Moral Crypto

[David Honig]

At 12:34 PM 9/2/01 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>Someone else: 
>> The fact that you may be
>> identifiable at the point of entry to an anonymity system is
>> a weakness, not a desired feature, and if it can be avoided, it
>> should be.
>>
>
>Then design such a system.


You did a few lines earlier: 

>(Or if one is a remailer oneself.)
>

If the next generation of <OS, browser, Morpheus, etc.> came with a
remailer that was on by  default, then even running a remailer would be too
common to draw attention (prosecute).
And given that Joe Sixpack's node regularly relays MSMixmaster messages,
the *occasional* 
message injected by Joe will be nearly invisible.  Heavy use might be
detectable
depending on how obvious the relayed messages are.  


>"Anyone a remailer, anyone a mint" is one strong approach.

Very strong.  

In the case of a remailer, necessary.  

I suppose the spam potential, of everyone an SMTP forwarder, is problem?
Surmountable.  Deployment, sending-ease-of-use are the real problems.