[cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides

[Johny Sarampo]

On 12/31/13, brian carroll <electromagnetize at gmail.com> wrote:
> // someone has to be repetitious to provide proof-of-concept
>
> it is my belief that 'context is everything' applies to the review
> of these same issues and ideas, especially: location^3
>
> consider issues of mass surveillance and mass deployment
> of technical means and measures, for saturation potential so
> that getting to the target is a non-issue, zero cost essentially
> once installed (the role of infrastructure, resolving such issues
> by providing a managed platform that readily automate tasks)
>
>
> consider 'integrated surveillance' tools and capabilities in a
> blackbag context. really think a fleet of a 100 tempest vans
> exist in every city, or do the economics work against this as
> a scalable approach and require instead cellular towers or
> wi-fi antennas as a base for such activities to occur. and if
> this were possible, would it not be integrated to N-degrees
> of capability? consider electronic door locks in a context of
> black bag jobs. what if a remote software command could
> more easily unlock a car via cellular tower than a person,
> and invisibly, (this prior to them driving you off the road in
> autonomous or driverless vehicles, exciting future awaits)
>
> so is psychological warfare and other information operations
> by default assumed to involve teams on the ground or is it
> potentially seamlessly integrated with existing infrastructure
> and streamlined as another protocol layer that can or will be
> deployed as or if needed, in terms of threat escalation and
> what is legitimated in the given corrupt/illegal approach. if
> assuming it involves people going from point A to B there
> is little likelihood of these activities being deployed at the
> scale of mass surveillance, and yet if infrastructure itself,
> there is high likelihood or it is probable that they could be
> made economical and exist as a potential to be used as
> weapons against populations though may only target a
> few individuals in the existing context, potentially, thus
> 0.00001% for more extreme and oppressive measures
> may be accurate, in that what is hacked becomes the
> person themselves, say via forced disease triggering or
> whatnot, as part of this context of hostile surveillance
> that in active and passive ways could still be deadly,
> just slow drip, over time, versus out-in-the-open where
> such attacks could be documented, proven to exist
>
>
> ystsp  isozo  bxbvi
>

Actually you don't need on-the ground "tempest" vans.
I've noticed these strange micro-cells deployed in telephone poles,
normally connected to fiber or PSTN networks. Officialy they are used
to extend mobile communications range, but I've seen alot nearby
giant cell antennas. Can these be used for other purposes? what type
of frequencies can these type of equipment suck/spit?. Could these be
used for such seamless surveillance strategy? One thing I know.
These are high-powered antennas connected to fiber/pstn networks. Attached
are fotos of such equipment. Microcell2.jpg is such an example.
Microcell2-bridge
is a closeup of what seems to be some kind of switch connected to the antenna.
What do you think these could be?
Maybe we should pay more attention to our telephone poles.
Just a thought.
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