CDR: Re: Zero Knowledge changes business model (press release)

[petro]

Mr. May:
>At 5:14 PM -0500 10/31/00, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>>I spent perhaps half an hour on the phone with Austin Hill this 
>>afternoon. Here's what we discussed.
>>...
>>* ZKS will offer to store keys. "That includes us holding 
>>encryption keys." Austin described the key-splitting the same way 
>>Adam has here. He refused to say whether or not a third-party 
>>(Joe's Escrow Service) would ever hold keys.
>
>Except for the very specialized case of protecting against 
>loss/forgetting of passphrases and keys, it's hard to imagine how 
>Alice's privacy is ever enhanced by having a third party hold keys.

	Think of it in terms of privacy+access.

	Medical records are not "stateless", and are for many reasons 
not usually kept by the individual (or when they are, they are often 
kept by both the health care provider *and* the individual). Now, it 
I haven't thought this through all the way (and I'm not exactly a 
world class thinker) but I can see several possible "products" that 
might be marketable in a "privacy aware" marketplace:

	(1) A system were both the HCP key *and* one of Alice's key 
or TTP's key are necessary to read a medical record, but where only 
the hospitals key is necessary to write to the record. This would 
provide more privacy for Alice (or at least a combination of privacy 
and access logging) than exists under the current completely 
un-encrypted, accessible by almost anyone system that exists today.
	You might want the TTP to hold either a copy of Alice's key 
with a strong access logging system, or have a setup (If possible) 
were the Either Alice's or the TTP's key will decrypt/allow access 
for cases when you need access to Alice's information when she is 
unable to provide it (severe trauma or medical condition, dead, in an 
adversarial legal battle etc.).

	Medical records are not only Alice's record of what was done 
to her/wrong with her, but also the HCP's record of what they did.

	Yes, it would still be possible for someone to get the 
information through a print-screen or other ways. Total and complete 
security is a really tough nut. The goal may simply be to make it 
harder to leak information, or provide strong accountability to that 
information.

	(I worked in a Hospital in the early 90s. At that time it 
would have been trivial for me to look up anyone on the hospital 
computer system and order their chart, and return it with a "Oops, 
ordered the wrong number")


	(2) A system for larger HCP's like (for instance) Kaiser, or 
the hospital I used to work in, where a specific HCP within that 
system must cooperate with Alice to get *specifically* which parts of 
a record they need. By way of example, at a less monogamous point in 
my life, I was worried that I had contracted an STD (turns out I was 
wrong), and wanted to get it taken care of. The hospital where I 
worked (and had insurance) was not an option because they had one 
medical record on each patient, and, well, my mother worked there as 
a nurse in a department where I was being seen (occasionally) for a 
completely different problem. I wound up going somewhere else and 
paying out of pocket for the consultation. If there was the ability 
within the record keeping system for selective exposure of 
information, that could be handy.

	There is little reason for a Urologist to get access to your 
dental records.

	At least one would hope not.

>If not this byzantine protocol, what? If Alice supplies personal 
>information to Bobco, he has it, period. A hospital, for example, 
>has this personal information. Hospitals leaking or selling or 
>sharing this information is indeed a pressing concern, but one not 
>readily solvable with technology. It's like the various schemes to 
>delete information before it can be saved to hard disk..these 
>schemes just don't work: if human eyes can see something, or if ears 
>can hear it, then cameras and sound capture cards and so on can 
>bypass the attempted erasures.

	At least part of the goal may be to meet "Due Diligence" 
tests. If a HCP/Accountant/Investment Broker takes reasonable 
precautions in protecting privacy, then it's that much harder for 
them to be sued for negligence.

	If they provide strong accountability procedures, and enforce 
them, then that slows leaks down.

>Much of the press release was typical press release junk about 
>privacy being important, corporations seeking to fully maximize 
>their paradigms, etc., etc. But some of it talked about key 
>splitting and local laws, which is usually worrisome to paranoid 
>folks like us.

	It would be a rare company indeed that let the Techs correct 
the press releases.

>>* ZKS appears to be targeting heavily-regulated areas like medical 
>>and financial sectors. They will come in, set up a 
>>privacy-protective system, perhaps provide some ongoing service, 
>>and (if so) collect ongoing fees. In those cases, "a consumer 
>>solution like Freedom allowing anonymity doesn't fit that market."
>
>"Collect ongoing fees."
>
>I'm not knocking free enterprise, but there are often problems with 
>business plans which seek to find ways to collect fees.
>
>The most successful companies I've seen have started with a product 
>idea, often already in prototype form (Cisco, Sun, Intel, Apple, 
>etc.) and have then gone very quickly into production. Having 100 
>engineers working on Freedom, as was claimed today, and yet having 
>essentially no users of Freedom nyms visible a year later, 
>suggests...
>
>And moving toward a vague focus on solving customer privacy problems...
>
>Well, I have no reason to wish them poor luck. But it doesn't sound 
>too promising. I really do hope I'm wrong and that they provide 
>interesting products for customer privacy and do well with them.

	While not being particularly happy with ZKS (Mac/MacOSX port 
public, despite repeated assurances that "it is coming" (for what, 2 
years now?)), There are many services that they could legitimately 
provide companies, such as "privacy procedure" auditing etc., either 
directly for the company, or as a "consultant" to one of the 
Management Consluting firms (Arthur Anderson, KPMG etc.).

>There are some interesting "credentials without identity" protocols 
>which desperately need to be implemented. An example: a credential 
>which someone can present to a pharmacist which allows a drug, e.g, 
>an AIDS drug, to be picked up...without revealing identity. Alas, so 
>many pieces need to be put together to do this that it seems almost 
>hopeless; certainly a startup company cannot afford to spend the 
>many years it would take to deploy this kind of system.

	The problems with this aren't technical, but rather legal.

	Da Man insists that you present ID. Therefore the Pharmacy 
insists you present ID. Now, if that order were encrypted so that 
only you, *or* a TTP could reveal *who* picked up order # 3247834 for 
60 tablets of vicodan, then you have, if not more privacy, at least a 
trail of accountability to who leaked it.

>>* Tim below suggests that "Wouldn't a better approach be for Alice 
>>to protect her own privacy?" The answer, generally, is yes. I 
>>suspect the Brands patents can do much to that end. But Austin 
>>seems to be envisioning a market in which *some* third party in the 
>>transaction, be it a business, intermediary, or ZKS, possesses 
>>personal info about customers and only receives what is necessary.
>
>The first level of protection is for Alice to reveal as little as 
>she wishes and to not trust others with information which may damage 
>her. So she should not give out her passwords over the phone, or 
>online. And she should not reveal her AIDS diagnosis by buying AIDS 
>drugs at her local pharmacy. And she should not be ordering books on 
>bomb-making and terrorism through Amazon.
>
>However, once Alice has given Bob this damaging information, the jig 
>is up. Bob knows her passwords or her AIDS status or her preferences 
>in books, whatever. And Charles may know other things. And Dave 
>still other things.
>
>Now, can any protocol stop Bob and Charles and Dave from pooling 
>their information they each have collected on Alice? Nope.
>
>The point is to unlink Alice's identity with the items she 
>purchases, the medicines she needs, the books she buys. Which is why 
>remailers, digital cash, proxies, and suchlike are interesting.
>
>Perhaps ZKS is planning to unveil robust versions of all of these 
>things. If so, I applaud them.

	Part of the problem, at least in Medical and Financial 
"spaces" is that it's not only Alice and the Companies desires, but 
also the Feds desires.

	To provide *better* privacy than we have now until such time 
as we can get the government off our backs (either through reform or 
other means) is a possible money maker.

	And if making money doing one thing allows ZKS to pay for 
some "R&D" that helps get the second, I'm all for that.

	As soon as I get a Mac Freedom client, Damn it! (And yes, I'm 
willing to pay, I am just not willing to move to Canada to help write 
it (even if I were capable of such a thing)).
-- 
A quote from Petro's Archives:
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"Despite almost every experience I've ever had with federal 
authority, I keep imagining its competence."
John Perry Barlow