Snowden ran a major 2 Gbps exit node named “TheSignal”

Troy Benjegerdes hozer at hozed.org
Sat Dec 13 11:10:53 PST 2014


On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 01:31:31PM -0800, Seth wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:07:22 -0800, rysiek <rysiek at hackerspace.pl> wrote:
> 
> >Or, maybe, quite the contrary. "Nah, that guy runs a TOR exit
> >node, organises
> >CryptoParties -- our guy would lay low". ;)
> 
> I'm not sold on the reverse psychology gambit.
> 
> "As for the timing, Snowden apparently emailed Greenwald for the
> first time 11 days before the party, and was still waiting for a
> reply when the party happened..."  https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140521/07124327303/snowden-ran-major-tor-exit-relay-hosted-cryptoparty-hawaii-while-waiting-greenwald-to-reply.shtml
> 
> "Cryptome has uncovered a public key for cincinnatus at lavabit.com,
> which is the same alias he used to contact Glenn Greenwald — and
> it’s associated with the organizing of an event in Honolulu, Hawaii
> in December 2012, where the now-famous NSA whistleblower was then
> living." https://blog.ageispolis.net/snowden-cryptoparty/
> 
> Dare I say that it's common knowledge at this point that using Tor,
> much less being an exit node operator puts you 'on the list' for
> full data take and retention 'til the end of time, not to mention
> active Computer Network Exploitation.
> 
> -------------------------------
> "But the German exposé  showed Tor providing the opposite of
> anonymity: it singled out users for total NSA surveillance,
> potentially sucking up and recording everything they did online."
> http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
> 
> "The first step of this process is finding Tor users. To accomplish
> this, the NSA relies on its vast capability to monitor large parts
> of the internet. This is done via the agency's partnership with US
> telecoms firms under programs codenamed Stormbrew, Fairview, Oakstar
> and Blarney.
> 
> The NSA creates "fingerprints" that detect http requests from the
> Tor network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded
> into NSA database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and
> analysis tool which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost
> everything" a target does on the internet.
> 
> Using powerful data analysis tools with codenames such as
> Turbulence, Turmoil and Tumult, the NSA automatically sifts through
> the enormous amount of internet traffic that it sees, looking for
> Tor connections"  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
> ----------------------------
> 
> Snowden *had* to have known the above, so why would he put himself
> at risk by using the same email/alias to contact Greenwald, and then
> establish a connection from that alias to his legal name by using it
> to organize the cryptoparty eleven days later?!!
> 
> Why would he not create a fresh and completely separate
> dedicated-use email account solely for the purposes of establishing
> contact with Greenwald?
> 
> On one hand we're supposed to believe that NSA are bumbling idiots
> that missed the email communication between Snowden and Greenwald
> using the same email alias he used as a CryptoParty organizer and
> Tor exit node(s) operator.
> 
> On the other hand we have malicious (probably state?) actors that
> are able to decrypt and leak a PGP encrypted email between Snowden
> and Greenwalk/Radack.
> http://cryptome.org/2014/04/radack-greenwald.htm  as well as leak
> Tor bugs to the developers?
> http://www.nsaneforums.com/topic/227563-nsa-and-gchq-agents-leak-tor-bugs-alleges-developer/
> 
> Are you fucking kidding me?
> 
> The story we are being told is not adding up.
> 
> The tiny tiny fragments of actual source documents that has been
> published only adds to my suspicion.
> 
> The more that times goes on, the more that I can't help wonder
> sometimes if Snowden is part a gambit to frame the debate.
> 
> The fundamental question of whether the surveillance state should
> even be allowed to exist must never be asked. That is always taken
> as a given.
> 

I'd ask the same thing about anonymity. It must always be taken that
both the surveillance state, and anonymity must exist, for one cannot exist
without the other.

But back to things not adding up.. none of us is a superhuman opsec 
practictioner. We all get tired, sloppy, arrogant, including the spooks and
the surveillance state.

If I would have been in Snowden's position I probably would have promoted
tor just as he was, in the hopes it might weaken the system.

As it is, I find the best treatment for paranoia is to give up the illusion
of anonymity, and my life is more relaxing and enjoyable if I do not feel 
obligated to keep secrets.



More information about the cypherpunks mailing list