Kyle Rittenhouse 12mins defense team vid - epic - FightBack.law - [PEACE]

[grarpamp]

Was Rittenhouse's Possession Of The AR-15 Unlawful?

https://jonathanturley.org/2021/11/14/was-rittenhouses-possession-of-the-ar-15-unlawful/
https://www.smith-wesson.com/product/mp-15?sku=13551&preselect=true
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/948/55
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/29/viii/593
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/11/11/kyle-rittenhouse-trial-prosecutors-crash-and-burn-america-watches/6390215001/

In covering the motions hearing last week in the trial of Kyle
Rittenhouse, I noted a surprising comment from Judge Bruce Schroeder
that he had “spent hours” with the Wisconsin gun law and could not
state with certainty what it means in this case.

The statement could effectively knock out the misdemeanor gun
possession count — the one count that could still be in play for the
jury after the prosecution’s case on the more serious offense appeared
to collapse in court. A close examination of that provision reveals
ample reason to question not just its meaning but its application to
this case.

The unlawful possession of the gun has been a prominent fact cited not
only by the prosecutors but the press.

At trial, however, prosecutor Thomas Binger at points seemed to be
learning the governing law from Rittenhouse. For example, he pressed
Rittenhouse on why he did not just purchase a handgun rather than an
AR-15.  Rittenhouse replied he could not possess a hand gun at his
age. Binger then asked in apparent disbelief that the law allowed him
to have an AR-15 but not a handgun and Rittenhouse said yes.  Binger
then moved on after seemingly drawing out a point for the defense.

The exchange was all the more baffling because it drew attention to
the fact that one of Binger’s alleged “victims” was an adult named
Gaige Grosskreutz who also decided to bring a handgun to the protests
and pointed his 9mm at the head of Rittenhouse when he was shot in the
arm.

However, the most damaging moment came outside of the presence of the
jury when the judge drilled down on the law. He told the prosecutors
“I have been wrestling with this statute with, I’d hate to count the
hours I’ve put into it, I’m still trying to figure out what it says,
what’s prohibited. I have a legal education.” He added that he failed
to understand how an “ordinary citizen” could understand what is
illegal.

It is hard to understand how the count could be given to the jury
without a clear understanding of what it means. It is also hard to
instruct a jury on an ambiguous statute. Criminal laws are supposed to
be interpreted narrowly.   It is called the “rule of lenity” and has
been around in the English system for centuries. For example,  in
1547, the court was faced with a law making it a felony to steal
“Horses, Geldings or Mares.” Given the use of plural nouns, the court
ruled that it did not apply to stealing just one horse.

The problem with the Wisconsin statute is not a problem of
pluralization but definition. It is not clear that the statute
actually bars possession by Rittenhouse. Indeed, it may come down to
the length of Rittenhouse’s weapon and the prosecutors never bothered
to measure it and place it into evidence.

In Wisconsin, minors cannot possess short-barreled rifles under
Section 941.28. Putting aside the failure to put evidence into the
record to claim such a short length, it does not appear to be the case
here. Rittenhouse used a Smith & Wesson MP-15 with an advertised
barrel length of 16 inches and the overall length is 36.9 inches. That
is not a short barrel.

Then there is the rest of the statute and ultimately the word “and.”
Under Section 948.60(2)(a) (“Possession of a dangerous weapon by a
person under 18”), “[a]ny person under 18 years of age who possesses
or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor.” That makes Rittenhouse guilty, right?

Well, you then have to look at the subsection (c), which states that
“This section applies only to a person under 18 years of age who
possesses or is armed with a rifle or a shotgun if the person is in
violation of s. 941.28 or is not in compliance with ss. 29.304 and
29.593.”

Since there is no evidence that Rittenhouse violated Section 941.28,
he presumably must be in violation of both sections 29.304 and
29.593.. The defense conceded Rittenhouse was in violation of Section
29.593, which requires certification for weapons. However, he is not
in violation of section 29.304, entitled “Restrictions on hunting and
use of firearms by persons under 16 years of age.” As the title
indicates, the section makes it illegal for persons under 16 to use
firearms. Rittenhouse was 17 at the time and the prosecution has not
challenged that fact.

If Rittenhouse were convicted on that count, it could face a serious
challenge on appeal. Indeed, it is curious is why Schroeder would even
submit the count to the jury if it is uncontested that Rittenhouse was
17. If that is the correct interpretation of the statute, there would
be no way for a jury to reasonably convict Rittenhouse. It is akin to
giving the jury a criminal count based on his use of force as a police
officer when there is no evidence that he was a police officer.

The defense also offered legislative history to support the narrower
interpretation but the prosecution opposed such reliance on material
beyond of the language itself. However, that language is difficult to
square with the charge and the evidence in this case.

Rittenhouse is obviously facing other counts. However, on that count,
the question comes down to the “and.” To paraphrase Johnnie Cochran
from the O.J. Simpson trial, if that clause “doesn’t fit, you must
acquit.”