DOC - Decentralized Onion Communication

[Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0]

On Mon, 10 Jan 2022 00:49:28 +0100
Stefan Claas <spam.trap.mailing.lists at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 12:40 AM Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 <punks at tfwno.gf> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >         that's a ridiculous comment because you do NOT know which nodes are 'trustworthy'
> 

> Well, I can only speak for myself, because I know some operators of  those nodes and ran
> in the past my own.


	that still means nothing. Notice also that one of the basic ideas behind tor is to use routers in different 'jurisdictions'. The chances that you know 'trustworthy' routers in 3 different countries are...zero.



> >
> >         And even if you did, the comment is still wholly misleading because the typical attack against tor is based on 'traffic analysis' based on packet/byte counts and timing. And those data are not 'encrypted'. So you can choose all the 'trustworthy' nodes you want, you are still fucked.
> 
> Quote:
> 
> MULTI-LAYERED ENCRYPTION
> 
> Your traffic is relayed and encrypted three times as it passes over


	That has nothing to do with what I said. Encryption does not prevent traffic analysis at all. Those three layers of encryption are stripped off at the end, and if you connect to an http: server for instance, then the server's ISP sees all the plaintext. 


	On the other hand, connections to 'hidden services' are end-to-end encrypted and you know you're talking to the 'right' service because the url is the public key so that's good, but it's a property that's independent of any node selection you can do.


	So...the 'hidden services' infrastructure does provide end to end encryption and some kind of public key management but that's about it. (I need to take a look again at the details of the DNS system, because it's probably another surveillance/weak point)