[Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis

Wed Dec 21 09:36:58 PST 2005

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 Subject: [Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
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 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001053_pf.html>

 The Washington Post

 Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis

 By Richard A. Posner
 Wednesday, December 21, 2005; A31

 We've learned that the Defense Department is deeply involved in domestic
 intelligence (intelligence concerning threats to national security that
 unfold on U.S. soil). The department's National Security Agency has been
 conducting, outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
 Act, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens within the United States.
 Other Pentagon agencies, notably the one known as Counterintelligence Field
 Activity (CIFA), have, as described in Walter Pincus's recent articles in
 The Post, been conducting domestic intelligence on a large scale. Although
 the CIFA's formal mission is to prevent attacks on military installations
 in the United States, the scale of its activities suggests a broader
 concern with domestic security. Other Pentagon agencies have gotten into
 the domestic intelligence act, such as the Information Dominance Center,
 which developed the Able Danger data-mining program.

 These programs are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties. They are
 not. Their significance is in flagging the existence of gaps in our
 defenses against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those
 gaps, though there may be better ways.

 The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of
 personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and
 processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their
 volume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names,
 addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This
 initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient
 being), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer.

 The data that make the cut are those that contain clues to possible threats
 to national security. The only valid ground for forbidding human inspection
 of such data is fear that they might be used to blackmail or otherwise
 intimidate the administration's political enemies. That danger is more
 remote than at any previous period of U.S. history. Because of increased
 political partisanship, advances in communications technology and more
 numerous and competitive media, American government has become a sieve. No
 secrets concerning matters that would interest the public can be kept for
 long. And the public would be far more interested to learn that public
 officials were using private information about American citizens for base
 political ends than to learn that we have been rough with terrorist
 suspects -- a matter that was quickly exposed despite efforts at
 concealment.

 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct
 surveillance of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents unless they
 are suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities.
 That is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of
 terrorists, may, without knowing it, have valuable counterterrorist
 information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining
 projects such as Able Danger.

 The goal of national security intelligence is to prevent a terrorist
 attack, not just punish the attacker after it occurs, and the information
 that enables the detection of an impending attack may be scattered around
 the world in tiny bits. A much wider, finer-meshed net must be cast than
 when investigating a specific crime. Many of the relevant bits may be in
 the e-mails, phone conversations or banking records of U.S. citizens, some
 innocent, some not so innocent. The government is entitled to those data,
 but just for the limited purpose of protecting national security.

 The Pentagon's rush to fill gaps in domestic intelligence reflects the
 disarray in this vital yet neglected area of national security. The
 principal domestic intelligence agency is the FBI, but it is primarily a
 criminal investigation agency that has been struggling, so far with limited
 success, to transform itself. It is having trouble keeping its eye on the
 ball; an FBI official is quoted as having told the Senate that
 environmental and animal rights militants pose the biggest terrorist
 threats in the United States. If only that were so.

 Most other nations, such as Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Israel,
 many with longer histories of fighting terrorism than the United States,
 have a domestic intelligence agency that is separate from its national
 police force, its counterpart to the FBI. We do not. We also have no
 official with sole and comprehensive responsibility for domestic
 intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are
 being filled by ad hoc initiatives.

 We must do better. The terrorist menace, far from receding, grows every
 day. This is not only because al Qaeda likes to space its attacks, often by
 many years, but also because weapons of mass destruction are becoming ever
 more accessible to terrorist groups and individuals.

 The writer is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and
 a senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago.
 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'