optimal use of untrusted peers - Re: iqnets: opportunistic XYZ, e.g. "begin xmit"

[Zenaan Harkness]

> An open question TODO: if all nodes in iqnets are bound to implement
> random "headroom" windows, at random times, and for random durations,
> can the actual headroom be measured and/ or tested by peer nodes?

Possibly "dropped packet count per unit time" is the only measure
available?

In any case this metric is a core metric - effectively aggregating
end user node, ISP, and GT-* "dropped packets" performance.

IQNets should inherently improve the global "dropped packets"
performance, not the least reason being that we shall, at core,
optimize on this specific metric (amongst others).

It may well be that handling this metric "very well", may satisfy the
bulk of our QoS, and node "peer node performance monitoring" needs!

When the fundamental definition of a "good" peer is one which is able
to minimize dropped (and therefore needing to be re-sent) packets,
modulo "is able to send packets within specified latency", it seems
we may have the bulk of what we need for a (proper) functional
overlay network.


>   - if so, we would have a mechanism to empirically test and
>     therefore utilize untrusted nodes, albeit at entirely random
>     (unpredictable times),
>     to make high value phone calls using "bulk fill contracts",
>     without the untrusted nodes knowing that this is what we are
>     doing!
> 
>   - this would be a very desirable property for any overlay network
> 
>   - but we must think like the government stalkers (who are out to
>     illegally monitor us), and who have very deep pockets, and who
>     run an abundance of trojan nodes:
> 
>     - such trojan nodes will say to their peer nodes that they are
>       undertaking "headroom" contracts at random times for random
>       durations, and yet may be doing no such thing at all, in order
>       to firetruck us over a barrell