Name Constraints, was Re: [caops-wg] Re: ca signing policy file

[David Chadwick]

Robert

perhaps the real question is, do you change your authorisation rights 
more or less frequently than your identifier. If more frequently, then 
it does not really matter if your identifier changes every year or two 
since you can change your authorisation rights to match the new 
identifier when it comes active. But if your authorisation rights are 
much longer lived than your identifier, then it becomes a pain to have 
to change these as well. However, in this case I would suggest that your 
authorisation rights are wrapped into the PKC, say in the 
subjectDirectoryAttributes extension, then they would carry over to the 
new identifier.

regards

David

Cowles, Robert D. wrote:
> The obvious choice for the "identifier" is the public
> key.  The drawback  is that it would be good to change
> the keypair more often than you change identity.
> 
> Can you explain name collisions cannot occur?
> 
> BC
> 
> 
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Frank Siebenlist [mailto:franks at mcs.anl.gov] 
> 
> ...
> 
>>When you say "name collisions", you must be referring to either 
>>compromised CAs or errors as name collisions should not occur...
>>
> 
> 

-- 

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David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD
Professor of Information Systems Security
The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF
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Email: D.W.Chadwick at kent.ac.uk
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