Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[David Honig]

At 10:51 AM 8/3/01 -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>
>Hello, earth to Tim. 
> (1) You can send anonymous mail by sending it through a remailer, but 
> (2) The remailers themselves are not anonymous.
> (3) If the remailers *were* anonymous, they could not operate 
>      because then the users would not know where to send their mails.
> 
>   As long as the remailers themselves are traceable, make no mistake: 
>they exist only because the lions have not yet passed a law against them.
>
>   You cannot have encryption technologies advancing and leaving the law 
>behind, so long as any vital part of the infrastructure you need is 
>traceable and pulpable by the law.
>
>				Bear

Our ursine friend neglects the use of broadcast.  

Consider: An ephemeral anonymous remailer entrypoint (Bob) publishes half a
PK pair.

Alice stegos a message using Bob's key and a snapshot she takes, and posts
it to something widely received, and with some memory.

Bob (and only Bob) sees the message, waits a bit, and reinjects it into the
System, where
it bounces around, encrypted, until it gets released to its destination.
Bob can't
actually read the message because its inside more crypto envelopes.

.....

Yes it would be insecure with sufficient subversion, as all things.