Tim May,you do a disservice to crypto and our group,go die.

[mattd]

 >You do a disservice to crypto and our group by implying, even in a
backhanded way, that Bell's "AP" system was or is in any way feasible.
Where's the true untraceable cash needed?
Please explain.
--Tim May

 >In 1995 the U.S. Secret Service reported less than one percent of seized 
counterfeit bills were created using a home computer. Last year, 47 percent 
of seized bills were produced with a computer and printer. and...Who needs 
untraceable anonymity when throwaway pseudonymous accounts
should suffice? and...untraceable digital cash is not
strictly needed.Merely enough trustworthy
netizens to promise to send their pledge to the 'predictor' who remains
anonymous.Do you take payment in kind? Strangers on a train? The hawala 
system for APster.
Security for pledgers who default? The remailers will be bigger than SETI 
but Howie and Chaum light the way.

 >>A few ideas to get the ball rolling:
Active privacy protection:
Collect the information a zealous G-man or Gestapo craves - (AP police? pr.)
fingerprints, DNA, dossier, phone logs, etc., but encrypt
and
un traceably divide it through remailers in locations chosen
randomly by input from me and those collecting it. As long
as I keep regularly anonymously authenticating myself, the
pieces can neither be located to destroy or compromise them,
or reunited. If my transmissions stop for some period, say
because I blew myself up in a suicide attack, the different
providers send their pieces to the authorities and the game
is up. I can assign a digital Power of Attorney or
inheritance for others to maintain my privacy when I can't,
but, if a grand jury investigating the plane I hijacked
publicly and legally indicts or subpoenas me (or the alias
under which I bought my plane ticket), they can broadcast a
code that retrieves some or all the data. However their
actual locations are unknown: if I set it up that way,
after some interval they also send it to my lawyer, a
selection of newspapers, etc.
Un-audit able taps:
Record full taps of all telephone and email conversations.
Encrypt with multiple keys and/or divide the bits and store
with redundancy and active privacy protection in multiple
locations through remailers, as before. The conversation
may only continue while the recording is anonymously proven
to be occurring. During the statutory storage period, the
providers anonymously check one another, and regenerate in a
new randomly chosen location if one provider disappears. On
the statutory expiration date, all the pieces do.
Watchdog timer:
Like the processor in a control system, the computers of a
jet require regular interaction with their assigned,
authenticated, and conscious pilot. Otherwise they announce
his incapacity to the world, and hand themselves over to
remote control from an authenticated ground controller.
(Not necessarily blinded, but included because topical.)
Also, I have a few more related older ideas on my website
below.
Good luck!
Howie Goodell
-- 
Howie Goodell hgoodell at cs.uml.edu Pr SW Eng, WearLogic
Sc.D. Cand HCI Res Grp CS Dept U Massachussets Lowell
http://people.ne.mediaone.net/goodell/howie
Dying is soooo 20th-century! http://www.cryonics.org

Timmy hates this so theres probably something to it.Lets put tims head in 
with that other nazi,disney.

""I
do not promise to streamline government or make it more efficient; for I
mean to reduce its size." (Barry Goldwater) Take that to its ultimate
practical extreme; that's what I'm proposing. "Howie G. (and jimmy B?)