Where is Coderman? Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison. He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123 https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9... This looks to be not there anymore? Or maybe Coderman got rid of horses. A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead? “FBI disruption strategies - extra-judicial life destruction ''' Disruption strategy involves “a range of tools including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject’s activities.” “The FBI’s overbroad and aggressive use of its investigative and surveillance powers, and its willingness to employ ‘disruption strategies’ against subjects not charged with crimes can have serious, adverse impacts on innocent Americans,” the ACLU concluded. “Being placed under investigation creates an intense psychological, and often financial, burden on the people under the microscope and their families, even when they are never charged with a crime,” it continued. “All the more so when a heinous crime like terrorism is alleged, and when the investigators are convinced the subject of their investigation is guilty but they just don’t have the evidence necessary for arrest.” The Congressional Research Service report noted that such methods are reminiscent of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, and particularly the COINTELPRO program, which engaged in “preventive, covert, intelligence-based efforts to target and contain people, groups, or movements suspected by the Bureau to be ‘rabble rousers,’ ‘agitators,’ ‘key activists,’ or ‘key black extremists.’” The FBI “relied on illegal means to curb constitutionally protected activity it deemed threatening to national security.” ''' https://theintercept.com/2016/02/18/fbi-wont-explain-its-bizarre-new-way-of-... FBI Won’t Explain Its Bizarre New Way of Measuring Its Success Fighting Terror Jenna McLaughlin Feb. 18 2016, 11:18 p.m. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has quietly developed a new way to measure its success in the war on terror: counting the number of terror threats it has “disrupted” in a year. But good luck trying to figure out what that number means, how it was derived, or why it doesn’t jibe with any other law enforcement statistic, most notably, the number of terror suspects actually charged or arrested. In the section on “Performance Measures” in the FBI’s latest financial statement, the bureau reports 440 “terror disruptions” in the 12-month period ending on September 30, 2015. That’s compared to 214 in fiscal year 2014. And it’s more than three times the 2015 “target” of 125. In a vacuum, that would appear to suggest that the FBI’s terror-fighting mission — which sucked up $5.3 billion, or 54 percent of the bureau’s $9.8 billion budget in 2015 — is exceeding expectations. But that number — 440 — is much higher than the number of arrests reported by the FBI. The Washington Post counted about 60 terror-related arrests in 2015; a study by George Washington University found 71 arrests related to the Islamic State from March 2014 to the end of 2015. Of those arrests, many were of people trying to travel abroad or trying to help others do so. Many more involved people planning attacks that were essentially imaginary, often goaded by FBI informants. And according to a document from the Department of Homeland Security obtained by The Intercept in November, there was only one genuinely “foiled attack” in the United States between January 2014 and September 2015. And that one, involving would-be shooters in Garland, Texas, targeting a cartoon-drawing event inspired by the Prophet Muhammad, was stopped by the local police department. The FBI didn’t respond to emails asking basic questions such as what qualifies as a disruption, why the number is so much higher than the bureau’s recorded arrests, or how it comes up with its annual “target.” In a January 2015 Performance Report, Justice Department officials explained that the “targets reflect the number of expected disruptions based on the estimated threat, yet account for potential fluctuations.” The officials acknowledged that “disruptions can be a challenge to quantify for future years” because the number of potential plots is “outside of FBI control.” Nevertheless, they wrote: “Based on past data trends, coupled with current and emerging threat pictures, the FBI expects to achieve its FY 2015 and FY 2016 targets.” A strange way to provide transparency The “terrorism threat disruptions” metric is a relatively new arbiter of success for the FBI. In a 2013 Department of Justice document about strategic goals, fighting terrorism is identified as Strategic Goal 1, and “number of terrorism disruptions” is Strategic Objective 1.1. “To provide transparency to its work in the area of counterterrorism, the Department will disclose a key statistic: the number of terrorism disruptions,” the department announced. But the definition was vague: “A disruption is defined as interrupting or inhibiting a threat actor from engaging in criminal or national security related activity. A disruption is the result of direct actions and may include but is not limited to the arrest; seizure of assets; or impairing the operational capabilities of key threat actors.” And the department’s idea of transparency was problematic. Because the FBI’s “operational priorities are classified,” the document noted, “it is only possible to report aggregate data that lacks significant detail.” Experts interviewed by The Intercept suggested two possible explanations for the high number of terror disruptions. Gold stars One possibility, they said, is that the number is just a subjective way to make people at the FBI look good, or to rationalize the cost. “This is how the whole career system works in the FBI — statistics, performance,” said Coleen Rowley, a former FBI agent and whistleblower. Individuals use statistics to advance their careers, and the agency, in turn, uses them to justify its budget, she said. “In the agency, this is the way to advance.” The fact that the agency establishes a target for terrorism disruptions is also troubling, said Michael German, a former FBI agent and fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice. “That the FBI actually sets a performance goal stating the specific number of terrorist disruptions it wants to accomplish over the year would seem to create an incentive to gin up cases where no real threat might exist.” And if the number is inflated, it wouldn’t be the first time the Department of Justice or the FBI had been criticized for inaccurately estimating the impact of their counterterrorism efforts. In 2007, an inspector general investigation found that the entire Department of Justice — the FBI included — had messed up its bookkeeping efforts on terrorism. The FBI mistakenly included marriage fraud, immigration cases, and others in their records of anti-terror cases. And in 2013, Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz called out the office that oversees U.S. attorney’s offices for shoddy reporting that significantly overstated the number of terrorism convictions, counting cases that actually dealt with narcotics or money laundering or including defendants who had their charges dismissed. “These inaccuracies are important in part because DOJ management and Congress need accurate terrorism-related statistics to make informed operational and budgetary decisions,” Horowitz said in a statement accompanying the 2013 report. Easier to disrupt than arrest Another possible explanation for such a big number, however, is that it accurately reflects a new FBI approach to fighting terror that is occurring outside of public view — where the bureau decides someone is a threat and disrupts his or her life in some way that isn’t nearly as subject to oversight and accountability as an indictment or an arrest. “I’m sensing a significant change in counterterrorism policy in the U.S., where we’ve gone from ‘watch and report,’ to ‘let’s just disrupt them any way we can,’” David Gomez, a former FBI agent and profiler, as well as a former LAPD officer, told The Intercept. “This has cut short the way the FBI does long-term investigations. … They’re not doing that anymore.” The FBI has indeed been going through some changes. As a 2013 Congressional Research Service report explains, “Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.” This has led law enforcement agencies to use aggressive, proactive techniques to catch potential terrorists before a crime is committed. According to the CRS report, one technique is the “Al Capone” approach — putting people in jail for a minor crime rather than sticking around and waiting for evidence of a serious violent threat. Another method is the informant, or “agent provocateur,” who starts communicating with potential suspects, goading them into committing an act of terrorism in order to catch them in the act. “Where the person targeted really is a terrorist, that might make sense,” said German. “But often when evidence that a person is a terrorist is lacking — that’s because he isn’t a terrorist.” German, in an email, asked: “Has the FBI secretly prevented people from getting jobs, hazmat licenses, gun permits, security clearances, or barred their travel where no charges were brought, providing no opportunity for them to challenge the accusations against them or prove their innocence? And then chalked that up as a successful ‘disruption’ so they would get a pat on the back and more resources from Congress, regardless of whether the person was actually guilty?” A 2009 FBI document obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union explicitly allows field offices to engage in “disruption strategies” at the conclusion of a terror assessment or investigation, after “all significant intelligence has been collected, and/or the threat is otherwise resolved.” Disruption strategy involves “a range of tools including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject’s activities.” “The FBI’s overbroad and aggressive use of its investigative and surveillance powers, and its willingness to employ ‘disruption strategies’ against subjects not charged with crimes can have serious, adverse impacts on innocent Americans,” the ACLU concluded. “Being placed under investigation creates an intense psychological, and often financial, burden on the people under the microscope and their families, even when they are never charged with a crime,” it continued. “All the more so when a heinous crime like terrorism is alleged, and when the investigators are convinced the subject of their investigation is guilty but they just don’t have the evidence necessary for arrest.” The Congressional Research Service report noted that such methods are reminiscent of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, and particularly the COINTELPRO program, which engaged in “preventive, covert, intelligence-based efforts to target and contain people, groups, or movements suspected by the Bureau to be ‘rabble rousers,’ ‘agitators,’ ‘key activists,’ or ‘key black extremists.’” The FBI “relied on illegal means to curb constitutionally protected activity it deemed threatening to national security.” The goal of “disruption” has typically been reserved for FBI agents pursuing people like drug traffickers — where “impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in the organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation,” counts as disruption. But that standard doesn’t really apply to the “lone wolves” or small groups that make up most of the FBI’s terror suspects. Great expectations The FBI is under a lot of pressure these days — charged with preventing every possible terrorist attack before it happens, while withstanding public scrutiny of its methods. Gomez, the former FBI agent, cuts the bureau some slack. “As a policeman, we used to have a saying about local drug dealers — we put them in jail for everything, use of heroin, a misdemeanor,” Gomez said. “They’re doing life in prison 60 days at a time.” The FBI is “going to be under severe criticism” one way or the other, he said. “You can’t win.” Rowley, though critical of the strategy, said she was also sympathetic. “It’s a bad position of, oh, you better prevent every act of terrorism,” she said. Contact the author: ” https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2016-February/012286.html
On 12/31/2018 02:30 PM, Where is Coderman? wrote:
Where is Coderman?
Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison.
He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123 https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9...
This looks to be not there anymore? Or maybe Coderman got rid of horses.
A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead?
My best guess: he gave up the persona after being outed as Martin Peck. This was my news of it: -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Re: Pastebin of banned accounts found Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 19:59:07 +0200 From: carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org> To: <SNIP> Hello, illustre group of recipients. I made a bit of research into the matter, wanting to figure out which e-mail exchange made "coderman" think I belong into a list of troublemakers even if I do my best to always discuss rationally - and how such a list would come about with so many respected names along mine. Well, I was successful. Here is what I found. https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035866.html Mr coderman admits to go by the real name "Martin R. Peck". He caused some confusion by promoting a fake NSA program that didn't actually exist. On the Whonix forum he "anonymously" reported his own news, introducing himself as follows:
Martin R. Peck, software engineer, has created this BigSun automated redaction system, which he has offered to provide to the NSA.
At the same time I had been having an exchange with him where I had openly dared to doubt the safety of the debian binary distribution system - a threat that he tried to downplay by comparing it with much less likely threats. See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035867.html thru https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035879.html We didn't actually arrive at any inflammatory tones, he just disappeared after his identity had been lifted and his argumentation started to look suspicious more than anything. Disappearing was a smart move, as I had indeed forgotten entirely about him. Probably so have you. What do I gather from this? Keeping my hands off of debian or any of its derivates has been a good choice. Same goes for fedora. Everybody get your gentoo skills back in shape, or help Guix/Nix get ready for prime time. <SNIP>
Hey, I don't know much about coderman, but he introduced me to this list. After some activism volunteering a few years ago, I found myself persistently harassed by strangers, authorities, and anonymous hackers in very misleading and often abusive ways. I found coderman on #tor-talk on freenode, which I joined in a state of intense fear and confusion to try to get the word out and seek help. Immediately after I started talking on the channel there were multiple netsplits, and coderman was one of the few on the same set of servers as me. He mentioned this list, the value of SDR work, other things about open source, security, and my experience, and e-mailed me. Coderman was the only person I was able to get in contact with who seemed to have any understanding of my situation. I mention this because what was happening to me was _really intense_ and destroyed not only my livelihood but also that of friends who supported me. I would not have been surprised if something happened to other people I talked to in order to continue suppressing the things I was exposed to. But I also recognize this was a time of extreme paranoia for me, so it is hard to know which fears were overblown. I developed serious mental issues from being in that situation where I was persistently separated from normality, and am still very much struggling with these issues. I am very frightened to talk about and further research this, which is why I have not spoken up in the past. This is not trolling or a joke. Karl On 12/31/18, Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
On 12/31/2018 02:30 PM, Where is Coderman? wrote:
Where is Coderman?
Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison.
He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123 https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9...
This looks to be not there anymore? Or maybe Coderman got rid of horses.
A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead?
My best guess: he gave up the persona after being outed as Martin Peck.
This was my news of it:
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Re: Pastebin of banned accounts found Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 19:59:07 +0200 From: carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org> To: <SNIP>
Hello, illustre group of recipients. I made a bit of research into the matter, wanting to figure out which e-mail exchange made "coderman" think I belong into a list of troublemakers even if I do my best to always discuss rationally - and how such a list would come about with so many respected names along mine. Well, I was successful. Here is what I found.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035866.html
Mr coderman admits to go by the real name "Martin R. Peck". He caused some confusion by promoting a fake NSA program that didn't actually exist. On the Whonix forum he "anonymously" reported his own news, introducing himself as follows:
Martin R. Peck, software engineer, has created this BigSun automated redaction system, which he has offered to provide to the NSA.
At the same time I had been having an exchange with him where I had openly dared to doubt the safety of the debian binary distribution system - a threat that he tried to downplay by comparing it with much less likely threats.
See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035867.html thru https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035879.html
We didn't actually arrive at any inflammatory tones, he just disappeared after his identity had been lifted and his argumentation started to look suspicious more than anything.
Disappearing was a smart move, as I had indeed forgotten entirely about him. Probably so have you.
What do I gather from this? Keeping my hands off of debian or any of its derivates has been a good choice. Same goes for fedora. Everybody get your gentoo skills back in shape, or help Guix/Nix get ready for prime time.
<SNIP>
Mirimir, I have replied to you after what you pasted to us.
My best guess: he gave up the persona after being outed as Martin Peck.
This was my news of it:
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Re: Pastebin of banned accounts found Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 19:59:07 +0200 From: carlo von lynX lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org To: <SNIP>
Hello, illustre group of recipients. I made a bit of research into the matter, wanting to figure out which e-mail exchange made "coderman" think I belong into a list of troublemakers even if I do my best to always discuss rationally - and how such a list would come about with so many respected names along mine.
I do not believe this is the answer. I think you misunderstand the email thread. You can see that Coderman is on the list as well “<snip> electromagnetize@gmail.com coderman@gmail.com data@kuketz.de <snip>” https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2015-October/010285.html We can see that Coderman doxxxed himself with Freedom of Information Act: “FOIPA adventures "you want me to consent to make my FBI file public? Are you fucking mad?" - https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/563036665837789184 --- i am currently making requests through MuckRock.com which i recommend for their helpful and dedicated staff, as well as their time devoted to review and reporting on released information. i am using the professional service, which lets you set requests private until reviewed and ready to release publicly. this implies a bit of trust in MuckRock, and i hope it is not misplaced. few years back i asked for participants in a similar effort. some things resulted: 1) this also opens up the requester to risk; that is, whoever is filing must also potentially show some trust, if a falsified DOJ-361 is sent and used as pretext to "deter" you. i have not heard of this actually happening, but i was also not willing to push it. '''beware who you accept, coder, or they're setting you up for USC 18 fuckery. sure, it may in the end be ok. but you're in misery until cleared.'''' 2) the information is going to be public; if you've got a file because you're a privacy enthusiast, then filing to make your file public is the opposite of enjoying your privacy. there is merit in taking one for team earth human, however... ” https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2015-February/006735.html I have read the MuckRock and it ends out that never was his file released: https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/foipa-17315/ - No Responsive Documents https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/privacyactdirect-19... - No Responsive Documents By the way this request is where you find Coderman's other aliases: “For the individual "Martin Russell Peck" born 1978, currently residing in zip 97123, specifically including any and all records for Martin Peck in Oregon, including past residences in Oregon; also past residences in Kansas, South Carolina, Colorado, and Utah, including records from any other applicable state office, including email addresses coderman@gmail.com , coder@peertech.org , coderman@mindspring.com, coderman@earthlink.net, coder@charter.net, also including aliases "coderman", "coderman_", "coder", "PureFiction", "fibrill", also including cross-references and indirect mentions, including records outside the investigation main file.” It is not that there are no documents but that they never did perform the search. It seems something was hanging up with Coderman's Freedom of Information Requests. Or maybe this happened like Coderman feared? “1) this also opens up the requester to risk; that is, whoever is filing must also potentially show some trust, if a falsified DOJ-361 is sent and used as pretext to "deter" you. i have not heard of this actually happening, but i was also not willing to push it. '''beware who you accept, coder, or they're setting you up for USC 18 fuckery. sure, it may in the end be ok. but you're in misery until cleared.'''' ” https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2015-February/006735.html Also a while back he has worked for TOR Project. In the list https://www.torproject.org/about/contributors.html.en “Martin Peck Worked on a VM-based transparent proxying approach for Tor clients on Windows.” I do not believe he has disappeared because of his name. Does TOR Project know what happened to Coderman? Is he outcast like Jake Applebaum?
On 12/31/18, Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
the safety of the debian binary distribution system
NSA operation ORCHESTRA Annual Status Report 2014 http://phk.freebsd.dk/_downloads/FOSDEM_2014.pdf
On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 04:53:15PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 12/31/2018 02:30 PM, Where is Coderman? wrote:
Where is Coderman?
Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison.
He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123 https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9...
This looks to be not there anymore? Or maybe Coderman got rid of horses.
A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead?
My best guess: he gave up the persona after being outed as Martin Peck.
This was my news of it:
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Re: Pastebin of banned accounts found Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 19:59:07 +0200 From: carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org> To: <SNIP>
Hello, illustre group of recipients. I made a bit of research into the matter, wanting to figure out which e-mail exchange made "coderman" think I belong into a list of troublemakers even if I do my best to always discuss rationally - and how such a list would come about with so many respected names along mine. Well, I was successful. Here is what I found.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035866.html
Mr coderman admits to go by the real name "Martin R. Peck". He caused some confusion by promoting a fake NSA program that didn't actually exist. On the Whonix forum he "anonymously" reported his own news, introducing himself as follows:
Martin R. Peck, software engineer, has created this BigSun automated redaction system, which he has offered to provide to the NSA.
At the same time I had been having an exchange with him where I had openly dared to doubt the safety of the debian binary distribution system - a threat that he tried to downplay by comparing it with much less likely threats.
See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035867.html thru https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035879.html
We didn't actually arrive at any inflammatory tones, he just disappeared after his identity had been lifted and his argumentation started to look suspicious more than anything.
Disappearing was a smart move, as I had indeed forgotten entirely about him. Probably so have you.
What do I gather from this? Keeping my hands off of debian or any of its derivates has been a good choice. Same goes for fedora. Everybody get your gentoo skills back in shape, or help Guix/Nix get ready for prime time.
It's been years since I used gentoo/portage, but my understanding is that its trended towards binary packages.. of course, this may be a misunderstanding, because I haven't used it in years :) And I'm sure you can still use portage in strictly source build mode. I've noticed the same thing with FreeBSD - unless you keep your own package repo with poudriere, or maybe portmaster or something, trying to keep a mix of stuff installed via src, from ports, and binaries installed directly via the pkg command, can cause some issues. The.. "issues".. are largely to do with whether you went in and changed options in the `make config` stage of building a particular port. I suppose if you just built EVERYTHING from src out of ports (which actually converts what you just built into a FreeBSD txz pkg in the process of `make install`) and never installed a binary package, it might not be such a big deal.. until you tried to do a major OS update, via freebsd-update or via make buildworld/buildkernel && make installworld/installkernel, in either case you generally need to upgrade all your packages to use the new ABI, if you're doing a major version jump.
<SNIP>
-- GPG fingerprint: 17FD 615A D20D AFE8 B3E4 C9D2 E324 20BE D47A 78C7
Excellent reasons to be "self-employed" as a crypto asset trader with a friend fronting for you at any exchanges requiring AML/KYC for fiat withdrawals to bank accounts. Maybe buy a "pre-paid" major CC in your name from someone dividing up their large credit line into smaller (e.g., $2000) accounts and "renting" them out. If you can live off these CCs they can be quite effective. (Some CC-issuers are questioning or closing or suspending accounts with more than a few named "friends"). Don't forget to use Monero and or Samourai wallet's new ricochet feature greatly impede blockchain analyzers (for BTC-only). On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 8:00 AM John Newman <jnn@synfin.org> wrote:
On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 04:53:15PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
On 12/31/2018 02:30 PM, Where is Coderman? wrote:
Where is Coderman?
Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison.
He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123
https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9...
This looks to be not there anymore? Or maybe Coderman got rid of
horses.
A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did
Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead?
My best guess: he gave up the persona after being outed as Martin Peck.
This was my news of it:
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: Re: Pastebin of banned accounts found Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2017 19:59:07 +0200 From: carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org> To: <SNIP>
Hello, illustre group of recipients. I made a bit of research into the matter, wanting to figure out which e-mail exchange made "coderman" think I belong into a list of troublemakers even if I do my best to always discuss rationally - and how such a list would come about with so many respected names along mine. Well, I was successful. Here is what I found.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035866.html
Mr coderman admits to go by the real name "Martin R. Peck". He caused some confusion by promoting a fake NSA program that didn't actually exist. On the Whonix forum he "anonymously" reported his own news, introducing himself as follows:
Martin R. Peck, software engineer, has created this BigSun automated redaction system, which he has offered to provide to the NSA.
At the same time I had been having an exchange with him where I had openly dared to doubt the safety of the debian binary distribution system - a threat that he tried to downplay by comparing it with much less likely threats.
See
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035867.html
thru
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/035879.html
We didn't actually arrive at any inflammatory tones, he just disappeared after his identity had been lifted and his argumentation started to look suspicious more than anything.
Disappearing was a smart move, as I had indeed forgotten entirely about him. Probably so have you.
What do I gather from this? Keeping my hands off of debian or any of its derivates has been a good choice. Same goes for fedora. Everybody get your gentoo skills back in shape, or help Guix/Nix get ready for prime time.
It's been years since I used gentoo/portage, but my understanding is that its trended towards binary packages.. of course, this may be a misunderstanding, because I haven't used it in years :)
And I'm sure you can still use portage in strictly source build mode.
I've noticed the same thing with FreeBSD - unless you keep your own package repo with poudriere, or maybe portmaster or something, trying to keep a mix of stuff installed via src, from ports, and binaries installed directly via the pkg command, can cause some issues. The.. "issues".. are largely to do with whether you went in and changed options in the `make config` stage of building a particular port. I suppose if you just built EVERYTHING from src out of ports (which actually converts what you just built into a FreeBSD txz pkg in the process of `make install`) and never installed a binary package, it might not be such a big deal.. until you tried to do a major OS update, via freebsd-update or via make buildworld/buildkernel && make installworld/installkernel, in either case you generally need to upgrade all your packages to use the new ABI, if you're doing a major version jump.
<SNIP>
-- GPG fingerprint: 17FD 615A D20D AFE8 B3E4 C9D2 E324 20BE D47A 78C7
On Monday, December 31, 2018, 1:30:42 PM PST, Where is Coderman? <DondeEsCoderman@protonmail.com> wrote:
Where is Coderman?
Searching public database and https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ shows no record of Martin Peck in prison.
He filed Court case "Roark v. United States 6:12-cv-01354-MC" at address: 27464 SW Vandershuere Road Hillsboro, OR 97123 https://www.google.com/maps/place/27464+SW+Vanderschuere+Rd,+Hillsboro,+OR+9...
mail/cypherpunks/2016-February/012286.html That's 32 miles from me. Jim Bell
On Tuesday, January 1, 2019, 12:32:04 PM PST, Where is Coderman? <DondeEsCoderman@protonmail.com> wrote:
That's 32 miles from me.
Jim Bell
Would you go to see if Coderman is there? Perhaps in person if he cannot use technology we will find answers.
I would try that, if people on the CP list generally agree I should do that, and if attempts are made to alert him that I am coming, and assuming that he doesn't respond by objectin to the visit. Perhaps a USnail letter should preceed my attempt, as well, at least if an electronic response isn't obtained. Right not, I happen to be about 7 miles north of Seaside, Oregon, and could drive back tomorrow, passing there. Jim Bell
On 12/31/18 4:30 PM, Where is Coderman? wrote:
A while back Coderman posted about FBI disruption strategies. Did Coderman get disrupted? Or is Coderman dead?
“FBI disruption strategies - extra-judicial life destruction
''' Disruption strategy involves “a range of tools including arrests, interviews, or source-directed operations to effectively disrupt subject’s activities.”
Speaking of which, regional so-called Bureaus of Investigation and even Town Clowns also use 'disruption strategies' to reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of political activists and other annoyances. Step one, two gents in conservative suits visit your employer, flash impressive ID cards, and obtain consent for a "confidential" interview. Then they start asking questions: How well to you know The Subject, have you seen any indications of X, Y or Z? They won't accuse you of anything, but their leading questions say that you are involved in dope dealing, terrorism, child trafficking, or whatever else they judge will frighten and/or anger your employer the most. Kiss that job goodbye. Your next employer visits the State labor department website to complete an unemployment compensation form, and on the same day their phone rings: Your SSN tripped a filter, and an e-mail arrived at your local Fusion Center. A watch officer grabs the script indicated, picks up the phone and asks for an appointment to interview your new employer, again on a "confidential" basis. Needless to say, the new hire intake process ends there and then with weak or no excuses made. How does a person get on an enemies list like the one described? Well, bluntly refusing to inform on your friends will do it - especially if you "turn" the asset who made the recruiting pitch, and/or feed him or her intelligence designed to waste as much of the opposition's money and resources as possible. For instance if you "have reason to believe" that certain people hanging around local activist orgs are Federal informants, persuading informants working for your Town Clowns that they are high level drug dealers might provide some harmless amusement. :o)
participants (8)
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grarpamp
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jim bell
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John Newman
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Karl
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Mirimir
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Steve Kinney
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Steven Schear
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Where is Coderman?