CDR: Re: FidoNet II

[petro]

Tim May:
>First, if you're going to attempt a "FidoNet II," at least use link 
>encryption at every stage. Since each node knows the next node it 
>will be phoning (or linking to), it's a relatively easy matter to 
>encrypt to the public key of that node. This makes each node a kind 
>of remailer, as someone looking only at the internode traffic will 
>only see encrypted bits.
>
>Second, so long as one has done the above, might as well make each 
>node an actual remailer. With all of the usual mixing of in/out 
>packets, packet size padding, etc.

	Given the following:

	(1) That the phone calls are made at given times of day.

	(2) Last a specifc length--i.e. always a multiple of 5 minutes etc.

	(3) All packets in/out are encrypted.

	Would it really matter? If traffic bound for a specific node 
were simply encrypted with that *nodes* public key, and every packet 
encrypted to with the next nodes key, would (2) Be enough?
-- 
A quote from Petro's Archives:   **********************************************
Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted with the government 
of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? 
Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let 
history answer this question. -- Thomas Jefferson, 1st Inaugural