Tor as a privacy tool that can be trusted by journalists, political dissidents, whistleblowers, etc. The judge in this case [299]officially ruled that Tor users lack "a reasonable expectation of privacy" in hiding their IP address and identity. This essentially opens the door to any US government agency being able to spy on Tor users without obtaining a warrant or going through any legal channels. This, of course, is a serious concern when you consider that journalists, activists, and whistleblowers are encouraged to use Tor to hide from government agencies and mass surveillance. Now let's put this all into context by looking at the history of Tor and it's funding. 7. Tor was created by the US government (and not for your "right to privacy") If you think Tor was created for "privacy rights" or some other noble-sounding cause, then you would be mistaken. The quote below, from the co-founder of Tor, speaks volumes. I forgot to mention earlier, probably something that will make you look at me in a new light. I contract for the United States Government to build anonymity technology for them and deploy it. They don’t think of it as anonymity technology, though we use that term. They think of it as security technology. They need these technologies so that they can research people they're interested in, so that they can have anonymous tip lines, so that they can buy things from people without other countries figuring out what they are buying, how much they are buying and where it is going, that sort of thing. — Roger Dingledine, co-founder of Tor, [300]2004 speech This quote alone should convince any rational person to never use the Tor network, unless of course you want to be rubbing shoulders with government spooks on the Dark Web. The history of Tor goes back to the 1990s when the Office of Naval Research and DARPA were working to create an online anonymity network in Washington, DC. This network was called "onion routing" and bounced traffic across different nodes before exiting to the final destination. In 2002, the Alpha version of Tor was developed and released by Paul Syverson (Office of Naval Research), as well as [301]Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson, who were both on contract with DARPA. This three-person team, working for the US government, developed Tor into what it is today. The quote above was taken from a [302]2004 speech by Roger Dingledine, which you can also [303]listen to here. After Tor was developed and released for public use, it was eventually spun off as its own non-profit organization, with [304]guidance coming from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): At the very end of 2004, with Tor technology finally ready for deployment, the US Navy [305]cut most of its Tor funding, released it under an open source license and, oddly, the project was [306]handed over to the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) remains one of the biggest promoters of Tor today, which is not surprising given EFF's deep ties to the project. 8. Tor is funded by the US government It's no secret that Tor is funded by various US government agencies. The key question is whether US government funding negatively affects Tor's independence and trustworthiness as a privacy tool. Some journalists have closely [307]examined the financial relationship between Tor and the US government: Tor had always maintained that it was funded by a “variety of sources” and was not beholden to any one interest group. But I crunched the numbers and found that the exact opposite was true: In any given year, Tor drew between 90 to 100 percent of its budget via contracts and grants coming from three military-intel branches of the federal government: the Pentagon, the State Department and an old school CIA spinoff organization called the BBG. Put simply: the financial data showed that Tor wasn’t the indie-grassroots anti-state org that it claimed to be. It was a military contractor. It even had its own official military contractor reference number from the government. Here are some of the different government funding sources for the Tor Project over the years: Broadcasting Board of Governors: "Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) [now called [308]U.S. Agency for Global Media], a federal agency that was spun off from the CIA and today oversees America’s foreign broadcasting operations, funded Tor to the tune of $6.1 million in the years from 2007 through 2015." ([309]source) State Department: "The [310]State Department funded Tor to the tune of $3.3 million, mostly through its regime change arm — State Dept's "Democracy, Human Rights and Labor" division." ([311]source) The Pentagon: "From 2011 through 2013, the Pentagon funded Tor to the tune of $2.2 million, through a U.S. Department of Defense / Navy contract — passed through a defense contractor called SRI International." ([312]source) The grant is [313]called: “Basic and Applied Research and Development in Areas Relating to the Navy Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.” We can also see what the Tor project has to say about the matter. When soliciting funds in 2005, Tor claimed that donors would be able to [314]"influence" the direction of the project: We are now actively looking for new contracts and funding. Sponsors of Tor get personal attention, better support, publicity (if they want it), and get to influence the direction of our research and development! There you have it. Tor claims donors influence the direction of research and development - a fact that the Tor team even admits. Do you really think the US government would invest millions of dollars into a tool that stifled its power? 9. When you use Tor, you help the US government do spooky stuff The United States government can’t simply run an anonymity system for everybody and then use it themselves only. Because then every time a connection came from it people would say, “Oh, it’s another CIA agent looking at my website,” if those are the only people using the network. So you need to have other people using the network so they blend together. —Roger Dingledine, co-founder of the Tor Network, [315]2004 speech The implications of this statement are quite serious. When you use Tor, you are literally helping the US government. Your traffic helps to conceal CIA agents who are also using Tor, as Dingledine and journalists are pointing out. Tor is fundamentally a [316]tool for the US government, and it remains so today: Tor’s original — and current — purpose is to cloak the online identity of government agents and informants while they are in the field: gathering intelligence, setting up sting operations, giving human intelligence assets a way to report back to their handlers — that kind of thing. This information is out there, but it's not very well known, and it's certainly not emphasized by those who promote it. You will never hear Tor promoters discuss how important it is for the US government to get others on the the Tor network. This remains a taboo topic that Tor advocates simply avoid. The Tor Project's [317]website also discusses how Tor is actively used by government agencies for different purposes: A branch of the U.S. Navy uses Tor for open source intelligence gathering, and one of its teams used Tor while deployed in the Middle East recently. Law enforcement uses Tor for visiting or surveilling web sites without leaving government IP addresses in their web logs, and for security during sting operations. Michael Reed, another early developer of Tor, explained how it has always been a [318]tool for US government military and intelligence operations: The original *QUESTION* posed that led to the invention of Onion Routing was, "Can we build a system that allows for bi-directional communications over the Internet where the source and destination cannot be determined by a mid-point?" The *PURPOSE* was for DoD / Intelligence usage (open source intelligence gathering, covering of forward deployed assets, whatever). Not helping dissidents in repressive countries. Not assisting criminals in covering their electronic tracks. Not helping bit-torrent users avoid MPAA/RIAA prosecution. Not giving a 10 year old a way to bypass an anti-porn filter. Of course, we knew those would be other unavoidable uses for the technology, but that was immaterial to the problem at hand we were trying to solve (and if those uses were going to give us more cover traffic to better hide what we wanted to use the network for, all the better...I once told a flag officer that much to his chagrin). Here's another early Tor developer who spilled the beans. Tor was never meant for "dissidents in repressive countries" or helping various privacy activists fighting for human rights, which is how Tor is promoted today. Just as Roger Dingledine asserted in the opening quote to this section, Paul Syverson (Tor co-founder) also emphasized the importance of getting other people to use Tor, thereby helping government agents perform their work and [319]not stand out as the only Tor users: If you have a system that’s only a Navy system, anything popping out of it is obviously from the Navy. You need to have a network that carries traffic for other people as well. Tor is branded by many different individuals and groups as a grassroots project to protect people from government surveillance. In reality, however, it is a tool for government agents who are literally using it for military and intelligence operations (including spying on those who think they are "anonymous" on Tor). Tor's utility for the military-surveillance apparatus is [320]explained well in the following quote: Tor was created not to protect the public from government surveillance, but rather, to cloak the online identity of intelligence agents as they snooped on areas of interest. But in order to do that, Tor had to be released to the public and used by as diverse a group of people as possible: activists, dissidents, journalists, paranoiacs, kiddie porn scum, criminals and even would-be terrorists — the bigger and weirder the crowd, the easier it would be for agents to mix in and hide in plain sight. According to these Tor developers and co-founders, when you use Tor you are helping US government agents in doing whatever they do on the Tor network. Why would anyone who advocates for privacy and human rights want to do that? 10. IP address leaks when using Tor Another recurring problem with Tor is IP address leaks - a serious issue that will de-anonymize Tor users, even if the leak is brief. In November 2017 a flaw was discovered that exposed the real IP address of Tor users if they clicked on a local file-based address, such as file://., rather than http:// or https://. [321]is tor safe[322]is tor safe This issue illustrates a larger problem with Tor: it only encrypts traffic through the Tor browser, thereby leaving all other (non-Tor browser) traffic exposed. Unlike a VPN that encrypts all traffic on your operating system, the Tor network only works through a browser configured for Tor. (See the `[323]what is a VPN` guide for an overview.) This design leaves Tor users vulnerable to leaks which will expose their identity in many different situations: * Tor offers no protection when torrenting and will leak the user's IP address with torrent clients. * Tor may leak IP addresses when accessing files, such as PDFs or other documents, which will likely bypass proxy settings. * Windows users are [324]also vulnerable to different types of leaks that will expose the user's real IP address. [325]windows tor[326]windows tor It's important to note, however, that oftentimes de-anonymization is due to user error or misconfiguration. Therefore blame does not lie with Tor itself, but rather with people not using Tor correctly. Dan Eggerstad emphasized this issue as well when he [327]stated: People think they're protected just because they use Tor. Not only do they think it's encrypted, but they also think `no one can find me'. But if you've configured your computer wrong, which probably more than 50 per cent of the people using Tor have, you can still find the person (on) the other side. Once again, non-technical users would be better off using a [328]good VPN service that provides system-wide traffic encryption and an effective kill switch to block all traffic if the VPN connection drops. 11. Using Tor can make you a target As we saw above with the bomb threat hoax, Eldo Kim was targeted because he was on the Tor network when the bomb threat was sent. Other security experts also warn about Tor users being [329]targeted merely for using Tor. In addition, most really repressive places actually look for Tor and target those people. VPNs are used to watch Netflix and Hulu, but Tor has only one use case – to evade the authorities. There is no cover. (This is assuming it is being used to evade even in a country incapable of breaking Tor anonymity.) In many ways Tor can be riskier than a VPN: 1. VPNs are (typically) not actively malicious 2. VPNs provide good cover that Tor simply cannot – “I was using it to watch Hulu videos” is much better than – “I was just trying to buy illegal drugs online” As we've pointed out here before, VPNs are more widely used than Tor - and for various (legitimate) reasons, such as streaming [330]Netflix with a VPN. So maybe you still need (or want?) to use Tor. How can you do so with more safety? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- How to (more) safely use Tor Given that Tor is compromised and bad actors can see the real IP address of Tor users, it would be wise to take extra precautions. This includes hiding your real IP address before accessing the Tor network. To hide your IP address when accessing Tor, simply connect to a VPN server (through a VPN client on your computer) and then access Tor as normal (such as through the Tor browser). This will add a layer of encryption between your computer and the Tor network, with the VPN server's IP address replacing your real IP address. Note: There are different ways to combine VPNs and Tor. I am only recommending the following setup: You > VPN > Tor > Internet (also called "Tor over VPN" or "Onion over VPN"). [331]Tor vs VPN[332]Tor vs VPN With this setup, even if a malicious actor was running a Tor server and logging all connecting IP addresses, your real IP address would remain hidden behind the VPN server (assuming you are using a good VPN with no leaks). Here are the benefits of routing your traffic through a secure VPN before the Tor network: 1. Your real IP address remains hidden from the Tor network (Tor cannot see who you are) 2. Your internet provider (ISP) or network admin will not be able to see you are using Tor (because your traffic is being encrypted through a VPN server). 3. You won't stand out as much from other users because VPNs are more popular than Tor. 4. You are distributing trust between Tor and a VPN. The VPN could see your IP address and Tor could see your traffic (sites you visit), but neither would have both your IP address and browsing activities. For anyone distrustful of VPNs, there are a handful of [333]verified no logs VPN services that have been proven to be truly "no logs". You can sign up for a VPN with a [334]secure anonymous email account (not connected to your identity). For the truly paranoid, you can also pay with Bitcoin or any other anonymous payment method. Most VPNs do not require any name for registration, only a valid email address for account credentials. Using a VPN in a safe offshore jurisdiction (outside the [335]14 Eyes) may also be good, depending on your threat model. For those seeking the highest levels of anonymity, you can chain multiple VPNs through Linux virtual machines (using Virtualbox, which is FOSS). You could also use VPN1 on your router, VPN2 on your computer, and then access the regular internet (or the Tor network) through two layers of encryption via two separate VPN services. This allows you to distribute trust across different VPN services and ensure neither VPN could have both your incoming IP address and traffic. This is discussed more in my guide on [336]multi-hop VPN services. Note: The claim that "VPN is fully, 100%, a single point/entity that you must trust" is false. This claim comes from [337]this Tor promoter who coincidently [338]works for the US government's Naval Research Lab. When you chain VPNs, you can distribute trust across different VPN services and different jurisdictions around the world, all paid for anonymously and not linked to your identity. With Tor alone, you put all your trust in The Onion Router... Tor Project agrees on the benefits of adding VPN The Tor Project also agrees on the benefits of correctly using a VPN with Tor, as I recommend above. Here are a few quotes from the Tor Project about the [339]benefits of using a VPN before Tor ([340]archived): 1. "might prevent your ISP etc from seeing that you're using Tor" 2. Routing Tor through a VPN "can be a fine idea assuming your VPN provider's network is in fact sufficiently safer than your own network." [A verified no logs VPN is a lot safer than an internet provider that has your name, date of birth, payment details, and is collecting your data and [341]sharing it with surveillance agencies, such as the case with [342]US internet providers.] 3. "Another advantage here is that it prevents Tor from seeing who you are behind the VPN. So if somebody does manage to break Tor and learn the IP address your traffic is coming from, ... then you'll be better off." While I generally agree with the points above, unfortunately, the Tor Project also stated some incorrect information in the beginning of their article as follows, "Most VPN/SSH provider log, there is a money trail, if you can't pay really anonymously." These points are incorrect. * "Most VPN/SSH provider log" - This is simply not true. There are many [343]no logs VPN services and also a small number of VPNs that are verified to be no logs, having undergone third-party audits, server seizures, or court subpoenas for user data. * "there is a money trail" - This is a huge misconception that is promoted by people who don’t know what they’re talking about. A “money trail” has no bearing on the effectiveness or encryption of a VPN. VPNs are not illegal and are becoming mainstream privacy tools. If an adversary knows you have a subscription with a specific VPN service, this has zero bearing on the effectiveness of your VPN. Even if the adversary has your username and password, this still has no bearing on the effectiveness or encryption of the VPN (it just means your adversary can use the VPN for free). VPN encryption is dynamic and negotiated new with each connection. And if you are worried about “money trails” then pay anonymously. * “can’t pay really anonymously” - This is again false, perhaps blatant lying to scare people away from VPNs. Most VPNs offer anonymous payment options, such as gift cards or Bitcoin, with no name required. You only need a valid email, and you can easily setup an anonymous/burner email for this purpose that’s not connected to your identity. Done. Note: While there have been various cases proving the FBI can easily de-anonymize Tor users, there has never been any court cases (that I've seen) proving the FBI (or any government agency) can de-anonymize VPN users, assuming there's good encryption with no leaks. Instead, we have seen a few isolated cases where the FBI pressured VPNs to log user data and provide this to authorities to identify a specific user, such as with the [344]IPVanish logging case in the US. Tor vulnerabilities and VPNs There are other attacks that the Tor Project [345]admits will de-anonymize Tor users ([346]archived): As mentioned above, it is possible for an observer who can view both you and either the destination website or your Tor exit node to correlate timings of your traffic as it enters the Tor network and also as it exits. Tor does not defend against such a threat model. Once again, a VPN can help to mitigate the risk of de-anonymization by hiding your source IP address before accessing the guard node in the Tor circuit. Can exit nodes [347]eavesdrop on communications? From the Tor Project: Yes, the guy running the exit node can read the bytes that come in and out there. Tor anonymizes the origin of your traffic, and it makes sure to encrypt everything inside the Tor network, but it does not magically encrypt all traffic throughout the Internet. However, a VPN can not do anything about a bad Tor exit node eavesdropping on your traffic, although it will help hide who you are (but your traffic can also give you away). I discuss these points more in my [348]VPN vs Tor comparison. Conclusion on Tor No privacy tool is above criticism. Just like with Tor, I have also pointed out numerous problems with VPNs, including VPNs that were caught [349]lying about logs, VPN [350]scams, and dangerous [351]free VPN services. All privacy tools come with pros and cons. Selecting the best tool for the job all boils down to your threat model and unique needs. Unfortunately, for many in the privacy community, Tor is now considered to be an infallible tool for blanket anonymity, and to question this dogma means you are "spreading FUD". This is pathetic. In closing, for regular users seeking more security and online anonymity, I'd simply avoid Tor altogether. A VPN will offer system-wide encryption, much faster speeds, and user-friendly clients for various devices and operating systems. This will also prevent your ISP from seeing what you're up to online. Additionally, VPNs are more mainstream and there are many legitimate (and legal!) reasons for using them. Compared to Tor, you definitely won't stand out as much with a VPN. For those who still want to access the Tor network, doing so through a reliable VPN service will add an extra layer of protection while hiding your real IP address. Further Reading: [352]Tor and its Discontents: Problems with Tor Usage as Panacea [353]Users Get Routed: Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries [354]Tor network exit nodes found to be sniffing passing traffic [355]On the Effectiveness of Traffic Analysis Against Anonymity Networks Using Flow Records [356]Judge confirms what many suspected: Feds hired CMU to break Tor About Sven Taylor Sven Taylor is the founder of RestorePrivacy. With a passion for digital privacy and online freedom, he created this website to provide you with honest, useful, and up-to-date information about online privacy, security, and related topics. His focus is on privacy research, writing guides, testing privacy tools, and website admin. Reader Interactions Comments 1. Alvaro [357]January 18, 2022 I've always been critical of Tor since its inception. The ability to access Onion sites sounds cool and all but most of those links are dead, Tor is selfdom rarely used by free speech activists to access legitimate websites. Nor is it practical since most sites are protected by Cloudflare and require Javascript to load sites up. On top of that its slow, and as Sven mentioned, you can be monitored or compromised by bad actors at any given moment since you don't know whose operating the Tor servers. Tor simply can't compete with VPNS at the moment. It might be a slightly better option than using free VPNS but that's not saying much. Paid VPN providers with the right audits done on them is simply the way to go. They might not be a 100% bulletproof requiring privacy, and speed but HTTPS already has you takened care of since your VPN/Internet Service Provider cannot see your individual activities beyond the Home URL you are in. Solid article by Sven Taylor. Hope more see it to wake themselves up from the lies promoted by the Tor team. [358]Reply 2. Patriot [359]January 11, 2022 My Timeline: (I'll be shocked if this is not instantly deleted or even makes it here) - I met once a year with several others I networked around the world with to basically prove each other wrong and ultimately learned from each other. Most were from Europe, with several Oxford grads who wrote compilers for Borland, two from the US and one from Australia. - Two years before 9/11, a businessman and friend who we all knew wanted us guys to work for a new startup to collect data about companies that they would then sell. The businessman said to me, "It is a great opportunity and it will make you a rich man in a few years." The guy in charge at the new company had architected what the Police use. When interviewed, they led me around and showed me a large data center in the building and I noticed the provider was Southern Bell. I asked and they said they use so much bandwidth the phone company decided to just move the central office of the area there. That didn't make sense to me. They made a peculiar comment that they liked it that I was a military pilot and they liked pilots, which also made no sense. I saw three guys dumping traffic and asked what they were doing. The answer was, "Defending against hackers trying to get at our information.". What also didn't make sense is what they said I would be doing was too simple to hire someone like me for. It would be like watching paint dry for me. One of the guys they had already hired said, "I'm looking forward to working with you. Isn't this amazing for only 4 months old?" Exactly what I was thinking. While the guy courting me was very wealthy, he was not this wealthy. This didn't make sense. For $60 I could buy CD's from Microsoft with a lot of business information and there is Dunn&Bradstreet. I had a great job as CIO of a Tier-1 Automotive supplier, paid well, great family area, could do what I wanted, set my own hours, and I had weekends off except during major upgrades of my own doing. I refused. Some time later, I started receiving peculiar phone calls from attorneys asking me vague questions and insisting I knew a lot more than I did. I relayed that to the guy who wanted me to work with them and I never heard from him again. - A few years after 9/11 I'm in a conversation with a guy I knew who had worked directly for the guy who was on the board that courted me. He had closer ties personally with the guys but was not one of us. I mentioned the reason I refused was things didn't make sense and also the peculiar calls from attorneys. At that point he told me it was a front company for the government to monitor people's conversations. This was 2+ years before the Patriot Act. I also learned that they perform drone strikes from down there, which might be why the strange comment about me having been a military pilot. The story from him was the peculiar calls were because the guy in charge turned out to be a crook. Of the guys hired, the guy from Australia and the girl from Germany found out their goals were the same and both left. They got married and still got to stay in the US and are now citizens. As I recall from the last conversation, baby #11 was on the way, and they were homeschooling. They both work as contractors for the guy telling me all of this stuff. The remainder immediately ended up at LexisNexis, which is noteworthy, because if you need an accident report, this is where the police send you, and is the brain child of the guy I would have been working for. I know the character of the one who left with the girl from Germany and another in the group who was also a pastor, which might make sense of the move to LexisNexis. They were there for a long time but no longer there and seem to be bought and sold as a group in which they are each shareholders, of which I'm guessing the businessman is among them. The place that wanted to hire me has since morphed into an organization for healthcare support, which fits perfectly with what had been the businessman's main money maker. - As you might imagine, the Snowden saga is a different read for me. On the one hand I understand the government's interest to protect its citizens. On the other hand, when Snowden was hired, he would have had to have been sworn to secrecy before knowing the scope of what it entailed. The verdict of what he did afterward can swap in your mind daily. If you read the official story of the Julian Assange case, and what they claim to be his maladies, it doesn't add up. Both could release extremely damaging information to national security but AFAIK neither has yet. - Days ago I decided to test my VPN that had been recently purchased by Kape Technlogies like my last one was. I picked a far away country and determined it was actually exiting a server in New York. I published several places on YouTube how to duplicate what I had done and it is deleted immediately. - Today, I hate technology and am getting out of it and will plead ignorance. I wished I'd never gotten into it. My concern is not that they are collecting everything, it is you cannot trust those entrusted to safeguard us and work for the good of its citizens. Some examples are the IRS targeting certain groups by not only denying their rights, they gave their customer lists to their competition who are their supporters, and then pled the 5th. Then there was the Trump investigation fiasco where we saw attempted entrapment and obtaining telephone records with no warrant of any kind, which were never presented, so apparently worked against the narrative. Assange's comments at his hearing are worth noting, "I don't understand how this is equitable. This superpower had 10 years to prepare for this case and I can't access my writings. It's very difficult where I am to do anything but these people have unlimited resources. They are saying journalists and whistleblowers are enemies of the people. They have unfair advantages dealing with documents. They know the interior of my life with my psychologist. They steal my children's DNA. (which was proven) This is not equitable what is happening here." Others have plea bargained under these circumstances even when innocent because there was no prospect that justice would prevail. [360]Reply 3. Per [361]January 11, 2022 I'm a bit confused. If people can so easily be identified when using Tor, why would any goverment agent use it? It's not like other goverments wont know of US' usage of Tor for agency purposes and would of course put resources into unmasking them, finding security holes etc. Wouldn't this place them at the same risk as anyone else using Tor? [362]Reply 4. Publius [363]December 27, 2021 Thank you for writing this, Sven! Eye opening for me. So, is there ANY benefit at all to using TOR over VPN? As opposed to just using (for example) SurfShark MultiHop with the Brave browser? Seems Tor over VPN doesn't offer any benefit for anonymity, security or privacy. In fact, if VPN can't help with malicious TOR exit nodes, then you're worse off with TOR over VPN? As opposed to just VPN with MultiHop and a browser like Brave? Thanks so much for this work! [364]Reply * Sven Taylor [365]December 28, 2021 "VPN with MultiHop and a browser like Brave" Yep, I would concur that is the best solution and it is what I also use. And of course, if you need to use the Tor network for some reason, such as reading ransomware blogs, then you can easily open a "New private window with Tor" in the Brave browser, with your VPN running in the background. [366]Reply * Publius [367]December 28, 2021 Awesome, thanks!! <U+1F64C> [368]Reply * HopefullyAnAnonymousGuy [369]January 23, 2022 Is it true that even if you use a VPN or Tor on a android phone all your actions are recorded into "logcats"? So google has all your actions stored anyway and can give them to thirdparties? I got curious about the darkweb from youtube and decided to go snooping around and ended up downloading a few things and went to drug sites although I did not buy anything. But now I have learned that this will always be connected to me and I am worried about this. [370]Reply * HopefullyAnAnonymousGuy [371]January 23, 2022 I know Im responding to my own comment here but I also wanted to thank you for writing this whole article. This is very insightful and obviously took alot of time and research. It was well written and interesting to read even for me Im not a big computer guy. 5. Computer-illiterate need help [372]July 2, 2021 I am confused. Suppose I use a vpn + tor. I log into some sort of .onion website. Let's say that my ip address is completely secure, and nobody knows who I am. Can the exit node still see my username, the password I use to log in, and all the data that I see/write on that site? If the exit node is malicious, can it download a virus if I try to download a file on that site? If so, why would anyone use tor for anything that involves logging into any website or involves confidential information, like financial documents or making cryptocurrency transactions? Sure, I would be anonymous, but would it not be highly insecure, even on a .onion address? Or am I missing something about how it works? Does the .onion address need to have https:// in addition to .onion? And if they know your username and your password and all your data, couldn't they steal that confidential information for their own purposes or even to try and identify you based on that? If they can steal your data like that and log into any website you visit over tor, or if they can put a virus into any file you download, or if they can see private information, would it not be safer to use a vpn that you trust and has no logs, instead of a vpn over tor? Please explain. I am computer-illiterate. [373]Reply * Stealthbomber [374]October 1, 2021 1) No, your connection to the website is TLS encrypted if you are using/seeing HTTPS in front of the website name ([375]https://www ...) Nobody in the chain will see the website content. They will however see where the packets come from and where they go. 2) Your login password is never transported in clear. At least on any website that is halfway decent secure. It is hashed in your browser and this hash is transported to the website and it compares it with what is stored in its database. This is called `Hashing'. Very simple but effective. 3) Onion addresses stay inside the Tor network. They are not exposed to a Exit node. 4) Putting a virus/malware in a downloaded file is difficult. If your website you download from uses TLS (https) they cannot manipulate your download because it is encrypted. Furthermore, if you use a secure operating system like Linux, you would be far less at risk of getting malicious downloads. By design, virus/malware made for Windows will not run on Linux. So you could download it but it would do no damage as you can't execute (run) it. VPN + TOR is the best solution so the Tor entry node does not know your ISP assigned IP address. Therefore they can't collaborate your traffic by watching all entry and exit nodes. [376]Reply 6. Doug [377]July 1, 2021 TLDR: Tor is a hangout for feds and pedos, with the US government continuing to fund its existence. In other news this week, DoubleVPN effectively protects and hides its users, some of whom are criminals, so governments shut down the VPN and seized the domain because they call it a "criminal VPN". [378]https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/authorities-seize-doublevpn-service.h… [379]Reply * Nunya Biz [380]December 21, 2021 These actions by governments speak VOLUMES. ADMIN, you should pin Doug's comment to the top. It hits the nail on the head!! Feds love it when you use their honeypot Tor project. And you better not use an "untrustworthy VPN with a money trail!" says the US government contractor Matt (the paid Tor shill) Traudt. [381]Reply 7. Paranoid US Citizen [382]June 23, 2021 Suppose TOR is nothing more than a second internet monitored by the US government. If that is the case, then if TOR becomes widespread, it will effectively allow the US to monopolize the internet. 1. Release TOR to the public for criminal use and for hiding dissidents in third world countries 2. Introduce TOR as a privacy software while reducing allowed VPNs to get more normal people to use TOR as a free alternative to a VPN 3. Completely remove all allowed VPNs 4. Heavily advertise TOR 5. Once about 99% of people use TOR, remove anything that the US doesn't like as "security risks" 6. Outlaw usage of any other networks (i.e. the internet). 7. Repeat step 5-6 in other countries If you aren't concerned about this, because you don't think you are a security risk, you should be. Think about your beliefs. I am a Christian, that means I believe what the Bible says is more authoritative than what the government says, and I have no problem disobeying a law that asks me to disobey Scripture. That makes me a security risk. Unless you believe you should obey everything the government says with no exceptions (this would put you on the side of the Nazis by the way), then YOU are a security risk. I am currently posting this using TOR, but will be finding an alternative soon to either replace or supplement it. [383]Reply 8. Jerry [384]May 22, 2021 I really liked your article on Tor. And I agree completely with this article. I have tried Tor twice-many years ago and a few years back. I will never use Tor again. I think it is crazy for anybody to trust the Tor network. News people and people in repressive countries need to find something else. I am not going to go into detail about my own experiences with Tor, but I am completely convinced that the Tor network is just a US government program that they use for their own purposes. Many of the servers used are probably owned by the US Navy, the FBI or the NSA, or even the CIA. And some people use the Tor network for criminal activity. There may be ways to use the Tor network safely, but I am not interested. [385]Reply 9. Mark Mays [386]April 18, 2021 Your article “https://restoreprivacy.com/tor/” was a great eye opener for me. I thought Tor was completely secure. Thanks for educating me. [387]Reply 10. spirit [388]April 16, 2021 i would say tor's safety depends entirely on the browser, which is the weakest part and the source of most leaks. It is a catastrophic mistake of the project to deliver the tbb in that standard config, which really is like a hybrid mode, looks good but is very bad at the same time. the pedos need javascript to watch their pervert videos, so they get what they deserve. For the innocent people who just watch youtube videos, which also needs javascript, tor is useless, because it doesent keep them private or anonymous, regardless if they use an additional vpn. The torproject is entirely unsafe for non-techies , video and media watchers, critics of governments and the State, dissidents without knowledge of the capabilities of the Forces they fear or fight . It is unsafe for most People, and that is the Reason why it failed to protect the innocent. No Balance of power in this world. [389]Reply * tom [390]June 14, 2021 did you even read this article? Tor is by no mean safe, when state actors are having the great majority of servers and therefore great control or at least overview on the network traffic [391]Reply 11. Wothamburger [392]March 23, 2021 I would like to point out that your fixation with pedophiles early in the article is... Well, disturbing. If the FBI won't disclose their methods for "uncovering" these so-called pedos, then they may have fabricated all the evidence. They are known to do this. The Michael Flynn case has been so bogged down with conflicts of interest and flat-out lies - two judges, the lawyers on BOTH SIDES, the FBI, the jury forewoman (yea!) and even the goddamn transcriptionist were all caught either trying to fabricate evidence or just flat out throw the case. They even said right to the guy they would trump up charges on his son if he didn't plead guilty. The judge said he was going for treason and the death penalty (yah!) after being promised probation. And when he finally proved his innocence, the judge dismissed the case and REFILED the exact same charges. These people are fucking monstrosities. Just that case makes the entire justice system look like a joke; it shows just how far the FBI and the law itself has fallen. Do not say the accused were "pedos" simply because the FBI says. They are less trustworthy than the CIA and NSA if you can fathom that. And don't trust the news. I've seen articles talking about how horrible it was Trump pardoned him. Pfft. If there's anyone who deserves to be pardoned it was that poor man. Either read the actual court dockets or listen to Viva Frei (where I heard it first). Bureau of investigation my ass; more like bureau full of lies. [393]Reply * Sven Taylor [394]March 23, 2021 "your fixation with pedophiles" Fixation? Maybe you need to read the article and then go back and read all of the sources. It is a well-documented fact that these types use Tor and are often busted for their actions on the Tor network. Again, this takes about 2 minutes of research. And while I do agree that the justice system, news, and political process is a joke throughout the West, that doesn't change the fact that pedos are using Tor. [395]Reply * pareo [396]March 27, 2021 Here's a message from head of pedo-circle which 1/3 of its member were arrested because of using VPN service and the rest, Tor users, remained free [397]https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/the_doghouse_pr.html/#co… [398]Reply * Sven Taylor [399]March 28, 2021 You are literally linking to a random comment that tells an unverified story, on a blog post that is over a decade old. And the word "VPN" does not even appear on the entire page, but instead something called "privacy.li". But even ignoring all of this, it seems your basic argument is, "Look, there's a VPN that didn't work right." And I would agree, there are bad VPNs that leak data, fail, etc. I've spent the past five years pointing out problems with bad VPN services, such as [400]IPVanish, [401]PureVPN, Hotspot Shield, and more. My argument has always been use a good VPN, not a bad one. And if you want to get serious, then read our guide on [402]how to really be anonymous online. 12. Oxy [403]March 20, 2021 I think this article might be misleading for a lot of people, because it sounds like it's a goverment spying app. The tools that are given to you are only as good as you implement them. You can use TOR; VPN, Bridges and route all traffic through TOR, use can use OS like Tails to further anonymize youself. Most importantly if you practice good hygiene and you use TOR for your daily use. That means there are no connection between you doing something you may not be allowed to and times when you were connected to TOR. Also it depends where you live too. Russian goverment would wipe their ass with some U.S. Warrant. I guess the simple answer to "is Tor Trustworthy and Safe?" would be Yes as much as anonymization tool could be. But it's up to users to use extra layers to further secure it. [404]Reply * Sven Taylor [405]March 21, 2021 You are assuming that Tor itself is completely safe and that's a big assumption given the evidence above. [406]Reply * Saundra [407]April 16, 2021 Tor is BS. Short and sweet. If a tool was created by some intel agency or with their help, they know how to get into it. Yeah, they just gave it away...lol. That's like thinkng that Edward Snowden is real. The whole pole-dancing, photog GF and the marriage in exile...made in heaven or a hollywood basement? As if the US govt couldn't locate the guy in Moscow if they wanted to. Please. I could locate him in Moscow, if he were there. Trust me, he's not even close. He's probably on the ISS. [408]Reply 13. Harvey [409]March 8, 2021 First you gave the good advice to distribute trust, then you concluded that normal users should "avoid tor altogether". Tor Browser gives no protection on its own from the government,but used properly it's a good anti fingerprinting tool to protect you from advertisers, who use way more than just your IP address to build their profiles. Out of the box, its a very isolated application that stops websites from learning about your device. Conversly, VPNs protect you from the government, but not from advertisers, who will still identify you instantly from all the info your device gives away aside from just your IP address. To protect against both threats, both tools should be used in tandem. Not Tor without VPN, and not VPN without Tor. P.S I also have a philisophical disagreement. You made it sound like the government releasing tor publicly so it would be more effective as an anonymity tool is a bad thing. On its own that doesn't count as a con, since it just means that the trust (or in your case, lack thereof) goes to the effectiveness of the tool itself, not to the good intentions of the people who made it, and not to any legislation/jurisdiction that the creator may or may not care about. Also, releasing it publicly means taking the good with the bad. We help them do spooky stuff, but we also help people anonymously doing good stuff. And even if tor didn't exist, would VPN companies ban government officials from using them? Ignoring the other flaws for a second, isn't it better to trust in effective encryption than it is to trust in humans? [410]Reply * Sven Taylor [411]March 8, 2021 I've never said VPNs can do everything. This is usually a straw-man argument that is often used in the anti-VPN argument: "VPNs don't make you anonymous because trackers... hurr durr... so don't use VPNs!" Of course, we recommend many different [412]privacy tools, to include a VPN, secure browser, and ad/tracker blocker. And you don't need Tor to block trackers and ads. There are many other [413]ad blocking methods that work better and more efficiently. [414]Reply 14. Reginald [415]January 4, 2021 Hi Sven, if one uses VPN before Tor, is it possible for the ISP to know the user is using Tor? I know the VPN can, but just wondering if ISP can tell the data was Tor even though it's encrypted via the VPN? I'm sure I remember reading the packet byte size was always the same with Tor, making it obvious, but maybe the VPN changes that? Thanks! [416]Reply * Sven Taylor [417]January 4, 2021 Correct. A VPN before Tor conceals your activities and your ISP (or network admin) will not be able see what you're doing, whether it is Tor or anything else. They will only see that your computer has an encrypted connection to an IP address that belongs to a VPN server, but all traffic remains encrypted. This also would have saved Eldo Kim, the hoaxer from Harvard, if he had used a VPN before connecting to Tor. [418]Reply * CrashBandicoot [419]November 13, 2021 Can you use multiple vpn servers over tor? ex. Laptop->VPN1->VPN2->VPN3->Tor->internet [420]Reply * CrashBandicoot [421]November 13, 2021 #Update# Ok i just saw that [422]article about multihops.. I always had that idea in my mind and never knew it actually existed. But now i know that i really can be anonymouse. How i would do it is using linux while using virtual machine inside virtual machine. then ofcourse using double vpn or multihops . Vpn on router, vpn on computer (vm) 15. human being [423]December 10, 2020 sentinel? no, it tries to connect to google at firstrun [424]Reply 16. Will Wheaton [425]November 24, 2020 So, if using the tor bridge, does it make the connection slower or faster to soome connections arpund the world? Usong tor browser i mean. Also, reply button doesnt work. [426]Reply 17. Will Wheaton [427]November 16, 2020 So, vpn (which is already connected) + tor mobile browser (connecting tor) , just for browsing the webs not the deep web is ok? I mean how the connection should be. Also, what do you think of sentinel dvpn + tor.? Cheers. [428]Reply 18. Will Wheaton [429]November 15, 2020 So, november 2020... So dont use tor browser for andriod is the best advice? Just for surfing the web is my main reason. Btw fennec for andriod lets you do about:config with firefox latest update plus with addons and all. [430]Reply 19. Anne omnibus [431]November 14, 2020 About:config not accessible in torbrowser 10.0.4 [432]Reply * Saundra [433]April 16, 2021 But it's accessible in 10.0.11? Because it is. [434]Reply 20. resident without a p [435]October 24, 2020 Note to the bridge users on tor: obfs4 engine caught trying to connect to dns on clearnet when requesting a new bridge, this cannot be safe and should be only allowed on socks tor dns "after" already been connected to tor. It is understood that in some countries you will not be able to connect to the tor net before request a new bridge, however , it is not understood why only a few "wellknown" bridges are hard-coded with static addresses in the ffox config file. It makes no sense when those new bridges need to be requested, when all available bridges easily could be updated directly with regular torbrowser updates. finally, tor should never connect to clearnet dns just saying based on own awareness [436]Reply 21. ivestigator [437]September 30, 2020 i just dont know why many ppl think tor attracts the attention of the Controlfreaks and vpns not.... what exactly is it what you dont understand of the term " Controlfreaks " ??? just b realistic for yourselves, there's a simple parameter to consider: Considering that Controlfreaks are mainly after Crimes, their logical thinking is.... hide => suspicious suspicious => need to know whats hidden need to know whats hidden => break of privacy & anonymity thats it ! you ( like me) may be just a privacy intussiast, advocat who just try to defend your basic human rights , but for the controlfreaks you appear to be just another suspect because its the way of thinking a controlfreak. this fact may keep the flame of eternal conflict of interest up. But another thing on the extreme corner is... Crimes against Humanity, which is really something the controlfreaks should be worried about, because they could one day end as the hunted for what they systematly and arrogantly did or are doing. for example: you do an update of your operating system, and the amount of data involved in the process is so big (not just some hunderts megabytes, but several gb's), you cannot believe anymore its a regular update, seams more a kind of image of what you have. So what are those Controlfreaks doing with all the data? is it ok to collect all the data of the users without their knowledge and agreement, this worldwide ? [438]Reply 22. JDS [439]September 25, 2020 It's an interesting question, for sure. Why use Tor when you can use a VPN and not attract any attention? Providers like Perfect Privacy and ProtonVPN certainly offer a good alternative. I prefer to use both. One of those providers coupled with the Tor Browser is more than enough for me. My threat model, along with probably the majority of your readers here, is uninteresting and will probably never warrant using Tor. You really have to ask yourself if using Tor defeats the entire purpose of the level of anonymity you were hoping to achieve. Unless you have a need for onion sites Tor appears at this point to be unnecessary. Hiding ones web traffic from ISP's should be enough for just about everyone. Why direct attention to yourself? I have a difficult time thinking that Tor users aren't actively monitored on the clear web, VPN or not. I don't have to wear a tinfoil hat to think that adversaries are actively trying to piece clearnet/Tor usage together. I honestly don't think it matters what you are up to while using Tor for this to happen. The question really is "Why bother"? Something for the Tor Cult to consider. [440]Reply * Saundra [441]April 16, 2021 They aren't TRYING to piece anything together. They don't have to try, it's done. You aren't hiding from the bigger agencies, just your own isp, at most, and probably keeping your vape-smoking neighbor from sniffing your traffic. [442]Reply 23. Axel [443]August 15, 2020 Hello sir. I just wanted to thank you for this very informative article. You are absolutely right about how Tor is promoted today, as many of this stuff you mentioned is not widely spoken of. Many people, myself included, appear to misunderstand how Tor works and the risks that come with it. [444]Reply 24. tony [445]July 18, 2020 Hi could you write guide about hidding openvpn in ssh a)user->ovpn->ssh->internet or... b)user->tor->ssh->internet My home isp totally consorship tor and openvpn protocol. They have I mean strong DPI. I leave in desert and there is no other isp to choce.. In NY in my second home there is no problem. I like hkrs..tunnel they are awsome:) Normally DPI witch ssh can not recognize ..torore ovpn witch ssh layer over. I want use ssh as vpn and vpn witch ssh. Best Regards [446]Reply 25. Rebel [447]May 9, 2020 185.159.156.0 185.159.156.255 256 AS8473 ProtonVPN-SE1 SE, Arno 185.159.157.0 185.159.157.255 256 AS59898 ProtonVPN-CH2 CH, Plan-les-Ouates 185.159.158.0 185.159.158.255 256 AS56704 ProtonVPN-IS1 IS, Reykjavik 185.159.159.0 185.159.159.255 256 AS19905 ProtonVPN-CH1 CH, Plan-les-Ouates Autonomous System 8473 AS name BAHNHOF Reg. date 1997-09-18 Organization [448]http://www.bahnhof.net/ ID ORG-BIA1-RIPE Country SE, Sweden...ups RIR RIPE NCC prefix count 96 unique ip count 591.104 ipv4 peers 80 Autonomous System 59898 AS name AS-ALLSAFE Reg. date 2017-03-27 Organization Allsafe LLC Hauterive, Neuchatel, Switzerland ID ORG-AS591-RIPE Country CH, Switzerland RIR RIPE NCC prefix count 7 unique ip count 1.792 ipv4 peers 4 Autonomous System 56704 AS name FARICE-AS Reg. date 2011-04-28 Organization ID ORG-Fe9-RIPE Country IS, Iceland RIR RIPE NCC prefix count 5 unique ip count 4.096 ipv4 peers 21 Autonomous System 19905 AS name NEUSTAR-AS6 Reg. date 2007-08-24 Organization NeuStar, Inc. ID NEUS Country US, United States....ups City Sterling Region/State VA RIR ARIN prefix count 154 unique ip count 41.728 ipv4 peers 32 good luck with the 100eyes [449]Reply 26. notmyname [450]April 25, 2020 would you say Mozilla Firefox modified for privacy according to your guide with a VPN is better than tor browser with a VPN in terms of privacy? [451]Reply * Sven Taylor [452]April 25, 2020 It seems with the latest Tor browser update, they are making it more and more difficult to use the Tor browser without the Tor network. So yes, at this point, I'd opt for modified Firefox that is secure and hardened for privacy, with one of our [453]recommended VPN services. [454]Reply 27. Nomen Nescio [455]March 29, 2020 > Tor has garnered a cult-like following in recent years among people who pretend it’s infallible. Honest criticism of Tor is often met with accusations of “FUD” and ad-hominem attacks, so as not to disrupt the collective Groupthink. I have experienced this. I was viciously attacked on Reddit a couple years ago when I brought up what I thought was a valid point which should be investigated, about the first Tor node which was always the same. Intuitively this does not feel like a secure situation, but I was kind of shouted down by some users. Curiously, I can't find back my post now which as I remember I posted on r/Tor. [456]Reply 28. postdoc [457]March 27, 2020 VPN is a centralization of information about you and thus centralization of power over you. The perceived safety of Tor comes from decentralizing this information and its power. It's analogical to autocracy vs democracy debate. You can argue that a country under one wise and virtuous ruler works way better and more efficiently than any democratic one, but for many such system is just too dangerous. They prefer to let idiots vote rather than give all the power to one person, whoever he would be. [458]Reply 29. rebel [459]February 2, 2020 vpns arent more secure than tor, tor isnt more anonymous than vpns. tor nodes are all registered ip nodes, vpns are all registered, aswell as proxies of all kind, therefore vulnerable to spy . fingerprinting is gotten more sophisticated than most ppl are aware of. IX nodes , aka internet exange nodes (probably all) are not your friends. bckd0rs everywhere, full of fake ssl, fake secure software, fake secure hardware, etc.. who has the taxpayers money?..exactly, those who have everything. dont forget it , lazy sheeps in tha democracy. you let it happen.. the law_warfare against you and your children. [460]Reply 246. https://restoreprivacy.com/tor/ 249. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink 250. https://www.engadget.com/2016/01/07/fbi-hacked-the-dark-web-to-bust-1-500-p… 251. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/technology/online-dark-web-drug-markets.… 252. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents… 253. https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-research-report-on-the-tor… 254. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5x4q/court-docs-show-a-univers… 255. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/22/legal_wrecking_balls_break_budget_… 258. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/judge-confirms-what-many-suspec… 259. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2719591-Farrell-Weds.html 260. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/01/did-feds-mount-a-sustained-atta… 261. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/01/did-feds-mount-a-sustained-atta… 262. https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1545&format=pdf 263. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4x3qnj/how-the-nsa-or-anyone-else-can-cr… 266. https://www.techtimes.com/articles/200592/20170307/fbi-drops-child-pornogra… 269. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4379303-Bbg-Tor-Emails-Stack-21.html 272. https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/claim-tor-does-not-provide-backdoors-to… 273. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4379303-Bbg-Tor-Emails-Stack-21.html 274. https://cdn-resprivacy.pressidium.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Bbg-Tor-Em… 275. https://surveillancevalley.com/the-tor-files/the-tor-files-transparency-for… 278. https://www.wbur.org/news/2013/12/18/pdf-criminal-complaint-harvard-bomb-th… 279. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/17/justice/massachusetts-harvard-hoax/ 280. https://www.smh.com.au/technology/the-hack-of-the-year-20071113-gdrkxw.html… 281. https://www.smh.com.au/technology/the-hack-of-the-year-20071113-gdrkxw.html… 282. https://www.wired.com/2010/06/wikileaks-documents/ 283. https://blog.torproject.org/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous 284. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/11/law-enforcement-seiz… 285. https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-… 286. https://gizmodo.com/someone-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-servers-on-the… 287. https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-ma… 288. https://web.archive.org/web/20190807043523/https://www.scmagazineuk.com/tor… 289. https://cdn-resprivacy.pressidium.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/10_honions… 292. https://www.itproportal.com/2014/10/28/ever-used-tor-then-you-need-to-check… 295. https://www.securityweek.com/onionduke-apt-malware-distributed-malicious-to… 298. https://www.techtimes.com/articles/167002/20160626/the-fbi-can-still-spy-on… 299. https://cdn-resprivacy.pressidium.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Opinion-an… 300. https://archive.org/details/3_fr_t2_15h_4-Dingledine_a 301. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Dingledine 302. https://archive.org/details/3_fr_t2_15h_4-Dingledine_a 303. https://cdn-resprivacy.pressidium.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/3_fr_t2_15… 304. https://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/ 305. https://www.evernote.com/shard/s1/sh/8065781b-2110-4d01-bda7-a71a0e2b9e42/6… 306. https://www.evernote.com/shard/s1/sh/23cf697d-2353-4247-815c-b4efa35d8639/3… 307. https://pando.com/2015/12/18/tor-project-super-secure-anonymity-network-wil… 308. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Agency_for_Global_Media 309. https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/notes-bbg-cia-cutout-funding-of-tor-pro… 310. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_State 311. https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/state-department-funding-tor-project 312. https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/notes-on-pentagon-funding-of-the-tor-pr… 313. https://www.evernote.com/l/AAH7pJeJr95LUZE0rbTG2QeH7EZGBA7gWr4 314. https://web.archive.org/web/20051126055913/https://tor.freehaven.net/people… 315. https://archive.org/details/3_fr_t2_15h_4-Dingledine_a 316. https://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/ 317. https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 318. https://www.csoonline.com/article/2228873/microsoft-subnet/no-conspiracy-th… 319. https://archive.is/WR9X1 320. https://pando.com/2014/11/14/tor-smear/ 323. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/ 324. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/windows-drm-files-used-to-de… 327. https://www.smh.com.au/technology/the-hack-of-the-year-20071113-gdrkxw.html… 328. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/best/ 329. https://medium.com/@thegrugq/tor-and-its-discontents-ef5164845908 330. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/best/netflix/ 333. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/no-logs/ 334. https://restoreprivacy.com/secure-email/ 335. https://restoreprivacy.com/5-eyes-9-eyes-14-eyes/ 336. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/multi-hop/ 337. https://archive.fo/IzoMI 338. https://archive.is/2QWkY 339. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorPlusVPN#You-VPNSSH-Tor 340. https://archive.fo/J9YZV 341. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_(surveillance_program) 342. https://www.pbs.org/video/frontline-room-641a/ 343. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/no-logs/ 344. https://restoreprivacy.com/ipvanish-provides-logs-to-authorities/ 345. https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting 346. https://archive.is/15rhK 347. https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#CanExitNodesEavesdrop 348. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn-vs-tor/ 349. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn-logs-lies/ 350. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/scams/ 351. https://restoreprivacy.com/vpn/best/free/ 352. https://medium.com/@thegrugq/tor-and-its-discontents-ef5164845908 353. https://cdn-resprivacy.pressidium.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/usersroute… 354. https://web.archive.org/web/20190807043523/https://www.scmagazineuk.com/tor… 355. 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1 0

torproject forum hosted by 3rd party, not least of problems
by grarpamp 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

On 1/13/22, nusenu <nusenu-lists(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Since tor-talk is apparently going to be closed down soon [1], > here are a few suggestions: > > [1] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/support/-/issues/40057 > > let us know whether/when you will be closing tor-relays as well https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2021-October/045779.html " I was surprised to learn that the forum is _not_ self-hosted on torproject infrastructure. It is hosted by "Civilized Discourse Construction Kit, Inc." the company behind discourse.org. That means the torproject does not have full control over the infrastructure and its security and logging practices. The forum privacy policy mentions that IPs get logged and stored over an extensive amount of time https://forum.torproject.net/privacy As Jérôme pointed out [5] the forum is also subject to discourse's privacy policy " Lol. Not to mention that hosted and "web" based means that users can, unlike distributed standalone email, now be more central exploited on attack surface from server side in browser/JS/etc by rogue, bought, mole'd staff, corp changeup, court order, etc at these companies. And who cares what the channel is when every single Tor Project communication channel has been intentionally "bricked up" and 100% fully and completely censored for *years* by the Tor Project Inc to avoid embarassement, avoid being called out, preserve their personal cashflows, keep users from learning all of tor's weaknesses and then forking or developing better, more variety, and or more resistant anon overlay projects etc. After all, Tor's monetary captured people rake in multiple millions of dollars every year, including by problematic fundraising nft drops, off a conveniently Govt funded design that's well over 20+ years old, that even the NSA was quoted well over 10+ years ago saying that the NSA could exploit tor. NSA GCHQ FVEY and myriad private and GovCorp adversaries have all since then advanced their attacks and technology light years ahead of tor's baked design. While Tor adds irrelavant non-design trappings and periphery and social-activism, decides to cancel users free concious choice to use v2 Onioncat IPv6+UDP transport for whatever they want and terminates that entire good class of usage, innovation, and app development within onionland, censors user and operator knowledge of same, ejects people who like code but refuse to apologize for Tor or/play its socio-politic, game, monoculture, and more, Tor's Government funded social marketing engine also consumes and starves out a lot of funding from and steers messaging in a space that needs a distributed nature in all things. If the world knew how the Tor Project Incorporated has become total hypocrites of the Freedom of Speech they claim to support, Tor Project would be defunded, users would leave in disgust, and the crypto overlay network space would flourish anew generation again. The fact of Tor Project's secret censorship agenda alone is enough. Add in refusing to routinely acknowledge and publicly disclose for users in exceedingly prominent places that Traffic Analysis and Sybil are in operation, actually removing warnings from their website, pasting over them with safe sounding phrases, putting users at risk that way, among many other problems... makes things even more serious. https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/categories/19-Tor " Today, the Tor Project seems to be more focused on fund raising than actual privacy, anonymity, or anti-censorship. " "Tor Stinks -- NSA"

3 6

[twitter] snapshot of cutting edge public transformer model research
by fuzzyTew 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

I am very lucky to have one of the content feed AIs out there give me content that is not random and/or gross. This twitter feed gives me high-quality artificial intelligence research papers, tutorials, etc, new ones almost every day. I hope it keeps up. I see the AK user a lot in this feed. arXiv.org ShapeFormer: Transformer-based Shape Completion via Sparse Representation We present ShapeFormer, a transformer-based network that produces a distribution of object completions, conditioned o... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…> ---------- AK sharedAK shared arXiv.org PONI: Potential Functions for ObjectGoal Navigation with... State-of-the-art approaches to ObjectGoal navigation rely on reinforcement learning and typically require significant... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…> ---------- AK sharedAK shared arXiv.org SPIRAL: Self-supervised Perturbation-Invariant Representation... We introduce a new approach for speech pre-training named SPIRAL which works by learning denoising representation of ... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…> ---------- AK sharedAK shared arXiv.org Improving the fusion of acoustic and text representations in RNN-T The recurrent neural network transducer (RNN-T) has recently become the mainstream end-to-end approach for streaming ... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…> ---------- AK sharedAK shared arXiv.org Zero-Shot Long-Form Voice Cloning with Dynamic Convolution Attention With recent advancements in voice cloning, the performance of speech synthesis for a target speaker has been rendered... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…> ---------- AK sharedAK shared arXiv.org Transformer-Based Video Front-Ends for Audio-Visual Speech Recognition Audio-visual automatic speech recognition (AV-ASR) extends the speech recognition by introducing the video modality. ... Read more at Twitter <https://twitter.com/i/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fi%2Ftopics%2…>

1 0

Hungarians walk among us
by professor rat 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

Imre Lakatos’s basic idea is that a research programme constitutes good science—the sort of science it is rational to stick with and rational to work on—if it is progressive, and bad science—the kind of science that is, at least, intellectually suspect—if it is degenerating. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lakatos/

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TechRadar: Intel might have a plan to keep up with Moore's Law
by jim bell 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

TechRadar: Intel might have a plan to keep up with Moore's Law. https://www.techradar.com/news/intel-might-have-a-plan-to-keep-up-with-moor… "However a patent unearthed by Twitter user @Underfox3 has found that the company could well be developing a plan: stacking transistors on top of each other for better performance in less space. Now, of course, this is only a patent – companies patent weird and whacky things all the time for a variety of reasons, most likely to prevent competitors from getting the jump on them. " "But there is something interesting about Intel thinking its way around the problem of how to squeeze more power into ever-smaller spaces - namely, if this design comes to fruition, Intel could be looking at sub-2 nanometer (nm) processes."

1 0

Fwd: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY
by Gunnar Larson 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

This makes us seem super aggressive. Oh, well. Have you heard of Kiva.org? ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <noreply(a)its.ny.gov> Date: Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 10:55 AM Subject: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY To: <g(a)xny.io> Thank you for submitting your FOIL request through Open FOIL NY. Here is your Open FOIL NY confirmation information for future reference: LARSON_NYSP_20220126105517996 LARSON_DOB_20220126105517996 LARSON_DHSES_20220126105517996 *INFORMATION SUBMITTED:* *Records Requested From* New York State Police Division of the Budget Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services *Short Title* New York City Police Department MoneyGram Relationship *Description* Dear Sir or Madam: xNY.io research: https://docs.google.com/document/d/10htpAEAcydm9NTgUQZVU4aEfJq999UwRlGvOJZs… The New York City Police Department has a relationship with MoneyGram. We would like to receive any and all information related to the NYPD's relationship with MoneyGram ticket payment options. For example, we would like to receive a copy of the Terms and Conditions the NYPD has with MoneyGram. Furthermore, how does NY-DFS manage discretion with MoneyGram and the New York State BitLicense. For example, Ripple, a New York State BitLicense awardee has a long history with MoneyGram. Are MoneyGram and the NYPD in bed together, via the New York State Department of Financial Services? Thank you, Gunnar Larson *Uploaded Files* *FOIL Response Format* Email *If fees apply, please contact me if costs will be greater than* $1000000 Your FOIL request has been forwarded to the organization(s) you selected, and the respective Records Access Officer will contact you directly for further processing of your request. Please allow up to five business days for such communication(s). For your convenience, here is additional contact information: New York State Police 1220 Washington Avenue Bldg 22 Albany, NY 12226-2252 Division of the Budget State Capitol Room 128 Albany, NY 12224 Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 1220 Washington Ave Building 7A Albany, NY 12226 -- *Gunnar Larson - xNY.io <http://www.xNY.io> | Bank.org <http://Bank.org>* MSc <https://www.unic.ac.cy/blockchain/msc-digital-currency/?utm_source=Google&u…> - Digital Currency MBA <https://www.unic.ac.cy/business-administration-entrepreneurship-and-innovat…> - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001

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A Fake Twitter Account Was Set Up in Our Name; Here’s What Happened Next
by Gunnar Larson 27 Jan '22

27 Jan '22

*Wall Street On Parade* has the following business model: we focus our attention on research and bringing important facts and news about Wall Street and its perpetual sugar daddy, the Fed, to our readers. If our readers feel these articles deserve a wider circulation, we encourage them to link to them on their own social media pages. This spares us the downtime of engaging on social media, thus giving us more time for research. This business model has worked well for us for a decade. On January 14 we were doing research for an upcoming article when we accidentally stumbled upon a Twitter page called @wallstonparade. It was using our full trademarked name, “Wall Street On Parade,” and displaying our copyright. It was also using our slogan: “A Citizen Guide to Wall Street” and posting sections of our daily articles. Fortunately, and through simply a stroke of luck (or divine intervention) we caught it after only a few days of operation. We were stunned that someone was brazen enough to think they could get away with the illegal use of a trademarked name. We were further stunned that Twitter didn’t have a system of due diligence to prevent this from happening. We did some quick research at Twitter and learned that they allow fan sites, as long as strict rules were followed. Those rules included stating emphatically on the Twitter page that you are not the real owner of the name or trademark. This Twitter page seemed to be going out of its way to represent itself as the actual *Wall Street On Parade*. We immediately filed a complaint form for trademark infringement with Twitter, supplying all of the requested documentation and proof of ownership. We received an automated response on the same day, January 14, giving us a ticket number for our complaint. A week later, the fake Twitter page was still happily rolling along, violating our trademark and Tweeting out our content. At one point, it even re-Tweeted content from another Twitter user, giving the impression that *Wall Street On Parade* was endorsing this user. At another point, a Twitter user replied: “Didn’t know the Martens were on here. Nice.” This indicated that, indeed, our identities had been purloined. The person or persons who had set up the Twitter page made no effort, whatsoever, to explain that they were not the actual Martens. https://wallstreetonparade.com/2022/01/a-fake-twitter-account-was-set-up-in… -- *Gunnar Larson - xNY.io <http://www.xNY.io> | Bank.org <http://Bank.org>* MSc <https://www.unic.ac.cy/blockchain/msc-digital-currency/?utm_source=Google&u…> - Digital Currency MBA <https://www.unic.ac.cy/business-administration-entrepreneurship-and-innovat…> - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001

1 0

Fwd: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY
by Gunnar Larson 26 Jan '22

26 Jan '22

FYI ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <noreply(a)its.ny.gov> Date: Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 9:25 AM Subject: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY To: <g(a)xny.io> Thank you for submitting your FOIL request through Open FOIL NY. Here is your Open FOIL NY confirmation information for future reference: LARSON_DFS_20220126092534880 LARSON_DHSES_20220126092534880 *INFORMATION SUBMITTED:* *Records Requested From* Department of Financial Services Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services *Short Title* NYCCoin NY-DFS Superintendent and New York Mayor Collusion *Description* Dear Sir or Madam: Many experts are concerned about MIA Coin and resulting NYCCoin disasters. We would like to receive any and all documents related between the NY-DFS Superintendent and the New York City Mayor's office related to NYCCoin. Thank you, Gunnar Larson *Uploaded Files* *FOIL Response Format* Email *If fees apply, please contact me if costs will be greater than* $1000000 Your FOIL request has been forwarded to the organization(s) you selected, and the respective Records Access Officer will contact you directly for further processing of your request. Please allow up to five business days for such communication(s). For your convenience, here is additional contact information: Department of Financial Services One State Street 20th Floor New York, NY 10004 Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 1220 Washington Ave Building 7A Albany, NY 12226 -- *Gunnar Larson - xNY.io <http://www.xNY.io> | Bank.org <http://Bank.org>* MSc <https://www.unic.ac.cy/blockchain/msc-digital-currency/?utm_source=Google&u…> - Digital Currency MBA <https://www.unic.ac.cy/business-administration-entrepreneurship-and-innovat…> - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001

1 0

Fwd: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY
by Gunnar Larson 26 Jan '22

26 Jan '22

FYI ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: <noreply(a)its.ny.gov> Date: Wed, Jan 26, 2022 at 8:57 AM Subject: FOIL Request Confirmation from Open FOIL NY To: <g(a)xny.io> Thank you for submitting your FOIL request through Open FOIL NY. Here is your Open FOIL NY confirmation information for future reference: LARSON_DFS_20220126085729415 LARSON_DHSES_20220126085729415 *INFORMATION SUBMITTED:* *Records Requested From* Department of Financial Services Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services *Short Title* Lending Club Board of Directors - September 11 NY-DFS September 11 Resignation *Description* Dear Sir or Madam: Please submit any and all records related to the LendingClub.com September 11 Board of Directors resignation below. The date of the resignation is in question. You may understand the sensitive nature of the date of the resignation. Gunnar Larson Sun, Oct 24, 2021, 5:06 PM to Anuj, Investor, Press Hello there: Thank you very much for the reply. Gunnar On Sun, Oct 24, 2021, 11:36 AM Anuj Nayar wrote: Hi Gunnar On September 11, 2021, in connection with her nomination to serve as superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, Adrienne Harris notified us of her resignation, effective September 12, 2021, from the Company’s Board. Details can be found in the 8k filed on 9/15/21 (below) https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001409970/bbc437e4-2920-4d5d-8e0… From: Gunnar Larson Date: Saturday, October 23, 2021 at 9:37 AM To: Investor Relations , Press Cc: Gunnar Larson Subject: [EXT] LendingClub: Current Board of Directors CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Dear Madam or Sir: Good day to you. Surveying market research, I was wondering if you can kindly confirm, from LendingClub's July 15, 2021 press release: Is Ms. Adrienne Harris currently a member of LendingClub's board of directors? https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lendingclub-appoints-adrienne-harr… [prnewswire.com] Reviewing your website, Ms. Harris is not referenced: https://www.lendingclub.com/company/leadership Bloomberg and other sources do not reference Ms. Harris as a LendingClub board member: https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/LC:US [bloomberg.com] Sending you the very best regards. Thank you, Gunnar -- Gunnar Larson - xNY.io [xny.io] | Bank.org [bank.org] MSc [unic.ac.cy] - Digital Currency MBA [unic.ac.cy] - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001 *Uploaded Files* *FOIL Response Format* Email *If fees apply, please contact me if costs will be greater than* $1000000 Your FOIL request has been forwarded to the organization(s) you selected, and the respective Records Access Officer will contact you directly for further processing of your request. Please allow up to five business days for such communication(s). For your convenience, here is additional contact information: Department of Financial Services One State Street 20th Floor New York, NY 10004 Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 1220 Washington Ave Building 7A Albany, NY 12226 -- *Gunnar Larson - xNY.io <http://www.xNY.io> | Bank.org <http://Bank.org>* MSc <https://www.unic.ac.cy/blockchain/msc-digital-currency/?utm_source=Google&u…> - Digital Currency MBA <https://www.unic.ac.cy/business-administration-entrepreneurship-and-innovat…> - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip) G(a)xNY.io +1-646-454-9107 New York, New York 10001

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