December 2013 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
by John Young 06 Jan '14

06 Jan '14

Brian Carroll rightly expands the discussion of pervasive targeting by ubiquitous technology. In architecture, for example, the increasing use of automation for controlling building systems -- HVAC, electrical, plumbing, security among others -- poses considerable vulnerabilities beyond legacy analog controls. Many of the automated systems are administered remotely over telephone, cable and wireless networks. Others are controlled locally within structures. Some are secured with encryption but many are not. And few are TEMPEST-protected outside military and governmental facilities. We have found that few architects and building engineers are knowledgeable about building automated systems nor the variety of means to secure and protect them. They are customarily designed, operated and maintained by specialty firms not traditional building designers. Moreover we have found that building management and maintenance staff rely upon outside firms for advanced technology, thus subjecting their facilties to unsupervised interventions by outside personnel who may themselves be sub-contractors, and sub-subs for each component of automation. In short, it is fairly easy to interdict and access building automation systems for implanting devices, injecting packets, tampering with OSes, siphoning networks, temporarily suspending security, all the things recently revealed in the 30c3 presentations. Digital security and TSCM experts are familiar with many of these vulnerabilities but there is a common practice to specialize in services (often at client request) and neglect comprehensive coverage. For example, to inspect communications and security systems but not HVAC, plumbing, electrical and automation systems which often have far more inadvertent emitters and transceivers contained in extensive components throughout a structure. NSA TAO and the joint CIA-NSA Special Collection Service are especially capable to expoit these gaps, and usually send teams composed of experts in each building system to determine a comprehensive attack on vulnerabilities, and shrewdly, planting multiple and various decoys to mislead counterspies. A catalog of these full-scope operations would be quite informative and perhaps diminish the effectiveness of ruses and decoys, in particular the kind of solo operation valorized in movies, books and TV.

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Re: [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
by grarpamp 05 Jan '14

05 Jan '14

>>> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-November/031001.html >> https://bayimg.com/BAfJGAafB > Sorry, but no. > Tor mailing lists are not places where spreading rape culture is ok, > whatever the point you are trying to make. Perhaps it is a leaked artistic caricature of a fun/educational play session between consenting parties in something like edukink, sfcitadel, soj, tes, fetlife and the like. Perhaps it is something else. As with all art... interpretation, learning, and appreciation or lack thereof is upon the viewer. No need to click links or start wars over them if you don't like. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_speech_versus_blasphemy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_speech https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journalism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humor > Roger's original request was for a mashup he could use in his > presentations to LEAs and to the NSA itself. > Somehow I don't see him using this. :-) Surely some NSA listening post is getting a really good laugh after ingesting that link. Here's more that would make equally good follow ons to their previously leaked slides when mashed together in a future presentation... https://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&q=nsa+parody https://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&q=nsa+humor / Agreed. It's offensive and frankly lazy. / http://i.imgur.com/PV2q1ZO.gif Oh really? Here we thought 'fuck'ing was offensive. _ I like the double entendre: FreeBSD > Linux :) _ Accurate and funny. Nice work. Someone should add a Fawkes mask in the shoetip for added effect. Now that everyone's well represented, no further comment.

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P2P VPN
by Matej Kovacic 05 Jan '14

05 Jan '14

Hi, this might be of interest to you: https://code.google.com/p/badvpn/ Peer-to-peer VPN The VPN part of this project implements a Layer 2 (Ethernet) network between the peers (VPN nodes). The peers connect to a central server which acts as a chat server for them to establish direct connections between each other (data connections). These connections are used for transferring network data (Ethernet frames), and can be secured with a multitude of mechanisms. Notable features are: * UDP and TCP transport * Converges very quickly after a new peer joins * IGMP snooping to deliver multicasts efficiently (e.g. for IPTV) * Double SSL: if SSL is enabled, not only do peers connect to the server with SSL, but they use an additional layer of SSL when exchanging messages through the server * Features related to the NAT problem: 1. Can work with multiple layers of NAT (needs configuration) 2. Local peers inside a NAT can communicate directly 3. Relaying as a fallback (needs configuration) More info here: https://code.google.com/p/badvpn/wiki/badvpn P. S. It would be nice to see this with easy to use GUI and prepacked binaries for all "main" systems... Regards, M.

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Re: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
by coderman 03 Jan '14

03 Jan '14

On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 1:23 AM, cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)riseup.net> wrote: >... > Some of your stuff is at cpunks.wordpress.com and at JYA cryptome.org as > well. also, https://peertech.org/dist/cypherpunks-199209-199812.tar.bz2 sha256 579c3059e24b2d65f324053b0fed550a9d1d4fb2504a1a272940a26697ed8a33 (where else is the above mirrored? i had links, they're no longer good...) best regards,

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"To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
by griffin＠cryptolab.net 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

This talk is divided into two parts. Morgan Marquis-Boire and Claudio Guarnieri talking about the militarization of the internet in part one, including both targeted and dragnet surveillance in deep-packet inspection. (See also Citizen Labs' work on BlueCoat). In part two, Jake Appelbaum talks about some of the most hardcore and cutting-edge NSA surveillance tactics and equipment. (See also yesterday's Der Spiegel articles). Part 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZYo9TPyNko Part 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA best, Griffin -- As always, opinions are mine and kittens are cuddly :3 Seriously, go take a kitten break: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=fluffy+kittens

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peertech.org cert [was: DEF CON cell network attacks]
by coderman 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 more details here soon... only 443 should be considered valid - that is, try https://peertech.org first, plain-text must die. and remember lkaglbgpvvcmc6xc.onion in case it becomes necessary Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 2b:50:49:6a:55:85:55 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/, CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2 Validity Not Before: Dec 3 00:18:04 2013 GMT Not After : Dec 3 00:18:04 2014 GMT Subject: OU=Domain Control Validated, CN=peertech.org Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (4096 bit) Modulus (4096 bit): 00:b7:64:54:f1:2e:3a:ec:11:29:5a:93:1f:ad:f0: 16:8c:9c:eb:d9:0f:49:d2:9d:16:9a:53:a4:60:b6: 23:5b:4f:f3:17:90:77:0a:b3:25:27:f2:27:dd:65: 83:b6:e4:d5:13:b1:3b:97:5d:b5:b9:a9:62:32:4a: 7e:fb:67:73:20:5f:d7:44:52:c8:fc:ca:f8:fb:f1: 4f:d1:9d:94:39:72:12:2b:67:22:4c:0b:dc:7f:31: 34:cf:63:42:f1:c8:3d:ed:7c:de:2f:e2:63:e1:a2: 0a:c9:e6:86:dd:3f:39:73:af:01:58:d7:6d:59:7a: 51:d0:b7:bb:4c:8d:5f:1e:43:10:da:96:09:67:56: 2f:38:f6:a8:44:a7:96:9a:5c:bc:3e:6c:d6:d1:b6: 96:80:34:c8:88:84:4e:2e:06:14:0f:c5:f2:11:ff: f6:15:06:f2:25:e7:d2:1a:8d:62:ef:5c:0e:fb:44: 8e:73:da:96:23:26:03:62:5c:2b:e6:70:5c:87:76: d3:21:59:83:57:ac:56:15:bd:4f:25:fb:df:10:ec: 0e:56:fa:44:c8:8b:a4:97:ea:b1:98:71:3b:51:78: 79:ee:33:cf:b5:a5:68:15:86:9f:31:70:ee:8f:2f: f4:53:32:b7:99:4f:67:21:db:1e:5d:4f:dc:5b:5d: 59:fd:30:3e:a2:04:22:13:76:05:4c:44:d6:08:fe: b5:42:5f:b5:4a:38:4f:3d:eb:ea:59:63:ab:27:87: 7e:c4:46:3b:96:75:41:be:85:7e:e8:b5:8a:d4:11: aa:cc:6a:28:b9:50:a3:f4:45:e2:50:d5:1f:6c:bf: b8:ba:07:10:20:f8:7f:94:ec:15:d7:39:a6:fe:df: 65:78:1d:60:2c:b0:b1:76:40:82:b5:0f:d6:c8:e3: 8b:bb:f3:04:ff:80:e3:de:fc:2c:32:0e:21:13:d5: bd:38:94:a1:c8:53:da:c7:3b:a9:a5:c1:70:ea:89: ef:a7:f8:04:35:41:7e:38:05:73:ff:76:8a:c1:92: 7f:03:b8:76:48:b9:f6:61:b1:c5:22:be:b9:36:73: de:0e:b8:36:4a:9c:c5:66:3b:63:2c:be:4f:20:75: 94:03:d8:05:d0:78:12:df:77:d8:17:51:7e:3c:24: 7f:cc:c6:8e:2a:f7:bc:f8:5c:29:64:bb:10:42:4d: c0:83:64:6f:da:78:14:52:2e:97:49:e8:5d:7f:38: 36:3d:5a:5d:7c:44:71:28:21:04:6e:24:f5:f8:59: 93:1f:e9:d1:3e:6d:6d:db:93:57:8f:44:74:d6:64: e9:2b:b6:33:fd:16:81:92:29:a5:80:6a:1f:2b:78: 66:d3:ed Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:http://crl.godaddy.com/gdig2s1-6.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1 CPS: http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/ Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.godaddy.com/ CA Issuers - URI:http://certificates.godaddy.com/repository/gdig2.crt X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:40:C2:BD:27:8E:CC:34:83:30:A2:33:D7:FB:6C:B3:F0:B4:2C:80:CE X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:peertech.org, DNS:www.peertech.org X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: C6:5E:C0:43:56:84:2E:11:A3:35:C8:AC:A9:70:96:7B:A5:2E:5B:77 Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption b1:ea:a9:16:b6:9c:56:f4:59:99:df:36:69:92:a5:57:48:df: 70:55:a6:1f:5b:51:74:b4:d1:d7:5a:f6:71:e6:92:f2:56:14: 07:f4:2c:14:06:50:4a:e6:f8:32:8c:a1:ed:4b:25:50:fa:05: 99:01:74:db:45:ae:c2:ca:dc:f3:e7:ad:50:1b:12:c2:1e:ea: c8:19:41:db:b0:eb:f1:0c:c7:ba:af:c2:08:9e:7d:3c:c9:de: 5d:7f:ff:9e:c3:cc:54:bd:ac:1f:24:47:17:ae:ba:75:b7:0b: b7:ee:3b:3a:ba:2a:f7:19:19:1a:98:56:35:34:16:8a:ec:ac: 50:f0:45:7c:06:5a:fe:b1:d8:8b:13:94:5b:2c:1c:3d:b6:df: f9:79:69:b0:75:68:b3:e5:01:8e:90:85:bc:bf:92:47:ba:d0: 9c:8c:5d:28:d6:d3:17:58:96:76:ed:bf:65:75:7c:25:58:57: 2f:52:ae:9f:a9:a1:35:92:ca:28:13:b6:ae:a8:89:cf:ce:a6: cd:31:28:42:f7:66:9d:de:38:0d:4c:d5:ae:49:6c:db:92:28: a2:7c:4a:18:8e:7b:b6:0a:c9:d4:8d:0a:82:d4:04:a6:d0:3d: 8c:a6:37:ac:16:98:bd:79:49:83:60:7f:b5:dc:d7:80:aa:5d: ae:f7:11:eb - 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Jim Bell comes to Cypherpunks?
by Jim Bell 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

Since the issue was just raised about me needing a PGP key (presumably, for now, just for signing purposes), it occurred to me that the best way to get that key signed would be for me to attend a meeting of Cypherpunks. Since many such meetings occur in the Bay Area (San Francisco and environs) I could come from Vancouver Washington (Just across the Columbia river from Portland) and attend an upcoming Cypherpunks meeting. What I'd appreciate would be a local who could provide transportation (I don't do 'credit card' and they probably wouldn't rent a car to me if I did!), and possibly a place to stay for 2-3 days. Does this sound like a plan? I could bring my BOP (Bureau of Prisons) ID, smuggled out when I was released, and auction it off for bitcoins, to pay for my expenses. (It's sure to be a collector's item someday!) Jim Bell

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Fw: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
by Jim Bell 01 Jan '14

01 Jan '14

From: James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Sent: Tuesday, December 31, 2013 2:54 PM Subject: Re: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany "James A. Donald" >> As to Swartz he didn't commit any real crime so he never was, or pretended >> to be, 'above the law'. >Accessing someone else's computers without permission to obtain the >information therein is trespass. The powerful trespass against the less >powerful. He had mistaken ideas about how powerful he was. My understanding (from reading the Wikipedia article on Swartz an hour ago) was that he accessed "PACER" information. ( http://www.pacer.gov/ ) The information in PACER (which I have used a few times before, for example to access the docket for fake, forged, fraudulent "appeal" case 99-30210) is simply Federal court case files. (Dockets; filings). This material is legally in the public domain: It is not even copyrighted. I don't know if Swartz did anything 'illegal' to get into the computer that had the information, but I doubt that. Incidentally, the charge for PACER documents is now $0.10 per page, but if you run up a charge of less than $15.00 in a calendar quarter, there is no charge. (In other words, less than 150 pages downloaded are free) Jim Bell

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To Protect and Infect Slides
by John Young 31 Dec '13

31 Dec '13

30c3 slides from Jacob Appelbaum: http://cryptome.org/2013/12/appelbaum-30c3.pdf (3.8MB)

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trojan hardware (keyboard black bag implant) circa 2003
by coderman 30 Dec '13

30 Dec '13

out of time, barest gist til next year: back when doing wifi security research and other interests [trunc.] received an FBI black bag job; presumably physical focus due to non standard OSes and FDE. IBM keyboard internal chip replaced with identical logging variant; note that this is not as sophisticated as the more recent TAO toys with covert RF channels and active, on-demand capabilities... the keyboard tampering: https://peertech.org/dist/baghw04.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw05.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw06.jpg which is for all intents and purposes otherwise visually undetectable using this trojan chip technique, tailored for every common manufacturer. while that was not bad, aside from leaking tamper event, the FDE was so sad/funny. a screw amuck, replacement drive significantly different (when compared to identical lot mate purchased with original that got yanked for offline attack) https://peertech.org/dist/baghw01.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw02.jpg https://peertech.org/dist/baghw03.jpg --- in a round about manner this was all instigated in part by wifi research done at the time which put various powerful entities into a tiff. here's what the pacNW sample looked like back in early 2003: https://peertech.org/archives/wifi-scan/ "Cleartext Nodes: 8755 (62.59%) , WEP Nodes: 5232 (37.40%)" ... ah, memories :) --- one last fun learning by example: consider that you thwart direct physical access black bag type attempts, and are not running a vulnerable router/CPE, and present a sufficiently compelling target, you may encounter a clever "just outside the property line" isolation and active attack on DOCSIS uplink. (a broadcast medium is hard to mess with in a covert manner, unless you're able to isolate target from the local broadcast loop itself.) https://peertech.org/dist/docsis-mitm.jpg (circa 2007 - make note of image comments and also single "Comcast tech" shielding self behind door...)

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