Netscape, Corporations, and GAK Support
Picking up on Tim's and Atilla's comments on Netscape, GAK, a WTO czar and government regulation of security on the Net: Jim Clark's speech was probably a trial balloon, to see what the reaction would be. Remember that the NIST conference on KE is December 5. It would make sense for the corporations to welcome application of police power to handle threats to public order, in cyberworld like the other. That way they reduce culpability for failures of their private security systems, as they do on private real estate property. Key escrow requires someplace for the buck to stop beyond several private pitstops, and that is usually Uncle Sugar when no other party has the resources to withstand sustained, substantial, culture-wide risk -- as, say, in the financial realm. Internationally, the same need exists. Probably the corporations would like to work in concert with governments on this, so no single firm, or nation, gets stigmatized, or wounded and prey to vultures -- as Netscape was with the brute hack, and as Microsoft and others have been with other attacks on their lightly guarded property, or as the US might be if it does not work out international agreements. Moreover, it has been noted here that government contracts are crucial for a new company -- for testing, for credibility, for prestige. All the major players already have such vital contracts -- indeed most would not have thrived without them -- so why would Netscape, and its investors, not want them too? It's possible that Netscape was selected to sound off on KE to see if it could play with the Big Boys -- take the heat, pass initiation, qualify for the Bohemian Grove bear hugs of assured stability, growth and profits. Could be, though, that after getting stable R/E for his backers, Jim will be confident enough to join Pixar in that rhumba risk of mercurial, evanescent mass-marketers. That's not to be believed now at 7,000 times earnings.
Folks, lay of Netscape on this one. _EVERYONE_ is doing Terissa for the feds to use themselves. There are reporting requirements (FOI) which most people on this list seem to enjoy which make the privacy issue moot. There are other people who do not want to have non escrowed data flowing over their internal nets, nuclear installations etc. When I was involved in the site security area there was no way I would allow messages to be bouncing round the internal net which I could not read. They might well be from trojan horses planted inside the net sending data out. Key escrow is not bad in itself. It is the idea that individuals be forced to use it for private conversations that is the bad idea. If people want to argue "make the technology avaliable and it will be abused" then let them. Just remember that we normally argue the other side of the case. Phill
participants (2)
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hallam@w3.org -
John Young