[OGSA-AUTHZ] minutes of yesterdays telecon

Blair Dillaway blaird at microsoft.com
Thu Feb 15 12:39:43 CST 2007


I'm suggesting that is one operational model that may be desired. A resource site may be designed to consume authZ assertions generated by a TTP. Off-loading more complex authZ policy resolution to a TTP could be done for better resource server perf, because the resource server doesn't have full knowledge of its organization's federated trust policy (if roles are assigned in an external org), etc.

/Blair

-----Original Message-----
From: David Chadwick [mailto:d.w.chadwick at kent.ac.uk]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2007 10:30 AM
To: Blair Dillaway
Cc: OGSA AUTHZ WG
Subject: Re: [OGSA-AUTHZ] minutes of yesterdays telecon

Hi Blair

thanks for your comments. I have one question below

Blair Dillaway wrote:

CUT

>
> I may not have the complete context here, but seems to me there may
> be an important difference in some environments. The policy for
> controlling the assignment of permissions based on roles may not be
> available at the site where an authorisation assertion is validated
> and consumed. In such cases, the role needs to validated and an
> authorisation assertion generated even if they have a 1:1 mapping.

I would like to clarify the above. The site where an authz assertion is
validated and consumed must be the resource site. Correct? So you are
saying that the resource site has no control over which roles give
permissions to access it, and instead it trusts an external TTP to say
who has permission to access it. Is this your model?

regards

David


>

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