Snowden ran a major 2 Gbps exit node named “TheSignal”
Seth
list at sysfu.com
Fri Dec 12 13:31:31 PST 2014
On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote:
> Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit node,
> organises
> CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;)
I'm not sold on the reverse psychology gambit.
"As for the timing, Snowden apparently emailed Greenwald for the first
time 11 days before the party, and was still waiting for a reply when the
party happened..."
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/07124327303/snowden-ran-major-tor-exit-relay-hosted-cryptoparty-hawaii-while-waiting-greenwald-to-reply.shtml
"Cryptome has uncovered a public key for cincinnatus at lavabit.com, which is
the same alias he used to contact Glenn Greenwald — and it’s associated
with the organizing of an event in Honolulu, Hawaii in December 2012,
where the now-famous NSA whistleblower was then living."
https://blog.ageispolis.net/snowden-cryptoparty/
Dare I say that it's common knowledge at this point that using Tor, much
less being an exit node operator puts you 'on the list' for full data take
and retention 'til the end of time, not to mention active Computer Network
Exploitation.
-------------------------------
"But the German exposé showed Tor providing the opposite of anonymity: it
singled out users for total NSA surveillance, potentially sucking up and
recording everything they did online."
http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
"The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish this,
the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts of the
internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US telecoms firms
under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar and Blarney.
The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the Tor
network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA
database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool
which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target
does on the internet.
Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as Turbulence,
Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through the enormous
amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for Tor connections"
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
----------------------------
Snowden *had* to have known the above, so why would he put himself at risk
by using the same email/alias to contact Greenwald, and then establish a
connection from that alias to his legal name by using it to organize the
cryptoparty eleven days later?!!
Why would he not create a fresh and completely separate dedicated-use
email account solely for the purposes of establishing contact with
Greenwald?
On one hand we're supposed to believe that NSA are bumbling idiots that
missed the email communication between Snowden and Greenwald using the
same email alias he used as a CryptoParty organizer and Tor exit node(s)
operator.
On the other hand we have malicious (probably state?) actors that are able
to decrypt and leak a PGP encrypted email between Snowden and
Greenwalk/Radack. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/radack-greenwald.htm as
well as leak Tor bugs to the developers?
http://www.nsaneforums.com/topic/227563-nsa-and-gchq-agents-leak-tor-bugs-alleges-developer/
Are you fucking kidding me?
The story we are being told is not adding up.
The tiny tiny fragments of actual source documents that has been published
only adds to my suspicion.
The more that times goes on, the more that I can't help wonder sometimes
if Snowden is part a gambit to frame the debate.
The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should even be
allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken as a given.
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