[IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 08:51 PM 4/23/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
>On Fri, 23 Apr 2004, John Kelsey wrote:
>
>> The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is:
When
>> does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you?
>
>This serves a purpose as well.
>
>Why would you ever cooperate if you can't expect much from the deal
>anyway?

Since passphrases are in persons' minds, and minds and wills can be
broken,
one has to consider the security implications of this.   Mil orgs don't
assume
that prisoners are able to keep secrets under arbitrary duress.

Duress layering buys time for your colleages and family in all cases,
whether they
kill you or not.   If they're not killing you, then maybe they'll buy
one of the
deeper levels of duress layers.


If you physically destroy the keys or the data, there is little to gain
by torturing
you or your family.  That is superior to gambling that your deeper
duress levels
are convincing to the man with the electrodes.

An iButton that you could crunch in your teeth to destroy it would be
nice...