Stash Burn?

Tyler Durden camera_lumina at hotmail.com
Mon May 2 10:34:36 PDT 2005


Hum. Well, maybe. I guess a "dual use" argument wouldn't fly.

Wait...that furnace should be able to reheat burgers also.

-TD



>From: "R.W. (Bob) Erickson" <roberte at ripnet.com>
>To: "'Tyler Durden'" <camera_lumina at hotmail.com>,<cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net>
>Subject: RE: Stash Burn?
>Date: Mon, 2 May 2005 12:34:15 -0400
>
>Congratulations, you just turned your vehicle into "drug paraphenalia"
>What? You claim it is Not for drugs? Tell this to the judge.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-cypherpunks at minder.net [mailto:owner-cypherpunks at minder.net] On
>Behalf Of Tyler Durden
>Sent: May 2, 2005 10:14 AM
>To: eugen at leitl.org; cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>Subject: Stash Burn?
>
>yes, this reminded me of another brilliant idea.
>
>Why don't some cars have a little tiny furnace for stash destruction?
>
>If you've got an on-board stash and some Alabama hillbilly with a badge
>pulls you over, you just hit the button and have you're little stashed
>incinerated. Who cares if the badge knows you USED TO have something on
>board? Too late now if any trace of evidence is gone.
>
>What's wrong with this idea?
>
>-TD
>
> >From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
> >To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
> >Subject: Secure erasing Info (fwd from richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU)
> >Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2005 19:49:56 +0200
> >
> >----- Forwarded message from Richard Glaser <richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU> -----
> >
> >From: Richard Glaser <richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU>
> >Date:         Wed, 27 Apr 2005 12:17:43 -0600
> >To: MACENTERPRISE at LISTSERV.CUNY.EDU
> >Subject: Secure erasing Info
> >Reply-To: Mac OS X enterprise deployment project
> ><MACENTERPRISE at LISTSERV.CUNY.EDU>
> >
> >FYI:
> >
> >Rendering Drives Completely Unreadable Can be Difficult
> >-------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >The National Association for Information Destruction has said it cannot
> >endorse the use of wiping applications alone for ensuring that data have
> >been effectively removed from hard drives.  NAID executive director Bob
> >Johnson said the only way to ensure that the data will be unreadable is
> >to physically destroy the drives, and even that has to be done in
> >certain ways to ensure its efficacy.  Most major PC makers offer a drive
> >destruction service for $20 or $30.  Some hardware engineers say they
> >understand why the drives have been created in a way that makes it hard
> >to completely erase the data: customers demanded it because they were
> >afraid of losing information they had stored on their drives.
> >http://news.com.com/2102-1029_3-5676995.html?tag=st.util.print
> >[Editor's Note (Pescatore): Cool, I want a "National Association for
> >Information Destruction" tee shirt. How hard could it be to have an
> >interlock feature - you can really, really clear the drive if you open
> >the case, hold this button down while you delete?
> >
> >(Ranum): Peter Guttman, from New Zealand, did a terrific talk in 1997
> >at USENIX in which he showed electromicrographs of hard disk surfaces
> >that had been "wiped" - you could still clearly see the 1s and 0s where
> >the heads failed to line up perfectly on the track during the
> >write/erase sequence. He also pointed out that you can tell more
> >recently written data from less recently written data by the field
> >strength in the area, which would actually make it much easier to tell
> >what had been "wiped" versus what was persistent long-term store. The
> >paper, minus the cool photos may be found at:
> >http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
> >Hard disks, I've found, make satisfying small arms targets.]
> >
> >Here is Mac OS X software called "SPX" that uses the "Guttman" method
> >of securely deleting data off a hard disk. If you want to donate old
> >HD's this might be the best method for protecting your data that was
> >on the HD other than physically destroying the HD's.
> >
> >http://rixstep.com/4/0/spx/
> >--
> >
> >Thanks:
> >
> >Richard Glaser
> >University of Utah - Student Computing Labs
> >richard at scl.utah.edu
> >801-585-8016
> >
> >_____________________________________________________
> >Subscription Options and Archives
> >http://listserv.cuny.edu/archives/macenterprise.html
> >
> >----- End forwarded message -----
> >--
> >Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
> >______________________________________________________________
> >ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
> >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
> >http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net
> >
> >[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature 
>which
>
> >had a name of signature.asc]





More information about the cypherpunks-legacy mailing list