Traceable Infrastructure is as vulnerable as traceable messages.

[jamesd at echeque.com]

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On 6 Aug 2001, at 10:13, Ray Dillinger wrote:
> Offhand, I'd estimate that if three US remops were taken down 
> forcefully, and the federal law looked as though any other 
> could be, all but two or three hardcases would cease operating 
> remailers in the USA.  That would wipe out well over 70% of the 
> remailers, leaving a very small universe indeed to monitor.

If the government decides to crack down on any one activity, and 
harm any particular small group of people, it is likely to have a 
large effect on that activity, and cause considerable harm to 
those people.

If, however, the government decides to crack down on lots of 
activities, and harm lots of people, it is unlikely to succeed.

Right now the government is cracking down on lots and lots of 
activities, and lashing out at lots and lots of people, with 
predictable results.

To be effectual against remailers, the government would have to 
give them priority over lots of other people that the government 
wants to harm.   There is a big big queue of people to be whacked 
who are not being whacked, and only finite resources to whack 
them.

If the government moves remailers nearer to the top of its
priorities, someone else gets moved back away from the top. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
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