CDR: FidoNet II

[Tim May]

At 10:33 AM -0400 10/19/00, Harmon Seaver wrote:
>Tom Vogt wrote:
>
>  > all you need to do is use the internet as a transport layer. it's there,
>>  so why use the phone? cops can possibly intercept your phone calls more
>>  easily than randomly routed IP packets.
>>
>>  the technology is there. all you'd need to do is set up a network of
>>  nodes that rsync itself at regular intervals, preferably using at least
>>  ssh.
>
>         At least -- but it's still subject to traffic analysis to 
>discover who the
>perps are, on both ends. And yes, phones can be tapped too, but it's 
>more difficult,
>takes more effort, warrants (at least here, so far).

First, if you're going to attempt a "FidoNet II," at least use link 
encryption at every stage. Since each node knows the next node it 
will be phoning (or linking to), it's a relatively easy matter to 
encrypt to the public key of that node. This makes each node a kind 
of remailer, as someone looking only at the internode traffic will 
only see encrypted bits.

Second, so long as one has done the above, might as well make each 
node an actual remailer. With all of the usual mixing of in/out 
packets, packet size padding, etc.

Third, the use of radio links has come up several times over the 
years. A couple of early Cypherpunks were involved in packet radio 
and addressed the issue. By the way, the FCC still has restrictions 
on encrption over the airwaves, as I understand things.

(One can argue that a micropower transmitter, or a "Part 15" 
transmitter, is exempt or undetectable, but this may not be enough if 
the Feds really want a bust.)

Fourth, given the speeds of the Net, given the move to put phone 
calls over the Net, given the many tools...why on earth would anyone 
want to revive FidoNet? Implement remailer protocols to do a virtual 
FidoNet, perhaps, but don't actually have machines phoning up other 
machines!

Fifth, notwithstanding all these comments, go for it.

>But I've been thinking more
>about this and realized that packet radio is really the best 
>transport medium, done
>in burst modes on shortwave or even CB frequencies with big linear 
>amps. A pirate
>packet network,  with some stations just running scanners and 
>gatewaying into the
>internet maybe.


Watch out for those trucks with the rotating antennas.

>
>  > But now - the ability to propagate fragments universally - e.g. usenet,
>  > email, web, etc., in encrypted and stego'd forms - that's interesting.


Spread-spectrum.

>
>  > I'm not providing a very succinct description at the moment, but I think
>>  you get the drift. Its about obscuring the origins of requests and
>>  answers from casual and perhaps programmatic observation. Its not
>>  downloading an encrypted web page from a single server. Its about
>>  acquiring that page from a variety of places as encrypted fragments,
>>  that might appear as casual requests. And going to a particular server
>  > does not cause a particular piece of data to be delivered - from that
>  > server, but it may be delivered later from another machine.
>  >
>  > So back channel is really about creating this virtual back channel using
>>  the store and forward approach. The channel's packets are encrypted, and
>  > the node is non-deterministic in its behavior.

Laudable. Sounds like you're recapitulating the early years of the 
Cypherpunks list discussions.

Look to remailer networks and I think you'll find what you're looking for.

Would radio offer advantages worth the effort of going to a different 
transmission mechanism? Wireless, a la Bluetooth and obviously via 
Ricochet, etc., is already here. A ham radio system, even one based 
around the "big linear amps" you speculated about earlier, would have 
a long uphill struggle.

Still, a worthy outlet for your energies.

Between your thinking above and your recent search for Vinge, sounds 
like you're moving squarely into the crypto anarchy camp. Maybe 
there's hope as well for Nathan Saper and all of the other commies on 
the list.


--Tim May
-- 
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   831-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
"Cyphernomicon"             | black markets, collapse of governments.