[tor-talk] Dishonest tor relay attack math question

[grarpamp]

On 9/28/21, PrivacyArms via tor-talk <tor-talk at lists.torproject.org> wrote:
> Dear Tor community,
>
> I came across a post on the Whonix forum recently. Since I am also
> interested in this question I copied it here:
> https://forums.whonix.org/t/math-behind-honest-tor-nodes/12464
> http://forums.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/t/math-behind-honest-tor-nodes/12464
> The question (edited):
> How can I calculate how much impact X honest Tor relays have?
> Is it better to calculate with bandwidth consumed (250Gbps), despite the
> number of relays (~7000)?
>
> Basically, I want to get the mathematical equation to this statement:
> I run X Tor relays at Y Mb/s each and by doing so I secure Z % of the Tor
> network!
> Starting thoughts:
> - Each “normal” route has three nodes involved: Guard, Middle, Exit
> - I am aware of guard pinning and vanguard protection for middle relay
> pinning
> - Maybe it is easier to assume an infinite usage time of the network to
> eliminate guard and vanguard pinning
> - I guess the best is to assume a scenario with 1%, 5%, 10%, etc. dishonest
> relays
>
> I would love to hear your thoughts about it and a concrete math equation
> would be amazing.


Too many approach reality from the wrong direction.

Instead, try calculating how much impact X dishonest tor relays have....

And try to understand reasons why the NSA says "Tor Stinks"
some of the time, and that was over 10 years ago, attack
methods and actors are improved and more prevalent
since then, tor is still same since 20+ years...

Then consider what "adding more relays" under that
design really does, and or cannot do...

Security product advertisements tend to be quite polished affairs,
yet those products often as full of holes as any other.