[Nsi-wg] Issue 28 in ogf-nsi-project: Security

[ogf-nsi-project at googlecode.com]

Comment #7 on issue 28 by thost... at gmail.com: Security
http://code.google.com/p/ogf-nsi-project/issues/detail?id=28

Hadn't seen that document before.

In my opinion it misses one of the key points with NSI, i.e., that NSAs  
trust each other, and that a global user list isn't needed. When putting in  
signed requests into the message, an NSI infrastructure is essentially  
turned into a relay network. If a network provider does not trust other  
NSAs to make create connections, and requires proof of user identity, they  
should probably have users contact them directly and use something else  
than NSI.

You can still propage end user identity (credentials are secrets, e.g.,  
password or private keys, and are not intented for distribution), but the  
attributes can only be informative, not be used for authentication or  
authorization (not unlike the requesterNSA / providerNSA fields, and any  
other fields in the message).