Stash Burn?

[Eric Tully]

There's laws against destroying evidence, interfering with an officer, 
interfering with an investigation, etc.  If they can prove that you had 
it and destroyed it,  now they can charge you with two crimes instead of 
just one.  (I think I heard once that someone was charged with 
destroying evidence for taking batteries out of a device when he was 
arrested hoping to wipe its memory).

- Eric




Tyler Durden wrote:
> yes, this reminded me of another brilliant idea.
> 
> Why don't some cars have a little tiny furnace for stash destruction?
> 
> If you've got an on-board stash and some Alabama hillbilly with a badge 
> pulls you over, you just hit the button and have you're little stashed 
> incinerated. Who cares if the badge knows you USED TO have something on 
> board? Too late now if any trace of evidence is gone.
> 
> What's wrong with this idea?
> 
> -TD
> 
>> From: Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org>
>> To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net
>> Subject: Secure erasing Info (fwd from richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU)
>> Date: Sat, 30 Apr 2005 19:49:56 +0200
>>
>> ----- Forwarded message from Richard Glaser <richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU> -----
>>
>> From: Richard Glaser <richard at SCL.UTAH.EDU>
>> Date:         Wed, 27 Apr 2005 12:17:43 -0600
>> To: MACENTERPRISE at LISTSERV.CUNY.EDU
>> Subject: Secure erasing Info
>> Reply-To: Mac OS X enterprise deployment project
>> <MACENTERPRISE at LISTSERV.CUNY.EDU>
>>
>> FYI:
>>
>> Rendering Drives Completely Unreadable Can be Difficult
>> -------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> The National Association for Information Destruction has said it cannot
>> endorse the use of wiping applications alone for ensuring that data have
>> been effectively removed from hard drives.  NAID executive director Bob
>> Johnson said the only way to ensure that the data will be unreadable is
>> to physically destroy the drives, and even that has to be done in
>> certain ways to ensure its efficacy.  Most major PC makers offer a drive
>> destruction service for $20 or $30.  Some hardware engineers say they
>> understand why the drives have been created in a way that makes it hard
>> to completely erase the data: customers demanded it because they were
>> afraid of losing information they had stored on their drives.
>> http://news.com.com/2102-1029_3-5676995.html?tag=st.util.print
>> [Editor's Note (Pescatore): Cool, I want a "National Association for
>> Information Destruction" tee shirt. How hard could it be to have an
>> interlock feature - you can really, really clear the drive if you open
>> the case, hold this button down while you delete?
>>
>> (Ranum): Peter Guttman, from New Zealand, did a terrific talk in 1997
>> at USENIX in which he showed electromicrographs of hard disk surfaces
>> that had been "wiped" - you could still clearly see the 1s and 0s where
>> the heads failed to line up perfectly on the track during the
>> write/erase sequence. He also pointed out that you can tell more
>> recently written data from less recently written data by the field
>> strength in the area, which would actually make it much easier to tell
>> what had been "wiped" versus what was persistent long-term store. The
>> paper, minus the cool photos may be found at:
>> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
>> Hard disks, I've found, make satisfying small arms targets.]
>>
>> Here is Mac OS X software called "SPX" that uses the "Guttman" method
>> of securely deleting data off a hard disk. If you want to donate old
>> HD's this might be the best method for protecting your data that was
>> on the HD other than physically destroying the HD's.
>>
>> http://rixstep.com/4/0/spx/
>> -- 
>>
>> Thanks:
>>
>> Richard Glaser
>> University of Utah - Student Computing Labs
>> richard at scl.utah.edu
>> 801-585-8016
>>
>> _____________________________________________________
>> Subscription Options and Archives
>> http://listserv.cuny.edu/archives/macenterprise.html
>>
>> ----- End forwarded message -----
>> -- 
>> Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
>> ______________________________________________________________
>> ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
>> 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
>> http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net
>>
>> [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature 
>> which had a name of signature.asc]